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This thesis aims to address several issues emerging in the new digital world. 
Using Trusted Computing as the paradigmatic example of regulation though code 
that tries to address the cyber security problem that occurs, where the freedom 
of the user to reconfigure her machine is restricted in exchange for greater, yet 
not perfect, security. Trusted Computing is a technology that while it aims to 
protect the user, and the integrity of her machine and her privacy against third 
party users, it discloses more of her information to trusted third parties, exposing 
her to security risks in case of compromising occurring to that third party. It also 
intends to create a decentralized, bottom up solution to security where security 
follows along the arcs of an emergent “network of trust”, and if that was viable, to 
achieve a form of code based regulation. Through the analysis attempted in this 
thesis, we laid the groundwork for a refined assessment, considering the 
problems that Trusted Computing Initiative (TCI) faces and that are based in the 
intentional, systematic but sometimes misunderstood and miscommunicated 
difference (which as we reveal results directly in certain design choices for TC) 
between the conception of trust in informatics (“techno-trust”) and the common 
sociological concept of it. To reap the benefits of TCI and create the dynamic 
“network of trust”, we need the sociological concept of trust sharing the 
fundamental characteristics of transitivity and holism which are absent from 
techno-trust.  
This gives rise to our next visited problems which are: if TC shifts the power 
from the customer to the TC provider, who takes on roles previously reserved for 
the nation state, then how in a democratic state can users trust those that make 
the rules? The answer lies partly in constitutional and human rights law and we 
drill into those functions of TC that makes the TCI provider comparable to state-
like and ask what minimal legal guarantees need to be in place to accept, 
trustingly, this shift of power. Secondly, traditional liberal contract law reduces 
complex social relations to binary exchange relations, which are not transitive 
and disrupt rather than create networks. Contract law, as we argue, plays a 
central role for the way in which the TC provider interacts with his customers 
and this thesis contributes in speculating of a contract law that does not result in 
atomism, rather “brings in” potentially affected third parties and results in 
holistic networks. In the same vein, this thesis looks mainly at specific ways in 
which law can correct or redefine the implicit and democratically not validated 
shift of power from customer to TC providers while enhancing the social 
environment and its social trust within which TC must operate.  
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“With great power comes great responsibility” 
(Spiderman) 
 
CHAPTER 1 :  
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Internet as a complex dynamic system 
The Internet is the largest global network system that currently exists, called 
also “the network of networks” because it is comprised out of smaller 
interconnected networks.1 Through the Internet extensive information and 
services are routed every day, to facilitate the communications and services we 
are requesting from it by any connected digital device. Guadamuz characterized 
the Internet as a complex dynamic system which is self-organising.2 While 
Internet’s architecture has been proven robust enough through years, it has also 
proven itself highly vulnerable concerning cyber attacks and cyber crime; 
including computer viruses, worms, botnets, Denial of Service (DoS) attacks and 
others. It is an open system that allows anyone to be connected, upload and 
download information to it, yet giving space for cyber attacks to take place. 
As the Internet became a common place for online users globally and since 
the Internet was not designed for this type of commercial activity, huge problems 
have been caused both economically but mainly concerning online safety and 
reduction of the cyber crime.3 Zittrain, in his book with title “The future of the 
Internet and how to stop it” states that: 
                                                        
1  RFC 1122. (1989). Requirements for Internet Hosts -- Communication Layers. 1.1.2 
Architectural Assumptions. 
2  Guadamuz, A. (2013). Networks, complexity and internet regulation scale-free law: 
The University of Edinburgh. p. 254 
3  Gordon, L., & Loeb, M. (2002). The economics of information security investment. 
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC), 5(4), pp. 438-457. 
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“If the Internet had been designed with security as its centerpiece, it 
would never have achieved the kind of success it was enjoying, even 
as early as 1988. The basic assumption of Internet protocol design and 
implementation was that people would be reasonable; to assume 
otherwise runs the risk of hobbling it in just the way the proprietary 
networks were hobbled. The cybersecurity problem defies easy 
solution, because any of the most obvious solutions to it will cauterize 
the essence of the Internet and the generative PC”.4 
Attempts to deal with the growing number of reported cybercrime incidents 
include legislation, user training, public awareness, and other technical security 
measures.5 The UK government recognizes the detrimental impact that a 
cyberattack can have on the economy and the social well being of the country6 
and the effect of how nations deal with internet freedom and security. While the 
legal system struggles to keep up with technology developments and their 
enforcement and prosecution, the regulation through technology took 
                                                        
doi: 10.1145/581271.581274, Gordon, L., & Loeb, M. (2006). Economic aspects of 
information security: An emerging field of research. Information Systems Frontiers, 
8(5), pp. 335-337. doi: 10.1007/s10796-006-9010-7 
4  Zittrain, J. (2008). The future of the Internet and how to stop it. New Haven [Conn.]: 
New Haven Conn. : Yale University Press.p. 60 
5  EU fights against cybercrime and has implemented a strategy European Commission. 
(2013a). Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure 
Cyberspace. In T. C. JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE 
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE 
REGIONS (Ed.): European Commission. EU elaborates more in its recent digital 
agenda European Commission. (2015, 2/3/2015). Cybersecurity.   Retrieved 
26/6/2015, 2015, from https://ec.europa.eu/digital-
agenda/en/cybersecurity#Article. See also UK’s strategy report Cm7642. (2009). 
Cyber Security Strategy of the United Kingdom safety, security and resilience in cyber 
space.  London: The Stationery Office Limited. 
6  Cm7234. (2007). The Government reply to the fifth report from the House of Lords 
Science and Technology committee.  London: The Stationery Office Limited, Cm7948. 
(2010). Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security 
Review.  London: The Stationery Office Limited. The Home Office minister Baroness 
Neville-Jones presented an estimation that cybercrime costs UK £27bn each year in 
UK Cabinet Office and National security and intelligence. (2011). The Cost of Cyber 
Crime - full report. UK: Detica Limited. 
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increasingly center stage.7 Rather than prosecuting crime, the focus shifted on 
communicating architectures that make it impossible to commit crimes in the 
first place.  
1.2 The importance of Security 
Transactions over the Internet such as e-commerce are perceived as high 
risk; and trust is mostly needed in such cases of high risk.8 In the absence of 
interaction with people who are validated as trustworthy, risk is higher. With 
technology improving and upgrading online and offline, and as digital crimes 
increase, consumers seem more and more concerned regarding privacy and 
security, while researches identify that the primary goal to balance these is by 
winning public trust. Both consumers and merchants are negatively influenced 
by lack of trust which leads to failure in the desirably wide deployment of the 
technology.9 
 These concerns have been addressed by the research community in a 
number of studies, using different indices that may affect individuals’ perception 
                                                        
7  See also Lessig, L. (1996). The Zones of Cyberspace. Stanford Law Review, 48(5), pp. 
1403-1411. , Pagallo, U. (2015). Good onlife governance: On law, spontaneous orders, 
and design The Onlife Manifesto (pp. 161-177): Springer, Yeung, K. (2008). Towards 
an Understanding of Regulation by Design. In K. Yeung (Ed.), Regulating technologies: 
Legal futures, regulatory frames and technological fixes (pp. 79-108). Oxford: Hart, 
Yeung, K., & Dixon-Woods, M. (2010). Design-based regulation and patient safety: a 
regulatory studies perspective. Social Science & Medicine, 71(3), pp. 502-509.   
8  Mutz, D. C. (2005). Social Trust and E-Commerce: Experimental Evidence for the 
Effects of Social Trust on Individuals’ Economic Behavior. Public Opinion Quarterly, 
69(3), pp. 393-416. doi: 10.1093/poq/nfi029 
9  Katsikas, S., Lopez, J., & Pernul, G. (2005). Trust, Privacy and Security in E-Business: 
Requirements and Solutions. In P. Bozanis & E. Houstis (Eds.), Advances in Informatics 
(Vol. 3746, pp. 548-558): Springer Berlin Heidelberg. 
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on trustworthiness.10 Inside the digital world we are currently experiencing 
every day, there are two evident conclusions:  
 that the digital companies will need to find the measures to increase the 
trust and security that they provide towards their customers;  
 technology solutions should be implemented to ensure based on their 
carrying features protection over consumer’s trust, privacy and security 
while transacting over the internet.  
In the same vein, prior research review suggests that new technologies and 
frameworks should be developed to address the issue of security, trust and 
privacy assuring that data are safe while used over the internet, considering the 
large number of vulnerabilities existing.11 While security solutions and 
technologies have been developed in an effort to deal with security, trust and 
privacy issues, a unified solution has not been achieved leading Service Providers, 
Collaborators and Trusted Third Parties to create an unstable and imbalance 
environment for users.12 
Achieving the ideal unified and balanced framework is supposed to include 
STP policies, technologies, processes and legal aspects all blended together to 
present the optimal trusted environment. As a step towards the success of a 
                                                        
10  The ability of an online seller to handle business transactions with benevolence and 
integrity are the three main dimensions of trustworthiness as research has validated 
Schoorman, F. D., Mayer, R. C., & Davis, J. H. (2007). An Integrative Model of 
Organizational Trust: Past, Present, and Future. Academy of Management Review, 
32(2), pp. 344-354. doi: 10.5465/amr.2007.24348410. Therefore consumers would 
ultimately expect online sellers to be proficient and reliable, while being honest and 
benevolent Belanger, F., Hiller, J. S., & Smith, W. J. (2002). Trustworthiness in 
electronic commerce: the role of privacy, security, and site attributes. JOURNAL OF 
STRATEGIC INFORMATION SYSTEMS, 11(3-4), pp. 245-270. . 
11  Ab Manan, J.-L., Mubarak, M. F., Isa, M. A. M., & Khattak, Z. A. (2011). Security, Trust 
and Privacy–A New Direction for Pervasive Computing. Information Security, pp. 56-
60.  
12  ibid., p.2 
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holistic system that promotes and assures security, trust and privacy in all levels, 
computer scientists, architects, engineers, designers and developers from large 
market players have reached to the decision that Trusted Computing is the ideal 
environment that can meet all the issues. 
Internet security is a big problem. In the past, it was left with little success to 
individual users or companies to keep their own systems safe, leading to a 
fragmented approach. Guadamuz’s book13 shows why such an approach is 
doomed to failure: if you are part of a complex dynamic network, trying to keep 
yourself protected while not caring for what happens outside your small sphere 
of influence is doomed to failure. It tries to deal with individual threats, one at a 
time, while ignoring that the main security threats match the structure of the 
network, so that taking out one node at a time won’t be successful.  
TC emerged as a possible solution to this dilemma. It not only promises to 
take the weakest link in the security chain - the individual PC user - out of the 
equation. It also promises to “build up” secure networks in the same way the 
Internet itself operates - that is, as a complex dynamic system of mutually assured 
trustworthiness. What seems like an excellent candidate for a technological fix of 
a major threat to our critical infrastructures is based on a massive shift of power 
away from individual users to a monopoly of major industry players. There has 
been, to date, little in terms of systematic reflection or analysis of what this power 
shift means for our society, the winner and losers, and also, importantly, the role 
of law to manage this paradigm change in the way internet security is provided.  
Legal discussion, to the extent that it took place at all, focused on narrow 
issues of privacy or copyright law. These are important issues, but we argue that 
they are only symptoms of a more far reaching shift in the technology landscape. 
At the same time, uptake and market success of TC was disappointingly low.  
                                                        
13  Guadamuz, A. (2013). Networks, complexity and internet regulation scale-free law: 
The University of Edinburgh. 
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Regarding the legislative aspect that should apply for this type of system as 
well as the implications that appear, an exhaustive discussion follows in the next 
chapters. There, we will argue that systemic features of the TC philosophy are 
inevitably creating legal issues for which the current legal system is insufficient. 
Under the technical issues that we identify in the next chapters, underlying we 
find fundamental legal and jurisprudential issues that make “scale-free law”14 
difficult to achieve. 
TC’s aim is to allow the computer user to trust his own computer and for 
third parties to trust that specific computer.15 TC tries to build complex dynamic 
trust networks “bottom up”,16 without central, let alone state, oversight or 
control. If social trust relations in complex modern societies also organize 
themselves in dynamic complex networks, and if security “travels along” the trust 
edges in this network - because we only trust those whom we can securely trust, 
those who are “trustworthy” - the result would be an environment with 
ubiquitous security, which is the ultimate aim of the TCI. We will show that the 
TC network will only work when in addition to security and techno-trust, also 
legally enabled social trust “runs along” the edges that connect the nodes of the 
network. That is, if for any two connected nodes in the TC network, the parties 
can trust each other in the computer science sense, and have as a fallback a shared 
trust in institutions that can apply legal sanctions; we will get dynamic complex 
networks that are isomorphic to the communication network of the Internet. 
                                                        
14  “It is called scale-free because the same distribution of relationships exists at any 
scale” ibid., p.27 
15  Lipson, H. F. (2002). Tracking and Tracing Cyber-Attacks: Technical Challenges and 
Global Policy Issues. In C. M. University (Ed.), CERT Coordination Center, Special 
Report CMU/SEI-2002-SR-009. 
16 Using base elements to build up a larger system. 
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1.3 Research questions 
With this background in mind, this thesis asks a number of interrelated 
research questions: 
 How can the law make conceptual sense of the technological change that 
TC heralds? 
 Is the disappointing uptake of TC in parts caused by an adverse legal 
environment? 
 How, if at all, can the law reassure consumers and mitigate the increasing 
power imbalance, while at the same time not disincentivising industry 
investment in security? 
 Which parts of the law, and what type of concepts, are best suited to 
provide a legal environment for TC that meets the above criteria? 
This in turn leads to some tentative research hypothesis: 
 The disappointing uptake of TC can in parts be attributed to a divergence 
of legal, technological and societal understandings of trust. 
 Law and technological expertise are both important ways to create trust 
- but neither can on its own create the type of trust societal acceptance of 
technology requires. They need to be coordinated so that they can make 
up for each other’s shortcomings. 
 TC is a particularly problematic type of technology for legal regulation as 
it straddles the private-public law divide. In some ways the TC 
consortium takes on powers and responsibilities previously more closely 
associated with the policing function of the state, a public law issue. It 
remains however a private law entity, and relates to the people affected 
by the technology mainly through contract law.  
 Contract law in modern, liberal market societies plays an important role 
to foster trust - but is badly suited, for deep conceptual reasons, to 
promote trusts in networks. 
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 However, some traditional legal concepts, and some emerging 
conceptions of (private) law itself, might be much better suited to 
engender trust, especially if they are backed up or complemented by 
public law regulation. In particular, we can use the law of evidence and 
procedure to promote trust in the “public law face” of TC; reliance liability 
and a relational conception of contract law to promote trust in the 
“private law face” of TC. 
1.4 Methodology 
To substantiate this thesis’ arguments, the thesis uses mainly an 
interdisciplinary, conceptual analysis. This analysis looks at legal, technological 
and societal conceptions of trust, and tries to distill for each some rather abstract, 
structural descriptions. It then tries to match the respective concepts across the 
disciplinary boundaries. For the analysis of TC, the thesis relies in addition to 
academic analysis on the software and hardware specifications as released by the 
TCG, and discusses them from the understanding of a computer scientist. It then 
tries to match them with concepts from social and political science, in particular 
theories of trust in modern society. This is gained mainly through an analysis of 
classical texts in sociology and the “grand theory” tradition of Weber, Durkheim 
or Luhmann: What does, according to these thinkers, trust mean in modern 
society, and how is it generated? Their analysis points to the role of law, and here 
we take a mix of academic and jurisprudential legal analysis, together with 
examples from statutory and case law, to gain an understanding of the role of law 
to build trust. This means in particular that this thesis is not primarily a doctrinal 
analysis of the legal issue caused by TC in a given jurisdiction. Rather, we take 
ideas and examples from a variety of jurisdictions as our inspiration or 
illustration, to gain a more abstract, conceptual understanding of how “the law” 
thinks about private and public law relations, issues of liability and responsibility.  
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We then try to match them to the more substantive concept of trust in 
modern society on the one hand, the techno-conception of trust on the other. We 
support some of these claims by a limited empirical analysis that tries to 
understand how the “concept matching” works in practice. For this, we look at 
the way in which computer scientists actively involved in the development of TC 
think about and understand the legal environment of their product.  
 We then argue, following Guadamuz, that if we want to understand the 
Internet as a regulatory problem, we need to take its nature as a complex dynamic 
network seriously. To defeat security threats that are parasitic on the Internet 
structure, and with other words themselves (complex dynamic networks) are 
typical for a DoS attack for instance, we need “networks of security” rather than 
isolated security solutions and “gated communities". In the case of TC in 
particular, this requires networks of trust relations that are isomorphic to the 
structure of the internet. If law is needed to support this network, legal trust 
needs to mirror technological trust in the sense that the network of legal 
relations, duties and rights has to be isomorphic to the network of technology 
driven communication relations. In more accessible terms: If my computer trusts 
your computer because of its technological signature, then I can trust you because 
of the liability relation between us. We will argue however that classical private 
law, with its focus on litigation and individual contract relations, can disrupt 
rather than enhance this network of trust - unless we rethink in more systematic 
ways the interaction of law and technology. 
1.5 TC benefits 
The proponents of TC suggest that Trusted Computing promises to provide 
four crucial advantages: reliability, security, privacy and business integrity. Thus, 
these guarantee a system that will be available when in need, that will resist any 
attack once protecting the system itself and the data, that will give the demanded 
privacy to the user and finally that provides to businesses the ability to interact 
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effectively with their customers. Also, TC will provide protection from viruses 
due to the fact that a check will be applied to all files trying to “enter” the system. 
This is to be done through structuring new applications that give new 
possibilities to the owners of computer systems and/or end users. One of them is 
that a TC system can detect files that are unauthorized, such as pirated music or 
software, or viruses and, delete them remotely. This means that TC could be used 
to restrict access to everything from music files to pornography to writings that 
criticize political leaders. This approach is not uncontroversial. Content-owning 
businesses may wish to prevent end-users doing particular things with files e.g. 
ripping copyright music files; and employers may wish to control employees' 
ability to access and/or distribute information across corporate networks, and so 
support this functionality. However, individuals are likely to have significant 
concerns about the effect of such technical solutions on their rights for privacy 
and freedom of speech. This may well lead possible buyers to refuse to purchase 
TC systems.  
There is clearly corporate support for the TC concept, but it is important that 
such support should be viewed critically. In an executive e-mail sent to Microsoft 
employees, Bill Gates suggested that the firm needed to build “a Trustworthy 
Computing environment for customers, that is as reliable as the electricity that 
powers our homes and businesses today”.17 He went on to suggest that possible 
goals for TC might include: authentication of users; the inhibition of spam and 
junk emails that could probably reach to the user as they appear to come from 
trusted senders; production of software that satisfies the needs of the users either 
individuals or businesses; and lastly trustworthiness provided to computing 
experiences. He pointed out that now “making security improvements is an even 
higher priority than adding features”. This statement would appear to be 
                                                        
17  Gates, B. (2002, 18 July 2002). Executive E-mail: Trustworthy Computing.   Retrieved 




somewhat at odds with Microsoft's previous processes, which appear to have 
concentrated on adding features to applications rather than building in security 
features. Given the dominance of its current O/S, Microsoft's stated strategy with 
regard to TC may need to be treated with some caution. 
Siani Pearson of HP Laboratories in Bristol notes that “the most important 
aspect for users is that Trusted Platforms provide a low-cost way to trust a 
software environment for some particular purpose”.18 This may be true in 
principle, and there are certainly other potential advantages for users that she 
indicates, including hardware-based security, feedback about trust to the user, 
technological foundation for privacy and trustworthy digital signature; all of 
which seek to create better user confidence. However, in the light of the literature 
review, it is arguable that a key element in determining probable cost has not 
been fully examined: the lack of a discussion of liability issues suggests that there 
may yet be important "hidden" costs. 
Finally, Gehring argues that TCG offers the advantage that it standardises 
components while building trusted systems.19 Standard setting is likely to be a 
key element of TC; however Gehring's point also raises questions, not least about 
the effect of such standardization upon the dynamics of the computing market. 
There is a significant risk in such a scenario of the promotion of anti-competitive 
behavior. The personal computing market already faces competitive failures 
caused by the domination of "Wintel";20 adding TC, where 'non-trusted' 
                                                        
18  Pearson, S. (2005, 23-26 May 2006). Trusted Computing: Strengths, Weaknesses and 
Further Opportunities for Enhancing Privacy. Paper presented at the Proceedings of 
the Trust Management: Third International Conference, iTrust 2005, Paris, France 
(pp. 305-320),Springer-Verlag GmbH. 
19  Gehring, A. R. (2006, 2006). Trusted computing for digital rights management. 
http://www.indicare.org/tiki-read_article.php?articleId=179. from 
http://www.indicare.org/tiki-read_article.php?articleId=179 
20  Windows is still the most dominant OS that exists at the moment: NetMarketShare. 




computers and applications can be frozen out, and unauthorized files can be 
barred or deleted, without significant safeguards, may only make things worse.21 
1.6 Debates and Concerns 
Given the foregoing, it is unsurprising that Trusted Computing has given rise 
to number of controversies between its proponents and opponents. This is due 
to the fact that the aim of TCG will provide more trustworthiness from the point 
of view of software vendors and the content industry, but will be less trustworthy 
from the point of view of their owners. Consequently opponents say that 
cryptographic systems don’t offer enough security for the computer and thus for 
the user, but instead provide vendors and technology companies with the 
freedom to make “decisions about data and application that typically have been 
left to users”.22 Proponents state that the implementation and application of 
technologies that provide trusted computing will increase users’ trust in their 
                                                        
share.aspx?qprid=10&qpcustomd=0. Yet, if we consider the CPU AMD vs Intel market 
share, INTEL possesses by far a highest portion of the pie. Some people may argue 
that the dominant market role of “Wintel” has been eroded recently, and that this 
alone indicates the possibility that market mechanisms can come to bear. It is true 
that new players have entered the market. However, in sheer numbers, “Wintel” still 
dominates significantly. It is also correct that competition authorities especially in 
Europe have challenged the supremacy of the big providers, and may do so more in 
the future. These developments have the potential to alleviate some of the concerns 
raised in the thesis. However, it is important to realise that the infrastructure and 
standard decisions made now, will have a lasting effect and force certain design and 
business model choices even if the originators should eventually lose their 
dominating position. 
21  Felten, E. W. (2003). Understanding Trusted Computing: Will Its Benefits Outweigh 
Its Drawbacks? IEEE Security & Privacy, 1, 60-62, Schoen, S. (2005). Compatibility, 
competition, and control in trusted computing environments. Inf. Secur. Tech. Rep., 
10(2), pp. 105-119. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.istr.2005.05.005 
22  Vaughan-Nichols J. S. (2003). How Trustworthy is Trusted Computing? IEEE 
Computer Society Press, 36 (3 ), pp. 18-20.  
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ability to protect their systems from malicious code and guard their data from 
theft.  
There are numerous criticisms of TC. As mentioned by Vaughan-Nichols 
some critics say that TC companies are merchandising the technology because it 
helps online-content owners enforce intellectual-property policies at the expense 
of the end user.23 On the other hand TC proponents argue that users have the 
choice of not installing and running the TC technology if they don’t want to use it. 
Yet, not running the TC technology might mean that such users lose the ability to 
use applications or download content that will work only with trusted 
technologies.  
Some harsh critics have emerged who will not be easily won over. Richard 
Stallman, founder of the Free Software Foundation and creator of the well-known 
GPL open source license is an opponent to TC. He declares that trusted computing 
or as he brands it “treacherous computing”, will allow content providers; 
together with computer companies to make the computers obey them, instead of 
the users. The aim of these companies and TC is to make sure that the computers 
will disobey the users. In other words, the “computer will stop functioning as a 
general-purpose computer” and “every operation may require explicit 
permission”.24  
Arbaugh notes TC’s incapability to be used in conjunction with “free” 
operating systems. This is because, firstly the owner will not be able to load 
alternate trusted storage root and, secondly, TC does not have the ability to 
“disable the “extended” capability”,25 as a result, the owner will not have the 
                                                        
23  ibid., p.18 
24  Stallman, R. (2002). Can you trust your computer? NewsForge-The Online Newspaper 
for Linux and OpenSource. 
http://www.zelig.org/business/02/10/21/1449250.shtml%3Ftid=19.html 




choice of using any operating system he likes. Consequently, this awaits the 
danger of circumvention of the GNU Public Licence (GPL). Although GPL requires 
the TC’s result to be Open Source, to compile and to be able to be verified, the 
source code will not stand-alone, as a TPM-specific certificate will be necessary.26 
The latter though, is not an uncontroversial issue. Safford in his attempt to clarify 
any misunderstandings on the TCPA, states that this is a pure invention and that 
the TCPA chip can have full functionality without the need for a TPM-specific 
certificate.27 
Microsoft and HP have stated that both Palladium and TCPA will have an 
open specification, and Linux can be written for it, yet there are no formal 
guarantees, and thus Microsoft and/or HP retain the capability at some future 
point to go back on those statements.28  
A number of problems will arise from the adoption of TC technology. The 
foremost problems as stated by the opponents of TC are that sharing will be 
impossible due to the fact that TC will be used for what they term “Digital 
Restrictions Management”, so that videos, music and other multimedia can be 
played only on a specified computer. Secondly, Digital Rights Management (DRM) 
will be used for email and documents, leading to documents and emails that will 
disappear, or will not be readable on certain computers. Restrictions in 
downloading and installing all types of software unless permitted by the TC 
technology may also cause problems. Critics suggest that TC might threaten Open 
                                                        
26  Green, L. (2002). Trusted Computing Platform Alliance: The Mother(board) of all Big 
Brothers. Presented in DEFKON 10. from 
http://www.cypherpunks.to/TCPADEFCON10.pdf 
27  Safford, D. (2002a). Clarifying Misinformation on TCPA. White paper. from 
http://www.research.ibm.com/gsal/tcpa/tcpa_rebuttal.pdf 
28  Green, L. (2002). Trusted Computing Platform Alliance: The Mother(board) of all Big 
Brothers. Presented in DEFKON 10. from 
http://www.cypherpunks.to/TCPADEFCON10.pdf, Safford, D. (2002a). Clarifying 




Source Software (OSS) development, as both OSS operating systems and 
applications may fail to be recognized as trustworthy by TC systems, which will 
then refuse to run them. In addition, programs that use TC when installed will be 
able to continually download new authorization rules through the Internet and 
impose those rules automatically. In such circumstances it is claimed, the 
computers may apply the new instructions downloaded, without notification, to 
such a degree that a user will no longer be able to fully interact with their 
computer.29  
It is almost inevitable that TC will cause problems of incompatibility with 
legacy systems, both hardware and software. As a result, users may find 
themselves at risk of "forced upgrades" and lost data from old applications e.g. 
applications whose serial numbers have been removed from support schedules 
or blacklisted. 
Remote Censorship is another “feature” that TC can provide. Applications 
that delete pirated music or other non-authenticated files via remote-control are 
possible. It seems likely that, applications that report files that are not 
authenticated in order to report the user and then remotely delete the files are 
about to be applied in business models. Anderson refers to this model as “traitor 
tracing”.30 
An additional point is that especially for businesses it will be very hard to 
swap from TC products to any competitors’ products. Further, after switching 
into competitors’ products, these products may not work properly on the TC 
system, or may cause other compatibility problems. For businesses the impact 
will also be on the economical area. The cost of any swapping between products 
plus the cost of training the employees for proper use of the new products will be 
                                                        
29  Anderson, R. (2003a). Trusted Computing Frequently Asked Questions / TCG / 
LaGrande / NGSCB / Longhorn / Palladium / TCPA – Version 1.1. (2003). 
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/tcpa-faq.html 
30  ibid. p.2 Question 2 
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extravagant.31 Although this paper does not focus on this aspect of TC, this clearly 
has the potential to raise competition law issues - particularly where existing 
near-monopoly players such as Microsoft and Intel are involved.32 
Opponents of TC have not been unaware of these implications, and some 
have claimed that the reason for Intel investing to TC was a “defensive play”.33 By 
increasing market size, enlargement of the company will be achieved. Anderson 
points out that “They were determined that the pc will be the hub of the future 
home network”. Microsoft, they say, was motivated by the aspiration of 
embedding entertainment into their empire, the perspective of being able to cut 
down dramatically software copying, and economic enlargement by the cost 
created by switching software to any similar competitive products.34 
Interoperation with other products is another issue that needs discussion. 
Interoperation will be achieved only where the vendor wants to be applied. 
Vendors have a very good reason why they would want the latter to happen: 
because then all buyers will purchase the same product from the same company 
– so that they can interoperate with each other – and therefore there will be a 
network effect. In such a market, the leading company may choose not to 
interoperate with other companies and thus locking all other companies outside 
this network and all the users inside it.35 
                                                        
31  ibid. p.4 Question 6 
32  Schoen, S. (2005). Compatibility, competition, and control in trusted computing 
environments. Inf. Secur. Tech. Rep., 10(2), pp. 105-119. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.istr.2005.05.005 
33  Anderson, R. (2003a). Trusted Computing Frequently Asked Questions / TCG / 
LaGrande / NGSCB / Longhorn / Palladium / TCPA – Version 1.1. (2003). 
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/tcpa-faq.html at p.4 
34  ibid., p.4 Question 6 
35  Felten, E. W. (2003). Understanding Trusted Computing: Will Its Benefits Outweigh 




This thesis grew out of an interest with the technical aspects of Trusted 
computing as the “last best hope” for a secure internet. As a pure computer 
scientist, I was fascinated by the technological potential, but instinctively worried 
by the social implications that seem to be neglected. Looking at law as a way to 
balance out what I still think as a major power grab by an international 
consortium, I tried to learn enough about the law to make sense of this 
development. It soon became transparent that law alone also did not provide an 
answer, making it necessary to learn about social and economic theories of trust 
as well. This thesis is the result of an attempt by a computer scientist to make, in 
her own conceptual framework, enough sense of both law and sociology and to 
understand how it might apply to TC.  
This meant in particular that the thesis is interested in legal concepts, which 
is abstract structures: abstract forms that “match”, in a parallel reading, what 
computer technology does, rather than a concept analysis of the doctrinal 
solution of any specific country. For the legal reader, this cavalier attitude to 
issues such as jurisdiction, or even the more detailed issue of most of the laws 
mentioned here might be disconcerting. In this case I ask for indulgence and an 
openness to the type of question that the thesis tries to answer. Not: what does 
UK law say about the liability of TC providers, but: can law as a system, at least in 
principle, come to grips with the technological development hate face? In this it 
takes much in inspiration from Guadamuz’ book on Networks, Complexity and 
Internet Regulation. It showed how sociological, computer scientific and legal 
analysis can work in coronation to give account of a phenomenon in general, 
without getting bogged down in the particulars of a national legal order. For 
computer scientists, the often parochial nature of law is a cognitive problem: 
computer programs compile or don’t compile regardless of what country they are 
in, Law, as I learned, is very different in this respect, and a major challenge was 
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CHAPTER 2 :  
INTRODUCTION TO TRUSTED COMPUTING 
2.1 Introduction in Trusted Computing 
This section contains an introduction to the technical basis of trusted 
computing, using as a case study the Trusted Computing Group as arguably the 
most influential promoter of this technology.1 A few comments are necessary to 
put our argument into perspective: Even though this thesis uses the Trusted 
Computing Group as an example throughout the discussion, this is not intended 
to be just, or indeed mainly, an analysis of the TCG. Rather, we consider their 
solution as paradigmatic for a specific philosophy of Internet security. As 
commentators have noted, even though trusted computing “seemed” to be a 
highly plausible answer to various threats of cybercrime, the implementation 
promoted by the TCG failed to achieve the crucial economy of scale and network 
effect that would have made it from an incremental technological improvement 
for specialist applications into a game changer.2 But this does not mean that we 
can or should ignore trusted computing as a subject of legal and socio-legal 
academic inquiry. First, interest in the trusted computing approach has recently 
gained new momentum, driven on the one hand by cloud computing and 
virtualization,3 on the other by the Internet of Things and the specific demands 
                                                        
1   see Proudler, G., Chen, Liqun, Dalton, Chris. (2014). Trusted Computing Platforms: 
TPM2.0 in Context (1 ed.): Springer International Publishing. Chapter 1; see also 
Huanguo, Z., Jie, L., Gang, J., Zhiqiang, Z., Fajiang, Y., & Fei, Y. (2006). Development of 
trusted computing research. Wuhan University Journal of Natural Sciences, 11(6), pp. 
1407-1413. doi: 10.1007/BF02831786 
2   Sadeghi, A.-R. (2012). The rise, fall and reincarnation of trusted computing. Paper 
presented at the Proceedings of the seventh ACM workshop on Scalable trusted 
computing, Raleigh, North Carolina, USA (pp. 1-2),ACM. 
3   See e.g. Neisse, R., Holling, D., & Pretschner, A. (2011). Implementing Trust in Cloud 
Infrastructures. Paper presented at the Proceedings of the 2011 11th IEEE/ACM 
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that autonomous, flexible and decomposable systems pose.4 The legal issues that 
we identify in this thesis are likely to reemerge in these new applications of TC. 
Even more importantly though, the limited success of TC can also be attributed 
to the divergence of technical, social and legal understandings of “trust”. TC from 
its inception caused public controversy. Some of this was ill deserved, though 
partly caused by major mistakes on the side of the TCG to introduce and promote 
the concept. Others, as we will see, were more serious. TC, if taken serious, would 
have changed not just some technical details of the way in which computing 
works. Rather, it would have meant a significant change in the way we relate to 
our machines, and through them to other citizens of the digital world. By treating 
                                                        
International Symposium on Cluster, Cloud and Grid Computing. , Santos, N., 
Gummadi, K. P., & Rodrigues, R. (2009). Towards trusted cloud computing. Paper 
presented at the Proceedings of the 2009 conference on Hot topics in cloud 
computing, San Diego, California. , Schiffman, J., Moyer, T., Vijayakumar, H., Jaeger, T., 
& McDaniel, P. (2010). Seeding clouds with trust anchors. Paper presented at the 
Proceedings of the 2010 ACM workshop on Cloud computing security workshop, 
Chicago, Illinois, USA. , Zhidong, S., Li, L., Fei, Y., & Xiaoping, W. (2010, 11-12 May 
2010). Cloud Computing System Based on Trusted Computing Platform. Paper 
presented at the Intelligent Computation Technology and Automation (ICICTA), 2010 
International Conference on (pp. 942-945),for the specific problems caused by multi-
cloud environments see AlZain, M. A., Pardede, E., Soh, B., & Thom, J. A. (2012). Cloud 
Computing Security: From Single to Multi-clouds. Paper presented at the System 
Science (HICSS), 2012 45th Hawaii International Conference on (pp. 5490-
5499),IEEE. 
4  See e.g. Gessner, D., Olivereau, A., Segura, A. S., & Serbanati, A. (2012, 25-27 June 
2012). Trustworthy Infrastructure Services for a Secure and Privacy-Respecting 
Internet of Things. Paper presented at the Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing 
and Communications (TrustCom), 2012 IEEE 11th International Conference on (pp. 
998-1003), IEEE, Ukil, A., Sen, J., & Koilakonda, S. (2011, 4-5 March 2011). Embedded 
security for Internet of Things. Paper presented at the Emerging Trends and 
Applications in Computer Science (NCETACS), 2011 2nd National Conference on (pp. 
1-6),IEEE. Skeptical on the usefulness of TC for the IoT is Hoepman, J.-H. (2012). In 
Things We Trust? Towards Trustability in the Internet of Things. In R. Wichert, K. Van 
Laerhoven & J. Gelissen (Eds.), Constructing Ambient Intelligence (Vol. 277, pp. 287-
295): Springer Berlin Heidelberg. 
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TC as a mere technical fix, the wider societal implications of TC were ignored, and 
as a result the “suitability” of the social and socio-legal environment for the 
approach was insufficiently understood.  
Law plays in this picture a dual role. It can hinder the development of TC by 
exposing TC providers with new and difficult to quantify litigation risks, or it can 
fail to protect the reasonable expectation of consumers of TC to have remedies in 
case TC causes them harm. Conversely, it could promote TC by matching or 
underwriting the technological concept of trust with a legal or socio-legal concept 
of trust – if as a user, I was entitled to “trust” a computer system as the term is 
understood in the technology community, and the legal system rewards this trust 
by protecting the reliance I put into the system through appropriate remedies, 
then I’ll be much more likely to accept the shortcomings associated with TC. As 
we will see in more detail, this “matching” or “isomorphism” between technical 
and legal understandings of trust was never really developed or made fully 
explicit; something which we claim contributed to the lack of uptake of TC. 
Crucially though, these problems were not (just) the result of the specific 
approach the TCG took, though the history, corporative structure and 
communication strategy of the TCG did not help to instill public trust in their 
product. Rather, we will argue that systemic features of the TC philosophy itself 
are inevitably creating legal issues for which the legal system is badly prepared. 
Some of them are of a more technical doctrinal nature, but underlying them all 
are fundamental legal and jurisprudential issues which generally make “scale-
free law” (in the terminology of Guadamuz) difficult to achieve. To the extent that 
any approach to cybersecurity is based on “scale free” trust and self-organizing 
trust networks in the way TC is, law is in danger of being left behind. But as law 
is left behind, so is one of the major instruments for governments to instill social 
acceptance and public trust in institutions, as opposed to personal trust between 
individuals. While in theory, TC as a computing paradigm could work as a purely 
self-organising, complex network that is based on nothing but individual trust 
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relations, in reality and in its implementation it is crucially dependent on public 
trust in the TCG as an institution. It is at this nexus between personal and public 
trust, Trusted Computing and the Trusted Computing Group as a paradigmatic 
institution; that the most pressing conceptual issues emerge.  
As indicated above, this analysis is less concerned with the TCG as a specific 
historical and contingent group that tries to make the Internet more secure. 
Rather, the TCG is seen as but an example, or even an “ideal type”, for the type of 
institution that may find itself charged with providing Internet security. As an 
ideal type, we can contrast it to approaches that try to ensure Internet security 
directly through the state – that approach sees the Internet as equivalent of public 
roads or “the king’s highway” whose maintenance and security is a core provision 
of the nation state, and backed where necessary by non-negotiable sanctions. 
Equally, we can contrast it with approaches that leave Internet security solely or 
primarily an issue to be addressed by individual users – the approach that gave 
us firewalls or anti-virus software that individuals have to install, sometimes for 
payment, on their own machines and can configure to their liking. Similarly, we 
treat TC as the security paradigm promoted by the TCG as a paradigmatic case for 
an entire family of programming and development approaches to Internet 
security. As any approach to Internet security, it has to balance often conflicting 
demands, including privacy, costs, security, user autonomy and transparency. TC 
proposes, as we will see, a very specific mix of these characteristics, with different 
degrees of emphasis on each of them. Some of these choices result in core 
commitments that can be used to characterize a class of approaches to Internet 
security. To the degree that these design choices raise interesting legal issues, all 
approaches that share these features will raise similar challenges. To illustrate 
this point, a short example that will be discussed in more detail later may suffice. 
While trusted computing tries to make using the Internet more secure, it is not 
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what is technically known as “secure computing”.5 Proudler draws the distinction 
like this: 
 “Secure” is a classification, the result of an assessment to determine that 
an item does exactly what it is supposed to do, nothing more and nothing 
less.  
 Something can be trusted if it behaves as expected.  
 Something is trustworthy if its behaviour is predictable. 
We can draw here an analogy from the epistemology and history of science 
that may help some readers to understand the difference. “Secure computing”, as 
defined above, corresponds to the Cartesian ideal of security - we can prove, using 
only undisputable (“clare et distincte”, in Descartes’ words) axioms and equally 
certain rules of inference, that a given machine will never do anything else but 
what is expected of it. Trusted computing by contrast is Humean, or maybe 
Popperian in its approach. It is based on observations and inductive inferences: 
“Right now this machine seems to be performing as intended, and it also did so in 
the past, so we probably can trust it for time being.” Once new information comes 
in, we may have to revisit (falsify) this conclusion, which is tentative like all 
knowledge. Finally, “trustworthy”, in Proudler’s somewhat idiosyncratic 
definition, is something that is predictable. Staying with the analogy, 
“trustworthy” is a judgment that raises Hume’s problem of induction – an 
extrapolation from past and present observed behavior to the future.6 He 
continues this discussion by accepting that trusted computing is less secure than 
secure computing, but that secure computing is prohibitively expensive, whereas 
                                                        
5  Proudler, G., Chen, Liqun, Dalton, Chris. (2014). Trusted Computing Platforms: TPM2.0 
in Context (1 ed.): Springer International Publishing. p. 9ff. 
6  We assume Proudler means that behavior is trustworthy if it is predictably 
benevolent. A known fraudster’s behavior might be highly predictable, but only in the 
sense that we can trust him to be up to no good. In the same vein, we can “trust” 
Microsoft products to predictably not work as intended but have bugs etc. 
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trusted computing, while far from being cost-neutral, could benefit from the 
economies of scale to deliver a higher degree of protection at viable costs. Or in 
his own word: 
“The overwhelming majority of commercial users won’t consider 
owning secure computers because they are too expensive. Trusted 
platforms are less secure than secure platforms, but cheaper to buy 
because they are manufactured in huge quantities, and cheaper to 
maintain because they can provide variable levels of protection, even 
when the platform’s software changes. This compromise should 
promote an increased level of protection in commercial computers.”7  
The dilemma that he describes here is one that every technological solution 
to computer vulnerabilities faces – make it too secure, and nobody but the 
military can afford it, and even they only for the most security critical tasks, or 
make it affordable, but trade in a bit of security. Every system that opts like the 
TCG for affordable yet imperfect security faces however two issues – one purely 
legal, the other a technico-legal problem. The first is a simple question of liability. 
Because TC is a less-than-perfect solution to the security challenge, things can – 
and given enough time – will go wrong.8 At the same time, TC increases 
                                                        
7  Ibid., p.9 
8  as the ongoing studies in vulnerabilities of TC, and how they can be rectified, shows. 
The approach is, as we argued above, Popperian, and continues to evolve through a 
system of trials and errors. See e.g. Virvilis, N., Gritzalis, D., & Apostolopoulos, T. 
(2013). Trusted Computing vs. Advanced Persistent Threats: Can a Defender Win This 
Game? Paper presented at the Ubiquitous Intelligence and Computing, 2013 IEEE 
10th International Conference on and 10th International Conference on Autonomic 
and Trusted Computing (UIC/ATC) (pp. 396-403),IEEE.; see also e.g. Zhu, L., Zhang, 
Z., Liao, L., & Guo, C. (2012). A Secure Robust Integrity Reporting Protocol of Trusted 
Computing for Remote Attestation under Fully Adaptive Party Corruptions. In Y. 
Zhang (Ed.), Future Wireless Networks and Information Systems (Vol. 143, pp. 211-
217): Springer Berlin Heidelberg. for a study of one specific identified vulnerability, 
fully adaptive party corruption. For a study that recommends combining TCG with 
other solutions to plug identified security issues see e.g. Aslam, M., Gehrmann, C., & 
Björkman, M. (2013). Continuous security evaluation and auditing of remote platforms 
by combining trusted computing and security automation techniques. Paper presented 
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nonetheless the costs of computing, as even its most ardent supporters 
acknowledge.9 Consumers will only buy TC protected computers if they think the 
investment is worthwhile – and that means for the vendor to emphasize the 
added security that it offers.10 An obvious conflict of interests arises – the 
advertising department will want to emphasize the protection that the product 
offers, the legal department will want to put as many liability exclusion clauses 
into the contract with the customer as possible.11 But the more aggressive the 
advertising extolling the virtues of TC is, the more likely customers will believe 
they have bought actual security, and not just a “trusted” system. The systematic 
ambiguity between the everyday notion of “trusted” that identifies it with 
“trustworthiness” with the much more limited meaning that term has in 
computing circles, will likely exacerbate this problem. At some point, courts may 
                                                        
at the Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Security of Information and 
Networks, Aksaray, Turkey (pp. 136-143),ACM. 
9  See for a non-partisan analysis Vishik, C., Sheldon, F., & Ott, D. (2013). Economic 
Incentives for Cybersecurity: Using Economics to Design Technologies Ready for 
Deployment. In H. Reimer, N. Pohlmann & W. Schneider (Eds.), ISSE 2013 Securing 
Electronic Business Processes (pp. 133-147): Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden. 
10  On the problem of cost benefit analysis in Internet security , see Anderson, R. (2001). 
Why information security is hard - an economic perspective. Paper presented at the 
Computer Security Applications Conference, 2001. ACSAC 2001. Proceedings 17th 
Annual (pp. 358-365),IEEE. Particularly relevant for the point here his attempt to 
include psychological analysis of consumer behaviour in Anderson, R., & Moore, T. 
(2009). Information security: where computer science, economics and psychology meet 
(Vol. 367). On the empirical basis for making rational decisions on security 
investment see also Gordon, L., & Loeb, M. (2006). Economic aspects of information 
security: An emerging field of research. Information Systems Frontiers, 8(5), pp. 335-
337. doi: 10.1007/s10796-006-9010-7; This issue affects not only consumers, but 
also companies and public sector entities, see e.g. Tanaka, H., Matsuura, K., & Sudoh, 
O. (2005). Vulnerability and information security investment: An empirical analysis 
of e-local government in Japan. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 24(1), pp. 37-
59. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2004.12.003. 
11  On this problem see the hart-hitting presentation by Virvilis, N. (2015). Advanced 
Persistent Threats: The Empire Strikes Back! , pp. 16-19.   
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have to decide if the customer’s understanding of what they bought should get 
precedence over liability exclusion clauses hidden deep in the terms and 
conditions – especially if any mistake on her side was caused by overselling the 
security benefits of TC.12 Even more problematic, customers might engage in 
more risky behavior because they consider themselves safe. This problem is 
discussed in behavioral psychology as the “risk compensation problem”. This 
hypothesis, which postulates that people will often act more careful when they 
sense greater risk and less careful if they feel protected, originated in road safety 
research in the 1970s and is sometimes named “Peltzman effect”. Peltzman had 
argued that even though road safety regulation should have made driving much 
safer, in reality no such reduction in accident rates could be found. He attributed 
this to the fact that in the now theoretically safer environment, drivers were 
willing to take greater risks that compensated for any improvements the 
regulations may have had.13 While Peltzman had looked at the effect of safety 
regulation in particular, his idea was soon extended to other form of security, in 
particular security by design. The relative failure to reduce deadly bicycle 
accidents despite more widespread use of helmets has been attributed to risk 
compensation strategies by both bicyclist and car drivers.14 Some studies have 
indicated that the use of helmets in skiing had similar consequences, with 
                                                        
12  Coming to a similar conclusion as we here is Oppliger, R., & Rytz, R. (2005). Does 
Trusted Computing Remedy Computer Security Problems? IEEE Security and Privacy, 
3(2), pp. 16-19. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/MSP.2005.40, who argues on p.19 
that in a TC world, courts will be more likely to hold manufacturers liable for faulty 
products.  
13  Peltzman, S. (1975). The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation. Journal of Political 
Economy, 83(4), pp. 677-725. doi: 10.2307/1830396. 
14  Rodgers, G. (1988). Reducing bicycle accidents: A reevaluation of the impacts of the 




helmeted drivers taking greater risks of increased speed.15 The failure of condom 
distribution to stem the flow of AIDS as much as predicted was finally attributed 
by some to risk compensation, where condom wearers had more sexual partners 
than non-wearers.16 It should be noted that many of these findings are 
contested.17 It is probably safe to say that Peltzman’s own initial idea of a 
“perfect” compensation where most if not all temporary reduction in risk is 
ultimately compensated by more risky behavior and a return to the status quo. 
As Vrolix on one of the most comprehensive meta-studies argued: 
"Behavioural adaptation generally does not eliminate the safety gains 
from programmes, but tends to reduce the size of the expected 
effects".18 
                                                        
15  Ružić, L., & Tudor, A. (2011). Risk-taking Behavior in Skiing Among Helmet Wearers 
and Nonwearers. Wilderness & Environmental Medicine, 22(4), pp. 291-296. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.wem.2011.09.001 
16  Wilson, N. L., Xiong, W., & Mattson, C. L. (2014). Is sex like driving? HIV prevention 
and risk compensation. Journal of Development Economics, 106(0), pp. 78-91. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2013.08.012 
17  On risk compensation and bicycle helmets, the figures have been questioned eg. by 
Phillips, R. O., Fyhri, A., & Sagberg, F. (2011). Risk Compensation and Bicycle Helmets. 
Risk Analysis, 31(8), pp. 1187-1195. doi: 10.1111/j.1539-6924.2011.01589.x; for 
skiing and risk taking, Ruedl, G., Pocecco, E., Sommersacher, R., Gatterer, H., Kopp, M., 
Nachbauer, W., & Burtscher, M. (2010). Factors associated with self-reported risk-
taking behaviour on ski slopes. British Journal of Sports Medicine, 44(3), pp. 204-206. 
doi: 10.1136/bjsm.2009.066779 concluded that "Safety helmets clearly decrease the 
risk and severity of head injuries in skiing and snowboarding and do not seem to 
increase the risk of neck injury, cervical spine injury, or risk compensation behavior". 
Mattson finally failed to replicate the findings that indicated that risk compensation 
played a role in certain HIV prevention strategies, see Mattson, C. L., Campbell, R. T., 
Bailey, R. C., Agot, K., Ndinya-Achola, J. O., & Moses, S. (2008). Risk Compensation Is 
Not Associated with Male Circumcision in Kisumu, Kenya: A Multi-
Faceted Assessment of Men Enrolled in a Randomized Controlled Trial. PLoS ONE, 
3(6), pp. e2443. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0002443. 
18  Vrolix, K. (2006). Behavioral adaptation, risk compensation, risk homeostatis and 
moral hazard in traffic safety. Transportation Research Institut Economics and Public 
Policy Report, pp. 1-59.   
28 
 
Quantification of risk compensation is methodologically difficult and the 
results often contested.19 Nonetheless, Vrolix’s meta-study indicates that the 
phenomenon is real, though its effects can range from the marginal to the 
substantive. Currently, there seems to be little knowledge on what type of risk 
environment in conductive or adverse to risk compensation strategies. Despite 
these difficulties, theories of regulation increasingly accept that empirical studies 
on the effects of risk compensation are necessary to find an efficient mix of 
regulatory tools, from law to technological design.20 There are at present no 
studies done for cybersecurity.21 This raises the possibility that the game 
theoretical models to predict cybersecurity risks22 and appropriate responses are 
                                                        
19  see Dulisse, B. (1997). Methodological issues in testing the hypothesis of risk 
compensation. Accident Analysis & Prevention, 29(3), pp. 285-292. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0001-4575(96)00082-6. See also Streff, F. M., & Geller, 
E. S. (1988). An experimental test of risk compensation: Between-subject versus 
within-subject analyses. Ibid., 20(4), pp. 277-287. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0001-4575(88)90055-3. Some of the problems are that 
ethical yet accurate methodologies are difficult to find: Underhill, K. (2013). Study 
designs for identifying risk compensation behavior among users of biomedical HIV 
prevention technologies: Balancing methodological rigor and research ethics. Social 
Science & Medicine, 94(0), pp. 115-123. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2013.03.020. A partial solution is offered in 
Thompson, D. C., Thompson, R. S., & Rivara, F. P. (2001). Risk compensation theory 
should be subject to systematic reviews of the scientific evidence. Injury Prevention, 
7(2), pp. 86-88. doi: 10.1136/ip.7.2.86. 
20  Hedlund, J. (2000). Risky business: safety regulations, risk compensation, and 
individual behavior. Ibid., 6, pp. 82-89. doi: 10.1136/ip.6.2.82. 
21   at least the author was not able to find one after an exhaustive database search. The 
closest match for the purposes of this thesis is Brandimarte, L., Acquisti, A., & 
Loewenstein, G. (2013). Misplaced Confidences: Privacy and the Control Paradox. 
Social Psychological and Personality Science, 4(3), pp. 340-347. doi: 
10.1177/1948550612455931, which however does not deal with cybersecurity 
directly, but the question of control over one’s information in general. 
22  authoritative Alpcan, T., & Başar, T. (2010). Network security: A decision and game-
theoretic approach: Cambridge University Press. See also Grossklags, J., Christin, N., 
& Chuang, J. (2008). Secure or insure?: a game-theoretic analysis of information 
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based on mistaken empirical assumptions. Trusted Computing in particular is a 
plausible candidate for risk compensation, for the reasons identified above. To 
the extent that game theoretical models of cyberrisk are used to validate TC,23 
this should be a concern.  
Risk compensation also poses a potential issue for legal regulation. Delictual 
liability will typically involve a “reasonable man on the street” or “reasonable 
foreseeability”. But it may be in the very nature of “trusted” systems to change 
our perception of what a “reasonable” person would do and what risks she is 
willing to take. Behaviour that would be deemed as obviously risky in a non-TC 
environment may well be deemed as “reasonable reliance on the TC certificate” 
by a future judge or jury, thus giving risk compensation a legal blessing. We will 
come back to this issue when we discuss the challenges that TC poses for the 
liability regime in general. Here we simply note that it is this type of issue in the 
interface of law and technology – germane to all approaches to cybersecurity that 
are based on certified trustworthiness – that this thesis ultimately tries to 
explore, using the TCG as an example.  
In what follows we will discuss the history of TC from its beginning, the 
structure of the organization which developed the TC technology (Trusted 
Computing Group), and the aims and objectives of TCG.  
As more and more of our activities are carried out online, it has become 
increasingly clear over the past decades that the internet, which was never 
                                                        
security games. Paper presented at the Proceedings of the 17th international 
conference on World Wide Web, Beijing, China (pp. 209-218),ACM. 
23  For an overview see Roy, S., Ellis, C., Shiva, S., Dasgupta, D., Shandilya, V., & Qishi, W. 
(2010, 5-8 Jan. 2010). A Survey of Game Theory as Applied to Network Security. Paper 
presented at the System Sciences (HICSS), 2010 43rd Hawaii International 
Conference on (pp. 1-10),IEEE. For a case study see e.g. Hoffmann, H., & Söllner, M. 
(2014). Incorporating behavioral trust theory into system development for 




intended for this type of commercial activity, is vulnerable to attacks and criminal 
activities. Infected computers are the main element of a botnet,24 which in turn 
enables the type of large scale Denial of Service (DoS) attack that threatens the 
very existence of the net.25 Additionally, botnets are a major source of spam, 
spyware, adware, click-fraud, access number replacements, and fast flux, mostly 
driven by the botmasters’ financial interests and secondly used in political or 
military contexts.26 Recent statistics presented by Eurostat, demonstrate that 
31% of internet users in the EU27 caught a computer infection which resulted in 
loss of information in the last 12 months.27 
                                                        
24  Botnets are networks formed by infected compromised machines which connect to a 
central server and compromise the host system. The European Network and 
Information Security Agency (ENISA) – the EU’s cyber security agency, provided a 
comprehensive report. See also on how to assess botnet threats including various 
types of best-practices to measure, detect and defend against botnets and 
recommendations on how to neutralise them, preventing new infections and 
minimising cybercrime profitability from botnets use. The document also examines 
the role of governments in the fight against botnets, and points out what legislation 
is needed and what investment is required Plohmann, D., Gerhards-Padilla, E., & 
Leder, F. (2011). Botnets: Detection, Measurement, Disinfection & Defence. In G. 
Hogben (Ed.), ENISA‘s Emerging and Future Risk programme (pp. 153): European 
Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA). Rajab et. al present challenges on 
botnet detection and tracking and an approach to infiltrate large numbers of botnets 
in Rajab, M. A., Zarfoss, J., Monrose, F., & Terzis, A. (2006). A multifaceted approach to 
understanding the botnet phenomenon. Paper presented at the Proceedings of the 6th 
ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet measurement, Rio de Janeriro, Brazil.  
25  Bayer, U., Habibi, I., Balzarotti, D., Kirda, E., & Kruegel, C. (2009). A view on current 
malware behaviors. Paper presented at the LEET'09: Proceedings of the 2nd USENIX 
conference on Large-scale exploits and emergent threats: botnets, spyware, worms, 
and more, Boston, MA, USA. http://www.eurecom.fr/people/vs_bayer.en.htm 
26  Plohmann, D., Gerhards-Padilla, E., & Leder, F. (2011). Botnets: Detection, 
Measurement, Disinfection & Defence. In G. Hogben (Ed.), ENISA‘s Emerging and 
Future Risk programme (pp. 153): European Network and Information Security 
Agency (ENISA), Wikipedia. (2011, 16/7/2011). Botnet.   Retrieved 28/6/2011, 
2011, from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Botnet#Types_of_attacks 
27  Eurostat. (2011). Nearly one third of internet users in the EU27 caught a computer 
virus 8 February 2011: Safer Internet Day. Luxembourg: Eurostat Press Office. 
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Recently, most frequently than ever, powerful organised crime gangs target 
as victims uninformed and unprepared consumers and exploit weaknesses in 
their computer systems. Attempts to deal with the growing number of reported 
cybercrime incidents include legislation, user training, public awareness, and 
other technical security measures.28 The UK government recognizes the 
detrimental impact that a cyberattack can have on the economy and the social 
well being of the country29 and the effect of how nations deal with internet 
freedom and security. While the legal system struggles to keep up with 
technology developments and their enforcement and prosecution, the regulation 
through technology took increasingly center stage.30 Rather than prosecuting 
                                                        
28  EU fights against cybercrime and has implemented a strategy European Commission. 
(2013a). Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure 
Cyberspace. In T. C. JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE 
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE 
REGIONS (Ed.): European Commission. EU elaborates more in its recent digital 
agenda European Commission. (2015, 2/3/2015). Cybersecurity.   Retrieved 
26/6/2015, 2015, from https://ec.europa.eu/digital-
agenda/en/cybersecurity#Article. See also UK’s strategy report Cm7642. (2009). 
Cyber Security Strategy of the United Kingdom safety, security and resilience in cyber 
space.  London: The Stationery Office Limited. 
29  Cm7234. (2007). The Government reply to the fifth report from the House of Lords 
Science and Technology committee.  London: The Stationery Office Limited, Cm7948. 
(2010). Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security 
Review.  London: The Stationery Office Limited. The Home Office minister Baroness 
Neville-Jones presented an estimation that cybercrime costs UK £27bn each year in 
UK Cabinet Office and National security and intelligence. (2011). The Cost of Cyber 
Crime - full report. UK: Detica Limited. 
30  See also Lessig, L. (1996). The Zones of Cyberspace. Stanford Law Review, 48(5), pp. 
1403-1411. , Pagallo, U. (2015). Good onlife governance: On law, spontaneous orders, 
and design The Onlife Manifesto (pp. 161-177): Springer, Yeung, K. (2008). Towards 
an Understanding of Regulation by Design. In K. Yeung (Ed.), Regulating technologies: 
Legal futures, regulatory frames and technological fixes (pp. 79-108). Oxford: Hart, 
Yeung, K., & Dixon-Woods, M. (2010). Design-based regulation and patient safety: a 
regulatory studies perspective. Social Science & Medicine, 71(3), pp. 502-509.   
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crime, the focus shifted on communicating architectures that make it impossible 
to commit crimes in the first place.  
One such architecture is Trusted Computing (TC), which has been in the 
centre of technical, social and legal interest over the past 15 years, aiming to be 
part of our lives in the near future. TC is an approach that aims to allow the 
computer user to trust his own computer and for “others” to trust that specific 
computer.31 In a more explanatory way, as Ross Anderson noted “TC provides a 
computing platform on which you can't tamper with the application software, 
and where these applications can communicate securely with their authors and 
with each other”.32  
Back in 2003, the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) (formerly known as the 
Trusted Computing Platform Alliance (TCPA)) – a non-profit organization – 
formed an alliance of promoters like AMD, Hewlett-Packard (HP), IBM, Intel 
Corporation, Microsoft, Sun Microsystems Incorporation, Fujitsu Limited and of 
contributors like Canon, Dell, Erickson, Google, Oracle, Samsung, and many more; 
and initiated the Trusted Computing (TC) project.33 The TCG works on the 
creation of a new computing platform that would provide enhanced trust to the 
current platform and aims to develop, define and promote standards to achieve 
higher security levels for the Information Technology (IT) infrastructure 
between multiple platforms, devices and networks.34  
                                                        
31  Lohmann von F. (2003). Meditations on Trusted Computing.  Retrieved from 
http://www.eff.org/Infrastructure/trusted_computing/20031001_meditations.php 
32  Anderson, R. (2003a). Trusted Computing Frequently Asked Questions / TCG / 
LaGrande / NGSCB / Longhorn / Palladium / TCPA – Version 1.1. (2003). 
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/tcpa-faq.html 
33  Full memberships list can be found at: 
http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/about_tcg/tcg_members 
34  Berger, B. (2005). Trusted computing group history. Inf. Secur. Tech. Rep., 10(2), pp. 
59-62. doi: 10.1016/j.istr.2005.05.007, TCG. (2010). Trusted Computing Group. 
2010, from http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/ 
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2.2 Trusted Computing fundamentals 
Computer Security is the subject dealing with fundamental security 
functionalities. Researched since the 1960’s, it has by now created a substantial 
literature.35 Trusted computing is a specific approach within the broader area of 
Computer security. While the term was coined in the late 1990s, some of the basic 
insights and ideas can be traced back to Lampson’s seminal “Protection” paper 
from 1974.36 Based on these initial studies, the rationale for the emergence of 
trusted computing has accumulated during the last two decades.37 While 
computer systems have changed in nature and become more and more 
ubiquitous, many technical challenges came into sight and led to the realization 
that system designers must proceed to design new computing systems that offer 
a higher amount of trust than the currently implemented ones. Prevention of 
denial of service, the performance of access control and monitoring and the 
achievement of scalability are just some of the numerous technical challenges 
that need to be overcomed by the current distributed systems. The need for such 
a platform becomes more imperative by the recognition that it is insufficient to 
rely on users taking the necessary precautions to protect their systems 
themselves (by frequently updating firewalls and anti-virus systems) and that the 
threats and attacks have amazingly increased due to automated attack tools, 
proliferation of vulnerabilities and increased mobility of users.38 CERT 
                                                        
35  Gollmann, D. (1999). Computer security. New York, NY, USA: John Wiley & Sons, Inc, 
Pfleeger, C. P., & Pfleeger, S. L. (2006). Security in Computing (4th ed.). Upper Saddle 
River, NJ, USA: Prentice Hall PTR. 
36  Lampson, B. W. (1974). Protection. ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review, 8(1), pp. 
18-24. doi: 10.1145/775265.775268  
37  See e.g. Lampson’s later paper England, P., Manferdelli, J., & Willman, B. (2003). A 
trusted open platform. Computer, 36(7), pp. 55-62. doi: 10.1109/MC.2003.1212691, 
that now uses the term of “trusted platform”.  
38  See also Berger, B. (2005). Trusted computing group history. Inf. Secur. Tech. Rep., 
10(2), pp. 59-62. doi: 10.1016/j.istr.2005.05.007, Kraemer, S., Carayon, P., & Clem, J. 
(2009). Human and organizational factors in computer and information security: 
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Coordination Center has reported the extremely large amount of vulnerabilities 
catalogued until 2008.39  
Furthermore, it has been found that software-only security mechanisms 
cannot provide sufficient protection for the whole system.40 TC consequently 
mixes software and hardware based solutions – as we will see this constitutes 
another cause for legal concerns as the contractual regime for software and 
hardware differs. A related problem are existing unsecured operating systems 
that currently do not provide single application isolation - thus reducing to the 
minimum the platform security level – which is found in diverse environments 
following the same security requirements. It is not possible to rebuild the 
Internet from scratch. Rather, to use the metaphor von Neurath used to 
characterize the attempts by philosophers to clarify language: 
“We are like sailors who on the open sea must reconstruct their ship 
but are never able to start afresh from the bottom. Where a beam is 
taken away a new one must at once be put there, and for this the rest 
of the ship is used as support. In this way, by using the old beams and 
driftwood the ship can be shaped entirely anew, but only by gradual 
reconstruction.” 41 
Legacy systems are a difficult issue for all cybersecurity strategies, and for 
TC in particular.42 At the core of TC is the idea that a computer should only 
communicate with a system that can proof its trustworthiness – something that 
                                                        
Pathways to vulnerabilities. Computers & Security, 28(7), pp. 509-520. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2009.04.006. 
39  CERT. (2009, February 12, 2009 ). CERT Statistics (Historical). Cataloged 
vulnerabilities.  Retrieved April 2010, 2010, from 
http://www.cert.org/stats/cert_stats.html#vuls 
40  Berger, B. (2005). Trusted computing group history. Inf. Secur. Tech. Rep., 10(2), pp. 
59-62. doi: 10.1016/j.istr.2005.05.007 
41   As explained by Quine, W. V. O. (1960). Word & Object. Cambridge: The MIT Press. 
42  See e.g. Schellekens, D., Wyseur, B., & Preneel, B. (2008). Remote attestation on legacy 
operating systems with trusted platform modules. Science of Computer Programming, 
74(1–2), pp. 13-22. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.scico.2008.09.005. 
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requires an account of its software and hardware. While it is at least possible to 
update old software that is not TC compliant, this will typically not be possible 
with the necessary hardware component. As a consequence, the TC revolution, 
were it to happen, could make a significant number of existing hardware obsolete. 
This is not just a problem for public acceptance; it also raises legal and regulatory 
issues. TC is inherently also a problem for competition law.43 These problems 
become heightened if TC is “discriminatory” not just against newly developed 
non-TC systems, where open standards can at least mitigate this problem (and be 
it at a cost and, as we will see later, never perfectly), but also against past systems 
that predate TC and can’t be easily upgraded in their hardware part.  
 In addition to the increasing security threats, the ease with which to write 
and spread malicious code (even ubiquitously), the vast number of personal 
computers along with the substantial use and incredible evolution of the Internet 
during the last 15 years,44 have led to the conclusion that systems with increased 
security, high confidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation, high-availability and 
authenticity should be deployed.45 Thus the three basic conditions that a trusted 
environment, in the computer science sense, must fulfill are: protected 
capabilities; integrity measurement; integrity reporting, all creating and ensuring 
                                                        
43  See e.g. Anderson, R. (2003b). ‘Trusted Computing’and Competition Policy–Issues for 
Computing Professionals. Open Knowledge, pp. 35. , Anderson, R. (2004). 
Cryptography and Competition Policy - Issues with ‘Trusted Computing’ Economics 
of Information Security (Vol. 12, pp. 35-52): Springer US. 
44  Stats, I. W. (2009). Usage and Population Statistics. from 
http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm 
45   Oppliger, R., & Rytz, R. (2005). Does Trusted Computing Remedy Computer Security 




platform trust.46 Systems covering these aspects are described as 
“trustworthy”.47 
2.3 Trusted Computing Group – The History 
The Trusted Computing Group (TCG) is a non-profit corporate organization 
whose stated aim is “to develop, define and promote open standards for 
hardware-enabled trusted computing and security technologies, including 
hardware building blocks and software interfaces, across multiple platforms, 
peripherals and devices”.48 It was originally formed as an industry working 
group, by Compaq, Hewlett-Packard, IBM, Intel and Microsoft in January 1999 
with the name Trusted Computing Platform Alliance (TCPA). From 1999 until 
2003 TCPA released a number of specifications which mainly focused in 
enhancing trust and security in computing platforms. In early 2001 the first 
specifications were released, defining the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) as the 
fundamental component of a trusted platform.  
In April 2003, TCPA was renamed to TCG adopting all the specifications 
released by TCPA and continuing its original development with broader 
horizons49 and extending the invitation for other companies to join the alliance. 
TCG is headquartered in Portland, Oregon, but has an international membership. 
                                                        
46   Burmester, M., & Mulholland, J. (2006, April 23 - 27). The advent of trusted computing: 
implications for digital forensics Paper presented at the Proceedings of the 2006 ACM 
symposium on Applied computing, Dijon, France (pp. 283-287 ),ACM Press. 
47   Kallath, D. (2005). Trust in trusted computing - the end of security as we know it. 
Computer Fraud and Security, 2005(12), pp. 4-7. doi: 10.1016/S1361-
3723(05)70283-9, Shirey, R. (2000). RFC2828: Internet Security Glossary: RFC Editor. 
48   TCG. (2010). Trusted Computing Group. 2010, from 
http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/ 
49  Berger, B. (2005). Trusted computing group history. Inf. Secur. Tech. Rep., 10(2), pp. 
59-62. doi: 10.1016/j.istr.2005.05.007 
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2.4 Trusted Computing Group – Structure 
Most computing industry bodies are structured based on organization 
structures and governance models defined by bylaws,50 and TCG is not an 
exception to that. As mentioned by Berger, the structure includes an open 
membership model, a board of directors, promoters and contributors, and a 
reciprocal reasonable and non-discriminatory (RAND) patent licensing policy 
among members. Thus, this structure enables the expansion and the promotion 
of open industry specifications. Membership requires a membership fee. This was 
later reduced for small companies, to enable them to benefit from the work of the 
group.51 As we will see in more detail later, in addition to the usual monopoly and 
competition problems that comes with the territory of standard setting, TC by its 
very nature risks to exclude “outsiders” from the market. We indicated above the 
potential competition issues with a TC approach: entities that are not TC certified 
will be unable to communicate with other TC systems. Our research could not 
establish if the late concession of a reduced membership fee was an example of 
enlightened altruism that recognized genuine advantages to have smaller 
companies “on board”, to preempt competition law challenges, or if it was even 
the result of external pressure. It is however important to note that this model 
still potentially deters many developers, especially non-commercial, open source 
and creative commons programmers. 
Potentially exacerbating this issue of exclusions, is the internal structure of 
the TCG. Currently the members are divided into three main hierarchical groups: 
at the top are the promoters – essentially the organizations that took the 
preliminary steps necessary for the formation of the corporation; the 
contributors – organizations that contribute to the corporation; and the adopters 
                                                        
50   ibid., p.59 
51  Rosteck, T. (2008). Die Trusted Computing Group. In N. Pohlmann & H. Reimer (Eds.), 
Trusted Computing (pp. 15-20): Vieweg+Teubner.p17. 
38 
 
– organizations that may adopt some of the technological outcomes of the 
organization. The last two groups in 2009 numbered more than 130 members, 
however currently this number has dropped52 while TCG is still inviting active 
member participation.53 There is however no legally enforceable “right” to 
member TCG, let alone to be part of any specific one of the three levels, and no 
judicial review were a company to be excluded.  
Leading members (i.e. promoters) govern TCG via a board comprised of 
AMD, HP, IBM, Intel, Microsoft, CISCO and Fujitsu. Members (i.e. contributors and 
adopters) cover a variety of companies drawn from areas like computing, 
software developers, systems vendors and network and infrastructure 
companies. 
TCG distributes a number of key deliverables containing hardware and 
software specifications, white papers and other materials that help the 
promotion and adoption of the specifications. The deliverables aim to help the 
data management and the digital identities increase security and protection from 
external software attack and data theft. Furthermore, these specifications offer 
the ability to be used for more secure remote access. 
2.5 Trusted Computing Group and the creation of trust 
TCG was formed as a result of the concerns on data exposure on systems; 
system compromise as part of software attack; and lack of methods to prevent 
identity theft.54 TC is an idea which has evolved from the need to address these 
                                                        
52  e.g. Sun Microsystems and Sony Corporation have been withdrawn from their 
membership in TCG. The first has been acquired and later merged with Oracle and 
has not renewed their TCG membership since. 
53  TCG. (2006a). Membership.   Retrieved 4th May, 2011, from 
http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/about_tcg/tcg_members, TCG. (2006b). 
Membership Levels.   Retrieved 4th May, 2011, from 
http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/join_now/ 
54  Berger, B. (2005). Trusted computing group history. Inf. Secur. Tech. Rep., 10(2), pp. 
59-62. doi: 10.1016/j.istr.2005.05.007, TCG. (2006c). More Secure Computing TCG. 
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issues with security solutions that will mitigate the risks and dangers; and help 
to increase data management and identity security. Furthermore, its aim is to 
protect the software and data in computer platforms (servers, desktops, laptops, 
PDA’s, mobile phones and many more)55 from external attacks and physical theft 
and hopes to improve security for remote access. Trusted Computing aims to add 
on computer hardware’s functionality to “enable entities with which the computer interacts 
to have some level of trust in what the system is doing”.56 This protection is provided by 
implementing isolated execution environments where software and data will be 
protected from any interference – not just by third parties but also the owner of 
the computers. Trusted platforms provide such environments and define the 
applications that will be permitted to operate on selected data.57 Additionally, 
trusted platforms can offer assurances about their behaviour both in hardware 
and software.58 
As we indicated above, ‘Trust’ has different interpretations in different 
disciplines –relevant for “techno-trust” is the definition of trusted systems 
according to RFC 282859 and discussed further by Balacheff et al. and Mitchell.60 
                                                        
55   Proudler, G. (2005). Concepts of trusted computing. In C. J. Mitchell (Ed.), Trusted 
Computing (Vol. 6, pp. 11-27). London, UK: The Institution of Engineering and 
Technology (IET). 
56   Mitchell, C. J. (2008). What is Trusted Computing? In C. J. Mitchell (Ed.),ibid. (pp. 1-
10). p.3 
57   Proudler, G. (2005). Concepts of trusted computing. In C. J. Mitchell (Ed.),ibid. (pp. 
11-27). 
58   Gallery, E. (2008). Who are the TCG and what are the Trusted Computing concepts? 
Paper presented at the TRUST2008, Villach, Austria. Presentation retrieved from 
http://dblp.uni-trier.de/pers/hd/g/Gallery:Eimear 
59  Shirey, R. (2000). RFC2828: Internet Security Glossary: RFC Editor. 
60  Balacheff, B., Chen, L., Pearson, S., Proudler, G., & Chan, D. (2000). Computing Platform 
Security in Cyberspace. Information Security Technical Report, 5(1), pp. 54-63. doi: 
10.1016/S1363-4127(00)87631-1, Mitchell, C. J. (2008). What is Trusted 
Computing? In C. J. Mitchell (Ed.), Trusted Computing (Vol. 6, pp. 1-10). London, UK: 
The Institution of Engineering and Technology (IET). 
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Thus, Trusted Systems are systems that can be relied upon to perform certain 
security policies in an expected manner and in the sense of behavioral 
consistency: TC “refers to a computer system for which an entity has some level of assurance that 
(part or all of) the computer system is behaving as expected”61 for a particular purpose. The 
outcome ultimately would be to allow the user to ‘blindly trust’ his computer 
again, without a constant need for self-monitoring. The TCG project is pursuing 
to allow the computer user to trust his own computer and for “others” to trust 
that specific computer.62 
This very specific conception of trust is not the same as the sociological 
concept,63 even though they share some characteristics. We will get back to this 
analysis below, but first we try to give an explanation of how TC tries to build 
complex dynamic trust networks “bottom up”,64 without central, let alone state, 
oversight or control.  
A very concise account of how Trusted Systems give rise to trust networks 
was recently given by Rosinger and Beer within the project “Smart Nord”, which 
aims at providing a multi-agent infrastructure for the electric grid of the future. 
In this complex market, the relevant actors (electricity consumers, producers, 
storage facilities etc) are represented by autonomous software agents.65 These 
                                                        
61  Mitchell, C. J. (2008). What is Trusted Computing? In C. J. Mitchell (Ed.), Trusted 
Computing (Vol. 6, pp. 1-10). London, UK: The Institution of Engineering and 
Technology (IET). 
62  Lipson, H. F. (2002). Tracking and Tracing Cyber-Attacks: Technical Challenges and 
Global Policy Issues. In C. M. University (Ed.), CERT Coordination Center, Special 
Report CMU/SEI-2002-SR-009. 
63  E.g. Fukuyama, F. (1995). Trust: The Social Virtues and The Creation of Prosperity (1st 
ed.). New York: Simon & Schuster Free Press Paperbacks book. that evoke concepts 
of “social capital”. 
64  Using base elements to build up a larger system. 
65   Rosinger, C., Uslar, M., & Sauer, J. (2013). Threat Scenarios to evaluate Trustworthiness 




agents coordinate their activities and thus can give rise to self-organizing 
alliances and conglomerates.  
In the process of forming coalitions, several factors need to be taken into 
account by the software to decide “whom to talk to”. One of them is the decision 
if another agent or machine can be trusted. The very same mechanism that will 
enable “benevolent” agents of consumers to build a coalition that then negotiates 
a bulk discount with a supplier can also be used to form a Denial of Service attack 
against that very supplier if the agents are malevolent or infected. A model of 
“trust” then becomes central for the attempt to ensure network security – TC as 
a security service. 
In everyday life, we often base similar decisions on the reputation of the 
people we interact with – has the person whom we trust with our keys while on 
holiday a reputation for reliability and will remember watering the plants, or a 
reputation for dishonesty and will sell our silver?  
Since in everyday language, reputation and trust are therefore often 
synonymous, here an attempt at a clarification for the purposes of “techno-trust”: 
In computing, reputation describes the general “objective” understanding of 
an entity by a community. Within a reputation system, every entity is assigned a 





Figure 1: Reputation representation 
In the technology-oriented definitions above, trust was implicitly understood 
differently. Trust describes the local and subjective opinion of an entity about the 
behavior of another entity, in particular, as we have seen, if it can it be predicted 




direct and indirect trust, making the “trust relation” transitive. This is a highly 
problematic assumption to make, both for sociological and technological 
conceptions of trust.66 In this type of trust network, every entity has a unique 
“trust value” or “opinion” about every other entity, which corresponds to a 
decentralized, dynamic and potentially chaotic network approach. 
 
Figure 2: Direct (blue arrows) and Indirect (red arrows) trust 
Here the red arrow symbolizes indirect trust, the blue arrows direct trust. If 
we accept that it takes a network to control a network, this decentralized model 
is much better suited for controlling security on the Internet, for the reasons 
Guadamuz noted.67 A centralized reputation model by contrast corresponds to a 
traditional perception of the state as “top down” guarantor of security – the 
reputation is determined by the central control agency (in analogy one can think 
of the criminal records bureau). All TC systems, independent of the specific 
                                                        
66  In the field of cryptography and in particular PGP that relies on transitive trust 
networks, the influential study by Christianson, B., & Harbison, W. (1997). Why isn't 
trust transitive? In M. Lomas (Ed.), Security Protocols (Vol. 1189, pp. 171-176): 
Springer Berlin Heidelberg. analysed just how problematic that assumption can be. 
For a discussion of the technical implications, with some references to social reality, 
see Liu, G., Wang, Y., & Orgun, M. A. (2011). Trust Transitivity in Complex Social 
Networks. Paper presented at the AAAI (pp. 1222-1229),AAAI Press. 
67   Guadamuz, A. (2011). Networks, Complexity and Internet Regulation: Scale-free Law: 





technological implementation, try as much as possible to emulate the 
decentralized Trust model.  
In the above definition, two aspects are crucial: TC, in the software sense, is 
importantly a form of “blind trust” – the user doesn’t make a personal decision 
any longer, but relies on his computer to identify other machines as trustworthy, 
and tell them about its own trustworthiness in return. Second, this trust in the 
machine is to a degree enforced, and not volitional. To this extend, Lipson’s 
definition that says that we are “allowed” to trust our machines again is 
potentially misleading. Rather, we have to trust our machines. To the extent that 
this approach requires trust in the sociological sense, it is the relation between 
the user and the TCG. The user (buyer of a product) has to trust the 
vendor/manufacturer that the TC system works as advertised, as she cannot 
override it any longer (because TC enforces blind trust). So TC regulates/enforces 
“techno-trust”68 between the owner and her computer on the one hand, and also 
techno-trust between the computer and any machine it communicates with on 
the other. Social trust by contrast is required between the buyer and the TCG that 
certifies that the product is “trusted” for TC purposes. 
Here we encounter a first idea why the specific approach to trusted 
computing promoted by the TCG may be insufficient, in the absence of positively 
enabling legislative interference. The disappointing uptake of TC that Proudler et 
al. identified when he wrote that introducing TC was like “a tug boat to change 
the course of a supertanker”69 indicates for us that this social trust was lacking – 
the market voted with its feet against something that was perceived as a power 
grab under the pretense of enhanced security. Tellingly and significantly, 
                                                        
68  “techno trust” will be used in the thesis as a shorthand for “trust as understood by 
computer scientists” whenever the context might make it unclear if “sociological 
trust” could also be meant. 
69  Proudler, G., Chen, L., & Dalton, C. (2014). Futures for Trusted Computing Trusted 
Computing Platforms (pp. 21-36): Springer International Publishing. p.2. 
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Proudler et al.’s own analysis is different. In their view, reluctant users of TC 
either did not understand the technology well enough and were misinformed by 
malicious or ignorant detractors; or understood the technological limitations 
only too well and waited out for even more mature solutions.70 In either case, the 
solution is essentially one of technology: communicate its features better, or 
improve it to the required standard. The main thrust of this thesis is that this 
analysis falls short. It doesn’t understand that at least a certain degree of social 
trust, rather than techno-trust, is still needed if we want complex and dynamic 
security networks to self-organise, which as Guadamuz indicates is the necessary 
condition for efficient Internet regulation.71 TC requires a shift of power to the 
TCG (or similar organisations). Such a shift in turn requires trust, which can never 
get fully derived from techno-trust alone, but requires also a modicum of social 
trust.  
For numerous reasons, some indicated above, the TCG never had the social 
capital on which social trust is based to supplement this foundation. As discussed 
above, is a cartel, and initially a rather exclusive one. It started as a group of 
industries heavy hitters, some of which with a notoriously bad public reputation 
as purveyors of inferior products and bully behavior, deservedly or 
undeservedly.72 Some of them faced lawsuits for abuse of market dominant 
                                                        
70  see also e.g. Biddle from Microsoft: “We believe our biggest challenge is educating 
people about the facts of what we are doing. There are many misconceptions about 
NGSCB, so we are engaging many stakeholders in a collaborative dialogue.” Cited in 
Vaughan-Nichols J. S. (2003). How Trustworthy is Trusted Computing? IEEE 
Computer Society Press, 36 (3 ), pp. 18-20. at p.18. 
71  Guadamuz, A. (2011). Networks, Complexity and Internet Regulation: Scale-free Law: 
Edward Elgar Pub. 
72  for a balanced analysis from the perspective of PR management, see e.g. Chapman, M. 
R. R. (2006). In Search of Stupidity: Over Twenty Years of High Tech Marketing 
Disasters: Apress., especially chapter 2, "Ripping PR Yarns: Microsoft and Netscape." 
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positions, especially in the EU,73 reinforcing the perception that they are willing 
to use their near-monopoly position to force products and solutions on unwilling 
users. One of the “victims” of a TC revolution could be “amateur” or other open 
source developers, who cannot afford the TCG accreditation, resulting in a 
traditional narrative which pitted the romantic heroes of the computing age as 
David against the Goliath of heartless multinational predators.74 As indicated 
above, TC grew out of DRM technologies, another techno-fix for Internet 
regulation with an exceedingly bad reputation.75 TC retains the ability to enforce 
copyright, and some of the consortium members are right holders, undermining 
any attempt to publicly disassociate TC from DRM.76 Technological solutions that 
increase user choice while maintaining the security benefits exist, but they were 
developed at a stage when the reputation damage had already occurred.77  
                                                        
73  Economides, N. (2001). The Microsoft Antitrust Case. Journal of Industry, Competition 
and Trade, 1(1), pp. 7-39. doi: 10.1023/A:1011517724873, Hazlett, T. W. (1999). 
Microsoft's Internet Exploration: Predatory or Competitive. Cornell JL & Pub. Pol'y, 9, 
pp. 29-60. , Wright, J. D. (2011). Does Antitrust Enforcement in High Tech Markets 
Benefit Consumers? Stock Price Evidence from FTC v. Intel. Review of Industrial 
Organization, 38(4), pp. 387-404. doi: 10.1007/s11151-011-9297-5. For a general 
analysis of some of the issues at stake see MacKie-Mason, J. K., & Netz, J. S. (2006). 
Manipulating interface standards as an anti-competitive strategy. Standards and 
public policy, pp. 231-259.  
74  Vaughan-Nichols J. S. (2003). How Trustworthy is Trusted Computing? IEEE 
Computer Society Press, 36 (3 ), pp. 18-20. Citing Richard Stallman as saying that one 
reason he opposes TC is that it may threaten open source operating systems and 
applications by viewing them as nonstandard and untrustworthy and thus not letting 
them run. 
75  See authoritatively, May, C. (2007). Digital rights management: The problem of 
expanding ownership rights: Elsevier.; for a detailed study of issues related to TC, see 
also Mulligan, D. K., Han, J., & Burstein, A. J. (2003). How DRM-based content delivery 
systems disrupt expectations of personal use. Paper presented at the Proceedings of 
the 3rd ACM workshop on Digital rights management (pp. 77-89),ACM. 
76   Vaughan-Nichols op cit p. 19 
77   For one such technological solution, see e.g. Cooper, A., & Martin, A. (2006). Towards 
an open, trusted digital rights management platform. Paper presented at the 
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If social capital is lacking to marshal social trust, why should buyers accept 
the TCG business proposition? This finally brings in law, as an additional factor. 
As we will discuss in more detail below, Max Weber famously suggested that in 
modern, individualistic, pluralistic and market driven societies, personal trust 
between individuals can or has to be replaced by trust in institutions, most 
importantly in the law.78 In the type of society he described, people were not any 
longer able to base e.g. investment decisions on personal knowledge, bond of 
loyalty and other emotional relations between borrower and lender, of the type 
that dominated small-scale rural economies where everybody knew everybody 
else, and non-repayment would face swift social ostracism. Rather, people 
learned to trust in laws, and the bureaucracies that enforced them. I can lend you 
money even if I don’t know you, personally, and have no reason to trust you, 
because a judge (whom I also don’t know personally) will if necessary order some 
other public officials to enforce my claim against you. This requires trust in 
systems of law and administration, rather than people (or companies). In the case 
of a security initiative such as TC that is driven by the private sector, this gives a 
prominent role in particular to contract law. However, as we will see this creates 
a dilemma, as the very conceptual foundations of contract law, at least classical 
liberal contract law, are ill suited for underpinning and sustaining complex 
dynamic networks.  
Nonetheless, the relative failure of TC does give a salutary lesson to the wider 
sociological debate. In recent decades, market and indeed network based models 
of governance have been postulate as the replacement of legal-bureaucratic 
                                                        
Proceedings of the ACM workshop on Digital rights management, Alexandria, 
Virginia, USA. Another solution which maintains the DRM element, but tries to 
mitigate its “overreach” and enhance as a result its public reputation is Erickson, J. S. 
(2003). Fair use, DRM, and Trusted Computing. Communications of the ACM, 46(4), 
pp. 34-39.  
78  Misztal, B. (2013). Trust in modern societies: The search for the bases of social order: 
John Wiley & Sons. p. 69ff  
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modes of organization. The end of the nation state with its clear hierarchies and 
expanding bureaucracy was seen as the problem, market and network driven 
solutions the answer. We lose trust in governments, but trust our Facebook 
friends, organized and home delivered courtesy of Facebook Inc. However, even 
our initial short discussion of TC shows that Johan Olsen was making an 
invaluable insight when he recently argued from a neo-Weberian perspective 
that legal rationality and bureaucracy should not be seen as a defunct alternative 
to markets and networks, but an overlapping and enabling mode of organization: 
“[this article] questions the fashionable ideas that bureaucratic 
organization is an obsolescent, undesirable, and non-viable form of 
administration and that there is an inevitable and irreversible 
paradigmatic shift towards market- or network-organization. In 
contrast, the paper argues that contemporary democracies are 
involved in another round in a perennial debate and ideological 
struggle over what are desirable forms of administration and 
government: that is, a struggle over institutional identities and 
institutional balances. The argument is not that bureaucratic 
organization is a panacea and the answer to all challenges of public 
administration. Rather, bureaucratic organization is part of a 
repertoire of overlapping, supplementary, and competing forms 
coexisting in contemporary democracies, and so are market-
organization and network-organization. Rediscovering Weber's 
analysis of bureaucratic organization, then, enriches our 
understanding of public administration.” 79 
TCG, so we argue here, got “the balance wrong” when relying exclusively on 
market and network driven solutions, with scant regards of the institutional-legal 
framework. Or rather, the desired network effect failed to materialize also 
because the market, in the absence of both a credible institutional-legal 
framework and a pre-existing social trust rejected the model. What is needed 
                                                        
79  Olsen, J. P. (2006). Maybe It Is Time to Rediscover Bureaucracy. Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory, 16(1), pp. 1-24. doi: 10.1093/jopart/mui027 
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then is in Meuleman’s words a “metagovernance” for networks and markets,80 an 
enabling regulatory framework that helps to plug the conceptual gaps between 
the societal and the technological conception of trust. The third and fourth parts 
of this thesis will identify two of the “choke points” that such a meta-governance 
will need to address.  
So far, we have focused as a preliminary conceptual clarification on the 
differences in the way in which computer scientists, psychologists and 
sociologists understand the term “trust”. On some level, this should not be 
surprising. Different disciplines develop their own theoretical vocabulary, and as 
long as everybody knows which definition is operative in a given context, efficient 
communication is possible.  
However, the argument here is somewhat more involved. The claim is that 
the mismatch between “techno-trust” and social conceptions of trust is a problem 
for the TCI (Trusted Computing Initiative). The TCI needs, for its product to be 
successful, social trust. The techno-trust that it delivers instead, falls short of 
what is needed, and in doing so creates two separate but causally connected 
issues for law and regulation. First, it causes potentially legal problems for users 
and wider society, problems that the law may need to rectify. Second, to achieve 
its aims it needs a more sympathetic regulatory framework that gives consumers 
better reasons to invest in TC. The two issues are connected: As long as potential 
users feel that TC exposes them to technical risks without legal redress, or legal 
risks without giving them the control to mitigate these risks, they will refrain 
from investing into the TCI model.  
The dual challenge that TC poses for law, needs further explanation. We 
noted above that “trusted” in the computer sense only partially matches the 
                                                        
80  Meuleman, L. (2008). Public management and the metagovernance of hierarchies, 
networks and markets: the feasibility of designing and managing governance style 
combinations: Springer Science & Business Media. 
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concept of “trustworthiness” as understood in social life: “trusted” is what the 
technology gives us, “trustworthy” is what we want.  
This raises an immediate legal problem in an environment that relies on 
contracts as the legal form of social connectedness – that is to say the way 
customers and TC providers relate with each other on the open market is not by 
bonds of kinship, shared ideology or tribal solidarity, but through contracts 
formed freely and through mutual consent. But if a product is sold as “trusted 
computing” to laypeople, it seems an obvious danger that they will misread it as 
“trustworthy”. As we discussed above, this might expose them to risk, misreading 
the level of protection that they are buying. If this is the case, does their 
expectation merit protection through the law, was it “reasonable”?  
This is a classical contract law question, and we will return to it later in 
Chapter 4. Hidden underneath however is a much more fundamental issue: can 
any classical, liberal contract law provide the type of relation that is needed for 
TC to create the networks of security and trust that they intent? In the classical 
concept of contract law, “privity of contract” implies that contracts are between 
two parties and two parties only.81 They are crucially lacking the transitivity that 
extends a binary relation to third parties – but this is crucial for models of trust 
as we have seen above. The atomism of contract law that flows from the principle 
of privity, is in theory inimical to this type of network effect. This was analyzed 
masterfully by Lewis and Weigert who contrast the Hobbesian “social contract” 
model as a quintessentially atomistic vision of society with the “holistic” model 
that is based on trust: 
“Trust functions as a deep assumption underwriting social order and 
is not reducible to individual characteristics. Changes in trust alter 
                                                        
81  For a classical exposition see Lilienthal, J. W. (1887). Privity of Contract. Harvard law 
review, 1(5), pp. 226-232. doi: 10.2307/1321337; for a more recent discussion of the 
problems of this concept see e.g. Adams, J. N., & Brownsword, R. (1993). Privity of 




social relationships. The study of power, exchange, family, and politics 
illustrates how trust constitutes social reality as emergent and 
holistic.” 82 
By framing (with necessity) their relation with their customers as one 
governed by classical contracts, TCI from the beginning counteracts the very 
network effects its product aims to create. It reduces trust to binary, non-
transitive relations that cannot in principle form the basis of a complex and 
dynamic system. They can’t be complex, because they are lacking transitivity and 
with that holistic network effects, and they can’t be dynamic because classical 
contract law focuses exclusively on the “magic point in time” when the contract 
is concluded through the meeting of the minds. Once the contract is concluded, it 
remains static, a historical event that lacks the flexibility to adopt dynamically as 
the network grows. This brings back the more empirical point we made above. 
TCI, so we argued, lacked the social capital, the public trust; that they would have 
needed to make their approach a success. But it also goes in radical way beyond 
the TCI, and affects all attempts to generate social trust through techno-trust. 
Even if the TCI had been run by the Creative Commons movement and been 
chaired by Mother Theresa (or even Linus Torvalds himself) and mustered the 
necessary social capital so that people trust the product, this would still have 
meant a personal relation between TC provider and individual customers only, 
not, as is needed, an ensuing trust between customers. Or, as again Lewis and 
Weigert put it: 
“This “social trust” helps us understand the formation of interpersonal 
relationships, the difference between economic and social exchange, 
and the discrepancy between attitudes toward society and toward 
particular institutional actors.”83 
                                                        
82   Lewis, J. D., & Weigert, A. J. (1985). SOCIAL ATOMISM, HOLISM, AND TRUST. 
Sociological Quarterly, 26(4), pp. 455-471. doi: 10.1111/j.1533-8525.1985.tb00238.x 
at 455. 
83  ibid., p. 455. 
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It is not, therefore, just the trust relation towards a particular institutional 
actor, here the TCI, that is the issue. Rather, holistic trust, and that is trust in the 
form of a network where everybody is ultimately connected with, and trusting in, 
everybody else is at stake. Economic exchange relations (“buying the TC 
product”) and the (contract) law that governs it cannot in principle achieve this, 
there will always be, so Lewis and Weigert, a “discrepancy” between the two. 
Where we depart however, from their analysis, is in our instance that there 
is an important and indeed constitutive role to play for law. This is the neo-
Weberian aspect we mentioned above. Formal rationality and “trust in 
institutions” is not sufficient, it needs also a “thick” substratum of pre-existing 
trust, even in modern, particularized and pluralistic societies. However, in this 
type of society, trust will never be all-encompassing enough to work entirely 
without a legal system to reinforce it. We therefore still need the law but the right 
type of law, one that does not dissect holistic relations and reduces them to binary 
ones, but one that “follows” and even “enhances” transitive and dynamic network 
foundations. On the level of specific legal instruments, we will argue that “reliance 
liability” is exactly the type of private law concept that can turn intransitive 
contract relations into transitive, network-supporting ones. On the level of legal 
theory, “relational contract theory” has opened up a way to think about contract 
relations that is not any longer a one-off, static and atomistic relation.84 
                                                        
84   For an introduction to relational contract theory, see Gudel, P. J. (1998). Relational 
Contract Theory and the Concept of Exchange [comments] (pp. 763). For a 
comprehensive discussion that focuses on the economic exchange relation and its 
role in sociology discussed here see in particular Macneil, I. R. (1987). Relational 
Contract Theory as Sociology: A Reply to Professors Lindenberg and de Vos. Journal 
of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE)/Zeitschrift für die gesamte 
Staatswissenschaft(2), pp. 272-290.  An important critical voice to which we will have 
to return is Fox Jr, J. W. (2003). RELATIONAL CONTRACT THEORY AND 
DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP. Case Western Reserve Law Review, 54(1), pp. 1-67.  
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In the remainder of this chapter however, we will continue to lay the 
foundations for this analysis, by attempting a “parallel reading” between the 
technical aspects of TC and the sociological reflection on the interaction between 
trust and law. 
To recap, we identified in the introduction the problem of network 
complexity as the “hard challenge” for Internet regulation. If social trust relations 
in complex modern societies also organize themselves in dynamic complex 
networks, and if in addition, security “travels along” the trust pathways (the 
edges) in this network - because we only trust those whom we can securely trust, 
those who are “trustworthy” - the result would be an environment with 
ubiquitous security, which is the ultimate aim of the TCI. In this world, security is 
not imposed top-down through central fiat, but is itself an emergent network 
property which, as we understand by Guadamuz, is likely to be the only efficient 
way to “tame” complex dynamic systems.  
As we argued, this however raises several problems. The first two relate to 
the antecedent of the above claim, and raise issues of sociology:  
a) are social trust networks self-organizing, complex dynamic systems? 
b) does “security” in these systems follow trust? 
c) If we can answer these two questions in the affirmative, the next question 
addresses the relation between the two conceptions of trust: 
d) are the network effects that Trusted Computing aims to create, despite 
the different conception of trust, isomorphic to the trust networks we 
find in society?  
If the answer to this question is yes as well, then we would have good reasons 
to belief that TC-type solutions can indeed result in ubiquitous security as an 
emergent feature of the communication network (at least if they come from a 
provider who is in turn both trustworthy and trusted). However, we have reasons 
to doubt all three of these premises, at least to a degree. This, in our view, is where 
law as a mode of regulation comes into the picture and plays a crucial role. 
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Trusted Computing is associated to two of the four modes of the square of 
regulation proposed by Larry Lessig.85 
 
Figure 3: Square of regulation proposed by Larry Lessig 
It is, first and foremost, a paradigmatic form of regulation through Code. The 
software architecture itself will tell you (or rather, your computer) what you can 
and cannot do and to which other machines you can or cannot speak to. However, 
at the same time it is also a form of regulation through markets – or at least 
depends on market rationality supplementing it. The relative lack of success of 
the TCG was less a result of technological problems, more a lack of market 
enthusiasm and uptake. As discussed above, the underlying idea of the TCI here 
was to compete initially with non-TC products on a mix of security and costs: 
more secure than its competitors, but not as much more expensive, than a secret 
solution of the type developed for the military and critical infrastructure. Since 
this compromise, so the TCI, has a rational balance between costs and benefits at 
least for some actors, a rational market should take up TC for some applications 
– those that are not so critical that they require more than TC, but not so trivial 
                                                        
85  Lessig, L. (1999). Code and other laws of cyberspace: Basic books. esp. p.123; Marsden, 
C. T. (2000). Regulating the global information society: Psychology Press. p.19.  
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the additional costs of TC are prohibitive. Only when the market uptake reached 
a certain threshold would the network effect inherent in the technological model 
take over and push non-TC products out, resulting in ubiquitous security. Even 
the “trivial” applications, machines or products that do not merit on their own 
investment in TC need to be able to communicate with the more safety critical 
ones. But TC only allows trusted machines to communicate. This will eventually 
force all applications to be at least TC compliant, or risk to get isolated in some 
small “high risk” pockets.  
We argue that part of the problem with TC and the TCG is that their 
technological conception of trust is on its own insufficient to develop the complex 
dynamic networks that the more substantial sociological concept of trust entail. 
What is needed in addition is an ecosystem of legal norms that supplement TC. 
Using ideas going back at the very least to Max Weber and his analysis of the role 
of formal law in modern, market driven societies, we will show that the TC 
network will only work when in addition to security and techno-trust, also legally 
enabled social trust “runs along” the edges that connect the nodes of the network. 
That is, if for any two connected nodes in the TC network, the parties can trust 
each other in the computer science sense described above, AND have as a fallback 
a shared trust in institutions that can apply legal sanctions; we will get dynamic 
complex networks that are isomorphic to the communication network of the 
Internet. However, as we will see, there are systematic problems with the very 
concept of law that makes this a difficult proposition to achieve.  
2.6 Technical Analysis of Trusted Computing technology 
2.6.1 How the Trusted Platform works 
In this section, we look in more detail at some technical aspects of Trusted 
Computing as exposed by the TCG that will inform our discussion later on. At the 
same time, we will provide a “running commentary” on the relation between the 
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technological and sociological conceptions of trust, analyze the degree in which 
they match, and indicate legal implications. Trusted platforms provide a 
technological implementation and interpretation of the factors that must be 
simultaneously true in order to achieve “trust” and are defined by the TCG:86 
“Unambiguous Identity - In the words of the TCG: 
In order for something to be able to be trustable it must be 
unambiguously identifiable, thus every component of a Trusted 
Platform must be known and identifiable. In the case of a software 
component, a hash of that software file provides a very useful and 
practical means to identify that component.” 
 The emphasis on unique identities as a source of trust illustrates several 
important issues and highlights some of the conceptual problems that bedevil the 
TCI approach to trust. Indeed, the sociological concept of trust could be argued to 
arise in situations where unique identifiers are the least relevant criterion. Often, 
I will trust a person not as an individual, but as a member or representative of a 
specific group. Theories of the evolution of cooperation for instance have 
postulated that we can understand the emergence of religion as a means to 
establish trust in situations where there is no previous personal relations, no 
“identification” in this sense, and no past experiences that could form the basis of 
trust.87 Remember in the discussion above, we suggested that “trust” for TCI is 
ultimately a Popperian, “past experience” based approach. I trust a person 
because I can (re)identify him as the agent of past, benevolent behavior – he 
carries a good reputation. This indeed makes the ability for re-identification 
essential. However, this already presupposes a considerable degree of closeness. 
He must trust me enough, and I must trust him enough, to be allowed close up to 
observe his actions. (We note in passing that the privacy concerns that have been 
                                                        
86  TCG. (2006d). TCG Infrastructure Working Group Architecture Part II - Integrity 
Management v1.0. In T. Hardjono (Ed.), (Revision  1.0 ed.). 
87  so e.g. Atran, S. (2002). In gods we trust : the evolutionary landscape of religion: Oxford 
; New York : Oxford University Press, 2002.  
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raised about Trusted Computing have in part their root in this need to share 
information about past behavior that can be traced back via unique identifiers to 
an agent).88 
 However, in an Internet context, why should I allow even this level of 
disclosure about me to third parties, who I do not know personally, who can be 
in a different jurisdiction and for all I know can be a dog? Early societies, before 
the modern administrative state and the rule by formal laws, faced the same 
dilemma. Trust was a given to the small number of family members who knew 
each other intimately. But as soon as a stranger approached, problems began. 
How can he be trusted, when we do not know him, have no way to identify him 
and also can’t risk to have him close enough for an extended period of time to 
observe if he consistently behaves benevolently? According to some influential 
sociological theories, this is where a new form of trust emerged, born out of 
necessity. When it is impossible to identify the stranger as an individual, a method 
must be found to identify him at least as a member of a group that shares certain 
normative commitments. If I can identify the stranger therefore as a member of 
my religious group, then a “trusted third party” ensures mutual rule compliance 
- in this case of course an omniscient and highly punitive observer, who ensures 
that any gain one of us can make by cheating or injuring me, the other is 
outweighed by divine punishment.89 Crucially for our topic, this new form of trust 
is not any longer a binary relation between just two people based on personal 
                                                        
88  See e.g. Reid, J., Gonzalez Nieto, J., Dawson, E., Okamoto, E. (2003). Privacy and Trusted 
Computing. Paper presented at the Proceedings of the 14th International Workshop 
on Database and Expert Systems Applications (DEXA’03) (2003), Washington (pp. 
383-388),IEEE. section IV. 
89  so Johnson, D. D., & Bering, J. M. (2006). Hand of God, mind of man: Punishment and 
cognition in the evolution of cooperation. Evolutionary Psychology, 4(1), pp. 219-233. 
On the relation between intra-group cooperation, trust and religion, see Sosis, R. 
(2000). Religion and Intragroup Cooperation: Preliminary Results of a Comparative 




acquaintance or prior observation, but forms a holistic network. The neophyte 
whom I recruit to the religion acquires instantaneously trust, and with that co-
operation, from all other members of the group, since the “recruitment” relation 
is transitive.90 Since group membership earns cooperation and trust from all 
other group members, there is an obvious danger that a free rider will try to fake 
membership. Trusted computing, unsurprisingly, faces the same problem: 
“Therefore, attacks that result in the compromise of the endorsement 
secret key (or any other key) should be expected to occur frequently, 
when trusted platforms are used, for example, in high value 
transactions or DRM applications. Recovery of this key allows 
attackers to create a virtual trusted platform that is entirely under 
their control. Publication of a valid endorsement key pair would allow 
widespread impersonation of the trusted platform, without the trust. 
The TCPA specification acknowledges that “the trustworthiness of the 
architecture is vulnerable to the compromise of a single TPM 
endorsement private key”.”91 
Societies however found an ingenious solution to this problem, which at the 
same time also made unique identification of a person unnecessary. It was 
typically possible to deduce the relevant group membership of a stranger from 
what he wears (or not wears) and eats (or not eats). He demonstrates seriousness 
by forgoing certain benefits, e.g. by refraining from eating types of food (pigs, 
cows etc.) despite scarcity, so giving a “costly signal” that he is not a free rider.92 
                                                        
90  This is of course also the model of Pretty Good Privacy – more on which below. 
91  Reid, J., Gonzalez Nieto, J., Dawson, E., Okamoto, E. (2003). Privacy and Trusted 
Computing. Paper presented at the Proceedings of the 14th International Workshop 
on Database and Expert Systems Applications (DEXA’03) (2003), Washington (pp. 
383-388),IEEE. section 3.2.  
92  see e.g. Henrich, J. The evolution of costly displays, cooperation and religion. 
Evolution and Human Behavior, 30(4), pp. 244-260. doi: 
10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2009.03.005, Watanabe, J. M., & Smuts, B. B. (1999). 
Explaining Religion without Explaining it Away: Trust, Truth, and the Evolution of 
Cooperation in Roy A. Rappaport's "The Obvious Aspects of Ritual". American 
Anthropologist, 101(1), pp. 98-112. doi: 10.2307/683344. 
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These “taboos” then become internalized and form the substratum of holistic, 
society wide trust. TC, by contrast, has no method to re-create this costly 
signaling. Rather, it follows the solution that the modern nation state adopted as 
an alternative approach to the same challenge. The modern, centralized nation 
state became a competitor for trust relations build on blood ties, religious or 
other “tribal” affiliation. In that environment, state issuing of Identity cards that 
give each citizen a unique identifier (e.g. the national security number) became 
necessary. The role of the citizen, her entitlements and status, is now fully 
determined by formal laws – Max Weber’s modern bureaucratic model of 
governance. In that environment, being able to identify myself as myself is 
sufficient and necessary to trigger a broad range of legal consequences and 
reactions. The need for personal trust diminishes proportionally – I trust the ID 
issuing authority, my relation to the person is thus identified, my obligations and 
rights towards him follow suit.93  
It was only recently, with postmodernity becoming a major topic for 
sociology, that sociologists rediscovered the irreducible importance of personal 
trust relations. Trust became important precisely because formal rational law, 
top down bureaucracies and the understanding of personhood as one of “formal 
equality before the law” reached its limits.94 “Identity politics” introduced a very 
different notion of identity, one where the individual is identified not through 
unique personal identifiers that are as a matter of regulation assigned to 
                                                        
93  Caplan, J. (2001). "This or that particular person": protocols of identification in 
nineteenth-century Europe. Documenting individual identity: The development of 
state practices in the modern world, 1, pp. 49-66.   
94  For an illustrative example see e.g. Bosniak, L. S. (1988). Exclusion and Membership: 
The Dual Identity of the Undocumented Worker Under United States Law. Wis. L. Rev., 
pp. 955-1042. Illegal immigrants are an ideal test case for this system – they lack the 
right type of identification certificate, and hence become “invisible” in such a system. 
Personal or “thick” relations of trust do not matter for the way in which they 
communicate with the state or their employer. 
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everybody, but highly contextual properties that are used to negotiate group 
membership (“me” as a mother, a person of colour, a Christian/ Muslim/ Hindu). 
Who I am is less important than what I am – or, maybe crucially for this thesis, 
which networks I am a member of.  
That sociology after the 1950s rediscovered trust as a major theme for 
study95 which was partly caused by an increasing recognition that the Weberian 
model of the liberal state under the rule of law, was insufficient to account for the 
actually observed social dynamics: pre-modern modes of trust had never fully 
disappeared, but continued to underpin much of societal interaction. The idea 
that social exchanges require at least some non-contractual element can be traced 
back at least to Durkheim’s work in the 1880s and his analysis of the interaction 
between law and religion.96 But it was the post-modern, heterogeneous societies 
that make this type of trust increasingly fragile, contested and problematic – 
rekindling in some of the foremost sociologists of this era such as Talcot Parson’s 
the interest in Durkeim’s work and the role of trust.97 Parson thought that “trust” 
was an essential ingredient to guarantee social stability and order. He realized 
however that in pluralist societies, this was a potential problem – how could trust 
be maintained in a society of increasingly isolated and atomistic individuals who 
might feel allegiance to certain group interests, but not society as a whole? 98 This 
                                                        
95  In that sense, “trust” was advocated as an alternative to the Weberian model of 
modern capitalist society e.g. by Luhmann, N., Davis, H., Raffan, J., Rooney, K., & 
Luhmann, N. (1979). Trust and Power : two works by Niklas Luhmann: Chichester : 
Wiley, 1979. 
96  in particular in Durkheim, E. (2014). The division of labor in society: Simon and 
Schuster.  
97  See e.g. Parsons, T. (1967). Durkheim’s contribution to the theory of integration of 
social systems Sociological theory and modern society (pp. 3-34). New York: Free 
Press. On Talcott’s conception of trust see Misztal, B. (2013). Trust in modern 
societies: The search for the bases of social order: John Wiley & Sons., op cit chapter 3 
98  This is another aspect of the “hard” problem of trust for the Internet, which is 
discussed intensely in e-commerce literature. It is not possible to do justice to this 
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Janus face of trust as a network of intra-personal relations based on things other 
than nationality came to the fore with the civil rights movement and the “identity 
politics” that it foregrounded. Taking again religion as our example, the 
Westphalian peace accord had created homogeneous societies where the head of 
state determined the religious identity of the entire polis. But religious conflict 
below the level of the nation state continued, and some might argue, increased, in 
the modern state – see the example of Northern Ireland, or the Shia-Sunni 
violence in nation states in the Arabic world. A tool (religion) that has its 
evolutionary roots in fostering cooperation had increasingly become a hallmark 
for divisiveness and fragmentation. Liberal societies reacted to this by 
recognizing some of these groups also in law, e.g. in affirmative action programs. 
But for the rule of law and legal regulation, this poses a challenge, as this concept 
of trust seems to rely on a conception of identity that in turn is incompatible with 
the rule of law and the idea of formal equality.99 This led to a second wave of 
sociological thinking about trust, one that did not take any longer its stabilizing 
role for granted. The most important contribution to this discussion was itself 
based on systems theory and the early cybernetics of Norbert Wiener, Niklas 
Luhmann’s system theoretical analysis of modern society.100 
                                                        
discussion within the confines of this thesis, though we will revisit it briefly when we 
discuss reliance liability in chapter 4. There, we will look at trustmarks as the 
analogue for TC in an e-commerce setting. For the general debate on the generation 
of trust in e-commerce, the reader is referred to one of the most widely cited 
contributions, Gefen, D., Karahanna, E., & Straub, D. W. (2003). Trust and TAM in 
online shopping: an integrated model. MIS Quarterly, 27(1), pp. 51-90.  
99  See on this Knight, J. (2001). Social norms and the rule of law: Fostering trust in a 
socially diverse society. Trust in society, 2, pp. 354-373.   
100  Most importantly: Luhmann, N., Davis, H., Raffan, J., Rooney, K., & Luhmann, N. 
(1979). Trust and Power : two works by Niklas Luhmann: Chichester : Wiley, 1979. For 
an application of his ideas in an internet context, see e.g. Gefen, D., & Straub, D. W. 
(2003). Managing user trust in B2C e-services. E-service Journal, 2(2), pp. 7-24. and 
McKnight, D. H., & Chervany, N. L. (2001). What Trust Means in E-Commerce 
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With Luhmann, we encounter a sociological thinker who is probably most 
attuned to frame the issues we encountered in terms of complexity and networks. 
For Guadamuz, Luhmann’s concept of autopoietic law shows how we can think of 
regulation in ways other than top-down, “command and control” regulation: 
“It is easy to see how the concept of autopoiesis is useful from a 
regulatory perspective, as it helps to explain how regulatory 
processes emerge, evolve and act as self- organising agents in society. 
Autopoietic regulation could be seen as an internal ordering force; 
organic, dynamic, and self-organising. This would contrast a more 
structured and hierarchical view of regulation known as “command 
and control” regulation, where governmental bodies serve as the 
organising force exerting control in a top-down manner.“101 
While appreciating Luhmann’s contribution, he urges nonetheless caution: 
“Having said this, it is essential to note that there appears to be a clear 
split between the understanding of autopoiesis in legal systems and 
the concepts of self-organisation and emergence studied in the 
previous chapter. While Luhmann repeatedly uses examples from 
biology to describe autopoiesis, and his concept of self-organisation 
matches that used in the physical sciences, it is clear that autopoiesis 
is very much a social theory. With few exceptions, the theoretical 
study of autopoiesis is devoid of the mathematical treatment and the 
wealth of evidence into self-organisation involving information 
theory, phase transitions and emergence described in Chapter 2. It is 
almost as if the social sciences and the physical sciences arrived at the 
same conclusion following entirely different paths.”102 
We cannot here attempt the cross pollination that he calls in as a desiderata. 
For our purpose, what is important is the role that Luhmann assigned to trust in 
the constitution of social systems and the autopoietic emergence of order: 
                                                        
Customer Relationships: An Interdisciplinary Conceptual Typology. International 
journal of Electronic Commerce, 6(2), pp. 35-59.  
101  Guadamuz, A. (2011). Networks, Complexity and Internet Regulation: Scale-free Law: 
Edward Elgar Pub. p. 55. 
102   Guadamuz, A. (2013). Networks, complexity and internet regulation scale-free law: 
The University of Edinburgh. 
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“Trust, by the reduction of complexity, discloses possibilities for 
action which would have remained unattractive and improbable 
without trust - which would not, in other words, have been 
pursued.”103 
Trust is one of the ways complexity is reduced. Reduction of complexity, by 
distinguishing an “inside” from an “outside”, is in Luhmann’s sociology the main 
function of systems. We have seen how trust can reduce complexity above – when 
encountering a stranger, instead of dealing with the infinitely many possibilities 
that his “identity” presents, I can reduce the complexity of my decision making 
process on whether to cooperate with him by seeing him as a mere representative 
of a group – a group that is either “inside” my own system or “outside” it (in which 
latter case, I stop caring). The moment I bring in this way “the outside in”104 and 
relabel the stranger as a component of my system, I have also reproduced that 
system – one of the key functions of systems being their constant. With other 
words, communication within a system selects a limited amount of all 
information from the outside that is available in theory. The stranger has a 
specific height, size, eye colour, manner etc. None of these infinitely many 
attributes matter, only those that have a specific “meaning” (in German, Sinn) – 
here those attributes that identify him as member of my religious group. This way 
the distinctive identity of each system is constantly reproduced in its 
communication, by distinguishing between what is and what is not considered 
meaningful. This is what Luhmann calls auto-poiesis, literally, self-creation, 
reproduction from elements previously filtered from an over-complex 
environment. Identity then, is not a condition for trust as it is in Trusted 
Computing. Rather, the converse is true: trust creates identity by allowing 
                                                        
103  Luhmann, N., Davis, H., Raffan, J., Rooney, K., & Luhmann, N. (1979). Trust and Power 
: two works by Niklas Luhmann: Chichester : Wiley, 1979. p. 25. 
104  Bańkowski, Z. (2007). Bringing the outside in: the ethical life of legal institutions Law 
and legal Cultures in the 21st Century: Unity and Diversity (Wolters Kluwer Polska, 
2007) (pp. 193-217). 
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systems to selectively ascribe meaning to the information that it acquires from its 
environment.  
Against this background, the focus of TC on unique and “official” modes of 
identification reads like a throwback into times where trust, as understood in 
sociology, was precisely not what was needed to ensure security. It bears the 
marks of top down, bureaucratic regulation, not bottom up network centric 
emergence through self-assembling network interactions. When it talks about 
trust, it means in fact something more akin to reputation, and as we discussed 
above, reputation systems do not form natural networks. In the context of the 
Internet, we can see this also by contrasting “Trusted Computing” with an 
approach that matches much more closely the transitive trust relation described 
above. There we used as an example how a trusted member of a group can “bring 
in” strangers by trusting them – proselyting in the pre-modern society. In the 
Internet society, we find the very same model in the Web of Trust that underpins 
Pretty Good Privacy. As Zimmerman put it: 
“As time goes on, you will accumulate keys from other people that you 
may want to designate as trusted introducers. Everyone else will each 
choose their own trusted introducers. And everyone will gradually 
accumulate and distribute with their key a collection of certifying 
signatures from other people, with the expectation that anyone 
receiving it will trust at least one or two of the signatures. This will 
cause the emergence of a decentralized fault-tolerant web of 
confidence for all public keys.”105 
This is the direct digital equivalent of joining a religion through e.g. a baptism 
by a trusted member of that religion, or joining an exclusive club on the 
recommendation of a member. Trust travels in this model along the nodes of the 
network, creating a “web of trust”.  
We face with other words a conceptual paradox: to build (what it perceives 
as) trust, TC relies on a concept that is in sociological terms seen as a 
                                                        
105  Zimmermann, P. R. (1995). The official PGP user's guide: MIT Press. 
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diametrically opposed mode of regulation. While the Web of Trust has been 
described as a network centric approach that beat governments and their 
traditional mode of regulation,106 the TCI reproduces traditional modes of 
governance, just with a private sector conglomerate taking the role of the 
executive. This is not just an abstract philosophical speculation. It helps us to 
understand better the legal and regulatory issues that TC creates, and also its 
relative failure. If TC is despite its name more similar to traditional forms of 
regulation than network centric, self-organizing regulation, then the legal system 
needs to take account of this – reproducing e.g. the constraints under which 
governments operate. This will be a key theme of chapter 3, where we will indeed 
argue that TC is best understood as privatization of centralized government 
functions, not a decentralized, emergent network governed by free contractual 
association only.  
Unhindered operations: The next core concept of TC is that of “unhindered 
operation”, which we encountered already above when discussing the techno 
concept of trust. According to the TCI, something can be trusted: 
“if it behaves in an expected manner for a particular purpose. A 
component of a Trusted Platform has been designed to perform a 
particular task and follow a designed behavior. That component must 
be able to operate without interference from other components or 
processes within the platform. In order for a given component to even 
begin to operate, it must not be (allowed to be) subjected to tampering 
within the platform.”107 
We discussed the “Popperian” element of trust above. With its 
epistemological counterpart, it shares the problem that the more complex a 
system is, the more interlocking parts it has, the more chaotic and unpredictable 
it can become. The idea behind this concept is seemingly simple and based on the 
                                                        
106  Levy, S. (2001). Crypto: How the Code Rebels Beat the Government--Saving Privacy 
in the Digital Age: Penguin. 
107  TCG. (2006d). TCG Infrastructure Working Group Architecture Part II - Integrity 
Management v1.0. In T. Hardjono (Ed.), (Revision  1.0 ed.). section 2.2 pg. 9. 
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lessons learned with popular computer systems such as Windows. A typical 
security problem for Windows was Privilege Escalation.108 Privilege Escalation 
essentially means that a computer is only as secure as its weakest link. Once a bug 
or configuration oversight in one component was identified and the component 
taken over by an adversary (say a flaw in the media player application), it was 
often possible to gain elevated access to resources that are normally protected 
from an application or user and thus control the entire machine. TC addresses 
this issue by preventing access to parts of the system that are not needed for the 
operation of another.  
To use a societal analogy: I might be able to trust you, personally, on the basis 
of your past behavior. I might not trust in the same way the people you associate 
with in your social circle. If I now have reasons to worry that they will influence 
your behavior towards me, I cannot any longer predict if you will be benevolent 
or malevolent. To extend this analogy even further, I might trust you and your 
wife. But I also know that there are “hostiles” in the environment who might have 
kidnapped your wife to force you into malevolent behavior against me. This was 
the reality for computer security in the past: a hostile agency could get access to 
one component part such as a media player (the wife, in our analogy), through 
escalation of privilege gain access to the root of the entire computer and from 
there control all its component parts, eventually using it for a Denial of Service 
attack.  
TC restores the ability to trust a computer by reducing this complex 
interaction – to be trusted, operations have to show that they are unhindered. In 
our analogy, you have to show first that your insalubrious contacts did not and 
could not affect the way you will fulfill your obligation towards me.  
                                                        
108  See e.g. King, S. T., Tucek, J., Cozzie, A., Grier, C., Jiang, W., & Zhou, Y. (2008). Designing 
and Implementing Malicious Hardware. LEET, 8, pp. 1-8.  
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Above we argued that the TC understanding of trust does not lead to organic, 
self-organizing networks as it is not based on a transitive trust relation. Here TC 
goes a step further, and actively prevents (certain forms of) transitivity, 
preventing this way the spread of harm.  
Attestation: We encountered the final core component of TC above. There, 
we argued that if we want to predict future good behavior, we need a way to 
certify past good behavior. In the words of the TCI: 
“In order for something to be trusted, there must be some way of 
verifying consistent good behavior of that thing. That is, for a Trusted 
Platform to be trustworthy, there needs to be some means for that 
platform to report (to the external world) its integrity state (as a 
whole), which is a function of the integrity state of each component 
that make-up that Trusted Platform.”109 
TPs are optimized for the protections and processing of private or secret 
data. They have isolated execution environments, where software/data is 
protected from external interference and they can offer assurances about their 
behavior (hardware and software environment).110 The need to build attestation 
into a TC solution, immediately leads to one of the core legal issues of this thesis. 
If someone acts in reliance of such an attestation, and the attestation was 
unwarranted (as we discussed above, TC does not guarantee perfect security) is 
there any redress for the reliance placed on that attestation? Here, more than in 
the other two core ideas, legal and technological issues are not only closely linked, 
but structurally isomorphic. In the TC world, security should follow trust along 
the arcs of the network. Given the “imperfection by design” that the cost-benefit 
analysis of TC entails, does liability follow the same arcs, and if so, does it have 
                                                        
109  TCG. (2006d). TCG Infrastructure Working Group Architecture Part II - Integrity 
Management v1.0. In T. Hardjono (Ed.), (Revision  1.0 ed.). Section 2.2, pg. 9. 
110  Gallery, E. (2008). Who are the TCG and what are the Trusted Computing concepts? 




the potential to enhance or even create the trust? Due to the centrality of the 
concept of attestation for this thesis, we will now look into it in more detail.  
2.6.2 Direct Anonymous Attestation Protocol 
The core of the TCI hardware is the protocol which implements attestation, 
known as Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA). From its name we can derive the 
basic logic of the initially planned protocol which implied:  
 proof without a Trusted Third Party (TTP) involvement (Direct);  
 non-disclosure of the identity of the signer (Anonymous);  
 requirement of statement or claim from a TPM (Attestation).  
It is capable of “remotely prov[ing] that a key is held in some hardware 
device and provid[ing] a strong authentication combined with privacy 
protection”.111 The DAA is standardized by the Trusted Computing Group and 
implements a number of applications, such as use of a cryptographic key for 
authentication of the OS as secure, secure access to networks and services, and 
ease of key management in companies. 
Furthermore, the DAA is based on a state-of the art group signature scheme; 
it relies on the Diffie-Hellman cryptographic key-exchange to protect the user’s 
privacy.112 Diffie–Hellman key exchange is a method to exchange cryptographic 
keys over a public channel, and one of the earliest examples of such a key 
exchange in cryptography. Crucially, it allows two parties that have no prior 
knowledge of each other to jointly establish a shared secret key over an insecure 
                                                        
111  Camenisch, J. (2004). Direct Anonymous Attestation: Achieving Privacy in Remote 
Authentication. ZISC Information Security Colloquium.  
112  Introduced first in Diffie, W., & Hellman, M. E. (1976). New directions in 
cryptography. Information Theory, IEEE Transactions on, 22(6), pp. 644-654. doi: 
10.1109/TIT.1976.1055638. A good account for its use by the TCI can be found in 
Brickell, E., Camenisch, J., & Chen, L. (2004). Direct Anonymous Attestation. Paper 
presented at the Proceedings of the 11th ACM Conference on Computer and 
Communications Security (CCS 2004) (pp. 132-145),ACM. 
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channel. Once again we see here the very specific understanding of “trust” in TC 
at work: we mentioned above from a sociological perspective the challenge for 
modern societies with their high degree of heterogeneity, isolation and 
anonymity to sustain the trust levels needed to allow transactions to take place. 
They posed a fundamental paradox: In order to trust you, I have to know you. In 
order to know you, I have to communicate with you. In order to communicate 
with you, I have to disclose some things about myself. But in order to be able to 
disclose things about myself to you, I need to trust you. How then, is “social 
control of impersonal trust” even possible?113 From the field of sociology, a for us 
interesting answer was given by Mark Granovetter, who argued that "concrete 
personal relations and structures (or 'networks') of such relations" in which 
economic action in modern industrial society is embedded remain an 
indispensable element to explain security and economic stability in modern 
societies.114 For him, examples of such embedded structures are social networks 
such as trade associations, professional organizations and also “quasi-firm 
arrangement that reflect long term associations between contractors and 
subcontractors”.115 The TCG, as an institution, is of course just such a “quasi-firm 
arrangement that reflects a long term association between contractors and 
subcontractors”. However, as we argued above, this embedded network does not 
extend to the outside and “brings in” the customer of the TCI – a problem to which 
we will return later. Rather, that external relation is governed by a reliance on 
classical contract law.  
                                                        
113  Shapiro, S. P. (1987). The Social Control of Impersonal Trust. American Journal of 
Sociology, 93(3), pp. 623-658. doi: citeulike-article-id:6111856. 
114  Granovetter, M. (1985). Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of 
Embeddedness. Ibid., 91, pp. 481-510. doi: 10.2307/2780199. p. 499 
115  Shapiro, S. P. (1987). The Social Control of Impersonal Trust. Ibid., 93, pp. 623-658. 
doi: citeulike-article-id:6111856 p. 623. 
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Granovetter contrasts this “embeddedness approach” against both 
“neoclassical” and “reformist” conceptions of economic action. The former relies, 
so Granovetter, on an “undersocialized", the latter on an "oversocialized" 
explanation. In a nutshell, we can make sense of this idea when we go back to 
Lessig’s square of regulatory modes introduced above. “Undersocialised” 
regulation is regulation by law only, the classical, Weberian model of the formal 
rational law. “Oversocialised” regulation is regulation that relies mainly or 
exclusively on appeals to morality – the “social norms” aspect of Lessig. Instead, 
Granovetter argues that we are always already embedded in social networks 
which ensure that we unthinkingly always interact with others, without having 
to reflect on either type of normative system. 
For the Internet, this poses a problem – while there are of course numerous 
“embedded” networks, in particular social media, we cannot take such a pre-
existing connection for granted. This becomes particularly problematic for 
Trusted Computing. The one thing TC does NOT trust in, are human users. Rather, 
the tendency of humans to make the wrong “risk decisions” when dealing with 
technology and security (not updating anti-virus software, disabling firewalls 
when they slow down performance etc.) is a problem that TC tries to address 
through automation. This is one aspect of the “unhindered operation” discussed 
above: a system that is supposed to have a firewall has to prove to a 
communication partner that the security operates “unhindered by its human 
owner”. Machines decide which other machines can be trusted. But machines lack 
social embeddedness of the kind Granovetter describes. Regulation by code then 
has to replace this embeddedndess. It ensures that we, or in the case of TC, our 
computers “do the right thing” and communicate without having to rely or to 
think about any set of rules external to that communication.  
The specific element of regulation by code discussed here, secure 
cryptographic exchange protocols such as Diffie-Hellman, break in particular the 
“trust paradox” outlined above. They allow two parties that have no reasons to 
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trust each other whatsoever to communicate nonetheless, protecting their 
privacy in the process, and thus opening up a channel that can then lead to lasting 
trust based on observed past performance.  
The aims of the TCG are materialized by integrating a trusted hardware 
module (TPM) into a platform (e.g. a mobile phone, a laptop). Security is 
essentially a combination of hardware and software. The hardware forces secure 
behavior that is not subject to “hacking”. The software (also) certifies that the 
secure hardware is in place and has not been physically tampered with. This 
mutual interdependence between hardware and software causes some legal 
problems if we try to classify “Trusted Computing” as a commercial product – is 
it a service, hardware or software? From the computing perspective, this 
distinction becomes meaningless – security is the union of these three. But law’s 
categories are not best suited to handle this type of interdependent entity, as we 
will discuss later.  
Here, we discuss some of the more abstract issues that this approach 
generates. A user of the platform communicates with a verifier who wants to 
assure that the user uses the platform containing the specified TPM. However, the 
user wants his privacy to be protected and therefore requires that the verifier 
only learns that he uses a TPM, but not which particular one. Initially, TC tried to 
avoid any third party - the security of a system resides in its hardware, and the 
system’s own software guarantees this. As it runs on a secure hardware, this self-
attestation in turn cannot be manipulated or forged, resulting in the theory of a 
“virtuous circle”. 
However, it soon became obvious that this approach was not possible. Full 
anonymity and “trust” seemed to be irreconcilable. We encounter here another 
version of the paradox of trust discussed above. In “trusted mode” a party 
(typically called “Bob” in the informatics literature), wants to communicate with 
another computer (Alice) so that Bob can trust Alice to run only un-tampered 
hardware and software. This will assure Bob that Alice will not be able to use 
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malicious software, either intentionally or because she in turn was victim of a 
malicious hack, which could in turn, infest his computer and compromise 
sensitive information. But to do this, Alice has to inform Bob that she is using 
registered and probably safe software and hardware, thereby potentially 
uniquely identifying herself to Bob. In essence, Alice tells Bob everything that 
runs on her computer in a way that can be verified by Bob. As a real world 
analogy, we can think of allowing a potential business partner to have his staff 
search our house before he visits us for contract negotiations.  
Sometimes, this is surprisingly unproblematic. During online banking 
transactions over the Internet for instance, I want my bank to be able to identify 
me anyway. Here, pre-existing social trust fills the gap technology alone can’t fill. 
Several of Granovetter’s factors for embedded social relation come into play – 
from the Financial Service Authority to a more nebulous belief in the 
professionalism of a large bank. But in many other types of communicating 
activities people require the anonymity that the computer provides. The 
compromise that TCG proposed to keep Bob anonymous with regards to Alice, 
while assuring her, that she is communicating with a “trusted” party was through 
a “trusted third party”. This entity acts as intermediary between a user and her 
own computer, and at the same time between her and other users. The latter, 
called remote attestation is of particular importance.  
TCG provided a solution to this problem by making use of a trusted third 
party which in this case was called the Privacy Certification Authority (PCA). Every 
TPM creates a key pair using the RSA algorithm and this key pair is called 
Endorsement Key (EK). The EK is created only once and PCA keeps a record of the 
Endorsement Key of every valid TPM. Whenever a TPM wants to verify itself to a 
verifier, it creates another pair of RSA keys which is called an Attestation Identity 
Key (AIK) and sends that key pair to the PCA. The PCA then authenticates this 
public key which refers to the EK. Then the PCA will check if the EK is contained 
in its list of valid EKs. If it is contained in the list, the PCA issues to the TPM a 
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certificate for the AIK. The TPM can now send the AIK’s certificate to the verifier 
and actually authenticate itself. Consequently, a TPM can only be uniquely 
identified by its EK which becomes known only to the PCA. So only the PCA, and 
not the verifier, can uniquely identify the TPM which is something that does not 
bother us, since the PCA is trustworthy. The verifier is only getting the TPM’s AIK, 
which is different each time and consequently the verifier cannot uniquely 
identify the TPM. 
In the solution described above we have two possibilities to detect a rogue 
TPM. These are: 
1. If someone manages to obtain a TPM's secret key (EK), and distributes it, then 
this key can be detected and announced as a rogue secret key. Detection is 
achieved via a code that is executed at the very beginning during boot process 
and is known as Core Root of Trust for Measurement (CRTM). This code is an 
immutable part of the TPM that should be trusted; it is placed in the BIOS and 
cannot be threatened by any known software attacks due to difficulties to 
manipulation.116 The Privacy CA can then compute the corresponding public 
key and remove it from its list of valid Endorsement Keys.  
2. If there are many enquiries at the PCA with the same EK and PCA issues 
certification for that specific EK, then the PCA might not want to continue 
issuing certificates for that EK. 
Although this is a solution for the trusted computing problem, it has a major 
disadvantage: the PCA is involved in every transaction and thus it must be highly 
available, but at the same time provide as much security as an ordinary 
certification authority which would normally operate off-line. Moreover, if the 
PCA and the verifier join together, or the PCA’s transaction records are revealed 
to the verifier - by some other means - (this can be solved using blind signatures), 
                                                        
116  Pearson, S. (2002). Trusted Computing Platforms, the Next Security Solution: 
Prentice Hall PTR. 
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the verifier will still be capable of uniquely identifying a TPM. Consequently, the 
problem with the PCA’s availability endures.  
A better solution was proposed by Ernie Brickell, Jan Camenisch and Liqun 
Chen. This solution was adopted by the TCG in the new specification of the TPM 
(1.2) in 2003. It associates techniques “developed for group signatures, identity 
escrow, and credential systems”.117 The proposed scheme can be described as a 
group signature scheme,118 but one which does not have the opportunity to open 
signatures but with a mechanism to detect fake TPMs.119 “Group signatures” as a 
method to find a technological solution to the trust problem, allows another 
comparison with sociological conceptions of trust. A Group signature scheme 
allows a dedicated member of a group to “act on behalf” of that group and sign 
anonymously messages for it. For example, a group signature scheme could be 
used by an employee of a large company “on behalf of” the company. The verifier 
only needs to know that it was an authorized employee who signed the message, 
not which one. The collective provides an additional degree of anonymity, but 
requires internally a pre-existing degree of trust and solidarity.120 
                                                        
117  See Brickell, E., Camenisch, J., & Chen, L. (2004). Direct Anonymous Attestation. Paper 
presented at the Proceedings of the 11th ACM Conference on Computer and 
Communications Security (CCS 2004) (pp. 132-145),ACM. Adopted in TCG. (2003). 
TPM - Part 1 Design Principles, Specification v.1.2 (Revision  62 ed.). 
118  on group signatures see Bellare, M., Micciancio, D., & Warinschi, B. (2003). 
Foundations of group signatures: Formal definitions, simplified requirements, and a 
construction based on general assumptions Advances in Cryptology—Eurocrypt 2003 
(pp. 614-629). Warsaw, Poland: Springer. 
119  Brickell, E., Camenisch, J., & Chen, L. (2004). Direct Anonymous Attestation. Paper 
presented at the Proceedings of the 11th ACM Conference on Computer and 
Communications Security (CCS 2004) (pp. 132-145),ACM. 
120  a similar point on the importance of solidarity for privacy protection has been made 
in Kwecka, Z., Buchanan, W., Schafer, B., & Rauhofer, J. (2014). 'I am Spartacus': 
privacy enhancing technologies, collaborative obfuscation and privacy as a public 
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Key to a group signature scheme is a group manager. That person plays a role 
we discussed above in the context of PGP: he is in charge of adding new members 
to the group and in case of disputes can reveal the original signer. This is 
important from a legal perspective: in case of a dispute, parties may want to rely 
on the third mode of regulation, formal laws, to seek redress. For this avenue to 
be available though, some evidence needs to be preserved in a forensically sound 
way. This will be at the center of the next chapter, where we will discuss the 
consequences of TC for evidence law. At this point we merely note the intricate 
balance between security and privacy on the one hand, modes of regulation on 
the other hand. TC uses regulation through code to increase privacy, but at the 
same time provides an infrastructure for litigation purposes (and if necessary at 
a cost to privacy) to enable the legal system to take over in a case of conflict, thus 
increasing, potentially, the trustworthiness of the overall approach. Many 
schemes have been proposed, however all should follow these basic 
requirements. 
The scheme described in Bajikar’s 2002 White Paper, also employs a 
signature scheme to issue certificates on a membership public key generated by 
a TPM. 121 In order to authenticate as a group member, or valid TPM, a TPM must 
prove that it possesses a certificate on a public key for which it also knows the 
secret key. To allow a verifier to detect rogue TPM’s, the TPM is further required 
to reveal and prove correct of a value , where f is its secret key and ζ is a 
generator of an algebraic group where computing discrete logarithms are 
infeasible. As before, there are two possibilities for the verifier to detect a rogue 
TPM. The first is by comparing with  for all f ’s that are known to stem 
from rogue TPM’s. The second is by detecting whether he has seen the same 
too many times. This only works when the same ζ is used many times. Yet, ζ 
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should not be a fixed system parameter or else the user will not gain any privacy. 
As an alternative, ζ should either be randomly chosen by the TPM each time when 
it authenticates itself or every verifier should use a different ζ and charge it with 
some frequency. But, we assume that with the use of an appropriate hash 
function, we can derive ζ. 
The scheme described above, employs the Camenisch-Lysyanskaya 
signature scheme, the respective discrete logarithms based proofs to prove 
possession of a certificate, the strong RSA assumption guarantees the 
memorability of certificates, and privacy and anonymity are assured by the 
decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption. The Fiat-Shamir heuristic is also used to 
turn proofs into signatures. 
2.6.3 Technology / Protocols On Trusted Computing 
2.6.3.1 Platforms  
Both hardware i.e. the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) and software i.e. the 
Trusted Support Services (TSS) are combined in a Trusted Computing System. 
The software must contain TC-enabled applications, and hardware’s role is 
emphasized in the ‘Fritz’ chip. The latter is a smartcard chip - named after the 
Senator Fritz Hollings, a US politician with a long history of legislative attempts 
to ensure that PCs do not support production of “unauthorized content”122 - and 
it is placed on the motherboard which constantly checks the software and 
hardware that are running on the machine. If both are found to be authorized, the 
operating system (OS) boots and assures any third parties that the machine is the 
                                                        
122  See Davis, Peter T. "TCPA: who can you trust." EDPACS: the EDP Audit, Control and 
Security Newsletter (2002) 15-19 p, 16 
76 
 
machine that claimed to be and the software that is running on it, is the software 
claimed to be.123  
An early description of the Fritz chip by the TCI is both interesting and 
revealing: 
“When you boot up your PC, Fritz takes charge. He checks that the boot 
ROM is as expected, executes it, measures the state of the machine; 
then checks the first part of the operating system, loads and executes 
it, checks the state of the machine; and so on. The trust boundary, of 
hardware and software considered to be known and verified, is 
steadily expanded. A table is maintained of the hardware (audio card, 
video card etc) and the software (O/S, drivers, etc); if there are 
significant changes, the machine must be re-certified. The result is a 
PC booted into a known state with an approved combination of 
hardware and software. Control is then handed over to enforcement 
software in the operating system […] Once the machine is in this state, 
Fritz can certify it to third parties: for example, he will do an 
authentication protocol with Disney to prove that his machine is a 
suitable recipient of ‘Snow White’. The Disney server then sends 
encrypted data, with a key that Fritz will use to unseal it. Fritz makes 
the key available only so long as the environment remains 
‘trustworthy’. For this purpose, ‘trustworthy’ means that the media 
player application won't make any unauthorised copies of content.”124 
First, we see here how hardware and software act indeed in unison – for the 
product “security”, they are inseparable. As we noted above, that raises issues 
from a legal perspective what exactly a consumer is buying - hardware, software, 
a service, a combination of these two, and what legal regime is applicable. Second, 
we see the degree of “force” that TC products exercise over the user – If Fritz 
decides that there is something untoward on your machine, it will not boot. That 
would still be fine if “untoward” was restricted to malware that can harm me. But 
as the example shows, it can as well be “unauthorized” software that I added to 
                                                        
123  Anderson, R. (2003a). Trusted Computing Frequently Asked Questions / TCG / 
LaGrande / NGSCB / Longhorn / Palladium / TCPA – Version 1.1. (2003). 
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rip video files. The TCI later attempted to disassociate TC from its origin as 
essentially a Digital Rights Management system, but here we can see just how 
problematic this approach could be: Not only does it either prevent third party 
software that “could” be used for copyright violation to run in the first place (and 
there can of course be many legitimate uses for such software), or alternatively 
prevents to communicate with (download) music files. More worrying, a chip on 
my own computer communicates the finding that “there is ripping software on 
this system, don’t trust this computer” to a third party. I have to put blind trust in 
this party and rely on it not disclosing the information – even though, as we just 
mentioned, it is preserved in a forensically sound way. The whole system is set 
up by companies who are also major copyright right holders. We will argue in 
chapter 3 and 4 that this creates a significant imbalance in procedural law and 
evidence, making the TCI police, prosecution and jury all in one. This imbalance 
asks in our opinion for regulation through law – rebalancing through the rules of 
admissibility and procedure, the relation between customer and TC provider.  
Currently TC is a composite of five main components: the ‘Fritz’ chip; a 
‘curtained memory’ – which is explained further below in section 2.6.3.1.2 – in 
the CPU; a security kernel in the operating system; a security kernel in each TC 
application; and a back-end infrastructure of online security servers. 
Furthermore, Safford stated that TC architecture supports two important 
security functions:  
 Secure storage of the key pairs generated, along with public key 
signatures, verifications, encryptions and decryptions and  
 System software integrity measurement.125 
                                                        




Minimum functionality which is necessary to describe the properties that 
influence the trustworthiness of a computing environment is represented by 
Roots of Trust.126 There are three core Roots of Trust: 
 a root of trust for measurement (RTM)  
 a root of trust for storage (RTS) 
 a root of trust reporting (RTR). 
In order for any misbehaviour within the system to be detected, all three 
Roots of Trust must be trusted. Roots of Trust are expected to function correctly 
without any external interactions. In conjunction with the Trusted Building 
Blocks (TBB), Roots of Trust achieve trust, while measurement, storage and 
reporting are done with minimal configuration.127 
To the following sub-sections we give a description of the basic protocols 
that were used, or are still currently in use. 
2.6.3.1.1 Palladium (now NGSCB) 
“Next Generation Secure Computing Base” (NGSCB) is a set of features for 
Microsoft Windows operating system. Initially this platform was named 
Palladium and is still widely known by this name. According to its promoters, 
Palladium provides users with greater data security than they already have, 
strong process isolation, sealed storage, personal privacy and system integrity. 
Enhanced practical user control; emergence of new server/service models; and 
potentially new P2P (peer to peer) or fully peer-distributed service models are 
some of the benefits that the platform gives to its users.128 This system was 
planned to be embedded in the Windows Vista operating system, and would 
                                                        
126  Burmester, M., & Mulholland, J. (2006, April 23 - 27). The advent of trusted computing: 
implications for digital forensics Paper presented at the Proceedings of the 2006 ACM 
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127  ibid. p.284 
128  Carroll, A., Juarez, M., Polk, J., & Leininger, T. (2002). Microsoft Palladium: A Business 
Overview: Microsoft Press Release. 
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become available in January 2007.129 However, this was not possible after all, 
considering the low significance that third parties depicted for this 
implementation. 
New features provided by Palladium run on existing Windows systems.130 
They require no changes, as the platform is not programmed to work on a 
separate operating system than Windows, and in co-operation with the same 
kernel, computer hardware, peripherals and chipsets. 
TC’s idea is to keep keys secret with the use of a digital encryption and 
signature device. In addition, it prevents identity theft and unauthorised access 
to personal data on the user’s own device, while connected to the internet or to 
any other network.131 Overall, what this platform provides to the user is: 
protection to personal data, to sensitive communications and to e-commerce 
transactions, from attack to either the system’s software or to a network’s 
software. 
2.6.3.1.2 TCPA (now TCG) 
TCG proposed a technology that makes use of four main features. Along with 
these, new hardware installation on existing PC’s is required. The features can 
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This refers to a “strong, hardware-enforced memory isolation feature”132 in 
order to avoid reading and writing memory between several programs. In TC the 
operating system should have access to this type of memory, so if an adversary 
enters the operating system it would not be possible for him to enter and 
interfere with any program and its memory. The advantages of using a hardware 
feature instead of software – which could operate in a similar fashion – are the: 
backwards compatibility; the reusability of code; and the fact that fewer changes 
need to be made to hardware drivers and application software.133  
Secure I/O 
This provides a secure hardware path from the keyboard or mouse (i.e. the 
user) to an application and vice versa. By doing this, none of the software 
programs will know what the user typed as a command or input to another 
program and how the application responded. Protection from physical attacks is 
provided and any programs that intentionally “corrupt, modify, or mislead the 
user, will be prevented from running or operating”.134 
Sealed Storage 
Until recently, any keys and passwords used by applications were stored 
locally on the hard-drive. This was not so secure, because keys could be accessible 
by any intruder or virus. So, it is important to ensure that only legitimate users 
can access these valuable and secret data. This is exactly what sealed storage 
does. It is characterised as “an ingenious invention that generates keys based in 
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part on the identity of the software requesting to use them and in part on the 
identity of the computer on which that software is running”.135 
Furthermore sealed storage can cooperate with memory curtaining and 
secure I/O in order to ensure that a user’s data can be read on their computer, 
and only by the particular computer that were initially created on. If a different 
application than the one that was originally used to create the data tries to 
decrypt or unseal the data, the operation will end up in failure. 
Remote Attestation 
This aims to allow “unauthorized” changes to software to be detected. It 
remotely traces any changes made to any application and allows a third party to 
decide whether the platform is considered trustworthy.136 This feature helps to 
prevent the sending of data to or from a compromised or untrustworthy 
computer and certifies that no unauthorised program installs, updates or that 
modifications are made in the hardware or software on the user’s machine. 
Moreover, “this allows an entity to authenticate the software configuration of a 
platform that is not under its control”.137 This is the most significant of all features 
mentioned. 
The TCG chip provides three main groups of functions. These are: 
 public key functions: which are used for key pair generation, public key 
signature, verification, encryption and decryption purposes. 
 trusted boot functions: which ensure that data are “trusted” if the data 
stored while booting are the same with the data at the time of sealing. 
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Trusted booting combines both authentic booting which creates a log 
containing the programs that are loaded on the computing device and 
secure booting which ensures that the computing device is in a secure 
state. 
 initialization and management functions: which allow the user to switch 
on or off the functionality, to reset the chip and take ownership.138 
TCG provides protection to sensitive authentication information from 
attacks by hackers and this is achieved by providing protection to the user’s 
private key. In addition, by sealing the master encryption key under a TCG 
register, it is possible to protect a user’s sensitive files and data.139 
TCG and Palladium have similar architectures and similar goals, but they are 
two different projects. One important similarity between the Palladium design 
and the existing TCG is that both contain the “remote attestation” feature. 
Palladium, in order to achieve full functionality in hardware and software, uses 
TCG’s hardware functionality.140 
2.6.3.1.3 LaGrande Technology (LT) 
LaGrande technology provided by Intel (recently renamed as Trusted 
Execution Technology (TXT)) as a response to the Trusted Computing trend – 
which is not a substitute of the TCPA, rather it lies heavily on the TCPA features. 
It is a protection model that embeds Palladium’s features as mentioned above. 
The main features that exist in LaGrande are the I/O of data, the sealed storage, 
the attestation and the protected execution. Mainly, LaGrande enables to run 
applications in an isolated environment, which means that prevents other 
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applications to intervene or compromise data. ‘Standard partition’ and ‘Protected 
partition’ are two new features that this technology uses. The first applies when 
the users are able to run applications and other software just as they did in the 
ordinary PC. The second applies when different applications can run secluded by 
any other software running on the same PC. 
2.6.3.1.4 AMD Pacifica 
At this point, it worth mentioning that apart from Intel’s LaGrande 
technology, AMD is working on one called formally Secure Execution Mode 
(known as SEM) and then called Pacifica and later marketed under the trademark 
AMD Virtualization, abbreviated AMD-V. These two projects are hardware-
related and provide hardware support to all major features of Window’s 
Palladium which is software-oriented. 
In particular AMD develops a security and virtual machine architecture 
which enables a single operating system to run in parallel numerous operating 
systems. This architecture supports Virtual Machine Architectures both for 
servers and clients,141 and allows a third party operating system to access the 
host’s operating system directly, resulting in higher performance. 
2.7 Recap and summary 
This first substantive chapter tried to achieve several goals. It tried to give 
the reader a general understanding of what “Trusted Computing” means, and why 
it is a good prima facie candidate to address the cyber security problem: It is a 
paradigmatic example of regulation through code, where the freedom of the user 
to reconfigure her machine is restricted in exchange for greater, but not perfect, 
security. It protects the user, the integrity of her machine and also her privacy 
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against other computer users to a degree, but at the cost of disclosing more of her 
information to a trusted third party, and by exposing her to greater security risks 
should that third party in turn be compromised. It aims to create a decentralized, 
bottom up solution to security where security follows along the arcs of an 
emergent “network of trust”. If it were successful especially in the latter, we 
would have found a form of code based regulation that is strictly isomorphic to 
the Internet itself, making a significant contribution to the problem of regulation 
of complex and dynamic systems that Guadamuz had identified.  
We introduced the general idea of Trusted Computing or TC by looking in 
more detail at the technical details of the specific implementation of this concept 
that is promoted by the Trusted Computing Initiative. The TCI has pushed the 
concept of TC closer to implementation, but nonetheless uptake so far remained 
disappointing. The reasons that are given for this relative failure differ. According 
to its critics, TC is an attempt at empire building by a cartel of big international 
businesses to foster their own agenda, exclude competitors (especially open 
source), help right holders to enforce their copyright even more brutally and in 
the process ride roughshod over consumer privacy. The security they promise is 
not the appropriate in light of their market share, reputation and brand name: 
pay us and we will protect you – but hand over your weapons first. In the long 
run, consumer security can as a result suffer even more, as we lose the ability to 
look after our own security, with products of our choice whether TCI certified or 
not. According to its promoters, TC remains the last best hope for a secure 
Internet, with the Internet of Things if anything requiring more radical versions 
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of TC,142 “TC on steroids” as one commentator put it.143 The relative lack of uptake 
then is the result of misconceptions – either due to miscommunication on the side 
of the TCI, or even maliciously spread by its detractors.  
We tried in this chapter to lay the groundwork for a more nuanced 
assessment. In our analysis, the problems the TCI faces are grounded in the 
intentional, systematic but sometimes misunderstood and miscommunicated 
difference between the conception of trust in informatics, what we termed 
“techno-trust”, and the concept of trust that is more commonly used in sociology, 
including the sociology of law. To deliver the benefits it intends, and that for us 
means to bring about a self-organizing, complex and dynamic network of trust 
that is isomorphic to the Internet infrastructure, and allow security to follow trust 
along the arcs or nodes of the network, the sociological understanding of trust is 
needed, or at least an understanding of trust that shares with it certain 
fundamental characteristics, such as transitivity and holism. But techno-trust is 
designed to be different. It is based on a concept of “predictability” that shares 
only some overlap with the sociological concept of “trustworthiness”, and even 
less with the concept of “trust” simpliciter. It aims to calculate, for a specific 
interaction, the degree of trust that one can rationally place on this one 
                                                        
142  see eg. Ukil, A., Sen, J., & Koilakonda, S. (2011, 4-5 March 2011). Embedded security 
for Internet of Things. Paper presented at the Emerging Trends and Applications in 
Computer Science (NCETACS), 2011 2nd National Conference on (pp. 1-6),IEEE. For 
a more sociologically driven approach similar to the one developed here see Køien, 
G. (2011). Reflections on Trust in Devices: An Informal Survey of Human Trust in an 
Internet-of-Things Context. Wireless Personal Communications, 61(3), pp. 495-510. 
doi: 10.1007/s11277-011-0386-4. 
143  ￼.Franz, M. (Producer). (2005). Practical Language-Based Security From The 




transaction, by predicting the chances of malevolent behavior. But for the 
sociologist, “Trust begins where prediction ends”.144 Lewis and Weigert conclude: 
“In groups for which trust exists as a social reality, interpersonal trust 
comes naturally, and is not reducible to individual psychology [...] like 
the Durkheimian collective representation, the sentiment of trust is 
manifest in the psyche of individual group members, but this must not 
lead us to the common, but erroneous inference that trust is 
fundamentally an individual and behavioral phenomenon produced 
by rational machinations of autonomous, calculating individuals.”145 
If we replace in the quote above “calculating individuals” simply by 
“calculators”, then of course we would have a description of the TCI approach to 
trust in a nutshell. It is much more akin to the Weberian, rule based model of 
formal rationality and the type of “trust” it engenders: a trust in the predictable 
behavior of institutions as third parties. 
We then tried to show that this is not just an abstract sociological 
interpretation. Rather, the different understandings of trust result directly in 
certain design choices for TC. In a close reading of the technical specifications, we 
tried to “translate” or “give meaning to” as many of the design choices into the 
language of sociology. In the case of enforcing unique identities and their 
attestation remotely by third party, we saw the clearest parallel to the Weberian 
bureaucratic state under the rule of law, with centralized government. Just as the 
government in the modern nation states issues unique IDs and then ensures their 
attestation against centrally held registers such as the criminal record register, 
so does TC (attempt to) build trust on the basis of identifiers that allow parties in 
a communication to predict future benevolent behavior on the basis of a record 
of past wrong (and right) doing. But trust, as a sociological concept, tries exactly 
to fill the gaps left by the Weberian formal rationality, plug the holes that this 
                                                        
144  Lewis, J. D., & Weigert, A. (1985). Trust as a Social Reality. Social Forces, 63(4), pp. 
967-985. doi: 10.1093/sf/63.4.967 p. 976. 
145  ibid. p. 975 
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concept of human interaction can’t fill on its own. So in the same way in which 
societies in addition to predictability and Weberian “rational reliance” still need 
social trust as a supplementary yet distinct feature, so does a TC approach require 
“something else” in addition to the rule based predictability that it enforces by 
code.  
The absence of this “something else”, so we argue, contributes in two ways 
to the failure of TC so far. One is specific to the TC: there is insufficient trust in 
them to bring about what would be a massive shift of power from consumers to 
the TC provider. The second problem is more fundamental: every 
implementation of TC that has the generic features outlined above will still face 
the problem that it atomizes the trust relation to a bi-polar relation between them 
and a customer, not a network of trust. In principle, TC on its own cannot create 
the social trust that it needs to work as intended.  
If this analysis is correct, then we face a serious problem: The sociological 
concept of trust, as we tried to show, has evolutionary origins, evolved in humans 
in complex interaction with social institutions such as religion, kinship and 
ideology, and became in the process both deeply ingrained in our individual 
psyche, our emotional responses to others and the way we deal with risk in 
everyday situations, but also and most importantly automatic, taken-for-granted, 
non-reflective and in the words of Granovetter “embedded”. TC though is 
regulation by code, here ultimately machines “trust each other” (which then 
allows the human customer to trust his own machine, as a side effect at best). 
Computers are not the result of organic evolution over millennia and carrying 
their evolutionary roots with them at all times – a point Joanna Bryson has made 
forcefully to argue why we need not be afraid of the Artificial Intelligence (AI) 
apocalypse.146 Computers also don’t have religious or ideological convictions, 
                                                        
146  Bryson, J. (2011). AI robots should not be considered moral agents. In N. Berlatsky 
(Ed.), Artificial Intelligence. Detroit: Greenhaven Press.  
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kinship based loyalty or other emotional attachments to other machines. Nor can 
they take things “for granted” or embedded in their world – quite on the contrary 
everything they know must be explicitly represented and taught. All this, on 
balance, is a very good thing. But does it mean that TC is doomed from the very 
beginning, and regardless of who the TC provider is? 
We don’t think so, and the next two chapters will outline a way out of the 
dilemma. At first glance, it will look counterintuitive, for we will argue that 
traditional laws (as opposed to laws embedded in code) can play an important 
contribution to fill the gap between “techno-trust” and “social trust”. This should 
indeed raise some eyebrows – did we not just argue that Weberian formal 
rational law can at best create an abstract “trust in institutions” by rational actors 
who (only) want to predict the behavior of their commercial partners, the 
shortened and “thin” version of trust that the “thick” concept of social trust wants 
to supplement? We obviously need to qualify to a degree that analysis. In doing 
so, we draw our inspiration from some of the sociological thinkers discussed 
above. In particular, we aim to combine Luhmann’s system theoretic view, Johan 
Olsen’s attempt to reinvigorate the role of bureaucracies as regulatory tool in the 
network society, and the evolutionary account of trust that we touched upon 
above. The evolutionary account of trust reminds us that the emergence of social 
trust is not only shaped by the environment, it is at the same time shaping that 
very environment. Early normative systems such as religion evolved in response 
to and as a reflection of social practices of cooperation. The same type of self-
reflective hyper cycles is generalized in Luhmann’s work as a general constitutive 
factor of the way in which systems maintain themselves.147 This puts a paradox 
                                                        
147  applied to law in particular by his student G Teubner. See Teubner, G. (1997). 
Breaking Frames: The Global Interplay of Legal and Social Systems. The American 
Journal of Comparative Law, 45(1), pp. 149-169. doi: 10.2307/840962. 
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at the very heart of the emergence of law and legal order.148 In our case, this 
means more specifically that the post-Weberian recognition of the irreducible 
importance of social trust for the maintenance of order in social systems in turn 
“reflects back onto” the Weberian concept of formal rational law. Formal rational 
law is then not the irreconcilable opposite of social trust, rather, they engage in a 
dialectical relation. Social trust enabled the emergence of formal laws, formal 
laws then stabilize the societies and their trust relations, while being in the 
process “translated” and changed into something new. This system’s theoretical 
idea of “imperfect translation” between normative systems has been described 
by Zenon Bankowski, who in doing so carved out a place for “the ethics of being a 
legal formalist”, merging two previously antagonistic concepts.149  
To put this into slightly more concrete terms, we can re-think the Weberian 
concept of law by asking the question: how could specific legal rules look like who 
do not just try to enhance predictability for atomistic individuals, but which are 
drafted as a result of the experience of having encountered the conceptual 
limitations of the Weberian approach? This can then provide a regulatory 
environment where the problems of TC’s reduced conception of trust are at least 
ameliorated.  
We touched above on two specific problems: TC shifts power from customer 
to TC provider, who in the process takes on roles previously reserved for the 
nation state. How then, in a democratic state, can we trust those that make the 
rules? Law, in particular constitutional and human rights law, play at least a part 
of the answer. This is a topic we will take up in the next chapter, where we will 
                                                        
148  See e.g. Luhmann, N. (1988). The Third Question: The Creative Use of Paradoxes in 
Law and Legal History. Journal of Law and Society, 15(2), pp. 153-165. doi: 
10.2307/1410051  
149  Bańkowski, Z. (2007). Bringing the outside in: the ethical life of legal institutions Law 
and legal Cultures in the 21st Century: Unity and Diversity (Wolters Kluwer Polska, 
2007) (pp. 193-217). 
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look at those functions of TC that makes the TCI provider most state-like, and ask 
what minimal legal guarantees need to be in place to accept, trustingly, this shift 
of power.  
Secondly, traditional liberal contract law, the epitome of Weberian formal 
rationality and his paradigmatic example, has the problem that it reduces 
complex social relations to binary exchange relations. Binary relations that are 
not transitive, so we argued, disrupt rather than create networks. Contract law 
will have to play a central role for the way in which the TC provider interacts with 
his customers – but can we think of a contract law that does not result in atomism, 
which “brings in” potentially affected third parties and results in holistic 
networks? This will be the topic of the fourth chapter.  
Taken together, they can be seen as an attempt at “reflexive law”, another 
concept developed within the system theoretical paradigm and based on an 
evolutionary account borrowed from the biological study of emergent normative 
behavior.150 The result is not a law that aims to directly ensure desired social 
outcomes, rather, it “restricts itself to the installation, correction and redefinition 
of democratic self-regulatory mechanisms.”151 In the same vein, we will look 
mainly at specific ways in which law can correct or redefine the implicit and 
democratically not validated shift of power from customer to TC provider, in the 
process enhancing the social environment and its social trust within which TC 
must operate.  
                                                        
150  Classically, Teubner, G. (1983). Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law. 
Law & Society Review, 17(2), pp. 239-285. doi: 10.2307/3053348. For an application 
to the legal issue of privacy, central also to TC, see Dorf, M. C. (2003). The Domain of 
Reflexive Law. Columbia Law Review, 103(2), pp. 384-402. doi: 10.2307/1123697. 
For a critical evaluation, see Blankenburg, E. (1984). The Poverty of Evolutionism: A 
Critique of Teubner's Case for "Reflexive Law". Law & Society Review, 18(2), pp. 273-
289. doi: 10.2307/3053405. 
151  Teubner, G. (1983). Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law. Ibid., 17, pp. 
239-285. doi: 10.2307/3053348 p. 239 
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CHAPTER 3 :  
TRUSTED COMPUTING AND THE DIGITAL CRIME SCENE 
(FORENSICS COMPUTING AND CRIME PREVENTION) 
3.1 Whom to trust with crime prevention and detection  
In the last chapter, we argued that TC brings a significant shift of power away 
from customers to industry. We also described how an increase in privacy 
towards third party (and the security this brings with it) is balanced against an 
increase of exposure towards the TC provider. In this chapter, we follow up on 
this idea in an aspect of TC that epitomises this shift in power and responsibility 
more than any other – crime prevention and detection. This chapter analyses the 
future of digital forensics in an environment where control is increasingly taken 
away from PC users and remotely managed by trusted third parties, typically to 
improve Internet security. The TCI is used again as the most developed example 
to illustrate some of the possible legal issues that arise. 
In recent years, politicians have begun to take cyber crime more seriously. 
For instance, the UK government recognizes the detrimental effect that a cyber 
attack could have on the economy and the social well being of the country.1 In 
2011, cyber crime remained the one field of policing that not only survived the 
recent spending cuts, but benefited from substantial additional investment as a 
result of reports that estimate the loss due to cyber crime for the UK at £27 
                                                        
1 The Government reply to the fifth report from the House of Lords Science and 
Technology committee, Cm7234. (2007). The Government reply to the fifth report 
from the House of Lords Science and Technology committee.  London: The Stationery 
Office Limited.; Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defense and 
Security Review, Cm7948. (2010). Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The 
Strategic Defence and Security Review.  London: The Stationery Office Limited. 
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billion.2 The threat of cyber attack is now classified as a “tier one risk”, next to 
international terrorism using chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear attack 
by terrorists, a military crisis or an influenza pandemic.3 
An influential House of Lords report in 2007 described the shortcomings of 
present approaches to Internet security.4 It critically discussed in great clarity 
and detail, the regulatory alternatives that governments are facing and their 
respective shortcomings:  
 Shift the risks and responsibilities even further to users. This could 
happen for instance by leaving the user with any losses incurred because 
their computer is not sufficiently secured, or creating a strong evidential 
presumption that they were negligent if their data is stolen. 
 Invest in conventional approaches to crime prevention and deterrence, 
that is a better resourced police and more specialist units, more 
aggressive prosecution of cybercrime and stiffer sentences. 
 Make it a state priority to provide considerable new investment in the IT 
infrastructure and thus reduce crime from happening “by design”. 
 Provide incentives to the private sector to provide software programs 
that are more secure. This could happen by imposing more, and more 
                                                        
2 The Cost of Cyber Crime, Office of Cyber Security and Information Assurance (OCSIA), 
& Detica. (2011). The Cost of Cyber Crime. Cabinet Office and Detica Retrieved from 
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/resource-library/cost-of-cyber-crime. 
3  Cm7953. (2010). A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security 
Strategy.  London: The Stationery Office Limited Retrieved from 
http://www.direct.gov.uk/prod_consum_dg/groups/dg_digitalassets/@dg/@en/d
ocuments/digitalasset/dg_191639.pdf?CID=PDF&PLA=furl&CRE=nationalsecuritys
trategy. p. 27 
4  House of Lords Publications. (2007). Personal Internet Security. (HL Paper 165–I). 





easily enforceable, liability on the software vendor for writing programs 
that are vulnerable to attacks. 
The Internet was not originally intended as a platform where people spend 
a substantive percentage of their lives, engage in commercial activity on a large 
scale, work, play and socialize, and interact in various forms with their 
governments. As the Internet becomes more central to the lives of most people, 
it was inevitable that criminals began to exploit its weaknesses to a much greater 
extent than previously. At one brief point in time, the main threat seemed to come 
from overenthusiastic teenagers designing viruses, but the risks are now from 
highly organized criminal groups with significant resources, both in terms of 
expertise and computing power.5 In addition, entire nation states can be subject 
to successful cyber attacks, possibly with the tacit approval or open participation 
of foreign states, or at the very least “rough agencies” close to state security 
agencies or the military.6 With hindsight, the development of the Internet might 
usefully have included security as a design feature. Starting again from the 
beginning is not a feasible option, which means that any response is likely to be a 
patch added to the existing system rather than a complete rebuild. Attempts to 
deal with the increasing number of reported cyber crime incidents include more 
                                                        
5  Hunton, P. (2009). The growing phenomenon of crime and the internet: A cybercrime 
execution and analysis model. Computer Law & Security Review, 25(6), pp. 528-535. 
doi: 10.1016/j.clsr.2009.09.005 
6  For an example see the attack on the cyber infrastructure on Georgia by (probably) 
Russia US-CCU Special Report. (2009). Overview by the US-CCU of the Cyber 
Campaign against Georgia in August of 2008. In J. Bumgarner & S. Borg (Eds.): US 
Cyber Consequences Unit. (pp. 9). Or the attack on the Iranian nuclear facilities 
through Stuxnet, described eg. in Langner, R. (2011). Stuxnet: Dissecting a 
Cyberwarfare Weapon. Security & Privacy, IEEE, 9(3), pp. 49-51. doi: 
10.1109/MSP.2011.67. For a comprehensive overview see Andress, J. (2014). Cyber 
warfare techniques, tactics and tools for security practitioners (Second edition.. ed.): 
Waltham, Massachusetts : Syngress, an imprint of Elsevier. 
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legislation, user training, public awareness, and other technical security 
measures.7 
However, the Internet will remain imperfect, and things will go wrong. 
Indeed, as we argued in the previous chapter, the futile search for perfect security 
may ultimately do more harm than good, by creating a misplaced sense of 
security in technology that might increase the use to take greater risks. This in 
turn raises two related questions from a legal perspective: 
1. Who should be given the role of minimizing the harm, together with the 
rights and authority that comes with such a role? 
2. Whoever that entity or person is, can or should they be held legally liable 
if harm occurs nonetheless? 
These two questions are connected. In a radical answer to question 2, 
software producers could not only be held liable for the harm done to one of their 
customers, when flaws in the software enable a hacker to steal sensitive data.8 
Rather, they could also be held liable if the computer subsequently becomes part 
of a botnet and harms third parties, outside the contractual nexus. This, 
obviously, would be a strong incentive for software developers to invest in 
program safety. However, if there was such a radical change of the liability 
regime, it would be necessary to give them the rights and privileges necessary to 
enforce, the new safety features that they have developed, if necessary against 
their own customers. Similarly, owners of computers could also be held liable for 
                                                        
7  Cm7642. (2009). Cyber Security Strategy of the United Kingdom safety, security and 
resilience in cyber space.  London: The Stationery Office Limited. 
8  Existing liability regimes for faulty software have largely failed to provide an 
incentive to software producers to make safety an overriding concern. While in 
theory, contractual liability for negligent design flaws does exist, it rarely results in 
successful actions. For the US, see Phillips, D. E. (1994). When Software Fails: 
Emerging Standards of Vendor Liability Under the Uniform Commercial Code. The 
Business Lawyer, 50(1), pp. 151-181.  
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third party harm if their computer was used in a botnet attack. In both cases, the 
treatment of computers would be analogous to the way in which some 
jurisdictions treat ownership of guns – legal to own, but where a third party 
comes to harm, the owner faces liability if they are negligent.9 Even closer to TC 
in this respect is the regulation of electronic signatures under the Electronic 
Signatures Directive, where the certifying authorities are held liable when third 
parties rely on a negligently issued certificate (or, under national implementation 
of the law, possibly even stricter).10 A final example presents negligently 
prepared audit reports by chartered accountants which can also trigger third 
party reliance.11 We will come back to this use of private law and delictual liability 
in the next chapter. There, we will discuss if TC providers could or should be held 
liable for third party reliance on their product. Here, the point to note is that even 
in the absence of TC, the possibility to impose delictual liability on software 
developers for security risks in their products even outside the contractual nexus 
with their customers is one of the regulatory options governments have in 
principle to improve the security of the Internet.  
As mentioned above, the House of Lords’ report identified three possible 
answers: to rely on laws and policing by the state, with a general responsibility 
similar to that as exists for other critical infrastructures; to provide incentives by 
requiring users to protect themselves, or to treat it as a technological problem 
that is left best to software professionals in the “enabling” industries, from PC 
                                                        
9  McClurg, A. J. (2000). Armed and Dangerous: Tort Liability for the Negligent Storage 
of Firearms. CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW, 32, pp. 1189-1246.  
10  Balboni, P. (2004). Liability of Certification Service Providers Towards Relying 
Parties and the Need for a Clear System to Enhance the Level of Trust in Electronic 
Communication. Information & Communications Technology Law, 13(3), pp. 211-242. 
doi: 10.1080/1360083042000219074 
11  Feinman, J. M. (2003). Liability of Accountants for Negligent Auditing: Doctrine, 
Policy, and Ideology. FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, 31, pp. 17-66.  
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manufacturers to ISPs.12 Edwards offers a helpful analysis of these different 
regulatory strategies.13 
The first option is funded by the taxpayer for the benefit of a very specific 
segment of the economy, in effect a hidden subsidy for bad software design – 
analogous to asking the government to use our taxes to construct even safer 
roads, so that vehicle manufacturers can spend less on designing safer braking 
systems. In addition, governments only act within national borders, which 
seriously limit their efficiency in addressing what is a global problem. Making 
users responsible for their own safety was traditionally, as the report notes, the 
preferred option by government and business alike – but as security experts have 
noted, this is an entirely unrealistic notion: the average user does not have the 
technological sophistication to protect himself, and, as one response to the report 
stated, “consumers were not required to purify or boil water, when the source of 
contamination was within the water supply infrastructure itself. Instead 
suppliers were required to maintain a secure network, and treated water up to 
exacting standards. The end-user simply had to switch on the tap to get pure, 
drinkable water”.14 Finally, there is the option of holding the private sector and 
the software industry responsible for the safety of the Internet.15 
For several reasons, the strategy of holding the private sector and the 
software industry responsible for the security of the Internet has much to 
                                                        
12  House of Lords Publications. (2007). Personal Internet Security. (HL Paper 165–I). 
London: The Stationery Office Limited Retrieved from 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200607/ldselect/ldsctech/165/165
02.htm. 
13  Edwards, L. (2006). Dawn of the Death of Distributed Denial of Service: How to Kill 
Zombies. Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal, 24(1), pp. 23-62.  
14  House of Lords Publications. (2007). Personal Internet Security. (HL Paper 165–I). 
London: The Stationery Office Limited Retrieved from 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200607/ldselect/ldsctech/165/165
02.htm. at 3.30. 
15  ibid. at 3.20. 
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recommend itself to policy makers. Internet service providers, hardware 
developers and software vendors enjoy the commercial benefits from the 
Internet, and their know-how and expertise means they are best placed to protect 
the user against the most common dangers. Furthermore, many of these 
companies already operate globally, avoiding some of the limitations that 
governments would inevitably face, and thus also avoiding the need for an 
international treaty that take a long time to negotiate. Putting the industry at the 
centre of the effort to create a secure Internet is indeed one of the 
recommendations of the report, if necessarily backed by legal sanctions. 
Releasing inherently vulnerable software and hardware to consumers, in this 
view, should carry at least the same liability that a water vendor would incur for 
the safety of the glass bottles used in storing the water – in a UK context, the 
Donoghue snail striking again, at both vendors and manufacturers.16 
This course of action would, naturally, create a significant risk to technology 
companies, exposing them to potentially costly litigation. Arguably, a much better 
strategy for the industry is to pre-empt any additional legislation by improving 
security voluntarily. The TC initiative can also be seen as a first response to this 
threat, with software companies and hardware developers taking on the 
responsibility for (aspects of) the Internet infrastructure. From an industry 
perspective, this self-regulatory approach has the advantage of much more fine-
tuned cost/benefit analysis. Where the law can only operate in broad categories 
of “negligence”, “gross negligence”, leaving it to more or less technologically 
aware judges (or in the US, juries) to determine if a specific software fault was 
due to such a below-par performance by the developers, industry has a much 
more fine grained understanding where further investment in security creates 
                                                        
16  Donoghue v Stevenson 562 (A.C. 1932). On the legal principle see MacCormick, N. 
(1991). Donoghue v. Stevenson and legal reasoning. Donoghue v. Stevenson and the 
Modern Law of Negligence, Continuing Legal Education of British Columbia, Vancouver, 
pp. 191-213.  
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measurable benefits.17 As we discussed in the previous chapter, the crucial 
distinction between “safe” software, “trusted” and “trustworthy” software that is 
based on different degrees of safety was developed precisely to enable such a 
balancing approach. It is at least debatable how legal concepts of liability “match” 
this risk management approach, creating a degree of uncertainty for software 
developers that in turn can have a negative impact on another crucial sector to 
balance incentives for investing in security with litigation risks - the insurance 
sector.18  
Legal liability regimes in this way interact with markets as form of 
regulation, stepping in where market failures are apparent and it is too easy for 
actors to externalize costs to the wider community – the situation we see pretty 
much consistently in the field of Internet security today, where the costs for 
security flaws tend to fall everywhere but the developers. We will come back to 
this issue in the next chapter. Here we take a slightly different take on the issue.  
Ensuring “security”, long before the Internet, has always been a mix of two 
aspects. If we take the police as a classical institution employed by the state to 
ensure that societal peace is maintained, we can distinguish between reactive 
                                                        
17  See the influential early study by Gordon, L., & Loeb, M. (2002). The economics of 
information security investment. ACM Transactions on Information and System 
Security (TISSEC), 5(4), pp. 438-457. doi: 10.1145/581271.581274, for a more recent 
analysis based on their work see Nagurney, A., & Nagurney, L. S. (2015). A game 
theory model of cybersecurity investments with information asymmetry. 
NETNOMICS: Economic Research and Electronic Networking, pp. 1-22. doi: 
10.1007/s11066-015-9094-7. 
18  On the role of insurance industries for an optimal incentive structure in cybersecurity 
see Kesan, J., Majuca, R., & Yurcik, W. The Economic Case for Cyberinsurance: 
University of Illinois College of Law. and also Lelarge, M., & Bolot, J. (2009). Economic 
Incentives to Increase Security in the Internet: The Case for Insurance (pp. 1494-
1502). A critical assessment on the disappointing uptake of cyberinsurance see 
Bandyopadhyay, T., Mookerjee, V. S., & Rao, R. C. (2009). Why IT managers don't go 




policing, solving of a crime after one has occurred with the aim of prosecution, 
punishment and deterrence, and proactive or ‘intelligence led policing’ that 
attempts to prevent crimes before they occur.19 Both strategies have always been 
employed by modern police and law enforcement organizations, though the 
relative weight given to each strategy has changed through the ages. As a result 
of technological developments, recent decades saw a particularly high interest in 
“proactive” or ‘intelligence led policing’ that uses data analytics to predict and 
prevent crime.20 Related to this and even closer to the topic of this PhD are 
attempts to reduce crime through architecture, measures that make it impossible 
to commit crime even without police interference.21 While technology has in 
recent years pushed crime prevention into the forefront of public debate, it is 
important to remember that first, these methods long predate modern ICT,22 and 
second post-crime analysis and investigation remains as important as ever. 
One reason for this is an inherent tension between the two approaches. A 
simple example can illustrate this point. Imagine the police have received a tip off 
about a planned bank robbery. From a crime prevention perspective, the most 
                                                        
19  For a general discussion see Gilling, D. (1997). Crime prevention : theory, policy and 
politics. London: London : UCL Press.  
20  For a comprehensive analysis the reader is referred to Ratcliffe, J. H. (2012). 
Intelligence-led policing: Routledge.; for an application to cybercrime see in particular 
Van Brakel, R., & De Hert, P. (2011). Policing, surveillance and law in a pre-crime 
society: Understanding the consequences of technology based strategies. 
Technology-led policing, 20, pp. 165.  
21  For a recent analysis of the state of the art in offline crime reduction through design, 
see Crowe, T. D. (2000). Crime prevention through environmental design : applications 
of architectural design and space management concepts (Second edition.. ed.). Boston, 
Mass.: Boston, Mass. : Butterworth-Heinemann.; For a cyberspace specific analysis 
see Katyal, N. K. (2003). Digital Architecture as Crime Control. The Yale Law Journal, 
112(8), pp. 2261-2289. doi: 10.2307/3657476. 
22  For an overview of early architecture-driven crime control offline, see Jeffery, C. R. 




obvious response would be to inform the owner, and increase substantially the 
visible police presence. This will in all likelihood deter the criminals from even 
attempting the crime. The obvious disadvantage is that such a high profile 
intervention is likely to lead to a mere replacement of the criminal activity – the 
gang is either going to wait until the police scales down its presence, or move to 
another, less well protected bank. Especially technology driven approaches to 
crime prevention such as CCTV, often have the effect to simply move crime into 
other areas, leaving overall crime figures in the long run unchanged.23 A different 
approach therefore could have been to maintain a low profile, allow the criminals 
even some initial success (and hence the completion of crime, such as breaking 
and entering e.g.) and only arrest them when they try to leave the bank with the 
money. From the perspective of a successful prosecution, this is close to ideal – 
the completion of the crime means evidence is created that has high probative 
value. This will prevent this specific gang from striking again (anytime soon, at 
least), and also send a deterring signal to other would-be bank robbers. On the 
other hand, this exposes the bank to a much higher risk, not just because they 
might get away with the money, but also because the security weaknesses of the 
bank come into open display, for the next robber to copy and to exploit.  
                                                        
23  For a study close to our example see e.g. Clarke, R. V., Field, S., & McGrath, G. (1991). 
Target hardening of banks in Australia and displacement of robberies. Security 
Journal, 2(2), pp. 84-90. On CCTV and displacement see Armitage, R. (2002). To CCTV 
or not to CCTV. A review of current research into the effectiveness of CCTV systems in 
reducing crime. Londen: Nacro, pp. 1-8. For an analysis very similar to the economic 
and game theoretical approaches used above to evaluate incentives to invest in 
security: Cornish, D. B., & Clarke, R. V. (1987). UNDERSTANDING CRIME 
DISPLACEMENT: AN APPLICATION OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY. Criminology, 
25(4), pp. 933-948. doi: 10.1111/j.1745-9125.1987.tb00826.x. A more optimistic 
view is taken in Johnson, S. D., Guerette, R. T., & Bowers, K. J. (2012). Crime 
displacement and diffusion of benefits. The Oxford handbook of crime prevention, pp. 
337. which also mentions “benefit diffusion” as an often difficult to measure 
consequence of “crime prevention by design”.  
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The criminal law tries to mitigate this tension in several ways, for instance 
by creating “inchoate offenses”, the possibility to charge for mere attempts to 
commit a crime. Still, arresting the criminals with the money is more persuasive 
too than arresting them shortly before they enter the bank, but equipped with 
power tools for cutting into a safe – in this case they may still try to present an 
innocent explanation for the equipment and their activities. Difficult decisions 
will have to be made how far an attempt is allowed to proceed, to ensure 
sufficiently strong evidence is generated. Since both reactive and proactive 
strategies have advantages and disadvantages, crime control then is finding an 
appropriate mix and manages the inherent tension. 
How can we apply these ideas to Trusted Computing and similar trust based 
approaches to Internet security? From what we discussed in the preceding 
chapter, TC is an obvious candidate for architecture-based, proactive crime 
control. This type of crime reduction through prevention is also historically the 
strategy most amenable to private sector actors. Long before the modern nation 
state, private security – from armed guards to castles with their moats and iron 
bars – dominated the scene. Indeed, the modern police force in Britain grew out 
of a mix of voluntarism – the citizen as police officer – and hired security guards.24 
Much less prominent is however the use of private agencies for crime 
investigation and “post-crime” security work.25 While there are of course private 
detectives, their main role was traditionally in the preparation of civil litigation. 
While this could involve analyzing crimes – one can think e.g. of arson 
investigators employed by security companies – these roles remained for a long 
                                                        
24  For an overview of the historical development and why it matters for contemporary 
discussions of crime control through technology see Schafer, B. (2013). 
Crowdsourcing and cloudsourcing CCTV surveillance. Datenschutz und 
Datensicherheit - DuD, 37(7), pp. 434-439. doi: 10.1007/s11623-013-0173-3. 
25  For a qualitative analysis of private investigators, including a historical overview, see 
Draper, H. (1978). Private police. Hassocks: Hassocks : Harvester Press.  
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time limited.26 This is understandable when we consider that crime investigation 
benefits greatly from the availability of sovereign power that is exercised through 
the state, such as compelling witnesses, gaining access to dwellings or 
correspondence of citizens against their consent, and ultimately the power to 
arrest. These key functions were reserved in the modern nation state for public 
police as parts of the executive power, even though in particular in common law 
countries, this transition was never perfect and legal remnants of the old regime, 
such as the rarely used private prosecutions in English law or the elected “posse” 
in the US remained on the statute books.27 
This situation however changed over the past few decades, partly as a result 
of the neo-liberal, minimal state (“Washington”) consensus that pushed 
privatization deep into territory previously the reserve of the state, including all 
aspects of the justice system.28 These developments let Bayley and Sheering talk 
about a “watershed” in the history of policing which radically alters not just our 
perception of the police, but that of the state as guarantor of safety and security 
in general.29 Partly this development is also the result of an ever increasing 
                                                        
26  There are sectorial exceptions. Some crime investigation requires specific subject 
knowledge that is most likely to be available though potential victims – e.g. economic 
crime that requires expertise in business and accountancy. See e.g. Williams, J. W. 
(2005). Reflections on the Private Versus Public Policing of Economic Crime. The 
British Journal of Criminology, 45(3), pp. 316-339. doi: 10.1093/bjc/azh083. 
27  For a comprehensive analysis of the transition of pre-modern proto-police to 
executive-centric police of today, see Rawlings, P. (2003). Policing before the police. 
Handbook of Policing, 2, pp. 46-72.   
28  see e.g. Shearing, C. D., & Stenning, P. C. (1981). Modern Private Security: Its Growth 
and Implications. Crime and Justice, 3, pp. 193-245. , Williams, J. W. (2005). 
Reflections on the Private Versus Public Policing of Economic Crime. The British 
Journal of Criminology, 45(3), pp. 316-339. doi: 10.1093/bjc/azh083; See also Gill, M., 
& Hart, J. (1997). Policing as a business: The organisation and structure of private 
investigation. Policing and Society, 7(2), pp. 117-141. doi: 
10.1080/10439463.1997.9964768. 
29  Bayley, David H., and Clifford D. Shearing. "The future of policing." Law and society 
review (1996): 585-606. 
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specialization in the forensic field that made it difficult for police organizations to 
cover all aspects of an investigation with equal efficiency. Computer forensics in 
particular is often carried out by private subcontractors of police agencies.30 
Technology has generally been an enabling factor for greater involvement of the 
private sector in core policing functions.31 Unsurprisingly, we find increasing 
voices that argue that cyber-investigations, not just preventative cybersecurity, 
should make more comprehensive use of private sector participants.32 
What we can take from this debate is that TC fits strongly with the general 
push towards stronger private sector involvement in what was traditionally 
mainly a police and hence function. We will indeed argue that it can be 
understood as a particularly radical approach to assign state roles to the private 
sector, not just helping with, but as we saw in the previous chapter guaranteeing 
or certifying the safety of the Internet. We also note that increasingly, private 
sector policing stops to be limited to pre-crime protection and prevention, and 
moves into the field of post-crime investigation, especially in areas where 
technology plays a crucial role. The tension that we noted above between pre-
crime prevention and post-crime detection then means, so we will argue in the 
rest of this chapter, that a move of TC into the field of crime investigation is not 
only in line with general developments in the field of policing, but indeed almost 
                                                        
30  a comprehensive case study for Canada can be found in Schneider, S. R. (1998). 
Combating Organized Crime in (and by) the Private Sector A Normative Role for 
Canada's Forensic Investigative Firms. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 
14(4), pp. 351-367.  
31  A detailed case study of the technological drivers from the US perspective can be 
found in Dunbar, P. (1997). What will be the Impact of Civilianization on Police 
Investigations by 2002 at the Oakland Police Department? Command College Paper, 
2, pp. 1-8.  
32  See e.g. Phillips, A., & Nance, K. L. (2010). Computer Forensics Investigators or Private 
Investigators: Who Is Investigating the Drive? Paper presented at the Systematic 
Approaches to Digital Forensic Engineering (SADFE), 2010 Fifth IEEE International 
Workshop on (pp. 150-157),IEEE.  
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inevitable. If TC were only a pre-emptive security measure, the crime 
displacement problems that we noted above are likely to arise, and in the light of 
the discussion of the previous chapter, with particular poignancy. In the first 
stage of uptake of the technology, the network effect or the immunity that TC 
offers will be limited, requiring investment with initially limited returns – one of 
the reasons we argued that are responsible for the relative lack of success of the 
TCI. Once however a sufficient number of machines are TC, we should expect that 
criminals will shift their attention to those machines not yet secured. This is in 
the typology of Johnson, Guerette and Bowers,33 a replacement of targets, one of 
the socially and politically most problematic displacements since it tends to affect 
the poorest and most vulnerable the most. This is due to the additional costs of 
TC that we discussed previously likely to be an issue also for the TCI, their 
arguments that they are simply offering a service for those digital actors whose 
safety sensitivity demands higher investment, but is easily affordable since they 
will typically also make profit online much more problematic than maybe 
anticipated. Another effect of this likely target replacement will be that using TC 
will become even more inevitable, strengthening further what is already a 
powerful cartel with in-build monopolistic tendencies.34 However, once TC 
uptake has achieved saturation, this type of replacement becomes impossible. 
Judging from the experience with CCTV, at this point criminals will “return” to the 
protected environment, due to a lack of alternative, easier targets. At this point 
criminological research predicts a different type of displacement, not of targets 
but methods.35 Criminals will shift their activities to methods that are less 
                                                        
33  Johnson, S. D., Guerette, R. T., & Bowers, K. J. (2012). Crime displacement and 
diffusion of benefits. The Oxford handbook of crime prevention, pp. 337. op.cit. p. 337 
34  as discussed in the previous chapter – one of the consequences of the TCI approach 
would be that unprotected machines lose the ability to communicate with protected 
machines.  
35  Johnson, S. D., Guerette, R. T., & Bowers, K. J. (2012). Crime displacement and 
diffusion of benefits. The Oxford handbook of crime prevention, pp. 337. op cit p. 338 
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affected by the protective architecture. In the case of TC, this could take (at least) 
two forms. On the one hand, criminals could use more sophisticated hacking 
methods. As we discussed, TC increases security, but cannot provide total 
protection, it is trusted, not secure computing. On the other hand, criminals might 
resort even more to non-technological forms of cybercrime such as social 
engineering which by definition is less impacted by technological counter 
measures – though in the case of TC, the fact that not even the owner has any 
longer full control over his machine but must trust it blindly, will also act against 
some forms of social engineering. Should this displacement of methods happen, 
the “false sense of security” that we discussed above will pose particular dangers 
and could at least initially increase the incidence of crime. In this case, taking on 
a compensatory role in crime investigation would be even more pressing. 
In the remainder of the chapter, we will further develop this line of argument 
and show that TC is not just a form of privatization of state functions, not just in 
the field of pre-crime deterrence and prevention, but ultimately requiring also a 
role in post-crime investigation. There we will face however a particular difficulty 
that goes beyond the concerns already raised against privatization of police 
investigations.36 Shearing and Stenning, in their influential analysis of 
privatization of policing, argue that: 
“The development of private security has been facilitated by 
fundamental shifts in the nature of property relations. These changes 
have encouraged the development of a preventative mode of policing 
consistent with the principles and hopes of nineteenth-century police 
reformers, but they also suggest that we are moving in the direction 
of a new disciplinary society and raise fundamental questions with 
                                                        
36  so e.g. from a political science perspective Loader, I. (1997). Thinking Normatively 
About Private Security. Journal of Law and Society, 24(3), pp. 377-394. doi: 
10.1111/j.1467-6478.1997.tb00003.x; For the TCI, such a move also carries some 
reputation risks, given the general low esteem in which private investigators are 
helped – see e.g. Livingstone, K., & Hart, J. (2003). The Wrong Arm of the Law? Public 




respect to sovereignty, justice, and individual liberty now almost 
entirely unrecognized. In particular, the legal institutions regarding 
private property operate to enhance the potential threat to individual 
liberty posed by the development of modern private security.” 37 
35 years on, their analysis has a new poignancy. The most important change 
in property relation that came with the Internet enabled knowledge economy – 
barely at the horizon when Shearing and Stenning were writing – is of course 
copyright. In the relation between copyright holders, the artistic works and the 
consumer of art, we find all of the elements they anticipate, in particular an often 
dramatic clash between regimes designed to protect the property interest and 
“sovereignty, justice, and individual liberty”. We find this conflict whenever 
copyright is used to curtail free speech.38 We find it where copyright regimes are 
used to argue for increased surveillance, such as the Sony DRM fiasco where 
rightholders tried to install hidden backdoors on the computers of customers,39 
or more generally when privacy gives way to copyright protection.40 It surfaces 
in the general debate around DRM regarding “over-protection”, the way in which 
                                                        
37  Shearing, C. D., & Stenning, P. C. (1981). Modern Private Security: Its Growth and 
Implications. Crime and Justice, 3, pp. 193-245.  
38  Iconically Nimmer, M. B. (1969). Does copyright abridge the first amendment 
guarantees of free speech and press? UCLA L. Rev., 17, pp. 1180 - 1204. ; For a more 
recent analysis from a US perspective see Tushnet, R. (2000). Copyright as a Model 
for Free Speech Law: What Copyright Has in Common with Anti-Pornography Laws, 
Campaign Finance Reform, and Telecommunications Regulation. BCL Rev., 42, pp. 1. ; 
For an analysis from a continental European jurisdiction see Quint, P. E. (1989). Free 
speech and private law in German constitutional theory. Md. L. Rev., 48, pp. 247.  
39  See e.g. Mulligan, D., & Perzanowski, A. K. (2008). The Magnificence of the Disaster: 
Reconstructing the Sony BMG Rootkit Incident. Berkeley Technology Law Journal, 22, 
pp. 1157.   
40  see e.g. Cameron, A. (2004). Digital Rights Management: Where Copyright and 
Privacy Collide. Canadian Privacy Law Review, pp. 1-9.   
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it challenges conceptions of justice when imposing abusive on the use of digital 
objects that the legislator has deemed permissible.41 
Just as with private policing in general, the shift in responsibility for Internet 
security to private sector organizations “raise fundamental questions with 
respect to sovereignty, justice, and individual liberty now almost entirely 
unrecognized”.42 In the case of TCI, this is made even more problematic by the 
fact that due to its origins in DRM, and its support by major Intellectual Property 
(IP) rightholders, here we have not merely an involvement of a private party to 
protect the property interests of a third party, rather, “private police” and 
“property owner” become one and the same person, at least for some crimes and 
delicts. This needs to be seen also within the context of an increased use of 
criminal law in copyright protection.43 Together, these developments form a 
“perfect storm”: a general trend to more and more aggressive use of criminal law 
to act against copyright violations happens at a time when outsourcing of 
preventative and investigative policing powers to private sector actors is at a new 
high - actors who in the case of the TCI are also major IP right holders and have 
                                                        
41  with further references see Zingales, N. (2012). Digital Copyright,'Fair Access' and the 
Problem of DRM Misuse. Paper presented at the Boston College Intellectual Property 
& Technology Forum (pp. 1-36), 
42  Shearing, C. D., & Stenning, P. C. (1981). Modern Private Security: Its Growth and 
Implications. Crime and Justice, 3, pp. 193-245.  
43  See e.g. Manta, I. D. (2011). The Puzzle of Criminal Sanctions for Intellectual Property 
Infringement. Harvard Journal of Law and Technology, 24(2), pp. 2010-2030. ; For a 
specific enforcement strategy, see Martin, B., & Newhall, J. (2013). Criminal Copyright 
Enforcement Against Filesharing Services. NCJL & Tech., 15, pp. 101. ; For an overview 
from the US perspective with a detailed discussion of relevant criminal statutes see 
Perahia, A., Dwoskin, S., & Goldman, L. (2013). Intellectual Property Crimes. Am. Crim. 
L. Rev., 50, pp. 1199-1244. On an international level, ACTA, the Anti-counterfeiting 
trade agreement, contained aspects of criminal law measures that raise wider 
concerns for the justice system Bitton, M. (2011). Rethinking the Anti-Counterfeiting 
Trade Agreement's Copyright Criminal Enforcement Measures. The journal of 
criminal law and criminology 102, 1, pp. 67-118.   
108 
 
used in the past technologies very similar to those now suggested for general 
online security for the protection of their IP rights.  
In this chapter, we also want to make a first tentative step to begin the 
discussion on the consequences for our conception of justice that Shearing and 
Stenning requested. We will try to show that a further shift of responsibility to 
post-crime investigation is in a TC environment probably inevitable. It is needed 
on the one hand to prevent the “displacement problems” discussed above. On the 
other hand, as we will see in more detail below, TC is also a potential obstacle to 
traditional, state-centric police investigations, since the very same measures that 
protect a computer from criminals also protects them against some legitimate (or 
at least legal) police investigation methods, such as remote forensic analysis. If 
therefore an increased shift of state powers to TC providers is inevitable, we need 
to think about the appropriate legal environment that can address the concerns 
regarding rule of law, justice and individual liberty. For public policing, this has 
been achieved traditionally (at least in common law jurisdictions) through a 
careful balance of powers within an adversarial setting – and we will have to 
investigate also if a private sector environment, with its emphasis on consensual 
and cooperative relations governed by contract, can replicate these adversarial 
features. Secondly, the law of evidence has been used to protect the rights of 
citizens, by e.g. suppressing information that was obtained in violation of 
procedural rules. Evidence law then became in effect a way to discipline police.44 
Again, we will have to analyze if a corresponding way to restrain private sector 
investigative activities can be found. This may also require legislative responses. 
In the past, private sector actors were in many jurisdictions free of some or most 
of the constraints faced by police officers when gathering evidence, giving 
                                                        
44  So e.g. Wilkey, M. R. (1978). Exclusionary Rule: Why Suppress Valid Evidence, The. 
Judicature, 62, pp. 214. ; For a more nuanced view critical of the effectiveness of this 
way to «reign in» police see Schlesinger, S. R. Ibid.Exclusionary Rule: Have 
Proponents Proven That It Is a Deterrent to Police, The. pp. 404.  
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additional incentives to police agencies to use the aid of private citizens.45 Will 
TC, if understood as a privatized police function, face similar issues of 
circumvention of legal rules aimed to protect the citizen from the state? And how 
great can the responsibilities be that we impose on TC, in exchange for the great 
powers it wields? To answer these questions, we need first to get a much better 
idea of how post-crime investigation will be effected in a TC environment. As this 
side of TC has so far not gained any attention at all - previous studies focused 
exclusively on the preventative or pre-crime aspect of Internet security - we will 
try to chart out this new territory first through a couple of examples and analogies 
to “brick and mortar” investigations. 
3.2 Crime investigation in a TC world  
Consider the following physical world crime scene scenarios: 
                                                        
45   A typical example are rules against entrapment – entrapment by a police officer can 
render any evidence that is subsequently obtained inadmissible. By contrast, when 
the entrapment is carried out by a journalist, as e.g. in the News of the world stings 
in Britain, no such consequences follow. The rationale behind this is that while the 
evidence is not necessarily unreliable, it is “inappropriate for the state” to generate 
even more crime than there is already – a concern that does not taint entrapment by 
private actors in the same way. "It is simply not acceptable that the state through its 
agents should lure its citizens into acts forbidden by law and then seek to prosecute 
them for doing so. That would be entrapment. That would be a misuse of state power, 
and an abuse of the process of the courts." Looseley and Attorney General's Reference 4 
All ER 898-9,  
  For the US doctrine see e.g. DeFeo, M. A. (1966). Entrapment as a Defense to Criminal 
Responsibility: Its History, Theory and Application. USFL Rev., 1, pp. 243. ; For the UK 
see Heydon, J. (1973). The Problems of Entrapment. The Cambridge Law Journal, 
32(02), pp. 268-286. ; For an application to cybercrime and the investigation of online 
child abuse see Schafer, B. (2006). The taming of the Sleuth—problems and potential 
of autonomous agents in crime investigation and prosecution. International Review 




3.2.1 Scenario 1 
The house of a suspect in a murder inquiry is searched. In a locked room, and 
a locked chest within that room, a bloodied knife is found that has the DNA of a 
murder victim on its blade. The room and the chest were securely locked, the 
owner of the house being the only one with a key that he never left out of his sight. 
There is no sign that either lock was tampered with, or that anyone other than 
the owner has ever been in the room. 
3.2.2 Scenario 2 
As above, but this time there are clear signs that someone had at least tried 
to force both locks, and there are some signs that someone other than the owner 
had been in the room and interfered with some of the furniture. 
3.2.3 Scenario 3 
As in 1 above, but this time, the owner had given a key to the room, but not 
the chest, to a cleaning agency. They had entered the room several times, but 
there is no reason to believe they had interest in the chest, or the ability to open 
it.  
3.2.4 Scenario 4 
As in 3, but this time, the owner has given copies to both the room and the 
chest to a security company that patrolled the house regularly and checked all 
rooms and storage facilities for intruders or explosive devices. The company had 
outsourced several of its activities to other partner companies, making copies of 
the key available to them as needed. Their records confirm without doubt that 
nobody but the owner and employees or agents of the company entered the room 
between the time of the murder and the police search that seized the knife. 
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3.2.5 Scenarios close up 
What can we say in these four scenarios about the evidential value of the 
knife? Intuitively, it seems clear that the owner of the house in scenario 1 has 
some explaining to do. Objects found in his possession can be clearly attributed 
to him, and there is no obvious explanation for the knife other than that he hid it 
there.  
Equally, it seems intuitively clear that the situation is considerably different 
in scenario 2. Someone other than the owner probably had access to the room 
and the chest, and not only that, the methods used to gain entry indicate the third 
party had criminal intentions.  
In scenarios 3 and 4, the situation is much less clear. In scenario 3, much will 
depend on the details of the case: the trustworthiness of the employees of the 
cleaning company, their effectiveness in vetting employees, the degree of 
supervision of employees while they were in the room, and the number of people 
that could have entered the room. Where someone had the ability to enter the 
room, the difficulty of opening the chest becomes a factor. Even if the senior 
managers or directors of the organization did not have any reason to frame the 
owner, the position of the employees must also be considered.  
In scenario 4, the situation is even more complex. On the one hand, the type 
of manipulation encountered in scenario 2 can be ruled out with much more 
confidence. This also affects scenario 1, or rather our justification to believe that 
the specific situation at the heart of an investigation falls into that category. It 
rules out the possibility that a burglar may have opened the chest (scenario 2), 
but was so good at his job that he did not leave any traces behind, making it look 
like scenario 1. On the other hand, a very high degree of trust is now placed with 
the security company and its employees. While in scenario 2, the owner and 
unknown third parties may have placed the knife in the chest, in scenario 4 there 




3.3 What is the relevance of all these for digital evidence? 
 To understand this, we have to transfer our scenarios into the virtual realm, 
where the house becomes a PC, the room an individual program running on the 
PC, and the chest contains the equivalence of individual files created by that 
program. Scenario 1 now exemplifies how lawyers, and arguably also the police, 
have often naively thought about the “crime scene computer”. In this view of the 
world, the owner (or password holder) is the only one with access to its content, 
and if illegal material is found on such a device, there is at the very least a strong 
assumption that it is there with the owner’s knowledge and consent. In England, 
aspects of this view have found their way into the law in the form of an evidential 
presumption: computers, as a mechanical instrument, are presumed to be in 
order.  
The Law Commission, 11 years after its enactment, recommended total 
deletion of PACE’s Section 69 stating that it served “no useful purpose”:46 
We provisionally proposed that section 69 of PACE be repealed 
without replacement. Without section 69, a common law presumption 
comes into play: 
“In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the courts will presume 
that mechanical instruments were in order at the material time. 
Where a party sought to rely on the presumption, it would not need to 
lead evidence that the computer was working properly on the 
occasion in question unless there was evidence that it may not have 
been – in which case the party would have to prove that it was (beyond 
reasonable doubt in the case of the prosecution, and on the balance of 
probabilities in the case of the defence). The principle has been 
applied to such devices as speedometers and traffic lights, and in the 
consultation paper we saw no reason why it should not apply to 
computers.”47 
                                                        
46  Evidence in criminal proceedings:hearsay and related topics ; a consultation paper 
(1995). 
47  The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, c.69 C.F.R. § Part VII - Evidence from 
computer records (1984). 
113 
 
The provision was repealed finally by s.60 of the Youth Justice and Criminal 
Evidence Act 199948 and assumes, amongst other things, that programs are not 
corrupted by third parties.49 For many reasons, this picture was always at best an 
overly simplistic version of reality that relied on numerous highly problematic 
assumptions, such as how many people are physically located within range of the 
computer that might have been able to use it if they wanted to; whether it really 
was protected by passwords; whether the computer was set up to ensure a 
password had to be put in each time the computer ‘went to sleep’; whether the 
wi-fi was on or not, and if it was on, whether the security provisions were 
sufficient enough to prevent a third party from entering the computer from 
outside. 
It is this last aspect, the inability of a third party entering from the outside 
that concerns us in this chapter. The problems with this specific assumption came 
to the forefront of the attention of the law when facts similar to scenario 2 were 
the subject of prosecutions or civil actions. Scenario 2 is broadly the equivalent 
to the “Trojan defence” as used in the cases of Matt Bandy,50 Aaron Caffrey and 
several others.51 Caffrey was acquitted by a jury of the charge of unauthorised 
                                                        
48   Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 c.23 § c. 27 (1999). It has been a long 
discussion whether the abolition of s.69 was or was not necessary under the 
clarifications of the House of Lords and if it achieved its goal. Hoey, A. (1995). 
Analysis of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, s.69 - Computer generated evidence 
Web Journal of Current Legal Issues, 5, ibid., Quinn, K. (2001). Computer Evidence in 
Criminal Proceedings: Farewell to the Ill-Fated s.69 of the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984. Int'l J. Evidence & Proof, 5, pp. 174 - 187.  
49  For a critical discussion of this presumption and the often unrealistic assumptions it 
is based on, see Mason, S. (2010). Electronic Evidence (2nd ed.): LexisNexis 
Butterworth. Chapter 5. 
50  For an analysis of the Bandy investigation see Mason, S. (Ed.). (2008). International 
Electronic Evidence. London: British Institute of International and Comparative Law. 
pp. lxxv-lxxxiii. 
51  Brenner, S. W. C., Brian; Henninger, Jef. (2004). The Trojan Horse Defense in 
Cybercrime Cases. Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J., 21(1), pp. 1-54. , ibid. pp. 
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computer modifications, which were part of a DoS attack against the Port of 
Houston’s computer system in September 2001. Caffrey successfully argued that 
the evidence against him was planted on his machine by the real attackers, and 
that his computer had been “zombified” by an unspecified Trojan that gave the 
attackers control of his PC. Even though a forensic examination of Caffrey’s PC 
found attack tools (our “bloody knife”), it did not find any traces of a Trojan 
infection (our “scratch marks on the lock”). Nonetheless, the jury accepted the 
defence argument that a Trojan could wipe itself – blurring the line between our 
scenario 1 and 2 above. To the extent that Caffrey’s argument was convincing, we 
could never be certain if we are really dealing with an unproblematic scenario 1, 
or a problematic scenario 2. 
Matt Bandy, a minor himself, was prosecuted for the possession of child 
pornography.52 Facing a possible sentence of imprisonment of up to 90 years, the 
ability of his defence team to show that his computer’s protection had been 
disabled and that his computer had at the time been infected by more than 200 
viruses and other malware, including Trojans that could have allowed third party 
access to his computer, allowed him to enter a plea bargain that resulted in an 18 
month suspended sentence. His case illustrates two points that will be relevant 
later: first, the tendency by users to disable protective software (for instance to 
“free up” CPU) or to fail to update it is an enabling factor for cybercrime. Second, 
at least according to the defence team, the police was overly naïve in assuming a 
“scenario 1” type setting, without testing the necessary assumptions with 
sufficient rigour. 
                                                        
3-50. Links to several unreported uses of the Trojan defense can be found here: 
http://www.forensicswiki.org/wiki/Legal_issues 
52  For an analysis of the Bandy investigation see Mason, S. (Ed.). (2008). International 




Malicious outsiders are, however, not the only problem that demonstrates 
the problematic assumptions underlying scenario 1. Almost every computer user 
will have granted – knowingly or unknowingly – at one time or another, an 
automated update agent in the computer the right to obtain access to the Internet 
and to download updates. In this respect, we are almost always in a “scenario 3” 
type setting, where the digital equivalent of “domestics”, carry out largely unseen 
work on our computers all the time. While it is unlikely that anyone working for 
an anti-virus vendor would hold a grudge against a particular person, and could 
circumvent the internal auditing and security measures to use that permission to 
install an illegal program or file on their computer, it is equally true that at any 
given point in time, a large number of organizations can legitimately make 
changes on the owner’s computer system. 
It is however scenario 4 that is at the centre of this chapter’s section. As with 
its offline counterpart, it allows us to rule out with a high degree of confidence, 
evidence planted by malicious third parties as described in scenario 2. On the 
other hand, every crime scene now becomes potentially tainted should the trust 
in the third party and its employees be misplaced. Trusted computing can be seen 
as such a security service, and to understand why it is nonetheless seen as an 
appealing model by many, we have to discuss in more detail the regulatory and 
risk assessment environment that gave rise to the TC initiative. Unsophisticated 
users have long been identified as the weakest link in any strategy to make the 
Internet more secure against cyber attacks. It is their computers that provide the 
raw material for botnets, the main tool for denial of service attacks, when they 
forget or fail to update their system with patches, let their anti-virus software 
expire or forget to update the virus signatures.53 Once sufficiently large, these 
                                                        
53  Bayer, U., Habibi, I., Balzarotti, D., Kirda, E., & Kruegel, C. (2009). A view on current 
malware behaviors. Paper presented at the LEET'09: Proceedings of the 2nd USENIX 
conference on Large-scale exploits and emergent threats: botnets, spyware, worms, 
and more, Boston, MA, USA. http://www.eurecom.fr/people/vs_bayer.en.htm, 
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botnets in turn can also threaten the systems of more resourceful and 
sophisticated users, including servers that are crucial for the very functioning of 
the Internet.54 An apparently obvious solution from the point of view of the 
technicians is to remove the responsibility of providing security for the computer 
from the general user, and assign it to a third party. This in turn creates several 
legal issues for the employees of these third parties, and several of them are 
discussed in more detail below. For instance, it is necessary to consider if 
exclusionary rules against illegal searches by the police are applicable by analogy, 
or if a third party employee finds incriminating material by accident, what the 
liability is if he chooses not to report it. For obvious reasons, any third party 
entering into a contract to perform such a service will need certain rights to 
obtain access to a computer or system to perform the contract effectively. As 
noted above, whether or not this is acceptable becomes a question of trust – there 
                                                        
Henderson, S. E., & Yarbrough, M. E. (2002). Frontiers of Law: The Internet and 
Cyberspace: Suing the Insecure?: A Duty of Care in Cyberspace. New Mexico Law 
Review, 32(11). It should be noted at this point that these solutions are themselves 
far from sufficient to provide perfect security – for a discussion, see e.g. Bilar, D. 
(2009). Known knowns, known unknowns and unknown unknowns: anti-virus 
issues, malicious software and internet attacks for non-technical audiences. Digital 
Evidence & Electronic Signature Law Review, 6, pp. 123 - 131. . However, the 
experience with available security measures shows that no technological solution, 
however sophisticated, can be expected to work if it relies ultimately on active user 
involvement and allow the override of automated protection mechanisms by the 
owner of the computer. 
54  While state agencies that should know better, have found themselves victims of 
hacking attacks, the damage in these cases was typically restricted to the computer 
system in question. With botnets, on the other hand, the victim is not just the user 
who lets his computer become infected, but also third parties and ultimately, the very 
functioning of the Internet can become threatened. It is this third party effect that 
changes the legal and practical landscape, and goes some way in explaining why the 
solution to sustainable Internet security is seen mainly in addressing the large 
number of relatively unsophisticated users. From a legal perspective, it is this 




is nobody a king or president has to trust more than his bodyguards, because they 
tend to be the only people allowed to carry weapons in her presence – but as 
history illustrates, such trust can be misplaced. 
However, if the future of Internet security includes a shift of responsibility 
(and control) away from ordinary users to professional organizations, a number 
of issues need to be considered, such as: 
 The conditions by which it can be considered to be rational to trust the 
security providers. 
 When and if potential interference with the digital crime scene might 
become an issue. 
 How the criminal law and the law of evidence should respond to such a 
shift in responsibility, especially if it is the private sector, as opposed to 
the state, that takes on the role of securing (parts of) the Internet 
infrastructure. 
 Whether it is necessary to adjust laws that were written mainly at a time 
when policing was the epitome of sovereign authority. 
To repeat at this point a caveat from Chapter 2: Trusted Computing serves to 
illustrate that the analysis discussed in this thesis are not mere speculation, but 
it should be kept in mind that the main interest is in the type of response to cyber 
crime, not the necessarily the TCI alone.  
3.4 Consequences for the regulatory environment  
As we’ve seen above, from the beginning, TC has been controversial within 
the academic and scientific world, the computer industry, and the end-user 
community.55 The proponents of TC suggest that TC promises to provide four 
                                                        
55  For an extensive discussion on the controversy and the reasons behind the 
controversial nature of TC see: Flick, C. (2004). The Controversy over Trusted 
Computing. (Bachelor of Science), The University of Sydney, Sydney. Retrieved from 
http://liedra.net/misc/Controversy_Over_Trusted_Computing.pdf   
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crucial advantages: reliability, security, privacy and business integrity. These, it 
is claimed, when taken together, guarantee a system that will be available when 
needed; will resist any attack by protecting the system and the data; will provide 
privacy to the user, and finally it will provide businesses with the ability to 
interact efficiently and safely with their customers. Additionally, TC should 
provide protection from viruses, because a check will be applied to all files trying 
to ‘enter’ the system, as well as the implementation of new applications aiming at 
providing greater protection. As we saw, critics of TC consider that restrictions 
will be imposed on users, because the owner of a PC does not have root access to 
cryptographic keys, and therefore users will no longer be in control of their own 
computer.56 The validity of this argument is also confirmed by proponents of TC, 
but they claim that this is a feature, not an error, as it will restrict issues such as 
user override.57 As noted above, the user has the ability to disable some of the 
safety features and where such features are rendered inoperative, the computer 
becomes open to cyber attack. The proponents’ suggestion to rebalance the 
degree, by which users can override such features that are in place by the 
manufacturer and still remain trustworthy, is based on this exact reason.58 
Consequently, the user will no longer be in full control of their own computer 
because they are not permitted to obtain access to the private keys that purport 
to make the computer trustworthy, thus it is asserted that trust is based on what 
                                                        
56  The reader can have an inside on the critics on TC considering the restrictions 
imposed on users: Green, L. (2002). Trusted Computing Platform Alliance: The 
Mother(board) of all Big Brothers. Presented in DEFKON 10. from 
http://www.cypherpunks.to/TCPADEFCON10.pdf, Stallman, R. (2002). Can you 
trust your computer?, NewsForge-The Online Newspaper for Linux and OpenSource. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.newsforge.com/business/02/10/21/1449250.shtml?tid=19 
57   See Yung’s view on the user overriding issue: Yung, M. (2003). Trusted Computing 
Platforms: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly. Paper presented at the 7th International 
Conference, FC 2003, Guadeloupe, French West Indies (pp. 250-254),Springer. 
58   ibid. p.252 
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is promoted as being a ‘well designed machine’, not badly educated humans. This 
is normally analysed as a key feature of the “pre-crime” aspect of TC, its ability to 
enhance security. But our discussions show that it is just as relevant for post-
crime and crime investigation purposes. The PC in this case becomes the crime 
scene. TC secures the crime scene against its human owner, be he victim or a 
suspect. It prevents him from interfering with at least some aspects of the 
evidence, either accidentally or intentionally. It may even prevent some types of 
“anti-forensic” software from running. Advanced anti-forensic software will not 
only delete files, it will alter the basic configuration of the computer so that no 
evidence remains that a deletion was carried out – this will in some cases change 
“integrity values” of the computer the way a rootkit does.59 TC prevents however 
rootkits from running, and therefore by implication also some anti-forensic tools.  
Richard Stallman, the founder of the Free Software Foundation and creator 
of the GNU Project, is one of the harshest opponents of TC. Stallman considers 
that ‘treacherous computing’ is a more accurate name for TC. His concern was the 
possibility content providers and computer companies to make computers obey 
them. It is possible for users’ data to be edited and deleted remotely, without any 
notification to the user or owner of the computer.60 However, our discussion 
indicates another way a TC computer can be treacherous – just as in the Tell-Tale 
Heart by Edgar Allan Poe, your computer keeps not only track of you, but now, 
                                                        
59   on the relation between rootkits and anti-forensics see in particular Blunden, B. 
(2013). Rootkit Arsenal: Escape and Evasion in the Dark Corners of the System: Jones 
& Bartlett Publishers.; For an overview of anti-forensics in general, the reader is 
referred to Harris, R. (2006). Arriving at an anti-forensics consensus: Examining how 
to define and control the anti-forensics problem. Digital Investigation, 3, pp. 44-49. 
doi: 10.1016/j.diin.2006.06.005. And also Garfinkel, S. (2007). Anti-forensics: 
Techniques, detection and countermeasures. Paper presented at the 2nd International 
Conference on i-Warfare and Security (pp. 77), 
60  Stallman, R. (2002). Can you trust your computer?, NewsForge-The Online Newspaper 




there is nothing you can do about it. At this point, it is important to remember 
that there can be legitimate reasons to securely delete files in a way that makes 
them forensically irretrievable, and without even a trace of the deletion - selling 
a machine that carried sensitive information on the second hand market for 
instance.  
TC thus poses a two-pronged dilemma in a forensic context: it prevents 
(almost) everybody from altering certain configurations on a computer, not just 
malicious third parties but also the owner – giving the computer evidence 
potentially much higher evidential value. At the same time, as per Stallman, it 
does open up the possibility to alter or add to that data by the TC provider as 
trusted third party. Or, translated back into the real world, not only do you have 
to give access to your house to someone who can plant a bloodied knife there, 
once the knife is in your house, there is no way you can get rid of it again. To 
permit this to anybody requires a considerable amount of trust in the sociological 
sense- trust that as we argued in the preceding chapter the TCI is unlikely to 
command.  
 In the context of this chapter, this possibility is central to scenario 4 above: 
 The extent that a TC system provides for the Trojan defence, when remote 
access to files by a third party is a necessary prerequisite for the system 
to fulfil its function, and 
 The legal duties, if any, that should be imposed on TC providers to 
maintain the integrity of “digital crime scenes”. 
Programs that use TC when installed will be able to continually download 
new authorization rules through the Internet and levy those rules automatically 
on the computer. In such circumstances, it is claimed that computers may apply 
the new instructions that have been downloaded without the user being made 
aware of the new instructions, to such a degree that a user will no longer be able 
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to fully interact with his own computer.61 This shows that in the context of 
computer forensics and crime investigation, the Digital Rights Management 
(DRM) heritage of TC becomes a potential issue. Digital Rights Management, 
which was one of the original aim for developing TC technology, will be used for 
e-mail, documents and multimedia which can disappear or remain unreadable on 
certain computers, thus altering programs and files – with obvious consequences 
when the evidential value of such files and programs have to be evaluated. A 
practical application of this problem could be for instance when the police tries 
to determine if known child pornographic images are or have been stored on a 
machine. Known images are given a hash value as unique identifier and compared 
to the hashed files on the suspect computer.62 Manipulation of hash values by a 
third party could then incriminate an innocent user.  
3.5 Legal responsibility in an age of TC  
A significant aim of this chapter is to argue that if the Internet is to be made 
more trustworthy through technological rather than legal solutions, the provider 
of that security will need to obtain access to user’s hard drives, and have the 
ability to extract information and to reconfigure the software on the machine. TC 
can be seen as a first step in this direction. In this analysis, in conceptual terms 
the TC approach amounts to a part privatization of what is, in the off-line world, 
an essential state function. Safety becomes a commodity, and its exchange is 
primarily governed by contract. Contract, and possibly the law of tort, has 
                                                        
61  Anderson, R. (2003a). Trusted Computing Frequently Asked Questions / TCG / 
LaGrande / NGSCB / Longhorn / Palladium / TCPA – Version 1.1. (2003). 
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/tcpa-faq.html, Stallman, R. (2002). Can you trust 
your computer?, NewsForge-The Online Newspaper for Linux and OpenSource. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.newsforge.com/business/02/10/21/1449250.shtml?tid=19 
62  McIntyre, T. (2012). Child abuse images and cleanfeeds: Assessing Internet blocking 
systems. RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON GOVERNANCE OF THE INTERNET, Ian Brown, ed., 
Edward Elgar, pp. 277-309. p. 279 
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consequently been seen often as the obvious solution to the regulatory issues that 
TC raises and we will return to this avenue in the next chapter. However, this 
perspective leaves the re-balancing act between the customer or computer user 
and the software company to a mix of market forces, competition law and good 
faith interpretation of contractual terms that cannot adequately address the 
interest of third parties in the security of the Internet, and in particular fails to 
address the interest of the state and law enforcement agencies. 
To the extent that scenario 4 is a realistic depiction of the new realities of 
investigative work in a trusted computing environment, several choices become 
available. One is to do nothing. In this case, the issue of access is similar to 
scenario 3. Since no legal challenge against the validity of digital evidence on the 
basis of an update agent or similar software on a computer that grants other 
organization access to it has been made to date, this could be considered as a 
mere theoretical concern. The risk is that should such a case ever arise, a large 
number of convictions could suddenly become unreliable in retrospect. 
Alternatively, if our analysis of TC as privatization of a core state function is 
considered seriously, it is necessary to create a legal duty on TC providers to 
ensure that any interaction with individual computers does not affect the 
integrity of the data for evidential purposes. Just as the police are required to 
observe the requirements of the chain of custody, and to document the chain 
appropriately, TC providers could be required to develop protocols with the 
explicit requirement of legal admissibility. This option would also highlight the 
potential privacy issues raised by trusted computing, making the quasi-policing 
role of TC more visible. This, arguably, could act as a deterrent for the uptake of 
the technology, but this assumes that consumers will be left with a choice in the 
matter. 
A related issue is the use of forensic diagnostic tools. One of the problems 
with TC that is frequently raised in the literature is the possibility that it will not 
allow certain programs, especially open source programs, to run on a computer. 
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This could at least theoretically prevent commonly used forensic tools such as 
Encase running on a suspect’s computer.63 Any attempt to deal with this problem 
generically may be more difficult than it seems, given the dual nature of many 
hacking tools – the very software that a system administrator uses to ensure safe 
working of a computer, or that is needed for a forensic analysis, are also capable, 
in the wrong hands, to be used for malicious purposes – the difference between 
hacking and auditing or administration tools lies not in the code, but the use it is 
put to. This became visible in Germany’s much criticized attempt to prohibit the 
possession of software that can be used for hacking purposes, and led one 
journalist to add as a by-line: “Will the last security expert to leave Germany turn 
off the lights?”.64 By the same token, many of the functions necessary to perform 
a forensic investigation on a computer – which by definition often means to ‘force’ 
the suspect computer to reveal its secrets by, for example, breaking passwords or 
searching for stenography – will look for all intents and purposes for the TC 
system, which is similar to the very type of process it is designed to prevent from 
running. 
This in turn leads to another problem: whether it is desirable in principle that 
TC provides the purported level of security from attacks. At first glance this 
question might seem absurd, but it is necessary to understand that the entire field 
of Internet security is based on a fundamental paradox: what works for the victim 
also works for the criminal, and what works for the criminal can also work for the 
police. This was epitomized in the debate around secure encryption in the late 
1990s: while strong encryption protects honest citizen against data thieves and 
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64  Leyden, J. (2007, 13/8/2007). Germany enacts 'anti-hacker' law - Will the last 
security expert to leave Germany turn off the lights? The Register, Security.  Retrieved 




other criminals by protecting sensitive communication such as bank details, it 
also protects criminals, their clandestine communications and on-line money 
laundering activities.65 Complex compromise solutions had to be designed, which 
typically combine restrictions on some technologies with legal requirements to 
hand over keys as part of an investigation.66 One of the potentially strongest 
selling points for TC and proof of its potential to enhance privacy is that a number 
of oppressive regimes such as China and Russia prohibit their citizens from 
importing the related TPM technology.67 However, the technology is neutral. That 
TC is considered to be suspicious by regimes that prefer its citizens to not discuss 
politics without the ability of the police to eavesdrop should also raise concerns 
for governments worried about organized on-line crime. 
It is also not an option to provide the public with a ‘weak’ form of TC that 
remains vulnerable to being penetrated by the police or other state agencies. As 
indicated above, organized criminals, often with a background in the 
disintegrating security agencies of the Eastern European block, can match those 
of official agencies. More plausible is the idea that the state will impose 
requirement to leave sufficient weak spots so that when authorized by a court, 
the TC provider is in a position to obtain access to the data. This is very similar to 
                                                        
65  Friedman, D. (1996). A World of Strong Privacy: Promises and Perils of Encryption. 
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for examples of cases that have been prosecuted in relation to encrypted materials, 
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for Windows Vista. from https://technet.microsoft.com/en-
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Murphy, M. G. (2011). The Regulation of Encryption Products in China. Bloomberg 




the provision of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) in the 
UK that creates obligations to reveal the password to encryption keys. In such an 
environment, TC providers face a stark choice: promise a lot, and risk liability 
when things fail, or make it clear in the contract that TC cannot guarantee safety 
– which would risk to undermine acceptance and take-up by users. It is 
noteworthy to mention at this point that Windows Vista, Windows 7, 8 and 10 are 
already using the Trusted Platform Module to facilitate the BitLocker Drive 
Encryption. It is undoubtedly the case that users are not aware of this, but even if 
they were aware, they would not be able to understand its features. 
Even more directly relevant in considering police investigations in a TC 
environment, is that some investigative methods used by the police use the same 
technologies that criminal hackers use to exploit computer vulnerabilities. In 
Germany, the ‘Federal Trojan’ was a piece of software that opened back doors in 
the computers of crime suspects, to permit clandestine monitoring of their 
activities.68 Even more controversially, the recent attack on Iran’s computer 
infrastructure for the nuclear industry was very likely the result of actions by a 
‘friendly’ state power (friendly, that is, to the US and UK as main sponsors of TC) 
using a similar, Trojan based approach.69 A technological solution such as TC that 
cannot distinguish in principle between good governmental Trojans and bad 
criminal Trojans and prevents both from functioning, creates potential for 
conflicts, both technological and legal, that need to be further explored. One 
answer, for instance, could be to create a further responsibility for the TC 
developers, that is, the duty to compromise their own product under certain 
circumstances. This in turn would require a set of legal instruments, on the one 
                                                        
68  Abel, W., & Schafer, B. (2009). The German Constitutional Court on the Right in 
Confidentiality and Integrity of Information Technology Systems - a case report on 
BVerfG, NJW 2008, 822. SCRIPTed, 6(1), pp. 106-123. doi: 10.2966/scrip.060109.106 
69  Falliere, N., Murchu, L. O., & Chien, E. (2011). W32.Stuxnet Dossier Security Response 
(1.4 ed., pp. 69). Cupertino, CA: Symantec Corporation. 
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hand to compel them to cooperate, and on the other a qualified privilege for any 
harm that might arise from such cooperation. Decisions also would have to be 
taken regarding the procedural requirements to be used to compel TC providers 
to cooperate with criminal investigations, in particular the degree (if any) of 
judicial oversight and warrant requirements. Hence, balancing the legal 
obligations, privileges, immunities and burdens in a way that is at the same time 
equitable to consumers and software vendors requires considerably more 
complex responses by the law than a change to the liability regime that the House 
of Lords envisaged.70 
A final issue arises from the DRM heritage of TC, and also how issues 
traditionally discussed in terms of privacy protection can take a new dimension 
in the context of criminal law and criminal investigations. As noted above, it 
seems that the TC providers can obtain sufficient information from the computers 
of TC users not only to prevent unauthorized programs or files from running (for 
instance to prevent the playing of an illegal copy of a music track), but also the 
possibility of removing programs. Given such power, it is possible to infer that 
the TC provider would at least have constructive knowledge about the content of 
the user’s computer. Increasingly, legal systems create an obligation to inform the 
police if they have knowledge of illegal activity.  
For instance, the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 in the United 
Kingdom makes it an offence to fail to disclose information to the police that 
would be “of material assistance in preventing or leading to the arrest of persons 
engaged in the commission of an act of terrorism”.71 In Germany, even broader 
                                                        
70  House of Lords Publications. (2007). Personal Internet Security. (HL Paper 165–I). 
London: The Stationery Office Limited Retrieved from 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200607/ldselect/ldsctech/165/165
02.htm. 
71  See section 117 Information about acts of terrorism in Anti-terrorism, Crime and 
Security Act 2001 c. 24 § c. 24 (2001). 
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duties exist to bring certain crimes to the attention of the authorities. Article 138 
of the Criminal Code (StGB) mandates that failing to disclose information about a 
large number of offences, from terrorism and treason to murder, kidnap and 
dangerous interference with the railway, carries a sentence of up to five years.72 
It is therefore of some relevance to decide what type of knowledge is required by 
these criminal offences, if fully automated processes that permit the 
identification and retrieval of information count as ‘knowledge’ for the purpose 
of these laws (and if not, if they should be included), and indeed how much actual 
knowledge TC providers could or should have about the content of their 
customers’ hard drive. It could be possible for instance, to look for the hash value 
of movie clips known to have content of abusive images of children, in addition to 
clips that are merely illegally downloaded.73 
Similar arguments have been made – and in our opinion never satisfactorily 
resolved at least in the US – regarding constructive knowledge and possession of 
illegal content in the case of Internet intermediaries such as search engines or 
online platforms. Google is technically in possession of illegal images when their 
web crawlers create cached versions of the web sites they visited, stored on 
Google servers. To build up their index, the search engine’s robots constantly 
crawl the Web, taking “snapshots” of every Web page they find accessible (i.e. not 
encrypted, or with a robot exclusion clause in its html code). These copies, also 
called “cached” copies are then stored on the search engine’s server.74 For the US, 
there is a patchwork of exemptions that indicate recognition of the problems for 
intermediaries that this can cause. The most famous one are the safe harbour 
rules under the DMCA, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, which is codified in 
                                                        
72 Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch, StGB)  § 138 (1998). 
73 US v. Cartier, No. No. 07-3222, 543 442 (Court of Appeals, 8th Circuit 2008). 
74  For more of the technical details and possible legal ramifications see Peguera, M. 
(2008). When the cached link is the weakest link: search engine caches under the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act. pp. 1102-1157. , especially p. 1106-1108  
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sections across 17 U.S.C.75 It exempts intermediaries from civil liability under 
copyright law provided they “cooperate” with legitimate takedown and notice 
requests. However, this is a specific exemption for copyright purposes and here 
arguably only for civil liability. In addition, 47 U.S. Code § 230 for instance creates 
a “good Samaritan” exemption for intermediaries that “do their best” in shielding 
the public from illegal or obscene material by using filters for blocking and 
screening, to ensure that this does not suddenly make them “publishers” of the 
material that nonetheless gets by their filters. It also exempts them from civil 
liability. However, 47 U.S.C. 230(e) reaffirms that this does not prevent criminal 
liability, and as 18 U.S.C. 110(4)(A) makes it a criminal offence to “knowingly 
possesses one or more books, magazines, periodicals, films, video tapes, or other 
matter which contain any visual depiction […] of a minor engaging in sexually 
explicit conduct”, it could at least be argued that the search engines commit a 
crime under that provision when their web crawlers create copies for the 
purpose of indexing.76 Finally, Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act 
creates an exemption for intermediaries for certain type of speech related 
offences.77  
                                                        
75  The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (1998). Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 
2860 (1998). For a discussion see e.g. Scott, M. (2005). Safe Harbors Under the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act. NYUJ Legis. & Pub. Pol'y, 9, pp. 99. and Holland, H. B. 
(2007). In Defense of Online Intermediary Immunity: Facilitating Communities of 
Modified Exceptionalism. Kansas Law Review, 56(101), pp. 101-137. For a 
comparison to the European approach, see Peguera, M. (2009). The DMCA Safe 
Harbors and Their European Counterparts: A Comparative Analysis of Some 
Common Problems. Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts, 32, pp. 481.  
76  So argued forcefully by Byars, B., O’Keefe, T., & Clement, T. (2008). Google, Inc.: 
Procurer, Possessor, Distributor, Aider and Abettor in Child Pornography. Paper 
presented at the Forum on Public Policy: A Journal of the Oxford Round Table (pp. 1-
7),Forum on Public Policy. 
77  See e.g. Ardia, D. S. (2010). Free Speech Savior or Shield for Scoundrels: An Empirical 
Study of Intermediary Immunity Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency 
Act. Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, 43(2), pp. 373-506.  
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What does this mean for TC? As we have argued, TC requires that the 
computer owner trusts the TC provider with some information at least – 
potentially giving them considerable access rights. Unlike in the examples of child 
pornography or copyrighted material discussed above, the TC provider does not 
become the owner of this information; it continues to reside solely on the user’s 
computer. Laws that proscribe possession therefore are – probably78 – not 
affected. However, the information gathered will be sufficient to alert the TC 
provider of some forms of illegal activity, including copyright infringements or 
attempted participation in a Denial of Service attack. Where criminal laws make 
it an offence not to report knowledge of a crime, this should then create criminal 
liability for that specific offence – the above cited laws either only shield from 
civil liability, or are “offence specific”.  
A possible argument in defense of TC providers could be that the relevant 
offences typically require “active knowledge”, not just a generic knowledge that 
“something” illegal is happening, somewhere. Since as we have seen in chapter 2, 
the information acquisition and processing that is required for TC is with 
necessity carried out automatically and by machines (“trust machines, not 
humans”), the argument could be made that the TC provider never acquires the 
relevant “knowledge”. This would certainly fit to the policy rationale that we find 
in the DMCA safe harbor provisions and the Intermediary Immunity provisions 
under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act.79 Google “knows” 
abstractly that it must have made copies of copyrighted material, and that some 
of its search results direct users to infringing sites. But unless a specific site is 
                                                        
78   Depending on the configuration of the TC approach, some data may reside on the TC 
provider’s service, but from the details available to us, this will not normally be any 
“substantive” content – the TC provider can see from the hash files and the 
certification what types of file are on a machine, but not the files itself.  
79   The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (1998). and Communications Decency 
Act of 1996, , Pub. L. No. 104-104 (Tit. V), 110 Stat. 133 (Feb. 8, 1996) C.F.R. (1996). 
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brought to its attention, the relevant “knowledge” is too diffuse to trigger legal 
responsibilities. Similarly, we know a priori that attacks against computers take 
place, and that therefore the TC provider will have “somewhere” on its system 
information that indicates illegal activities. But as long as no human identifies a 
specific computer or network, this does not amount to “actual knowledge”, at 
least not for the purpose of criminal law.80 However, there are good policy and 
legal reasons not to make this defense available. From a policy point of view, it 
would enhance the “responsibility gap” that has already been identified as a more 
and more pressing problem in a world where we outsource more activities to 
machines.81 This would create dangerous incentives to avoid legal responsibility 
by using automated processes, something which becomes even easier to 
accomplish. Secondly, it would also raise systematic-legal problems. If automated 
data processing is decoupled from “knowledge”, then many automated functions 
that are crucial for e-commerce and the Internet society, are once again called 
into question – for instance, automated contracting through autonomous agents 
could result in void contracts, because there too, a degree of “knowledge” is 
required as a matter of law.82 
                                                        
80  For a more systematic discussion of different types of knowledge in criminal law than 
can be carriedout here, see Edwards, J. L. J. (1954). The criminal degrees of 
knowledge *. Modern Law Review, 17(4), pp. 293-314. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-
2230.1954.tb02157.x. 
81  The term “responsibility gap” was coined by Matthias, A. (2004). The responsibility 
gap: Ascribing responsibility for the actions of learning automata. Ethics and 
Information Technology, 6(3), pp. 175-183. doi: 10.1007/s10676-004-3422-1; While 
he focusses on learning machines, the same problem arises also in other forms of AI 
– for applications close to those discussed in this thesis, , see e.g. Johnson, D. G., & 
Miller, K. W. (2006). A dialogue on responsibility, moral agency, and IT systems. Paper 
presented at the Proceedings of the 2006 ACM symposium on Applied computing (pp. 
272-276),ACM. 
82  A discussion of this problem would go beyond the scope of the thesis. For a discussion 
on the mental element in automated contracting, a discussion that goes back to the 
late 1980s, the reader is referred to Weitzenböck, E. M. (2001). Electronic agents and 
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In the US at least, and in line with its “fragmented” approach to regulate 
intermediary liability, special laws may be required to ensure that TC providers 
are not overburdened by reporting duties.  
In Europe, we have a more systematic approach in the e-commerce Directive, 
which grants more generic exemptions: 
First, we find in Article 12 a general “mere conduit” safe harbor provision: 
Mere conduit 
Where an information society service is provided that consists of the 
transmission in a communication network of information provided by 
a recipient of the service, or the provision of access to a 
communication network, Member States shall ensure that the service 
provider is not liable for the information transmitted, on condition 
that the provider: 
a) does not initiate the transmission; 
b) does not select the receiver of the transmission; and 
c) does not select or modify the information contained in the 
transmission.83 
Unlike in the US provisions, both civil and criminal liability are excluded. 
However, two legal issues remain. The first and most obvious is if TC providers 
are providing an “information society service” of the kind detailed in the 
Directive. As the interviews with some developers, to be discussed in more detail 
in the next chapter show, this is probably not how the TCI sees itself – they are 
selling “goods”, functionality embedded in hardware. However, our discussion in 
the previous chapter painted a rather different picture. TC at the very least makes 
transmission in a communication network safer, by interacting directly with the 
                                                        
the formation of contracts. International Journal of Law and Information Technology, 
9(3), pp. 204-234. . 
83   Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 
on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic 
commerce, in the Internal Market ('Directive on electronic commerce') (2000). 
Section 4: Liability of intermediary service providers Article 12 
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communication process. Its ultimate aim is to build up “from the ground” a more 
secure internet – that part of this activity takes place on the computers of 
individual users, doesn’t change the picture. Furthermore, as we discussed, to 
create the necessary “herd immunity”, being “TC certified”, will become a pre-
requisite for a computer to participate in the communication with other 
machines. This strongly indicates in our view that TC can be seen as providing 
“communication services”. While one could therefore argue that TC falls under 
the exemption of Article 10,84 this last point also indicates a problem: TC decides 
which computers are allowed to communicate with other computers – and this 
looks perilously close to an activity under provision (c) of Article 10, which would 
deprive the TC provider from its protection.  
Of particular relevance is furthermore Article 15: 
Article 15 
No general obligation to monitor 
1) Member States shall not impose a general obligation on providers, 
when providing the services covered by Articles 12, 13 and 14, to 
monitor the information which they transmit or store, nor a 
general obligation actively to seek facts or circumstances 
indicating illegal activity. 
2) Member States may establish obligations for information society 
service providers promptly to inform the competent public 
authorities of alleged illegal activities undertaken or information 
provided by recipients of their service or obligations to 
communicate to the competent authorities, at their request, 
information enabling the identification of recipients of their 
service with whom they have storage agreements.85 
Taken together, (1) and (2) mean that an Information Society Service 
Provider (ISSP) must not be compelled to actively monitor the information in 
their control, but if they obtain knowledge, it is permissible to obligate them to 
disclose the information, either pro-actively or as a result of a warrant or similar 
                                                        
84  ibid. Article 10 on the information to be provided. 
85  ibid. Article 15 
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request. In light of the discussion about “active knowledge” above, we can see 
how this works for Google, YouTube or Twitter. All of these services, have to 
process data which “could” provide evidence of criminal activity, but as this is not 
the core of their activity, they can’t be compelled to take on this task in addition. 
Google is not looking actively for illegal material, we just know a priori that it will 
stumble across some. But if a specific suspicion is raised to them, this changes the 
nature of their knowledge and they then can be compelled to cooperate in this 
specific case. But with TC, the situation is fundamentally different. “Looking for 
trouble” is in a way what they are all about, identifying unsafe machines or 
communications, and blocking them. For them, identifying (also certain types of) 
illegal activity is part of their core business, as a “privatized police” as we argued 
above. Therefore, Article 15 (2) alternates point (1) which will be the norm rather 
than the exception, at the very least permitting member states to request active 
reporting of signs for illegal activity, if this is not already covered by the types of 
criminal law that we mentioned above. 
To summarize: In our analysis, TC acts as a “privatized police”. This means 
they also get possession of information that is normally either unlawful for an 
ordinary citizen to have, or at least triggers reporting duties. This could expose 
TC to substantial criminal liability. Special privileges may have to be created by 
law to exempt them from an overly onerous reporting requirement, especially as 
this would make them even more visible as part of a surveillance operation on 
behalf of the state and in potential conflict with their customers. We identified so 
far two possible avenues to achieve this: bringing them explicitly under the 
umbrella created for ISSPs (which might mean to broaden the scope of this 
category) and give them the rights, privileges and duties of ISSPs, including 
potentially data retention duties to be discussed below. This seems in line in 
particular with the EU approach. Or create sector and offence specific new and 
tailor made exemptions, for “internet security providers”. This would be more in 
line with the US approach and have the advantage that any exemption can be 
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“tailor made” – as our discussion has shown, they are sufficiently different from 
Google or YouTube to make the EU directive a less than perfect fit. Further below, 
we will look also briefly at a third option that takes the idea of a “privatised 
police” more serious and extends rules to them that other professions that took 
on security functions are already subject to. Rather than seeing TC as a form of 
ISSP, in this approach they would be treated more like public notaries or 
volunteer police officers. First though, we will explore in some more depth the 
additional duties that could come from treating TC providers more like ISSPs. 
3.6 A case study: Retention and Preservation of data 
Collection of evidence from computers, networks, digital storage devices, 
servers and personal devices has been a standard practice in digital forensics. As 
stated earlier, TC originated as a form of DRM technology with the intent to 
control the use of digital content on user’s computer and prevent unauthorized 
and illegal use of the material. The data retained from users will be held in TC 
provider’s databases thus raising - amongst others - legal, privacy and forensics 
investigations concerns. There are two sides of the coin to be considered here – 
the duty to retain and preserve data for forensic purposes as long as required by 
law, and not to retain it any longer than permitted by data protection law. To 
gauge what exactly one’s duties under these conflicting provisions are, requires 
for entities that are engaged with the Internet (which may or may not be a wider 
group of ISSPs) to know exactly what type of entity they are for legal purposes – 
and as we have seen, for TC providers as “privatized police”, this may be more 
difficult to determine than one may have thought.  
 The EU Directive on data retention 2006/24/EC86 had been introduced in an 
attempt to give the authorities the ability to cope with organized crime and 
                                                        
86  Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 
2006 on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the 
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terrorism. Recently, early in April 2014 the European Court of Justice however, 
annulled the provision as being in irreconcilable conflict with the fundamental 
rights of privacy and protection of personal data87 (since the restraints already in 
place are not enough to ensure that only the necessary information is stored and 
used without prior notification to the subscriber).88 The Court emphasized the 
impermissibility of blanket retention of data without specific justification, as well 
as the possible abuse of the data that are not certain to be destroyed at the end of 
the retention period and concluded that a reform of their former decision should 
emerge; adding more pressure on the lawmakers to deliver vigorous data 
protection measures.89  
                                                        
provision of publicly available electronic communications services or of public 
communications networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC (2006). 
87  Court of Justice of the European Union. (2014). The Court of Justice declares the Data 
Retention Directive to be invalid [Press release]. Retrieved from 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2014-
04/cp140054en.pdf. CJEU Judgement in Cases C‐293/12 and 594/12 for an academic 
analysis see Cole, M., & Boehm, F. (2014). Data Retention after the Judgement of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union. University of Luxemburg, pp. 1-107.  
88  Bautista, C. B. (2014, April 8, 2014). EU court dismantles law requiring phone 
companies to retain customer data, Digital Trends. Retrieved from 
http://www.digitaltrends.com/mobile/eu-court-ruling-against-data-
retention/#!DTzyQ, BBC News. (2014). Top EU court rejects EU-wide data retention 
law, BBC News. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-
26935096, Breidthardt, A., & Strupczewski, J. (Apr 8, 2014). EU court rejects 
requirement to keep data of telecom users, Reuters. Retrieved from 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/08/us-eu-data-ruling-
idUSBREA370F020140408, White, A. (2014, Apr 8, 2014). EU Data-Retention Law 
Tramples on Privacy, Top Court Says, Bloomberg. Retrieved from 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-04-08/eu-data-retention-law-tramples-
on-privacy-top-court-says.html 
89  Bautista, C. B. (2014, April 8, 2014). EU court dismantles law requiring phone 
companies to retain customer data, Digital Trends. Retrieved from 
http://www.digitaltrends.com/mobile/eu-court-ruling-against-data-
retention/#!DTzyQ, White, A. (2014, Apr 8, 2014). EU Data-Retention Law Tramples 
on Privacy, Top Court Says, Bloomberg. Retrieved from 
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However, the UK reacted to the decision by enacting emergency legislation 
(Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 “DRIP”) which had for the 
time being (and subject to further legal challenges) kept the data retention 
regime in place for the UK.90 These changes in the law create obvious uncertainty, 
which is a problem for ISSPs in general,91 but will affect TC in particular – as we 
argued above; here certain types of data collection and retention are in a way 
“core” to the business that aren’t for other actors in the digital economy.  
ISPs in Europe have thus been until recently under a legal duty to retain data 
and to ensure the safety of those data for investigation, detection and prosecution 
of serious crime. Retention period, archival policies, categories of data, storage 
means, access control and encryption rules have been delineated regarding ISPs 
though the Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament.92 In the US, no 
general data retention duty exists. Attempts have been made to introduce such 
duties, most notably the “Internet Stopping Adults Facilitating the Exploitation of 
Today's Youth” (SAFETY) Act 2009 which was introduced in 2009 by 
Representative Lamar Smith, and which would have obligated providers of 
“electronic communication or remote computing services” to “retain for a period 
of at least two years all records or other information pertaining to the identity of 
                                                        
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-04-08/eu-data-retention-law-tramples-
on-privacy-top-court-says.html  
90  see also for a comparative analysis Kühling, J., & Heitzer, S. (2015). Returning through 
the National Back Door? The future of data retention after the ECJ Judgment on 
Directive 2006/24 in the UK and Elsewhere. European law review, 2, pp. 263-278.  
91  Tracol, X. (2014). Legislative genesis and judicial death of a directive: The European 
Court of Justice invalidated the data retention directive (2006/24/EC) thereby 
creating a sustained period of legal uncertainty about the validity of national laws 
which enacted it. Computer Law & Security Review: The International Journal of 
Technology Law and Practice, 30(6), pp. 736-746. doi: 10.1016/j.clsr.2014.09.008  
92  Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 
2006 on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the 
provision of publicly available electronic communications services or of public 
communications networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC (2006). 
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a user of a temporarily assigned network address the service assigns to that 
user.”93 
However, while the US is lacking a legal data retention duty, its police and 
security services have been highly successful in accessing data that ISPs keep 
voluntarily and/or for their own internal benefits. The Stored Communications 
Act94 in conjunction with the PATRIOT Act regulates for instance how access to 
communication data can be gained through the use of national security letters 
(NSL), a form of administrative subpoena, by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation.95 In addition to the highly controversial and highly secretive NSLs, 
there are other procedures such as SCA warrants that enable access to 
communication data by law enforcement agencies, subject to warrant 
requirements.96 
                                                        
93  GovTrack.us. (2009). H.R. 1076 (111th): Internet Stopping Adults Facilitating the 
Exploitation of Today’s Youth (SAFETY) Act of 2009. Bills.  Retrieved 22/8/2015, 
2015, from https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/hr1076, from a position 
sympathetic to the bill, Ryan, K. V., & Krotoski, M. L. (2012). Caution Advised: Avoid 
Undermining the Legitimate Needs of Law Enforcement to Solve Crimes Involving the 
Internet in Amending the Electronic Communications Privacy Act. USFL Rev., 47, pp. 
291.  
94  18 U.S. Code § 2709 - Counterintelligence access to telephone toll and transactional 
records  (1986). 
95  For a discussion of the legal framework and the difficulties for civil liberties see 
Gorham-Oscilowski, U., & Jaeger, P. T. (2008). National Security Letters, the USA 
PATRIOT Act, and the Constitution: The tensions between national security and civil 
rights. Government Information Quarterly, 25(4), pp. 625-644. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.giq.2008.02.001; See also Garlinger, P. P. (2009). 
Privacy, Free Speech, and the Patriot Act: First and Fourth Amendment Limits on 
National Security Letters. NYUL Rev., 84, pp. 1105. and Nieland, A. E. (2006). National 
security letters and the amended PATRIOT Act. Cornell L. Rev., 92, pp. 1201.  
96  For a critical assesment of the scope of SCA warrantes, see Benedetti, D. T. (2013). 
How Far Can the Government’s Hand Reach Inside Your Personal Inbox?: Problems 
With the SCA, 30 J. Marshall J. Info. Tech. & Privacy L. 75 (2013). The John Marshall 
Journal of Information Technology & Privacy Law, 30(1), pp. 5. On SCA warrants in the 
cloud, which is of particular relevance to TC due to the distributed nature of the data 
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This means that independently of the specific legal framework that is used to 
access data, ISPs are increasingly acting as a proxy for police and security services 
in evidence acquisition. As von der Meulen and Lodder have observed, at the 
same time when the concept of ISP was considerably widened and now includes 
the likes of Facebook and Google in addition to the traditional “access providers” 
such as BT or VirginMedia, their role changed from a neutral thirds to private law 
enforcers.97 Interesting for us in this respect is in particular von der Meulen and 
Lodder’s “sectorial analysis” of this phenomenon. In general, they note that not 
just the EU data retention duties, but generally legal cooperation requirements 
with the police or other third parties was consistently rejected by the ISPs, who 
sometimes succeeded in getting the legal collaboration requirements rescinded 
or at least watered down, as in the case of the French HADOPI  law98 or even more 
impressively the collective action against the proposed SOPA and PIPA legislation 
in the US, that pitted ISPs against copyright holders.99 In other cases they found 
                                                        
it collects, see Schultheis, N. (2015). Warrants in the Clouds: How Extraterritorial 
Application of the Stored Communications Act Threatens the United States' Cloud 
Storage Industry. Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Com. L., 9(2), pp. 661.  
97  Van der Meulen, N. S., & Lodder, A. R. (2012). From Neutral Thirds to Private Law 
Enforcers: Toward a Criterial Framework for Requests Placed on Internet Service 
Providers (pp. 1-18). Vrije University of Amsterdam  
98   ibid. p.3. see on the resistance against HADOPI see Mueller, M., Kuehn, A., & Santoso, 
S. M. (2012). Policing the network: Using DPI for copyright enforcement. Surveillance 
& Society, 9(4), pp. 348-364. , Muir, A. (2013). Online copyright enforcement by 
Internet Service Providers. Journal of Information Science, 39(2), pp. 256-269. doi: 
10.1177/0165551512463992; on the use of deep package inspection as a necessary 
precondition for HADOPI, which would be an inbuild feature of TC as we saw; See 
Guez, M. (Producer). (2010). Technical measures in the context of the Hadopi Law 
(France). . Presentation before the Stakeholders. Retrieved from 
http://fr.readwriteweb.com/wpcontent/uploads/2010/09/Slides-SCPP.pdf; 
Société civile des producteurs phonographiques (SCPP) for a more detailed analysis 
of the technical requirements – an in depth comparison with TC would go beyond the 
scope of this thesis.  
99  A detailed analysis of the interests at stake in this dispute, and the political 
environment in which it took place, is in Bridy, A. (2012). Copyright policymaking as 
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ingenious ways of abiding by the letter of the law while finding often ingenious 
solutions to undermine its efficiency. A particularly striking, and arguably illegal, 
example is “warrant canaries”. ISPs are prevented under the NSL warrants 
(discussed above) to disclose to their customers that a data request was made. 
Some found a workaround, or so they claim: They state on their website that they 
“never received a warrant” – and would take this note down if one were to be 
issued.100 In more traditional territory, example abound where ISPs have fought 
warrants on behalf of their customers.101 
As von der Meulen and Lodder show, not unsurprisingly ISPs were 
significantly more willing to fight or undermine attempts to co-opt them for law 
enforcement purposes if there was no direct benefit for them or their customers. 
As long as ISPs were not major copyright holders e.g. there was no benefit for 
them in alienating their customer base by penalizing some of them for copyright 
theft. Similarly, they had no direct benefit in disclosing customer details to law 
enforcement agencies if the victims of the alleged crime were not directly other 
customers – as would be the case both in child pornography prosecutions but also 
some hate speech cases. In these cases, their resistance to legal requirements for 
                                                        
procedural democratic process: A discourse-theoretic perspective on acta, sopa, and 
pipa. Cardozo Arts & Ent. LJ, 30, pp. 153. ; An analysis of an iconic event in this process, 
the Wikipedia blackout, is in Konieczny, P. (2014). The day Wikipedia stood still: 
Wikipedia’s editors’ participation in the 2012 anti-SOPA protests as a case study of 
online organization empowering international and national political opportunity 
structures. Current Sociology, 62(7), pp. 994-1016.  
100  For a positive assessment see e.g. Gilens, N. (2014). The NSA Has Not Been Here: 
Warrant Canaries as Tools for Transparency in the Wake of the Snowden Disclosures. 
Available at SSRN 2498150, pp. 525-546. For a negative assessment see Wexler, R. 
(2014). Warrant Canaries and Disclosure by Design: The Real Threat to National 
Security Letter Gag Orders. pp. 158-179.  
101  The Electronic Frontiers Foundation keeps records of such acts of resistance – noting 




cooperation was strongest.102 A different situation emerges when the target are 
the operators of botnets. Here, ISPs had a twofold motivation to cooperate, since 
botnets could attack them directly (and hence interrupt services to their 
customers) or expose their customers to attacks by a minority of criminals. 
Unsurprisingly, this example of “privatized law enforcement” turns out to be the 
most successful.103  
The above should not be understood as painting ISPs as selfless champions 
of their customers, willing to take on vested corporate interests at great personal 
risks and expenses, even though this was very much the picture the industry tried 
to paint of itself in the SOPA-PIPA wars.104 Once an appropriate incentive 
structure is created, for instance through “safe haven” provisions that invited 
ISPs to pass on the risk of copyright litigation to others, compliance can be 
vigorous and potentially beyond what the law technically requires.105 But what 
this analysis shows is that for at least some ISPs in at least some forms of co-
                                                        
102  see on HADOPI compliance e.g. Meyer, T. (2012). Graduated response in france: The 
clash of copyright and the internet. Journal of Information Policy, 2, pp. 107-127.  
103  Meulen and Lodder op cit p. 7. See however also Van Eeten, M. J., & Bauer, J. M. (2008). 
Economics of malware: Security decisions, incentives and externalities: OECD 
Publishing. STI Working Paper 2008/1 who argues that action was taken by ISPs in 
no more than 10% of cases.  
104  See in particular the analysis by Benkler, Y., Roberts, H., Faris, R., Solow-Niederman, 
A., & Etling, B. (2015). Social mobilization and the networked public sphere: Mapping 
the SOPA-PIPA debate. Political Communication(ahead-of-print), pp. 1-31.  
105  See the analysis by Helman, L. (2010). Pull Too Hard and the Rope May Break: On the 
Secondary Liability of Technology Providers for Copyright Infringement. Tex. Intell. 
Prop. LJ, 19, pp. 111. , in particular p. 183ff. Part of the reason for overcomplaince is 
management of litigation risks, where vague drafting (possibly intentionally) 
enhances overcompliance, see Craswell, R., & Calfee, J. E. (1986). Deterrence and 
uncertain legal standards. JL Econ. & Org., 2, pp. 279. An interesting reason for 
overcompliance is given by Gibson, J. (2007). Risk aversion and rights accretion in 
intellectual property law. Yale Law Journal, 116, pp. 882. where he shows how a 
feedback loop has caused overcompliance with copyright laws; see also Africa, M. 
(2000). The Misuse of Licensing Evidence in Fair Use Analysis: New Technologies, 
New Markets, and the Courts. California Law Review, pp. 1145-1183.   
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optation, the adversarial structure of the legal process and with that its checks 
and balances are preserved, however diminished they might be. The police still 
has to apply for a warrant that is served to a party which is not institutionally 
friendly to the police (the way judges seem to be, whose scrutiny of warrant 
applications seems limited), 106 and thus might decide to challenge it. Interests of 
police and ISP are not congruous unless an intentionally designed legal incentive 
structure makes them so.  
Under these circumstances, the type of ethical-analytical framework that von 
der Meulen and Lodder suggest may well be sufficient to provide a sufficiently 
abstract mechanism for testing the legitimacy of co-opting ISPs into policing 
roles. It assumes unwilling ISPs, and then focuses on whether co-opting them is 
legitimate at all, and if so, just how far the state can go in providing an “incentive 
structure” through the threat of penal or civil sanctions.  
We argue here, that the situation is radically different for TC providers, and 
that consequently, different methods need to be found to provide a legally 
justifiable regulatory environment. TC providers, when co-opted into policing 
tasks, are not any longer preserving even the vestiges of the adversarial structure 
that we find for other ISPs that are co-opted into policing functions. 
Where ISPs have acted in protection of their customers against state 
interests, they seem to be motivated at least in part by competitive pressures: 
DuckDuckGo, the privacy preserving browser, saw for instance massive increase 
in customer numbers in 2013 after Snowden revelations showed how much 
Security Services had used access to search results.107 Shortly after, Apple 
                                                        
106  see e.g. Lee, C. (2011). Reasonableness with teeth: the future of Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness analysis. Miss. LJ, 81, pp. 1133. For a comparison of EU and US 
approaches to warrant scrutiny and their empirical impact on privacy see Slobogin, 
C. (2000). Empirically Based Comparison of American and European Regulatory 
Approaches to Polic Investigation, An. Mich. J. Int'l L., 22, pp. 423.  
107  The causal connection is made by Krieger, M. (2013). Search Engine "Duck Duck Go" 
Experiences Traffic Surge in Wake of NSA Scandal. Liberty Blitzkrieg. 
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announced to incorporate DuckDuckGo as an alternative to its own Safari 
browser, at the same time making strong encryption part of their new iPhones, 
to the dismay of the security services.108 That privacy can serve as unique selling 
point, or at least a significant competitive advantage, has been argued before. 
According to the “Secure the Trust of Your Brand survey” conducted in 2006 by 
the Chief Marketing Officer Council: 
 More than 50% of consumers said their security concerns were rising; 
 40% have actually stopped a transaction due to a security concern; 
 Most importantly for our point, more than 30% said they would seriously 
consider taking their business elsewhere if they were dissatisfied with 
the protection of their data; 
 and 25% were definite on transferring business in trade off for better 
security.109  
Data like this indicates that ISPs who work in a competitive market can and 
do use privacy as a selling point.110 This means they have good reasons to be seen 
to resist at least those demands by law enforcement personnel that fall short of 
national warrant requirements – or with other words test the validity of warrants 
occasionally in court. This remains true despite numerous surveys showing that 
                                                        
https://libertyblitzkrieg.com/2013/07/10/search-engine-duck-duck-go-
experiences-traffic-surge-in-wake-of-nsa-scandal/. 
108  The response by law enforcement was reported here: Timberg, C., & Miller, G. (2014). 
FBI blasts Apple, Google for locking police out of phones. The Washington Post, pp. 1-
7. Indirect evidence for our contention is provided in Donohue, L. K. (2015). High 
Technology, Consumer Privacy, and US National Security. Am. U. Bus. L. Rev., 4, pp. 11. 
which analyzed economic data that showed that Post-Snowden, US ISPs were losing 
customers to providers that could guarantee better privacy 
109  Council, C. M. O. (2006). Secure the Trust of Your Brand, . CMO council webpage: CMO. 
110  more comprehensive economic studies that back this point can be found in 
Cavoukian, A., & Hamilton, T. (2002). The Privacy Payoff, How Successful Business 
Build Consumer Trust: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Trade. See in particular pp. 13-14. For 
a summary of their evidence; see also Kenny, S., & Borking, J. (2002). The value of 
privacy engineering. J. Inform. Law Technol.(JILT), 7(1), pp. 1-29.  
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many customers place only very limited financial value on privacy and are not 
normally willing to pay significant amounts of money for it.111 These studies focus 
on a direct commercial exchange of money for added privacy, they only ask: “how 
much would you be willing to pay in addition for privacy”, not “would you -
everything else being equal - go to a provider that indicates it is willing to fight 
for your privacy in court”.112  
Now we have prepared the basis for our argument: Co-optation of ISPs into 
law enforcement, as described by von der Meulen and Lodder, preserves at least 
to a degree the adversarial structure of the legal process, which is a crucial “check 
and balances” safeguard for our liberties, but only because companies see a 
competitive market advantage in doing so. This however presupposes a 
functioning and highly competitive market. However, as we have seen, the entire 
philosophy of Trusted Computing is based on eventual herd immunity - everybody 
will have to use TC certified products or their computers won’t be able to 
communicate any longer. A comprehensive legal analysis of the competition law 
issues that this raise is beyond the scope of this thesis, the crucial issue that TC 
                                                        
111  Grossklags, J., & Acquisti, A. (2007). When 25 Cents is Too Much: An Experiment on 
Willingness-To-Sell and Willingness-To-Protect Personal Information. Paper presented 
at the Online Proceedings of the Second Annual Workshop on Economics and 
Information Security. 
112  This is the argument in Acquisti, A., Friedman, A., & Telang, R. (2006). Is there a cost 
to privacy breaches? An event study. ICIS 2006 Proceedings, pp. 94. See also for 
contrast their earlier study Acquisti, A. (2004). Privacy in electronic commerce and 
the economics of immediate gratification. Paper presented at the Proceedings of the 
5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce (pp. 21-29),ACM. Here we can see 
clearly that customers reward and punish ISPs for news about recent privacy 
violations, even if they are unwilling to pay much “for their future security” – a result 
of our “bounded rationality” that is described in Acquisti, A., & Grossklags, J. (2007). 
What can behavioral economics teach us about privacy. Digital Privacy: Theory, 
Technologies and Practices, pp. 363-377. See also the earlier study by Milberg, S. J., 
Burke, S. J., Smith, H. J., & Kallman, E. A. (1995). Values, personal information privacy, 
and regulatory approaches. Communications of the ACM, 38(12), pp. 65-74.  which 
shows how heterogeneous our assessment of the value of privacy is. 
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inevitably requires a form of monopoly and hence causes competition concerns 
is however well documented and also follows from our discussion in the previous 
chapter.113 For our discussion, this demonstrates that co-opting TC providers into 
law enforcement is indeed a game changer that goes beyond previous attempts 
to leverage the ISPs as Internet gatekeepers for law enforcement purposes. 
Unlike other ISPs, TC providers, once herd immunity is achieved, will not be 
exposed to consumer pressure if they fail to protect legitimate consumer 
interests against law enforcement requests. As von der Meuven and Lodder’s 
study shows, this will mean they are less likely to “fit” into the adversarial 
structure of our legal system with its checks and balances – they have all the 
benefits of a private sector player, that is freedom from rules developed to control 
the police as part of the state, while their regulation through markets is at least 
severely curtailed. 
There is a second line of argument that shows why using TC providers for 
law enforcement purposes is likely to differ from previous attempts to co-opt 
ISPs. Referring again to the study by von der Meulen and Lodder, ISPs were 
particularly willing to cooperate with the police when they themselves were the 
direct target of criminal activity. This was mainly the case in botnet attacks. ISPs 
did not suffer, directly, from copyright violation, child pornography or online 
fraud, and were hence much less willing to cooperate in the control of these 
activities. TC, again, is different. Here we must remember our discussion of the 
                                                        
113  For a discussion, the reader is directed to Schoen, S. (2005). Compatibility, 
competition, and control in trusted computing environments. Inf. Secur. Tech. Rep., 
10(2), pp. 105-119. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.istr.2005.05.005. With a focus 
on the cryptography aspect of TC, see also Anderson, R. (2004). Cryptography and 
Competition Policy - Issues with ‘Trusted Computing’ Economics of Information 
Security (Vol. 12, pp. 35-52): Springer US. A sector specific analysis can be found in 
Yung, M. (2003). Trusted Computing Platforms: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly. Paper 
presented at the 7th International Conference, FC 2003, Guadeloupe, French West 
Indies (pp. 250-254),Springer. 
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previous chapter, and the origins of TC as a Digital Rights Management system. 
SOPA and PIPA had pitted content owners against technology companies. The TC 
consortium straddles this divide, with several of its members relying on 
copyright, especially software copyright, as core part of their business.114 Even 
more worryingly, recent years have seen an increasing emphasis on criminal law 
as a tool of copyright enforcement.115 This trend in itself has raised a worrying 
spectre of “over-criminalisation” in substantive law.116 Here our concerns are the 
procedural and evidential issues more than the substantive law. TC providers 
become both police and victims of crime, policing actions of which they 
themselves were victims. In the offline world, such an obvious conflict of interests 
would result in grave concern – a police officer whose house has been burgled 
can’t use his warrant card to question, or let alone to detain suspects in his private 
time to find out who did it. This however is exactly the situation we might find 
with TC. As we saw in the previous chapter, TC technology is still carrying 
functional tools that are essentially DRM technology systems in disguise, or 
repurposes – sealed storage, remote attestation, secure I/O and curtained 
memory – implemented by code, give TC provider the important power to know 
when a copyright violation occurs. Even more than that, not only would the 
                                                        
114  See on this point e.g. Roemer, R. (2003). Trusted Computing, Digital Rights 
Management, and the Fight for Copyright Control on Your Computer. UCLA JL & Tech., 
2003, pp. 8. see also Cohen, J. E. (2006). Pervasively distributed copyright 
enforcement. Georgetown Law Journal, 95, pp. 1-48.  
115  See already Green, S. P. (2002). Plagiarism, norms, and the limits of theft law: Some 
observations on the use of criminal sanctions in enforcing intellectual property 
rights. Hastings Law Journal, 54(1), pp. 167-242. which argued of the danger of an 
“increasing criminalization of intellectual property law and the widening gap 
between what the law is and what people think it should be”. See for a more recent 
analysis Manta, I. D. (2011). The Puzzle of Criminal Sanctions for Intellectual 
Property Infringement. Harvard Journal of Law and Technology, 24(2), pp. 2010-
2030.  
116  See e.g. Moohr, G. S. (2004). Defining Overcriminalization Through Cost-Benefit 
Analysis: The Example of Criminal Copyright Laws. Am. UL Rev., 54, pp. 783.  
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information about a violation become visible, more actions are possible to occur 
according to the content owner rules – software that does not comply with these 
rules can be banned from using the specific file content through remote 
attestation, or even sealed storage that will prevent users from opening the file 
content from such an unauthorized software. Moreover, using curtained memory 
and secure I/O, the TC technology prevents copying of a copyrighted file even 
from capturing it from sound peripherals in case of media files. All in all, TC will 
be impossible to be circumvented based on the approach they implemented,117 it 
will allow the content providers, and the software vendors to “exercise complete 
control over how and when their content is used” and point that the traditional 
relationship between the user and the content characterized by anonymity, 
copyright, privacy and other regimes, needs to be revisited in the digital age.118 
Furthermore, as discussed earlier in Chapter 3, the control of the computer will 
be taken off the users and shift to the TC vendors allowing full control to the 
machine and the content. 
Woodford, in an insightful paper back in 2004, described an example of how 
a legitimate music downloader using a Trusted Computing technology computer, 
can be deterred (by the changes in technology) from ripping or transferring the 
music bought on a storage medium or a device outside the computer tower (i.e. 
USB, CD, DVD etc.) thus indicating the change in the music ownership of the 
individual.119 Using the TC technology, illegitimate use as well as the intention to 
breach intellectual property found in digital form, can be trailed and controlled. 
This means the TC provider combines several key policing functions in this 
situation: He collects evidence and secures it, he deters, proactively, certain types 
                                                        
117  Carroll, A., Juarez, M., Polk, J., & Leininger, T. (2002). Microsoft Palladium: A Business 
Overview: Microsoft Press Release. 
118  Woodford, C. (2004). Trusted Computing or Big Brother? Putting the Rights back to 
Digital Rights Management. U. Colo. L. Rev., 75, pp. 253-300.  
119  ibid. p.253ff 
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of behavior, and finally he even carries out something not too dissimilar from an 
arrest – when a suspect’s computer, using software in violation of copyright law, 
gets remotely “blocked”.  
Going back to the fictional examples from the beginning of the chapter, the 
offline equivalent to law enforcement in a TC age might look closer like this: Every 
household has to hire a security guard or risks sanctions such as ostracism 
(inability to communicate with others) or inability to get insurance cover. All 
security guards are vetted and employed by a private company that also has a 
side business in theft insurance. While you pay for the security, the guards have 
a second income stream by checking your belongings for stolen goods, and will 
inform the police (or indeed change the locks on your door) when they find goods 
that belong to a client of the insurance arm of their company.  
At the heart of this problem for us is the “dual nature” of TC: organized as a 
private sector company, but as a standard setting body premised on achieving 
eventually a monopoly, it takes on roles previously reserved to the state. This 
allows in the absence of clarifying legislation the potential of a very peculiar form 
of “forum shopping” – relying on private or criminal law depending on which 
regime maximizes their power, or conversely, risking penalties under either 
regime which could be a major disincentive to invest in the development of the 
technology.  
For us, this is one more argument why it might be desirable to create a sui 
generis framework for TC (and similar security) providers that recognizes that or 
them, monitoring, analyzing and to a degree retaining data about suspicious 
activities is not the side effect of their activity, but their very reason for existence. 
Despite being a private sector actor, rules that normally apply to the police might 
be a much more appropriate avenue in the light of the discussion above.  
We used above data retention duties as a case study, to which we can now 
return. In what follows, we will use data retention and forensically sound data 
storage as one example of how criminal evidence rules can be extended to TC, 
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with the double advantage that on the one hand, this creates particularly strong 
and convincing evidence, and on the other, it creates a new mechanism of control 
over the TC provider that can generate trust in them as a side effect.  
Data retention duties of course are an intricate legal issue independently of 
the question of TC, and have created significant literature on their own.120 We by 
contrast, will put the focus on an issue that is of particular relevance for TC – not 
if, but how data should be retained, assuming that legitimate law enforcement 
functions make some form of data storage necessary. We’ve argued above that TC 
takes on some post-crime policing function. We know from experience that the 
evidence of police officers, just as the evidence from expert witnesses, carries 
particular weight. This makes them potentially dangerous for us - a bend police 
officer or a negligent expert can condemn an innocent person to prison. Building 
again on our examples above, a corrupt police officer could use the authority of 
his office to gain access to our dwellings and plant a bloodied knife. A negligent 
expert may not have heard about the latest findings that invalidate his method. 
We trust police and expert witnesses for a similar mix of reasons that we 
discussed in the introductory chapter for social trust in general.121 Some of them, 
as we discussed in the previous chapter are emotive and organically grown in a 
                                                        
120  See e.g. Bignami, F. (2007). Privacy and law enforcement in the european union: the 
data retention directive. Chicago Journal of International Law, Spring, pp. 233-255. , 
Blanchette, J.-F., & Johnson, D. G. (2002). Data Retention and the Panoptic Society: 
The Social Benefits of Forgetfulness. The Information Society, 18(1), pp. 33-45. doi: 
10.1080/01972240252818216, Cheung, A., & Weber, R. H. (2008). Internet 
governance and the responsibility of internet service providers. Wis. Int'l LJ, 26, pp. 
403. For an analysis of the interaction between EU law and the law of a member state 
see DeSimmone, C. (2010). Pitting Karlsruhe against Luxembourg-German Data 
Protection and the Contested Implementation of the EU Data Retention Directive. 
German LJ, 11, pp. 291.  
121  The most comprehensive and influential study on trust in modern police forces is 
Tyler, T. R. (2002). Trust in the law : encouraging public cooperation with the police 
and courts. New York, [N.Y.]: New York, N.Y. : Russell Sage Foundation. 
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society, where they often rely on personal acquaintance and kinship bounds.122 
Others are institutional: we trust the police because there are bodies such as the 
Police Complaints Commission, or the professional bodies for expert witnesses 
that can punish them if they violate the rules.123 Others still are “rational” in the 
way Weber used the term, which is based on formal legal rules. The rules of 
evidence, especially the exclusionary rules, have this function: they tell us we can 
trust the police, for if they oversell their mark, their work will be for naught.124 
We discussed the problem of “emotive trust” and the TCI in the preceding 
chapter and concluded that the nature of the TC consortium mitigates against this 
basis for a trust relationship. Generating trust through institutions, the second 
aspect of trust, would see the TCI as a consortium getting integrated into a wider 
institutional structure, chains of responsibility and accountability, complaints 
procedures and sanctions. At present, there is no structure in Internet 
governance to provide for such an organization that in the past has been 
intimately linked with the concept of the modern nation state, as we saw in our 
brief discussion of Weber. There remains option three, using the rules of evidence 
                                                        
122  For an application to the police see e.g. MacDonald, J., & Stokes, R. J. (2006). Race, 
social capital, and trust in the police. Urban Affairs Review, 41(3), pp. 358-375. ; For 
expert witnesses see Brodsky, S. L., Griffin, M. P., & Cramer, R. J. (2010). The Witness 
Credibility Scale: An outcome measure for expert witness research. Behavioral 
Sciences & the Law, 28(6), pp. 892-907. doi: 10.1002/bsl.917.  
123  See for the police v Hough, M., Jackson, J., Bradford, B., Myhill, A., & Quinton, P. (2010). 
Procedural Justice, Trust, and Institutional Legitimacy. Policing: A Journal of Policy 
and Practice, 4(3), pp. 203-210. doi: 10.1093/police/paq027; For expert witnesses 
see Turner, J. A. (2005). Going after the Hired Guns: Is Improper Expert Witness 
Testimony Unprofessional Conduct or the Negligent Practice of Medicine. Pepp. L. 
Rev., 33, pp. 275.  
124  See for the police Paulsen, M. G. (1961). The exclusionary rule and misconduct by the 
police. The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science, pp. 255-265. See 
for expert witnesses Graham, M. H. (1986). Expert Witness Testimony and the 
Federal Rules of Evidence: Insuring Adequate Assurance of Trustworthiness. U. Ill. L. 
Rev., pp. 43.  
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and similar procedural rules to generate trust. This is the option most in line with 
the general gist of this chapter’s argument: since TC providers carry out de facto 
police functions, they need to be subject to the same procedural rules.  
One particularly important procedural safeguard is the “chain of custody”. 
More than most others, it carries on its face the role to control the police and thus 
create trust.125 “Prove that at every step, only an authorized person handled the 
evidence, so that if something went wrong, or it got manipulated, we know whom 
to blame.” More than any other it poses new and intricate problems for electronic 
evidence, even outside TC environments.126  
We will look now at this specific rule to see what specific issues TC in a post-
crime scenario poses. Securing the data collected as evidence either from 
personal digital devices (e.g. computer, mobile phones, peripherals, PDAs, 
electronic devices etc.) or from networks (e.g. intranets, extranet, Internet) and 
maintaining a rigid chain of custody for the data has been a challenge. To maintain 
probative value, procedurally sensitive information retrieved from customer 
computers have to be kept safely and ensure that no data spoliation or alteration 
can take place.127 From the beginning, courts were sensitive to the problem of 
                                                        
125  See e.g. Stoughton, S. (2015). Evidentiary Rulings as Police Reform. U. Miami L. Rev., 
69, pp. 429-519. esp. p.437ff 
126  See e.g. Bratus, S., Lembree, A., & Shubina, A. (2010). Software on the witness stand: 
what should it take for us to trust it? Trust and Trustworthy Computing (pp. 396-416): 
Springer, Duranti, L., & Rogers, C. (2012). Trust in digital records: An increasingly 
cloudy legal area. Computer Law & Security Review, 28(5), pp. 522-531. , Prayudi, Y., 
Ashari, A., & Priyambodo, T. K. (2014). Digital Evidence Cabinets: A Proposed 
Frameworks for Handling Digital Chain of Custody. Int. J. Comput. Appl, 109(9), pp. 
30-36.  
127  Article 7 of Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data, CETS No.: 108 C.F.R. (1985). “Appropriate security 
measures shall be taken for the protection of personal data stored in automated data 
files against accidental or unauthorized destruction or accidental loss as well as 
against unauthorized access, alteration or dissemination”;  
Research by Schneier, B., & Kelsey, J. (1999). Secure audit logs to support computer 
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tamper-proof chain of custody records in digital forensics. However, there are 
also significant risks and corresponding costs attached to data preservation, 
raising economic, long-term preservation and other hindrances128 while avoiding 
it, has been described as the struck between “triumph and defeat in the 
courtroom”.129 Digital integrity has been defined by Menezes et. al as “the 
property whereby digital data has not been altered in an unauthorized manner 
since the time it was created, transmitted, or stored by an authorized source”.130 
It is a real challenge for hardware and software manufacturers to achieve and 
self-prove integrity of digital evidence with time binding in order to achieve 
transparency for the threefold digital integrity marks of “who”, “when”, and 
“what”.131 
                                                        
forensics. ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC), 2(2), pp. 
159-176.  has been aimed to limit the ability of a successful attacker to corrupt log 
files storing sensitive information, by using encryption methods on the log files; 
  Researchers Snodgrass, R. T., Yao, S. S., & Collberg, C. (2004). Tamper detection in 
audit logs. Paper presented at the Proceedings of the Thirtieth international 
conference on Very large data bases - Volume 30, Toronto, Canada. have also 
proposed mechanisms based on cryptographically strong one-way has functions 
aiming to prevent any possible corruption of the audit log produced by the system.  
128  Arora, J. (2009, January 29-30, 2009). Digital Preservation, an Overview. Paper 
presented at the National Seminar on Open Access to Textual and Multimedia 
Content: Bridging the Digital Divide, Hassell, J., & Steen, S. (2003). Avoiding Spoliation 
of Electronic Discovery. http://www.experts.com/Articles/Avoiding-Spoliation-of-
Electronic-Discovery-By-Johnette-Hassell-PhD-Susan-Steen, Tibbo, H. R. (2003). On 
the Nature and Importance of Archiving in the Digital Age Advances in Computers 
(Vol. Volume 57, pp. 1-67): Elsevier, Waters, D., & Garrett, J. (1996). Preserving Digital 
Information. Report of the Task Force on Archiving of Digital Information: ERIC. 
129  Hassell, J., & Steen, S. (2005). Preserving and Protecting Computer Evidence. Evidence 
Technology Magazine, 3(4), pp. 16-18.   
130  Menezes, A. J., Van Oorschot, P. C., & Vanstone, S. A. (1997). Handbook of applied 
cryptography. United States: CRC Press  (Boca Raton). 
131  Hosmer, C. (2002). Proving the integrity of digital evidence with time. International 
Journal of Digital Evidence, 1(1), pp. 1-7.  
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3.6.1 Chain of custody and Audit trails 
“There is no single way to enforce chain of custody in digital forensics, but 
the use of techniques such as time-stamping and hashing algorithms are central 
to all methods”.132 As computers run, evidence of the user’s metadata are 
collected, revealing the date and time of creation, edition and last time of access 
for files. Traces are always left behind even if the user does not realize, making 
audit trails much easier to establish.133 Preserving digital data is not enough on 
its own, as we need “proof that the preservation environment preserves 
authenticity and integrity while performing the communication constitutes a 
theory of digital preservation”.134 It is this self-reflective move where TC comes 
into its strength. As we saw in the previous chapter, a key aspect of TC is that it 
permits a system to prove about itself that it wasn’t tampered with – issues we 
discussed there under the header of “unhindered operation”. In Trusted 
computing technology then, integrity is of paramount importance. The TPM 
manufacturer acting as an authoritative entity is used to create integrity data or 
values, which can then be used amongst others as chain of custody procedures, 
digitally sign and assign the date on files or components, in a way that later 
modification is impossible to occur. As the Trusted Platform consists of several 
components both hardware and software, it is important that these components 
(mutable or not) remain intact from any deviations from the original state, and in 
case of modifications the Trusted Platform will be in place to autonomously 
                                                        
132  Thorvaldsen, Ø. E. (2006). Geographical Location of Internet Hosts using a Multi-Agent 
System. Norwegian University of Science and Technology.    
133  U.S. DOJ. (2010). Searching and Seizing Computers and Obtaining Electronic Evidence 
in Criminal Investigations: Office of Legal Education Executive Office for United States 
Attorneys. 
134  Moore, R. (2008). Towards a theory of digital preservation. International Journal of 
Digital Curation, 3(1), pp. 63-75.  
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detect and report this to the owner/ user.135 While the Trusted Platform desires 
integrity management, it has another objective: to manage the runtime integrity 
through proper management of its components during load-time and runtime 
although no promises are given that the components are implemented in a 
correct manner and are bug-free.136 
A second aspect of the traditional approach of chain of custody is that the 
entity that first collected (and in this sense “created”) the evidence needs to be 
clearly identified so that the integrity data source is clear. Again, in our discussion 
in the previous chapter, we saw how provable identities are created as part of the 
TCI attestation process. Thus in the TC case, the TPM manufacturer, or the TSS 
software manufacturer, or the BIOS manufacturer could all be considered as 
candidates for “co-creators” of the initial evidence data point, together with the 
target computer on which the evidence was found. The ultimate goal as described 
in the TCG Integrity Managements Architecture report is to provide all the 
necessary mechanisms to capture and represent integrity information and to 
verify the Integrity Report context using the reference measurements obtained 
during the runtime measurement procedure.137 This process of integrity 
verification then becomes the natural correspondent of integrity verification 
measures in “real” evidence - the sealed plastic bag with the CSI’s signature.  
Based on the Report,138 recording the measurements (integrity 
measurements) performed by components constituting the trust chain and 
presenting them (integrity reporting) in a comprehensive way to the external 
world, is compelling. Thus, it is possible to preserve and conduct the information 
gathered by the trust chain of the platform with care while keeping in mind the 
                                                        
135  TCG. (2006d). TCG Infrastructure Working Group Architecture Part II - Integrity 
Management v1.0. In T. Hardjono (Ed.), (Revision  1.0 ed.). 
136  ibid. p.13 
137  ibid. p.30 
138  ibid. p.42 
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timing of dissemination of the information to the external world. Briefly, the 
Integrity management collects actual integrity measurements from all the 
components comprising the Trusted Platform – the so called snapshots139 – which 
on a running live platform, are the runtime measurements140 making up the trust 
chain. It then compares these runtime measurements over pre-set reference 
integrity measurements of the same components which are called reference 
measurements141, which are determined by the components’ manufacturers or by 
other third parties and allow the Trusted Platform to measure the “level” of trust 
achieved.142 Being able to express trust numerically like this, chimes extremely 
well with recent developments in evidence law. In the US, in the landmark 
decision of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,143 the court established five 
                                                        
139  Snapshots from the Integrity Report. 
140  Runtime measurements refer to the measurements taken from the components of 
the platform (specifically from the Root of Trust for Measurement (RTM)) during the 
actual boot and operation of the specified platform. It is therefore expected that these 
measurements will differ according to the computer and its components and will 
reveal the platform’s integrity state; for more information look TCG. (2011b). TCG 
Infrastructure Working Group Integrity Report Schema Specification v 2.0 (Revision 
5 ed.).. The actual measurements are acquired by the Platform Trust Services (PTS) 
process and is intended to be integrated within the Trusted OS components to ensure 
the trustworthiness that TCG claims TCG. (2006d). TCG Infrastructure Working 
Group Architecture Part II - Integrity Management v1.0. In T. Hardjono (Ed.), 
(Revision  1.0 ed.). 
141  Pre-set static measurements are provided by the components’ manufacturers and 
are following the TCG Reference Manifest structure (RM) containing information that 
identify the manufacturer and are descriptive to the model TCG. (2011a). TCG 
Infrastructure Working Group Core Integrity Schema Specification v 2.0 (Revision 5 
ed.).. 
142  TCG. (2006d). TCG Infrastructure Working Group Architecture Part II - Integrity 
Management v1.0. In T. Hardjono (Ed.), (Revision  1.0 ed.). 




criteria, the “Daubert Standard” that governs the admissibility of all forms of 
expert evidence.144 The court established five criteria in particular: 
1. Empirical testing: whether the theory or technique is falsifiable, refutable, 
and/or testable. 
2. Whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication. 
3. The known or potential error rate. 
4. The existence and maintenance of standards and controls concerning its 
operation. 
5. The degree to which the theory and technique is generally accepted by a 
relevant scientific community. 
The “gold standard” for a Daubert-type analysis is DNA evidence or similar 
“laboratory based” disciplines, other newly emerging fields of forensic science 
should aspire to match them.145 DNA and it’s concept of “match probability” 
explicates in particular the third criterion, the known or potential error rates, one 
of the most important aspects of Daubert.146 Here we get the “there is a one-in a 
billion chance that the DNA could come from someone other than the suspect”.147 
No single piece of evidence needs to be perfect – but we need to know just “how 
                                                        
144  on Daubert in general see Giannelli, P. C. (1993). Daubert: Interpreting the Federal 
Rules of Evidence. Cardozo L. Rev., 15, pp. 1999. See also Dixon, L., & Gill, B. (2002). 
Changes in the standards for admitting expert evidence in federal civil cases since the 
Daubert decision. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 8(3), pp. 251.  
145  So e.g. Cheng, E. K. (2004). Reenvisioning Law Through the DNA Lens. NYU Ann. Surv. 
Am. L., 60, pp. 649. or Mnookin, J. L. (2001). Fingerprint evidence in an age of DNA 
profiling. Brook. L. Rev., 67, pp. 13.  
146  So e.g. Jabbar, M. (2010). Overcoming Daubert's shortcomings in criminal trials: 
making the error rate the primary factor in Daubert's validity inquiry. NYUL Rev., 85, 
pp. 2034. or Christensen, A. M., Crowder, C. M., Ousley, S. D., & Houck, M. M. (2014). 
Error and its meaning in forensic science. Journal of forensic sciences, 59(1), pp. 123-
126.  
147  See e.g. Scheck, B. C. (1993). DNA and Daubert. Cardozo L. Rev., 15, pp. 1959.  Koehler, 
J. J., Chia, A., & Lindsey, S. (1995). The random match probability (RMP) in DNA 
evidence: Irrelevant and prejudicial? Jurimetrics Journal, 35, pp. 201.  
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imperfect” it is, how strong its evidential weight is, even if it is in comparison to 
DNA very small.148  
Forensic computing is not a laboratory science like DNA, it is not normally 
based on large population data that provide us with background probabilities, 
and hence struggled for that reason alone to meet the Daubert standard.149 TC’s 
“reference measurements” are one important way in which forensic computing 
can emulate DNA evidence and meet the Daubert criterion.150 The ability to 
quantify the evidential strength, the trust that we can rationally place in a piece 
of evidence, is not restricted to the US legal system. In England and Wales, the 
Law Commission published in 2011 its final recommendations for reform of the 
law on expert evidence, with the emphasis on a new reliability-based 
admissibility test for expert opinion evidence based on the experience with 
                                                        
148  A typical example is Gonzalez-Rodriguez, J., Rose, P., Ramos, D., Toledano, D. T., & 
Ortega-Garcia, J. (2007). Emulating DNA: Rigorous quantification of evidential weight 
in transparent and testable forensic speaker recognition. Audio, Speech, and 
Language Processing, IEEE Transactions on, 15(7), pp. 2104-2115. Forensic speaker 
identification will never reach the probative weight of DNA. But to have any value at 
all, we need to know, through rigorous methods, just how reliable it is.  
149  So in particular Marsico, C. V. (2005). Computer evidence v. daubert: The coming 
conflict CERIAS Tech Report 2005-17 (pp. 1-21). Center for Education and Research 
in  Information Assurance and Security Purdue University.; In a similar vein, but with 
greater emphasis on measuring the reliability of individual experts rather than the 
methods they use, Meyers, M., & Rogers, M. (2004). Computer forensics: the need for 
standardization and certification. International Journal of Digital Evidence, 3(2), pp. 
1-11. Measuring error rates of individual experts rather than their methods has been 
one popular way to circumvent the spirit of Daubert. See e.g. Koehler, J. J. (2007). 
Fingerprint error rates and proficiency tests: What they are and why they matter. 
Hastings LJ, 59, pp. 1077.  
150  Not just addressing TC, but DRM in general for this purpose, see with more technical 
details Lee, W., & Hwang, C. (2007). A forensic computing system using a digital right 
management technique. Paper presented at the Fuzzy Systems and Knowledge 
Discovery, 2007. FSKD 2007. Fourth International Conference on (pp. 258-262),IEEE. 
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Daubert.151 This will also challenge computer forensic practices in the UK, with 
TC for the reasons given above, being a part of the answer.152 
Thereafter, the integrity data gathered need to be collected and assembled 
together to form a consistent set of integrity information about the Trusted 
Platform. The acceptable Reference Manifest will include only the formatted and 
normalized information that follow the ideal format.153 The value of the collected 
integrity data should be highly estimated leading to trust affirmations concerning 
the platform altogether. Attached to the Reference Manifest a digital signature154 
from the issuer (either the manufacturer of the component or a trusted third 
party) provides source-authentication of the data. The security of the integrity 
data will be ensured in all stages of the collection process while an evaluator 
mechanism will be in place and adequately report on the presence and status of 
the component integrity information to the data source (e.g. the creator or 
manufacturer of the integrity data).155 
Following, the collection of integrity data, the verifier needs to authenticate 
them as well as all the components comprising the Trusted Platform. The data 
                                                        
151 The recommendations are available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
229043/0829.pdf for a discussion see Wheate, R. M., & Jamieson, A. (2009). A Tale of 
Two Approaches-The NAS Report and the Law Commission Consultation Paper on 
Forensic Science. International Commentary on Evidence, 7(2). 
152  Sallavaci, O., & George, C. (2013). New admissibility regime for expert evidence: the 
likely impact on digital forensics. International Journal of Electronic Security and 
Digital Forensics, 5(1), pp. 67-79.  
153  TCG. (2011a). TCG Infrastructure Working Group Core Integrity Schema 
Specification v 2.0 (Revision 5 ed.). 
154  The digital signature can be confirmed by the Verifier by checking that the AIK 
private key previously used in the Integrity Report signature matches the one used 
to sign the quote information belonging in the attestation (Quote structure) as well 
as that the AIK certificate is attached to the EK-certificate of the TPM hardware. TCG. 
(2007). TCG Credential Profiles v 1.1 For TPM Family 1.2; Level 2 (Revision 1.014 ed.). 
155  TCG. (2006d). TCG Infrastructure Working Group Architecture Part II - Integrity 
Management v1.0. In T. Hardjono (Ed.), (Revision  1.0 ed.). 
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can be passed to the verifier (user) in various methods; either by publishing the 
information in an Integrity Database (or Reference Manifest Database) solely 
available to the verifiers, or with the use of a storage component. It is up to the 
discretion of the manufacturer to decide whether to create a database including 
all its component products, or to publish the database to a third party service 
provider. The intention of this database is to maintain an accurate source of 
component integrity information and which can be accessible by the verifier. 
During the collation stage which follows communication/publication, the 
integrity data gathered needs to align itself with the corresponding components 
for verification purposes. The verification of the correctness of the integrity data 
gathered, completes through the next and last phase of evaluation by the verifier 
entity when the components information is compared with those listed in the 
Reference Manifest Database.  
The procedure of comparing snapshots to Reference Manifest Structures, is 
an automated one and compares the essential structural information of both 
records side by side. Furthermore, it facilitates the verifier to be aware of the 
status of integrity components creating the platform in addition to the 
component’s source authenticity deriving from the manufacturer’s signature 
obtained in the collection phase.156 With the awareness of the verifier, an 
evaluation of the Requestor entity is executed under the term of Platform 
Authentication.157 The Runtime/Loadtime measurements and Reference 
measurements processes are shown in the following figure taken from the TCG 
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Figure 4: Runtime/Loadtime Measurements and Reference Measurement Processes 158 
Concerning protection of the Reference Manifest and Snapshot documents 
TCG has utilized an Integrity Wrapper that involves various attributes that are 
used by the verifier to establish the genuineness and the authenticity of the 
document (i.e. a confidence value, digital signature and date-time).159 Here we 
note again the more than metaphorical similarity between the “digital wrapper” 
and the “evidence collection bag” of old.  
As Chain of custody has been one of the options that TCG explored; 
expanding formally legal evidentiary rules on preservation of custody chains to 
them for forensic purposes seems an obvious option – though with the important 
“symbolic” effect that it “makes official” the quasi-police function of the TC 
providers by extending rules to them that in the past only applied to state actors. 
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Management v1.0. In T. Hardjono (Ed.), (Revision  1.0 ed.). Figure in pg. 16. 
159  ibid. p.20 
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TCG is using a Core Integrity Manifest Schema which defines code and 
configuration integrity management primitives.160 These primitives are 
commonly used in the Integrity Report produced and the Reference Manifest 
created by the component manufacturer. As stated earlier, for easier verification 
purposes, the Integrity Report and Reference Manifest follow common syntax 
and semantics enabling the Core schema to provide a unique interpretation of the 
measurements and their relation to the platform components.161 Amongst others, 
the Core schema consists of elements supporting collection and reporting of 
integrity values including the Collector element. This element may be included in 
the manifest as it holds the hash computation concerning the ComponentID. The 
SigningComponent element deals with the signature provided by the 
manufacturer on the component and it is optionally added to the manifest. 
3.6.2 Collecting online evidence 
Digital evidence handling from computers has been matured considerably in 
recent years. It includes collection of the data in a law-compliant way using 
specialized and standardized tools such as Encase®, AccessData’s Forensic 
Toolkit, Technology Pathways’ ProDiscover and others. One of the problems 
indicated above though, is that a TC system may well prove to be resistant to 
analysis by off–the–shelf forensic tools, as they tend to “force” the target 
computer into a behavior for which it was not designed. From the computer’s 
perspective, so to speak, there is no difference between the attack by an 
“untrustworthy” criminal hacker and a (socially) “trustworthy” police officer.162 
                                                        
160  TCG. (2011a). TCG Infrastructure Working Group Core Integrity Schema 
Specification v 2.0 (Revision 5 ed.). 
161  TCG. (2006d). TCG Infrastructure Working Group Architecture Part II - Integrity 
Management v1.0. In T. Hardjono (Ed.), (Revision  1.0 ed.). 
162  This should be a major source for concern. All the more worrying that apart from 
some lone academic voices such as Burmester, M., & Mulholland, J. (2006, April 23 - 
27). The advent of trusted computing: implications for digital forensics Paper 
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While as we just saw, the authentication element makes TC superior to non-TC 
environments for evidential purposes, it poses serious difficulties to get the data 
from a non-cooperating target in the first place. That TC therefore also poses a 
problem for post-crime investigation, should hardly be surprising. After all, a key 
component of TC is also secure encryption, whose detrimental effects on law 
enforcement are otherwise widely discussed – to the point that recent 
suggestions by both the US and UK governments point towards prohibition of 
certain encryption tools, just after the “crypto wars” of the 1980’s seemed over.163 
Just how desperate these reactions to the threat of crime and terrorism are, 
becomes clear if one remembers that encryption is a key enabler for online 
banking and almost all other online transactions. If this proposal went to go 
ahead, TC would be a prime candidate for prohibition. To brute force even the 
                                                        
presented at the Proceedings of the 2006 ACM symposium on Applied computing, 
Dijon, France (pp. 283-287 ),ACM Press., the issue has been ignored by police, 
lawyers and technologists.  
163  It would go beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss the impediments that 
encryption can create for law enforcement. A comprehensive analysis from the early 
discussions, still in the shadow of the cold war, and present day crime-centric debates 
are in Koops, B.-J. (1999). The crypto controversy: a key conflict in the information 
society (Vol. 6): Kluwer Law International. The initial discussions centred around 
possible use by the Warshaw Pact, using export control laws as the chosen legal 
mechanism to (try to) prevent the spread of the technology. See e.g. Nguyen, T. 
(1996). Cryptography, Export Controls, and the First Amendment in Bernstein v. 
United States Department of State. Harv. JL & Tech., 10, pp. 667. The question of access 
for law enforcement to encrypted data remains a persistent issue see e.g. Wolfe, D. 
(2000). Government's Right to Read: Maintaining State Access to Digital Data in the 
Age of Impenetrable Encryption, The. Emory LJ, 49, pp. 711. for a recent comparative 
overview see Saper, N. (2012). International Cryptography Regulation and the Global 
Information Economy. Nw. J. Tech. & Intell. Prop., 11, pp. xv.  An early socio-legal 
analysis similar to the one dominating this thesis, and also discussing the 
implications for online trust, can be found in Friedman, D. (1996). A World of Strong 
Privacy: Promises and Perils of Encryption. Social Philosophy and Policy, 13, pp. 212-
228. doi: 10.1017/S0265052500003526 . Even more explicit on the link between 
encryption and trust is Akdeniz, Y., & Walker, C. (1998). UK Government policy on 
encryption: trust is the key. JCL, 3, pp. 110.  
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2048-bit public/private keys suggested in early versions of TC would mean, 
according to RSA, a task many times longer than the universe is likely to last. To 
brute force a 1640-bit key would require about a million computers (with 500 
MHz processors) operating for about 100 billion years.164 Even stronger and 
more comprehensive is the BitLocker tool that encrypts the entire hard disk 
based on the trusted computing techniques that we discussed briefly in the 
previous chapter. In our assessment this goes beyond the privacy measures Apple 
has announced recently for its iPhones, proposals that garnered condemnation 
from police and police-friendly legal academics.165 Obviously, should the 
campaign to outlaw encryption gain against all odds momentum, this thesis will 
become moot and part of legal history.  
 Collecting digital evidence from the Internet however, belongs in a different 
unique discipline – Remote Internet forensics. The geographic location of the 
crime scene is what makes it distinct from digital forensics, as the data on 
computers can be accessed without being aware on the actual location of the 
data.166 The Internet is a large pool of information for investigations used by 
almost everybody (i.e. military, government, attorneys, personnel etc.) as well as 
a large provider for tools used in investigations. 
The Good Practice Guide for computer-based electronic evidence published 
by ACPO E-Crime Working Group & Metropolitan Police Service gives a clear 
                                                        
164  Halboob, W., & Mahmod, R. (2012). State of the Art in Trusted Computing Forensics 
Future Information Technology, Application, and Service (pp. 249-258): Springer.  
165  See e.g. Timberg, C., & Miller, G. (2014). FBI blasts Apple, Google for locking police out 
of phones. The Washington Post, pp. 1-7. Critically also Orin Kerr in his contribution 
to the influential Volokh Conspiracy blog, Kerr, O. (2014). The Volokh Conspiracy - 
Apple’s dangerous game. http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2014/09/19/apples-dangerous-game/. A critical response to Kerr’s 
analysis is here: Draughn, M. (2014, September 20, 2014). Orin Kerr’s Dangerous 
Thinking, Windypundit. Retrieved from https://windypundit.com/2014/09/orin-
kerrs-dangerous-idea/  
166  Shipley, T. G. (2007). Collecting Legally Defensible Online Evidence. pp. 1-25.  
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guidance on handling digital evidence from computers, yet the directions given 
on the collection of evidence from the Internet are much less clearer.167 The main 
reason for this is that the data of interest may be temporary and should require 
live content capturing to be fetched along with the huge size of the Internet. A 
review on cases in the area of digital evidence from the Internet exposes the 
complications around the concepts of evidence collection and preservation and 
reveals that collection of evidence from computers has evolved to a standard 
process, something which is not the case for evidence collection from the Internet 
– still following invalidated methods for data collection.168 Many commercial and 
freeware tools have been proved to capture Internet based data and some have 
been successful for law enforcement and therefore have been adopted for this 
purpose. However, it is worth noting that none of these tools have been originally 
designed for the purpose of collecting, preserving and presenting data to the 
court. 
3.7 Conclusions 
Internet security has finally gained the interest that it deserves from the 
governmental point of view.169 Consumers also need to be confident in Internet 
security. TC proposes a technical solution, where security is neither entrusted to 
the user, nor enforced by the state, but is found in every unit of the Internet. This 
chapter has outlined that this amounts to a dramatic shift of power away from 
consumers and state regulatory bodies to the software providers, and such a 
                                                        
167  ACPO E-Crime Working Group, & Metropolitan Police Service. (2007). Good Practice 
Guide for Computer-Based Electronic Evidence Official release version. 
168  Shipley, T. G. (2007). Collecting Legally Defensible Online Evidence. pp. 1-25.  
169  Cm7948. (2010). Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and 
Security Review.  London: The Stationery Office Limited, Downing, E. (2011). Cyber 
Security – A new national programme. (SN/SC/5832). House of Commons Library, 
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move will only be acceptable if it is accompanied by an equivalent shift in legal 
responsibility. While the House of Lords is right in its emphasis on the 
responsibility of software and hardware producers, it may have underestimated 
the amount of adjustments in the legal regime that this requires.170 The author 
contends that TC is best understood as the outsourcing of state functions to the 
private sector, and with that arises the requirement to provide, on the one hand, 
adequate protection for citizens, and on the other, a rational framework that 
grants the necessary legal privileges while imposing certain responsibilities on 
TC providers, making them more like the ‘special constables’ they in fact will 
become. 
In the preceding paragraph, we have seen how we can leverage the laws of 
evidence to rebalance rights and duties in a TC environment if we take the idea 
that TC providers are de-facto police service. Their greater rights to collect, 
evaluate and communicate data about their customers would be balanced by the 
same type of restrictions the police is under. TC, so we have argued, is not just 
another ISP that can more or less against its will be press ganged into supporting 
policing activity. Rather, TC changes for better or worse fundamentally the nature 
of digital evidence and computer forensic investigation. Its “dual nature” that 
oscillates between a traditional commercial entity, a quasi-public standard 
setting body, a de-facto monopoly and a law enforcement agency creates both 
risks and opportunities. The risk is that it falls between regulatory regimes, which 
could either see them amass power on behalf of the state, or conversely 
undermine even legitimate evidence gathering by law enforcement agencies. It 
could result in unchecked and unregulated powers concentrating in the hand of 
the TC consortium, but it could also result in a loss of the very trust that their 
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systems try to create and with that ultimately the failure of this approach that 
relies after all on voluntary uptake by customers.  
We have argued that with the great powers that the TC provider will yield, 
great responsibilities must come – and in a democratic society under the rule of 
law, these responsibilities need to be enshrined at law. Furthermore, law used in 
this way has been seen, ever since Max Weber, as a key element to generate 
societal trust – ultimately, being regulated in this way, and being seen to be 
regulated, is in the very best interest of the TC providers themselves, and can help 
to address the reluctant uptake that we traced back in the last chapter to the 
divergence between techno-trust and societal trust. In this chapter, we explored 
how such a legal rebalancing of rights and responsibilities can look like, focusing 
on public law and the law of criminal procedure. This chapter emphasized the 
“public service” role of TC as guarantor of the security of critical infrastructure. 
In the next chapter, we will focus on the other side of the coin, TC as a private 
sector actor whose relation with its customers is mediated by contract law. In this 
chapter, we argued that TC providers are not just another ISP, and while one can 
apply analogously some of the rules and regulations of e.g. EU data protection law 
or data retention duties that ISPs are subject to, it is more promising to treat them 
as a sui generis entity: A private sector actor in a monopoly position targeted by 
the state with maintaining the security of the critical infrastructure. This allows 
to exempt them from some restrictions on data collection that are appropriate for 
other ISPs, but that would unnecessarily impede their task of protecting the 
Internet against attacks, while at the same time making them subject to more 
stringent regulation that we would normally only find in the law regulating police 
activities.  
However, TC providers remain a private sector entity, and their relation to 
their own customers is ultimately governed by contract law. In the next chapter, 
we will ask if a similar “rebalancing: of rights and duties, power and 
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accountability” that we discussed here for criminal procedural law is also 
possible and necessary for their “private sector” face. 
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CHAPTER 4 :  
RELIANCE LIABILITY ISSUE IN ANALOGY TO TMS 
4.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we approached the legal environment around TC 
from a public law (criminal law) perspective – what can the state or society 
legitimately demand from TC providers, what rights can they be given, what 
obligations should they be under? The premise for this analysis was that TC will 
either be successful (have significant uptake) and as a result inevitably shift 
power and control to the TC provider and their consortium. Or it will fail (have 
insufficient uptake to ensure herd immunity) because it won’t be able to mobilize 
sufficient trust, and thus deprive us of a promising, and maybe the only, possible 
way to regulate and make more secure, dynamic, complex networks. We argued 
that criminal procedural laws are a type of law that is ideally placed to contribute 
to both goals: By extending demands previously only relevant for the police to TC 
providers, they acknowledge it tacitly, that the TC provider is now a de-facto 
police force. In their wake come potentially more rights (such some forms of data 
retention that would otherwise be impermissible, and generally a Data Protection 
regime that is made to fit their policing function rather than their commercial 
role), but also more duties. These duties in turn should foster societal trust – just 
as we allow the police under some conditions to search our dwellings, we protect 
ourselves against the abuse of this power by chain of custody requirements, we 
could, as we discussed, impose on TC a stringent chain of custody regime – as one 
worked-through example amongst many that are imaginable.  
But as much as the TCI can be co-opted into policing, and as much as it looks 
as if it is taking on state function, it remains of course in law a private sector 
entity, and the direct relations with its customers are mediated through private 
law in general, and contract law in particular. Here, the same type of issue arise: 
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what type of private law is best suited to increase the acceptability of TC and the 
uptake of the technology, by creating rational trust. Second, what type of private 
law is best placed at responding to and rebalancing the power shifts and 
imbalances that TC creates? As with criminal procedural law, these two issues are 
intimately linked. If TC creates obvious power imbalances over its users, their 
trust will be limited and their willingness to buy into the technology will be 
limited. In this chapter, we therefore look at the private law side of the equation. 
Here too, we will argue that TC results in a shift in de-facto power that traditional 
law is not best placed in regulating. Liberal contract law in particular is still 
premised on the assumption of a “bargain between equals” where people freely 
decide to bind themselves in mutually advantageous relations. In his seminal 
analysis of the history of contract law, Horwitz writes: 
“But where things have no "intrinsic value," there can be no 
substantive measure of exploitation and the parties are, by definition, 
equal. Modern contract law was thus born staunchly proclaiming that 
all men are equal because all measures of in - equality are illusory“.1 
This classical liberal concept of contract with its emphasis on formal equality 
and freedom was of course always problematic, based on a fiction more than 
reality. Standard terms of contract, used by economically stronger parties to 
regulate the relationship with their customers, are the norm rather than the 
exception.2 The typical response of the post-war, welfarist state was to use “good 
                                                        
1  Horwitz, M. J. (1974). The historical foundations of modern contract law. Harvard law 
review, pp. 917-956. at pp 918-919. 
2  For a discussion see the early and still seminal work by Kessler, F. (1943). Contracts 
of Adhesion--Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract. Colum. L. Rev., 43, pp. 629. 
A more recent discussion can be found in Trebilcock, M. J. (1997). The limits of 
freedom of contract: Harvard University Press. 
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faith” provisions in contract law,3 or a notion of “unconscionability”4 as a road 
towards stricter scrutiny of the validity of individual contract clauses by courts, 
sometimes at the instigation of consumer groups or state-appointed ombudsmen 
or watchdogs.5 This opened up the development of a consumer protection law 
that allowed a degree of benign paternalism,6 protecting consumers if necessary 
from themselves. Modern technologies have brought these age-old questions into 
new and sharper relief. As automated contract formation is becoming more and 
more the norm, the notion of “free choice” and “meeting of the minds” looks 
increasingly outdated in an algorithmic society. When your fridge contracts with 
your supermarket the next beer delivery, limitations on the computational 
capacities alone, will mean that both sides cannot but utilize rigid, pre-
                                                        
3  See for the US in particular. Summers, R. S. (1968). " Good Faith" in General Contract 
Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code. Virginia Law Review, 
pp. 195-267. For a comparative analysis of approaches within the EU, see Collins, H. 
(1994). Good faith in European contract law. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, pp. 229-
254. and also Zimmermann, R., & Whittaker, S. (2000). Good faith in European 
contract law: Cambridge University Press. 
4  On this approach see the highly influential study by Leff, A. A. (1967). 
Unconscionability and the Code. The Emperor's New Clause. University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review, pp. 485-559. with an ultimately skeptical conclusion as to 
their efficiency in addressing inequality. Empirical data on the use of the concept by 
contemporary courts showing their limited role in the present day can be found in a 
very recent skeptical appraisal is in Fleming, A. (2014). The Rise and Fall of 
Unconscionability as the'Law of the Poor'. Georgetown Law Journal, 102(5), pp. 1383-
1441. For an economic analysis see Epstein, R. A. (1975). Unconscionability: A critical 
reappraisal. Journal of Law and Economics, pp. 293-315.  
5  For a critical analysis of the different types of institutional arrangements that can 
«pre-approve» fair standard terms see in particular Becher, S. I. (2009). A'Fair 
Contracts' Approval Mechanism: Reconciling Consumer Contracts and Conventional 
Contract Law. University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, 42, pp. 747-804.  
6  See e.g Shiffrin, S. V. (2000). Paternalism, unconscionability doctrine, and 
accommodation. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 29(3), pp. 205-250.  
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determined protocols and standards.7 How “good faith” between machines 
should be understood remains an open problem.8  
At the same time, the Information Society poses new dilemmas for the 
concept of “good faith” too. Unequal access to information was traditionally a 
“trigger condition” for good faith scrutiny: If an elderly widow enters into a 
commercial contract with a bank, then the bank’s vastly superior knowledge of 
the risks that come with this transaction trigger specific duties, such as a duty to 
follow accepted guidelines in informing the client about risks (even if this is to 
the detriment of the bank), or even the prohibition of some clauses that exploit 
this information asymmetry altogether. But in an information society, what does 
this “asymmetric access to information” even mean? The Internet also comes with 
a promise to democratize access to information, and undoubtedly, never before 
was so much information quickly, cheaply (for free) and ubiquitously available to 
so many. True, this revolution came with its own inequalities, and the “digital 
divide” creates a new underclass of the information poor.9 But in the context of 
TC contracts, this is by definition irrelevant – anyone considering buying TC 
protection by definition is online and connected. Exploitative terms and 
conditions then should be much less common in this new world, where customers 
                                                        
7  See on this problem in particular Allen, T., & Widdison, R. (1996). Can computers 
make contracts. Harv. JL & Tech., 9, pp. 25. , Weitzenböck, E. M. (2001). Electronic 
agents and the formation of contracts. International Journal of Law and Information 
Technology, 9(3), pp. 204-234.  
8  See e.g. Weitzenböck, E. M. (2004). Good faith and fair dealing in contracts formed 
and performed by electronic agents. Artificial intelligence and law, 12(1-2), pp. 83-
110.  For another approach that analyses “good faith” through the comparison of 
team playing, see Schafer, B. (2003). It’s just not cricket-RoboCup and fair dealing in 
contract. Paper presented at the Proceedings of the Law and Electronic Agents 
workshop (LEA’03) (pp. 33-46), 
9  For a comprehensive introduction to this issue, that for the reasons stated goes 
beyond the scope of this thesis, see Norris, P. (2001). Digital divide: Civic engagement, 
information poverty, and the Internet worldwide: Cambridge University Press. 
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can much more easily compare notes and challenge abusive terms.10 This is a 
development that was hinted at by the Oxford philosopher Luciano Floridi, who 
predicted that in the Information Society, everybody will be deemed to know 
everything, and hence ignorance ceases being an excuse.11 If this prediction is 
true, then “good faith” as a protective mechanism for those on the weaker side of 
information asymmetry will lose much of its bite, and that at a time when wider 
economic developments have left demonstrably to a greater and greater 
reluctance by courts to use this avenue.12 
We will be taking a somewhat different approach in this thesis. Undoubtedly, 
consumer contract law and a paternalistic “good faith” based approach, also 
matters for the contracts that bind customers to their TC providers. However, we 
argue that issues created by TC go well beyond such a mere fix. TC is a game 
changer, with qualitative, not just quantitative new issues that require a more 
radical rethink of the regulatory environment. First, we argued that not only is 
the TCI as constituted a monopoly or cartel-like structure that has already proven 
quite apt at imposing their standards on smaller competitors, more importantly, 
TC itself, as a concept is based with necessity on a “monoculture” where herd 
                                                        
10  So optimistically Chari, N. V. (2010). Disciplining Standard Form Contract Terms 
Through Online Information Flows: An Empirical Study. NYUL Rev., 85, pp. 1618.  
Similarly Peppet, S. R. (2011). Freedom of contract in an augmented reality: The case 
of consumer contracts. UCLA L. Rev., 59, pp. 676-745. with a special focus on one 
specific technology, augmented reality.  
11  Floridi, L. (1999). Information ethics: On the philosophical foundation of computer 
ethics. Ethics and Information Technology, 1(1), pp. 33-52. at p. 35 
12  on the decreasing importance of “good faith” and “Unconscionability” as legal 
mechanisms to reign in unfair contract terms, see e.g. Fleming, A. (2014). The Rise 
and Fall of Unconscionability as the'Law of the Poor'. Georgetown Law Journal, 
102(5), pp. 1383-1441. An empirical study of US courts shows a more mixed picture, 
though even in this study, “not as bad as it might be” is the overall result. See 
Landrum, S. (2014). Much Ado About Nothing?: What the Numbers Tell Us About 
How State Courts Apply the Unconscionability Doctrine to Arbitration Agreements. 
Marquette Law Review, 97(3), pp. 751-812.   
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immunity is gained by everybody being forced to participate. Market pressure 
and choice, the tools suggested by libertarian contract lawyers to ensure fairness, 
are therefore systematically disabled. Indeed, the “force” employed by TC goes 
beyond this, and prevents users from changing their own computer in ways they 
might prefer. Classical notions of consent become even more untenable in this 
environment. Affected by this power imbalance are not just individual citizens, 
the traditional subjects of consumer protection law, but also technology 
companies outside the TCI group, so that for this reason alone traditional contract 
law is insufficient. By the same token, this uniform, monopolistic approach is 
necessary to achieve the desired security effects, and thus fulfills a socially highly 
desirable goal. Using the blunt force of anti-competition law and breaking up the 
TCI to re-create a market, would be undermining the very purpose of the 
initiative, as would be duties to open up their standards and methods (as security 
relies partly on secrecy). Even greater power imbalances and information 
imbalances are therefore a necessary feature of the TC environment. This brings 
us to the second and more fundamental reason why an approach looks at 
individual clauses in a TCI contract through the lenses of good faith. Here we 
return briefly to Guadamuz’ analysis of the Internet as a complex dynamic 
network. Guadamuz juxtaposes in his analysis the early cyber-libertarianism 
with the more recent (apparent) successes “resurgence of the regulatory state”. 
Citing John Perry Barlow’s Declaration of Independence of Cyberspace, one of the 
early “regulation sceptics”: 
“Governments of the Industrial World [...] Your legal concepts of 
property, expression, identity, movement, and context do not apply to 
us. They are all based on matter, and there is no matter here.”13 
he notes that in retrospect, such sentiment sounds naïve and unrealistic.14  
                                                        
13  Barlow, J. P. (1996). A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, .   Retrieved 
25/8/2015, from http://homes.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html  
14  Guadamuz op cit. p.84 
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He contrasts this with James Boyle’s dictum that  
“the idea that the technological changes of the digital revolution are 
always outside the control of the state seems unproven. In fact, the 
state is working very hard to design its commands into the very 
technologies that, collectively are supposed to spell its demise.”15 
and notes the considerable impact, at least in terms of laws that states enacted 
and enforced. However, when he then looks at the long term effects of this 
enforcement, his verdict becomes again more ambiguous: success seems to be at 
best temporary and not sustainable, crime, especially copyright violations, 
remain endemic. In his analysis, which this thesis embraces, the problem is not 
the international nature of the Internet. While it certainly complicates issues, it is 
not the root of the problem. Neither is it the difficulty of legislation, relatively 
slow, cumbersome and eternally reactive, to anticipate technology as such. 
Rather, the problem lies in the specific nature of complex networks. One quote 
from Strogaz that he gives is particularly relevant: 
“scale-free networks are resistant to random failures because a few 
hubs dominate their topology. Any node that fails probably has small 
degree (like most nodes) and so is expendable.”16 
This feature protects the Internet from attack, but it also protects cyber-
criminal networks that match its structure. TC in turn aims at a network of trust 
that is isomorphic to the Internet, does not even try to attack individual nodes of 
criminal activities in isolation, and thus circumvent the problem of their 
resilience. Security becomes an emergent property, not reducible to individual 
machines, friendly or unfriendly, or individual nodes.17 There is an extended 
debate on philosophy about the meaning of emergence, and to what extend it is a 
                                                        
15  Boyle, J. (1997). Foucault in cyberspace: Surveillance, sovereignty, and hardwired 
censors. U. Cin. L. Rev., 66, pp. 177.  
16  Strogatz, S. H. (2001). Exploring complex networks. Nature, 410(6825), pp. 268-276.  
17  Guadamuz op cit p. 39ff 
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legitimate concept. An overview of the discussion can be found in the recent 
treatise by Jochen Fromm.18 For the discussion here we only need to accept, for 
the sake of the argument, that complex dynamic systems have emergent 
properties, properties that cannot be reduced easily to properties of their 
constituent parts (in the way in which a mass of gas will have a mean temperature 
which cannot be predicted by looking at individual gas molecules). But the legal 
framework that it is using for this, classical contract law, is inherently reductive, 
reducing all legal relations to ultimately binary relations between two parties and 
two parties only.  
The problem, then, is not just that TC providers are in a dominant bargaining 
position, which could be mitigated by a strong interventionist good faith 
jurisprudence that rewrites if necessary the contract for the parties. It is also not 
(just) an increasingly problematic concept of freely given consent that is 
undermined by increasingly automated contract performance, though this too is 
acerbated by TC and its reliance on automated verification and authentication. 
Rather, it is the very nature of contract, not its substance but its form, that is the 
problem. Contractual relations, as we will see in more detail later, reduce a 
conflict to a dispute between two parties, and privacy of contract ensures that 
third party interests are bracketed out. But networks should be all about third 
parties – to have power laws requires transitive relations where everybody is 
connected to everybody, and everybody is affected by everybody, and be it by “six 
degrees of separation”.  
It is this idea that the thesis tries to develop over the next section. We will 
first recast some of the problems from the last chapter in the language of private 
law and private law relations, using again some small case scenarios. We will then 
show how these issues are traditionally framed in contract law, backing up the 
theoretical study with some small scale empirical research conducted by the 
                                                        
18 Fromm, J. (2004). The emergence of complexity: Kassel university press Kassel.  
175 
 
author with TC developers. We will then introduce what we consider to be two 
independent building blocks of a better way to understand the role of private law 
in regulating and facilitating complex dynamic networks: On a theoretical level, 
we will suggest to understand the contract between TC vendor and seller not in 
the traditional, atomistic way as a one off exchange that affects two parties and 
two parties only, but through the lenses of “relational contract theory”. On the 
practical level, we suggest using the concept of “reliance liability” as a 
cornerstone of TC regulation through private law. Reliance liability, or third party 
liability, breaks open the atomistic binary relation of classical private law and 
“brings in” third parties into the emerging trust network. 
4.2 Setting the scene 
Even though individual use of computers today is becoming ever more 
widespread and we use computers increasingly in all fields of our daily lives, our 
knowledge about computers, and computer security in particular, has failed to 
match this development. We use e.g. smartphones for much more than making 
voice calls, they are for more and more citizens an essential tool to access 
government services, carry out essential financial transactions or access 
information that directly informs their decision making. Worryingly, this 
increased reliance on the ubiquitous availability of information resources also 
results in de-skilling of non-digital skills, making us more and more reliant on the 
proper performance of our information tools, and therefore even more 
vulnerable should they become under attack.19 Despite this, security awareness 
                                                        
19  A particularly drastic example is discussed in Aporta, C., & Higgs, E. (2005). Satellite 
culture: global positioning systems, Inuit wayfinding, and the need for a new account 
of technology. Current Anthropology, 46(5), pp. 729-753.  which shows emerging 
reliance on the availability of ICT in some of the world’s most dangerous 
environments, and the loss of pre-technology skills. For navigation skills in western 
societies, see Leshed, G., Velden, T., Rieger, O., Kot, B., & Sengers, P. (2008). In-car gps 
navigation: engagement with and disengagement from the environment. Paper 
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remains low, we see the smartphone as not much more dangerous (or vulnerable 
to outside attacks) than the traditional telephone, where the greatest danger are 
fraudulent calls.20 Even with high-education, high industrialization countries 
such as the EU, this leaves a bitter taste, with 50% confessing to little or no digital 
skills in 2012.21 This draws a picture where although ICT has become widely 
available during the last decade, computer skills and therefore computer literacy 
are far behind the expected standards.22 As a consequence, it is unsurprising to 
learn that too many users do not update their protection regularly, or use bogus 
anti-virus software23 (aka scareware)24, or decide not to protect themselves at all. 
Moreover, with the discovery of zero-day vulnerabilities and Flame – described 
as “the most complex malware ever found”– 25 MIT suggests that the Antivirus 
                                                        
presented at the Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in 
Computing Systems (pp. 1675-1684),ACM.  
20  So e.g. the study by Mylonas, A., Kastania, A., & Gritzalis, D. (2013). Delegate the 
smartphone user? Security awareness in smartphone platforms. Computers & 
Security, 34, pp. 47-66. which suggested “security profiling” on the basis of their 
findings.  
21  Koniotou, M. (2013, 14/10/2013). EU Commissioner stresses need for digital skills, 
Cyprus News Agency. Retrieved from 
http://www.cna.org.cy/webnews.asp?a=6304a8e0a2fd4321ba4b9c697231faee 
22  European Commission. (2013b). "Information society statistics" - Statistics 
Explained Retrieved 15/10/2013 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Information_socie
ty_statistics# 
23  Graham, C. (2013, 21/1/2013). Fake anti-virus attack spread via bogus ADP anti-
fraud update emails, Naked Security. Retrieved from 
http://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2013/01/15/bogus-adp-anti-fraud-update-
emails/ 
24 See for an analysis of scareware Holtfreter, R. E. (2011). Scareware Fraud: All Trick 
and No Treat?(part 1). Fraud Magazine. 
25  sKyWIper Analysis Team. (2012). sKyWIper (a.k.a. Flame a.k.a. Flamer): A complex 
malware for targeted attacks (Vol. v1.05): Laboratory of Cryptography and System 
Security (CrySyS Lab)  
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era is over.26 While this would be tolerable if negligent users only harmed 
themselves – we do not after all make security locks for our houses compulsory – 
27 the nature of online threats means that such an individual poses not just a 
danger to himself, but also to others. Infected computers are the main element of 
a botnet28, which in turn enables the type of large scale Denial of Service (DoS) 
attack that threatens the very existence of the net.29 Additionally, botnets are a 
major source of spam, spyware, adware, click-fraud, access number 
replacements, and fast flux, mostly driven by the botmasters’ financial interests 
and secondly used in political or military contexts.30 Overall in 2011, botnets 
                                                        
26  Simonite, T. (2012). The Antivirus Era Is Over, MIT Technology Review. Retrieved 
from http://www.technologyreview.com/news/428166/the-antivirus-era-is-over/ 
27  this statement may need qualification in the light of what we discussed in chapter 2. 
While locks are not legally mandated, insurance companies can penalize you for 
being negligent.  
28  Botnets are networks formed by infected compromised machines which connect to a 
central server and compromise the host system. The European Network and 
Information Security Agency (ENISA) – the EU’s cyber security agency, provided a 
comprehensive report on how to assess botnet threats including various types of 
best-practices to measure, detect and defend against botnets and recommendations 
on how to neutralise them, preventing new infections and minimising cybercrime 
profitability from botnets use. The document also examines the role of governments 
in the fight against botnets, and points out what legislation is needed and what 
investment is required Plohmann, D., Gerhards-Padilla, E., & Leder, F. (2011). 
Botnets: Detection, Measurement, Disinfection & Defence. In G. Hogben (Ed.), ENISA‘s 
Emerging and Future Risk programme (pp. 153): European Network and Information 
Security Agency (ENISA). Rajab et. al present challenges on botnet detection and 
tracking and an approach to infiltrate large numbers of botnets in Rajab, M. A., 
Zarfoss, J., Monrose, F., & Terzis, A. (2006). A multifaceted approach to understanding 
the botnet phenomenon. Paper presented at the Proceedings of the 6th ACM 
SIGCOMM conference on Internet measurement, Rio de Janeriro, Brazil. . 
29 Bayer, U., Habibi, I., Balzarotti, D., Kirda, E., & Kruegel, C. (2009). A view on current 
malware behaviors. Paper presented at the LEET'09: Proceedings of the 2nd USENIX 
conference on Large-scale exploits and emergent threats: botnets, spyware, worms, 
and more, Boston, MA, USA. http://www.eurecom.fr/people/vs_bayer.en.htm 
30  Plohmann, D., Gerhards-Padilla, E., & Leder, F. (2011). Botnets: Detection, 
Measurement, Disinfection & Defence. In G. Hogben (Ed.), ENISA‘s Emerging and 
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produced approximately 81.2% of all spam.31 Recent statistics presented by 
Eurostat, demonstrate that 31% of internet users in the EU27 caught a computer 
infection which resulted in loss of information in the last 12 months of 2011.32 
A key argument of this thesis is that while TC aims to eventually provide a 
more secure and trustworthy technological solution for the benefit of the user, 
the price is a massive shift of power to the software providers. Unless a computer 
is TC certified, its usability will be severely hampered. Customer choice of 
software, especially Open Source Software (OSS), will as a result be curtailed. As 
we indicated above, this alone is sufficient to call into question the adequacy of 
traditional contract law and its underlying rationale of free choice exercised by 
rational market actors. The TC provider will also have unprecedented access to 
user’s hard drives, and the ability not only to extract information, but also to 
reconfigure the software. With such great powers, great responsibility should 
come, with a role for the law to address the arising ethical concerns and rebalance 
the interplay of power and responsibility. In short, governments (and citizens) 
should accept this power shift and its consequences only if a corresponding 
increase of responsibility occurs in the side of the TC provider.  
Conceptually, we argued in the previous chapter that the TC approach has 
aspects of a part privatization of what is in the online world, a core state function. 
We also argued that as a result some public law concepts could be fruitfully 
extended to TC. Care must be taken however to not overextend this analogy. 
Ultimately, the way TC provider and TC user relate with each other is through 
contract. While we will talk in legal theory about the “social contract” that gives 
                                                        
Future Risk programme (pp. 153): European Network and Information Security 
Agency (ENISA), Wikipedia. (2011, 16/7/2011). Botnet.   Retrieved 28/6/2011, 
2011, from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Botnet#Types_of_attacks 
31  Symantec. (2012). Internet Security Thread Report. In P. Wood (Ed.), (2012 ed.): 
Symantec Corporation World Headquarters. 
32  Eurostat. (2011). Nearly one third of internet users in the EU27 caught a computer 
virus 8 February 2011: Safer Internet Day. Luxembourg: Eurostat Press Office. 
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rise to society, we do not normally, in law, conceptualise the relation between a 
citizen and the police as contractual. If I’m burgled, I cannot normally sue the 
police for breach of contract, even if they fail to apprehend the guilty party – the 
“social contract” is not directly enforceable that way. Neither is a tort law action 
normally available, as courts in the UK have been historically averse to impose 
liability for “non performance” on public bodies.33 Back in 1924, Edward 
Borchard summarises the position for the common law tradition as: 
"obviously, the administration cannot be held to obligations of 
guaranteeing the citizen against all errors and defects, for life in an 
organised community requires a certain number of sacrifices and 
even risks”.34 
This has remained due to this day. In the case of Hill v Chief Constable of West 
Yorkshire35 the police succeeded to have the claim that they were negligent in 
investigating the Sutcliff murders struck out, since, the police owed no duty of 
care to individual citizens in the detection of crime. In a similar vein Capital and 
Counties plc v Hampshire County Council decided that a fire brigade only owed a 
duty of care if they inflicted damage on the property of an arson victim that would 
not have otherwise occurred (i.e. if they made things worse), but not for failing to 
prevent or effectively fight the fire.  
The rationale behind these exemptions are policy driven – imposing liability 
on public bodies would be a strain on the public purse, the police getting tied 
down in litigation with individual citizens, resource allocation would be done not 
                                                        
33  Hartshorne, J., Smith, N., & Everton, R. (2000). ‘Caparo Under Fire’: a Study into the 
Effects upon the Fire Service of Liability in Negligence. The Modern Law Review, 63(4), 
pp. 502-522. doi: 10.1111/1468-2230.00277 
34  Borchard, E. M. (1924). Government Liability in Tort. Yale Law Journal, pp. 1-45.  at 
1 for a more recent discussion see McMahon, M. (1992). Dangerousness, 
confidentiality, and the duty to protect. Australian Psychologist, 27(1), pp. 12-16. and 
Giliker, P. (2000). Osman and police immunity in the English law of torts. Legal 
Studies, 20(3), pp. 372-392.  
35  Hill v. Chief Constable of Yorkshire, 1988 238 (A.C. 53 1988). 
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to prevent or solve the most pressing crimes, but to prevent litigation etc. One 
question that then opens up is if we should extend such a general immunity to TC 
– under the assumption that our analysis in the preceding chapter was 
convincing, and that the monopoly position, together with the task to ensure the 
safety of a critical infrastructure, makes the TC provider sufficiently like a “public 
sector authority” to apply rules in analogy. In that case, the TC providers (and by 
implication, the entire IT industry that operates to TC compliant standards) 
would get blanket exemptions from liability when their products fail to deliver. 
Conversely, one could consider extending also some of the specific duty of the 
public sector, or the privatized utilities, to TC, such as some “non-discrimination” 
duties, duties to contract, or, most radically, even some upper limit on possible 
profits or price rises.36  
There might be some appeal in this approach. As we discussed, should TC 
become successful, then people whose computers are not TC certified will lose 
access to the Internet. As we increasingly consider access to the Internet a basic 
civil right,37 a situation where excessive costs for TC protection could force 
people off the net (if you can’t afford the security, your computer will get access 
denied) together with the monopoly status of the TCI, would bring them very 
closely to a privatized water utility in terms of the power they yield and the social 
impact they have. This, however, is not the route we will go down in this thesis. 
                                                        
36  For a discussion of the regulation of the privatized utilities in the UK, see e.g. Beesley, 
M. E., & Littlechild, S. C. (1989). The regulation of privatized monopolies in the United 
Kingdom. The RAND Journal of Economics, pp. 454-472. Even closer to our example, a 
discussion of privatised policing and the liability regime can be found in McBeth, A. 
(2004). Privatising Human Rights: What Happens to the State's Human Rights Duties 
When Services are Privatised. Melb. J. Int'l L., 5, pp. 133.  
37  See e.g. Best, M. L. (2004). Can the internet be a human right. Human Rights & Human 
Welfare, 4(1), pp. 23-31. , Lim, Y. J., & Sexton, S. E. (2011). Internet as a human right: 
a practical legal framework to address the unique nature of the medium and to 
promote development. Wash. JL Tech. & Arts, 7, pp. 295. , Skepys, B. (2012). Is There 
a Human Right to the Internet. J. Pol. & L., 5, pp. 15.  
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While as we will see there is some pressure emanating from Parliament to ensure 
the safety of the Internet through a combination of state investment on the one 
hand, increased liability for software developers on the other, there seems to be 
no appetite for state involvement that is either direct (“nationalizing Internet 
security”) or even indirect through creating a sui generis regulatory regime 
similar to the banking sector.  
By contrast, there might be some scope to “nudge” TC companies even in a 
monopoly position to responsible behavior, by adjusting gradually and 
incrementally the civil liability regime. Contracts can be used as a regulatory tool, 
as a way to build societies.38 This need does not result in a radical individualism, 
an approach called “Contractarianism” by Jean Braucher.39 Braucher remains 
critical of the neo-liberal over-emphasize on contracts as regulatory tools to build 
societies, also because it fetishizes free choice in environments where little of it 
is to be found. As our discussion above shows, this is particularly pertinent in an 
environment with automated contract formation, systemic information 
asymmetries and monopoly power.  
With TC, safety becomes a commodity, and its exchange is primarily 
governed by contract. This of course is not something entirely new – customers 
already “buy” safety offline and online, through private security firms or safety 
locks to their houses, and through products such as Intrusion detection systems, 
firewalls and anti-virus software online. For these traditional countermeasures, 
the operation of efficient free markets justified a cautious approach when 
imposing liability, letting alone other duties such as a duty to contract, giving the 
providers a large free reign to compete not just on issues of reliability and 
security, but also on the degree in which they offer guarantees and compensation.  
                                                        
38  So e.g. in Schäfer, B., & Bankowski, Z. (2003). Emerging Legal Orders. Formalism and 
the Theory of Legal Integration. Ratio Juris, 16(4), pp. 486-505.  
39  Braucher, J. (1990). Contract Versus Contractarianism: The Regulatory Role of 
Contract Law. Wash. & Lee L. Rev., 47, pp. 697.  
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At present, users can choose between a variety of competing products or 
none at all, if they conclude that the costs of protection outweigh the risks of an 
attack. Their computer could remain fully operational and capable of interacting 
with the Internet regardless of their choice. If they suffer harm from a cheap 
product, or by refusing any protection, the loss lies entirely with them. On the 
other side of the coin, most if not all antivirus software producers make it clear 
that their system merely increases safety, but cannot entirely prevent threats, 
both from a technical standpoint as well as from bad security policies and 
procedures that are in place.40 Just as a doctor doesn’t guarantee your health as a 
result, but only to provide means to make you healthier, so does TC promise only 
a means to make you safer, not safety as such. Clauses to that effect will typically 
be found in the Standard Terms and conditions, the “boilerplate” of the contract 
that we never read and always sign and agree with. By this, they minimize 
contractual liability, while potentially of course remaining liable in tort – e.g. 
when it can be proven that they have acted gross negligently, e.g. by infecting 
user’s computers with a new virus that had been analyzed in their lab, but 
through careless handling found its way into their latest updates.  
It is this convergence of issues that is behind our discussion here: If TC were 
to operate always faultlessly, offering total protection, issues of liability would, 
trivially, not arise. On the other hand, if TC was just a market competitor amongst 
many others, the traditional method of regulation through markets, backed up, as 
necessary with a robust consumer protection law to address information 
imbalance, would suffice. But TC cannot guarantee security – remember the 
discussions of different meanings of trust and security. But it requires, ultimately, 
a monoculture where the user, the main security risk, is heavily restricted in 
                                                        
40  Arief, B., & Besnard, D. (2003). Technical and Human Issues in Computer-Based 
Systems Security. TECHNICAL REPORT SERIES- UNIVERSITY OF NEWCASTLE UPON 
TYNE COMPUTING SCIENCE(790), Symantec. (2012). Internet Security Thread 
Report. In P. Wood (Ed.), (2012 ed.): Symantec Corporation World Headquarters. 
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his/her choices. It is this combination of factors that requires revisiting the issue 
of civil liability in a TC context.  
To recap the crucial concept discussed at length in chapter 2: In a TC world, 
my computer can “trust” other computers that identify themselves as “Trusted 
Computers”, and in turn is trusted by them. If the system fails, three possible 
scenarios occur:41 
A. My TC system does not operate as specified, for instance due to a bug 
preventing me from accessing my own files altogether. This is a classical 
contract law issue, and while the discussion on software liability is complex 
and complicated, with “liability exclusion clauses” of often dubious 
enforceability in abundance, it raises no new conceptual questions. 
B. My TC system behaves as specified, but is outwitted by an attacker. I in turn 
have behaved with (even less) safety awareness than before TC was 
introduced, relied totally on the TC protection, and suffer as a result a loss (by 
downloading e.g. malware). This remains at first sight a contractual issue 
between me and the TC provider, but under current law, my position is weak. 
However, as we argued, the need to use TC and the inability to make my own 
security arrangements mean that there is a social trade off involved that the 
law, possibly, should recognize. 
C. Someone else, relying on my computer’s malfunctioning certificate, 
downloads harmful software from me. Does this third party have any claims 
against my TC provider, given that he acted in reasonable reliance on the TC 
                                                        
41  We will touch on the issue of software liability again below, but only in passing. A 
more comprehensive discussion can be found in an early paper by Voas, J., McGraw, 
G., Kassab, L., & Voas, L. (1997). A'crystal ball'for software liability. Computer, 30(6), 
pp. 29-36. An interesting new dimension to this discussion is in Reutiman, J. L. 
(2012). Defective Information: Should Information Be a Product Subject to Products 
Liability Claims. Cornell JL & Pub. Pol'y, 22, pp. 181. , which expands the scope of the 
discussion beyond software to information in general.  
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certificate? This is the most radical conceptual issue that TC raises: do TC 
providers incur liability outside the contractual nexus? This is also the 
question that links this chapter to the previous one: For if we accept that TC 
owes a duty of care not just to its own customers, but also to third parties that 
rely on their certification, the similarity to a public sector agency such as the 
police becomes clearer. Furthermore, we will argue that this method of 
“breaking out of” the contractual atomism is a way to create network 
structures of legal liability that come closer in matching the trust network that 
TC tries to build up, and thus in turn the Internet.  
We will visit each one of these scenarios in the next sections and we will try 
to examine the contractual relation found in scenario B and from the proposed 
scenario of reliance liability for scenario C. 
4.2.1 Contractual relation between buyer and seller 
Liability for faulty software is an area of considerable legal controversy, not 
least because it remains unclear in UK law whether software is to be treated as a 
good, a service, or something else. The distinction is, seemingly, important 
because it determines the nature and scope of liability that can be derived from a 
contract, and also to some extent what can be legitimately excluded by contract. 
Trusted Computing further complicates the issue because a failure in such a 
system may be hardware or software related. As we saw in chapter 1, it is a crucial 
novelty of the TC approach to security that as Epstein noted “security software is 
not enough for software security solutions”,42 and thus hardware and software 
have to work in unison. 
                                                        
42  Epstein, J., Matsumoto, S., & McGraw, G. (2006). Software security and SOA: danger, 
Will Robinson! IEEE Security & Privacy(1), pp. 80-83.  
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Hardware is clearly a good43 - if software is deemed to be a service or sui 
generis in nature, this suggests that different components of the TC concept might 
be held to different standards. This would be problematic enough if faults in 
hardware and software could be neatly separated analytically. For TC, this is 
highly doubtful. As the discussion in the first chapter showed, the various TC 
components rely on each other and are essentially intertwined. This raises the 
very real possibility that each component works correct on its own terms, but 
still, once combined, fall short of what is expected from them. We suggest that 
potentially, a much better way is a “gestalt switch” that sees TC as neither “just” 
software nor “just” hardware and moves away from the mere tools that TC utilizes 
to a goal-oriented characterization. The “business” of the TCI, so to speak, is 
security. Security is what they sell, and the methods they use for this are merely 
coincidental. When hiring a security company for physical protection, we do not 
need to worry who build their guns or who provides the network service for their 
communication equipment. They promise my safety, I trust and can rely that they 
use the right tools for the job. In the field of IT security, this notion of “security as 
a service” has recently gained traction in the field of cloud computing.44 Trusted 
computing has indeed been characterized as one such “security of service 
provision” in cloud environments.45 The legal implications of this 
conceptualization have not yet been fully explored, but it is maybe not surprising 
that the idea of TC as a “security as a service” (SECaas) solution should emanate 
from cloud environments. Unlike the traditional customer buying a physical PC 
                                                        
43  Bradgate, R. (1999). Beyond the Millennium - The Legal Issues: Sale of Goods Issues 
and the Millennium Bug. The Journal of Information, Law and Technology (JILT), 2. 
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/jilt/1999_1992/bradgate/.  
44  See e.g. Hussain, M., & Abdulsalam, H. (2011). SECaaS: security as a service for cloud-
based applications. Paper presented at the Proceedings of the Second Kuwait 
Conference on e-Services and e-Systems (pp. 8),ACM.  
45  Kaufman, L. M. (2010). Can a trusted environment provide security? Security & 
Privacy, IEEE, 8(1), pp. 50-52.  
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and installing software on it – “real” activities that make us think immediately of 
“buying software” or “buying hardware”, the virtual environment of the cloud 
strips us off these preconceptions and allows us to see things as they really work. 
We will return to this idea of TC as “security as a service” bundle below.  
It has been suggested in the past that a more rigid liability regime would 
provide the right type of pressure to software vendors to improve software 
security and to ensure that the software provides the security it should provide.46 
Commissioners Viviane Reding and Meglena Kuneva proposed that “Licensing should 
guarantee consumers the same basic rights as when they purchase a good: the right to get a product 
that works with fair commercial conditions”.47 The rights of a purchaser of a physical 
product - which are familiar to us - along with the implied terms, are significant 
and are found in sections 12 to 15 of the Sale of Goods Act.48 These state, among 
others, that the goods supplied should correspond with their description and are 
of satisfactory quality and reasonably fit the buyer’s purpose. Contracts of sale 
such as those we just described are legislated under the Sale of Goods Act, and 
legislation has extended the scope of application to apply to all forms of contract 
arrangement by which goods are supplied.  
These rights are probably the ones best understood by both parties of a 
contract (consumers and retailers) and are arming the consumer in possible 
                                                        
46  EC. (2009). Consumer Rights: Commission wants consumers to surf the web without 
borders. (IP/09/702 ). http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-09-
702_en.htm#PR_metaPressRelease_bottom, Espiner, T. (2009). EC wants software 
makers held liable for code, ZDNet UK. Retrieved from 
http://www.zdnet.co.uk/news/it-strategy/2009/05/08/ec-wants-software-
makers-held-liable-for-code-39649689/. For a comparative, academic analysis see 
August, T., & Tunca, T. I. (2011). Who should be responsible for software security? A 
comparative analysis of liability policies in network environments. Management 
Science, 57(5), pp. 934-959.  
47  EC. (2009). Consumer Rights: Commission wants consumers to surf the web without 
borders. (IP/09/702 ). http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-09-
702_en.htm#PR_metaPressRelease_bottom 
48  Sale of Goods Act § c.54 (1979). 
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breach of the contract by the retailer. Our courts too seem to remain in a pre-
information age, at least conceptually – we understand physical objects much 
better than abstract information objects such as software. Even in cases where 
undoubtedly, the issue was a software fault, empirical studies also indicate that 
courts are much more likely to hold a software vendor liable for harm if the 
software was part of a physical machine had caused physical harm, and are less 
likely to apply the same rules to software flaws that remain “unseen and virtual”, 
such as ID theft due to weak security.49 Despite the increasing significance and 
explosive growth of the economic importance of the digital products and digital 
technology, the application of these legal requirements over this type of products 
still remains ambiguous. This “selective” application of the law which 
distinguishes digital products from the existing legislation creates a risk that the 
consumer of such products may be exploited by suppliers to deny consumers’ 
rights, or may be denied any protection of the law and that way may deprive the 
rights that consumers enjoy.  
In its White paper the UK government committed itself to take actions “which 
will enhance and protect consumer rights in a changing world” in relation to 
digital products (including computer software) and that will take the appropriate 
actions so that all principles applying to (physical) sales will also apply to digital 
products.50 
In an influential study, Chandler analyses two approaches where the law can 
be used to intervene in the software development process to provide the 
standards that the end-user demands. The first approach is the use of regulations 
or laws to overcome market failures (i.e. where the market fails to put pressure 
on manufacturers to produce more secure software, such as in a monopoly 
                                                        
49  A typical example is the reasoning in Petry v. Cosmopolitan Spa Intern., Inc, 641 
S.W.2d 202 (Tenn: Court of Appeals, Eastern Section 1982). 
50  Cm7669. (2009). A Better Deal for Consumers - Delivering Real Help Now and Change 
for the Future. (ID 6192113 07/09). London: The Stationery Office. 
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situation) by mandating minimum security standards. This has a number of 
disadvantages not least that a law may be too broad in its reach if applied 
uniformly across the software marketplace, because there are different levels of 
risk in different types of programs and it would be unrealistic to expect them to 
meet the same design standards.  
The second approach is “to impose liability for negligently-designed 
software”. This approach has some advantages like that the care needed from 
software developers can vary according to the context and therefore “software 
intended for use in conditions where design flaws may lead to substantial losses may be treated 
differently from software that does not present high risks”.51 
Chandler notes that applying a negligence standard to software security 
might be a way forward, but specifically warns that taking that path might cause 
the software industry to take measures that while improving security could have 
other, less desirable implications. Here she specifically refers to TC and the types 
of concerns noted above - the loss of consumer freedom and the implications for 
competition. She also notes (in the context of DDoS attacks) that, currently, 
purchasers may find it difficult to sue vendors for liability for damage caused by 
their product's failure. Firstly, license terms disclaiming or limiting liability may 
affect possible lawsuits. Secondly, users may face counterclaims of contributory 
negligence if they did not maintain properly their security by patches or virus 
scanning.  
The liability question that TC creates can therefore be turned into four 
separate issues: 
 is software a good, a service or sui generis? 
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 what are the implications for TC if the hardware and software 
components carry different liabilities, and should we think of TC better as 
“security as a service”, independent from tools used? 
 is the current level of liability exposure for producers in the event of 
hardware and software failure, appropriate for TC? 
 what are the implications for TC of a higher level of liability? 
4.2.1.1 Software as Good 
The Sale of Goods Act implies terms into contracts for the sale of goods in 
(ss.12-15).52 These implied terms aim to express the intention of the parties and 
can be helpful in the case where a user purchases defective software if such 
software is categorized as goods. For us, they are the door through which the 
consumer perception of “trust” and “security” that we discussed in the second 
chapter can be given legal voice. We noted there, the systematically diverging 
perceptions of “trust” and “security” between lay people and computer 
professionals. In an environment where contracts will be typically boilerplate 
and written from the perspective of the better informed party, this type of 
purposive reading can unearth again the meaning that the weaker, less informed 
party gave to the meaning of the transaction. Normally, software is not explicitly 
categorized as a good, unless it is part of a system which involves the use of 
software and hardware.53 While this seems to apply, prima facie, to TC, the typical 
examples of “embedded software” have a somewhat different form, e.g. the 
software in a digital radio that makes it work. The relation between hardware 
and software components of TC, as we saw in the second chapter, is rather 
different. They are at the same time more complex in their possible interaction 
(one generating proof about the other) and more loosely connected, as a battery 
                                                        
52  Sale of Goods Act § c.54 (1979). 
53  Rowland, D., & Macdonald, E. (2005). Information Technology Law (Third ed.). 
London, UK: Cavendish Publishing. 
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of independent security measures. It is less the case of software “making the 
hardware doing things” as in the radio, but more a question of mutual 
dependencies.  
In case of a breach of a condition the injured party has the right to reject the 
goods and claim damages. However, the Sale and Supply of Goods Act modifies 
the normal remedy in the case of breaches of ss.13-15 “conditions” and states 
that: 
1) Where in the case of a contract of sale – 
a. The buyer would, apart from this subsection, have the right to 
reject goods by reason of a breach on the part of the seller of a 
term implied by section 13, 14, or 15 above; but 
b. The breach is so slight that it would be unreasonable for him to 
reject them, then, if the buyer does not deal as consumer, the 
breach is not to be treated as a breach of condition but may be 
treated as a breach of warranty.  
2) This section applies unless a contrary intention appears in, or is to 
be implied from, the contract. 
3) It is for the seller to show that a breach fell within subsection (1) b 
above.54 
The implied term dealing with fitness for the buyer’s purpose was originally 
dealt by section 14(1) of the SGA 1893. Nowadays, an amendment is contained in 
SGA 1979 and in there it is stated that: 
Where the seller sells goods in the course of a business and the buyer, 
expressly or by implication, makes known – 
a. to the seller; or 
b. where the purchase price or part of it is payable by instalments 
and the goods were previously sold by a credit broker to the 
seller, to that credit broker, 
                                                        
54  Sale and Supply of Goods Act § c.35 (1994). 
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any particular purpose for which the goods are being bought, there is 
an implied obligation that the goods supplied under the contract are 
reasonably fit for that purpose, whether or not that is a purpose for 
which such goods are commonly supplied, except where the 
circumstances show that the buyer does not rely, or that it is 
unreasonable for him to rely, on the skill or judgment of the seller or 
credit-broker. 
In this statement we will analyze two terms that are crucial for the 
discussion. The first term is the one of “satisfactory quality”. By this term a 
standard quality is set for goods. Section 14(3) may result in the seller 
guaranteeing that goods will meet the needs of the buyer, whilst the above does 
not relate to the buyer’s intended use of goods.55 The second reference to the 
“particular purpose” of the buyer mainly refers to the “specified purpose” for 
which the user buys the product.  
Implied terms are quite significant as they arise automatically, they are easy 
to prove and they are classified as conditions which mean that in case of breach 
the consumer is entitled to a range of legal remedies including rejection of goods, 
demand a price refund, have the price reduced and return goods for repair or 
replacement. Yet, it is very rare for a consumer to take professional advice on a 
claim even for relative expensive items.56 “In most cases, consumers do not 
complain because the financial loss is limited (42%), they do not expect to get a 
satisfactory solution to their problem (35%) and they consider it too time-
                                                        
55  Rowland, D., & Macdonald, E. (2005). Information Technology Law (Third ed.). 
London, UK: Cavendish Publishing. 
56  As recent statistics by Eurostat pp.104-105 Eurostat - European Commission. (2009). 
Consumers in Europe (2009 ed.). Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the 
European Communities. reveals that out of the consumers interviewed for the 
consumer satisfaction and complaints on the prices of products they purchased, only 
16% of consumers in EU-27 made a formal complaint in form of writing, by telephone 
or in person during 2009. The most surprising though is that 51% of unsatisfied 
customers chose not to take any further action (e.g. in courts) and seeking advice by 
a solicitor appeared on the extremely low proportion of 9%.  
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consuming to complain (27%)”.57 However, in the present context the essentiality 
lays in these last two implied terms points: the exclusion or limitation of liability 
for any condition breach is prohibited by civil and criminal law; and consumers 
and retailers who hold reasonable expectations, are all familiar with the implied 
terms included in the contract. 
In order for a term to be implied, the buyer must rely upon the seller to 
provide goods which reasonably fit for the buyer’s particular purpose and 
furthermore it must be reasonable for the buyer to do so. There are two kinds of 
reliance: partial and non existence or non reasonable. The first one relates to the 
aspect of the goods’ fitness, which is relevant to the buyer’s claim, and the second 
one is valid if the buyer has the greater expertise or is in the best position to make 
an assessment for the goods’ suitability.  
It appears from the above, that where there is a combination of hardware 
and software being sold together, the courts may treat the combination as a sale 
of goods. This may fit the TC scenario, depending upon the nature of the customer 
(business or consumer), the nature of the sale (once-off or continuing upgrades), 
and the purpose to which the equipment is put. Although software is the most 
obvious example of digital product, the boundaries are still blurred as software 
can be a wide category on its own.58 Nevertheless, given the uncertainty 
surrounding software, it is appropriate to also consider other options. 
4.2.1.2 Software as a Service  
                                                        
57  Eurostat - European Commission. (2012). Consumer Conditions Scoreboard – 
Consumers at home in the single market (7th ed.). Luxembourg: Office for Official 
Publications of the European Communities. 
58  Bradgate, R. (2010). Consumer Rights in Digital Products (I. a. S. Department for 
Business, Trans.) A research report prepared for the UK Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills (pp. 76). Sheffield: Institute for Commercial Law Studies, 
University of Sheffield. 
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It is possible that software could be regarded as a provision of services - this 
has been suggested in cases where a vendor has written software specifically for 
a client thus a “bespoke” product - the writing of the software being the service. 
This was the approach taken by the court in The Salvage Association v CAP 
Financial Services Ltd.59 However in St Albans City & District Council v 
International Computers Ltd60 the court held that where a computer program was 
delivered on a disk it might be both a good and a service.61  
In terms of TC, it is clear that there are a number of issues to consider when 
considering the goods/services question: 
 is the software a “bespoke” product written/adapted for a particular 
client or is it mass market software? 
 if written for a particular client is it delivered as part of a purchase of 
hardware, or separately? 
 does some other element, such as a continuing provision of automatic 
upgrades and other software changes suggest an ongoing service? 
The answers to these questions can essentially change the way that the issue 
is approached as a “bespoke” product has more in common with the contract for 
professional services, yet a mass market software is “closer” to a physical 
product. To demonstrate the difference along with the means that the product is 
delivered, for example, Australian authorities in Toby Constructions v. Computer 
Bar Sales consider the hardware and software that is supplied as a package for 
sale, under one universal price, to be treated a single contract and it is classified 
as a sale of goods.62  
                                                        
59  Salvage Association v. CAP Financial Services Ltd, 1995 654 (1995). 
60  St Albans City and District Council v. International Computers Ltd, No. 1997-98, 1996 
481, 1995 F.S.R. 1686 (All E.R.4 1996). 
61  Bainbridge, D. (2005). The Nature of Software Contracts. IP & IT Law, 10.6(3), 
Singleton, S. (2003). Sale and Supply. ITLT, 11.2(11). 
62  Toby Constructions Products Pty Ltd. v. Computer Bar Sales Pty. Ltd [case]. (1983). 2 
NSWLR 48 (pp. 288). 
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Bainbridge suggests that the differences between goods and service where 
software is concerned are not so great, even after the passage of the Sale and 
Supply of Goods Act 1994. In essence, where the sale of goods legislation is 
concerned with quality and fitness for purpose, the provision of services 
legislation is concerned with the provision of a service using reasonable care and 
skill where reasonableness is generally regarded as at a relatively low standard 
of a "reasonably competent provider of the relevant services". In computer 
software terms, that does not require software to be entirely free from bugs or 
minor faults as held by the court in Saphena Computing v Allied Collection 
Agencies.63 
However, both commentators and the courts have suggested that computer 
software does not fit the existing legislation well due to the intangibility of the 
product, and the fact that it is usually licensed rather than sold outright. The Court 
in the St Albans case eventually decided the case by creating a new rule for 
software written specifically for a client of “fitness for purpose” even in the 
absence of a sale of goods, and Bainbridge argues that while that was a mistake 
(he feels it was a service), he makes the case for mass market software being 
considered a sui generis item.64 
4.2.1.3 Software as a Sui Generis Item 
From time to time, when the courts or the legislature are faced with a new 
development to which existing legal concepts do not adequately fit, they will 
create a new concept, for example the protection of rights in databases did not fit 
well in existing copyright law - the existing rights were inappropriate. Thus the 
legislature created a new or sui generis right to protect databases - the right to 
control extraction.  
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Equally, as matters stand, the existing law on the sale of goods and services 
does not fit well to the purposes of determining contractual liability for software 
failure - it may be therefore that the appropriate way forward would be a sui 
generis form of contractual liability for software. This would perhaps not be 
without precedent, as Lord Penrose said in Beta Computers (Europe) v Adobe 
Systems (Europe) Ltd “... In my opinion the only acceptable view is that the supply 
of proprietary software for a price is a contract sui generis”.65 This leaves open 
two questions relating to the project, what such a sui generis right should consist 
of for software now, and whether the advent of TC might mean a stronger level of 
protection should be given to users in the light of the promises made by vendors 
about the security qualities of TC systems. 
 
4.2.1.4 Implications for TC if the hardware and software 
components carry different liabilities 
As we have seen, TC comprises both hardware and software components. 
This also corresponds to the organizational structure of the TCG which is partly 
composed by both kinds of industries. We can here go back briefly to the different 
scenarios we described above. If we are dealing with a TC system malfunctioning, 
that is a system that is not even delivering what according to the state of the art 
would have been expected and possible, then it may just be possible to identify 
exactly which component is to blame. For type 2 failures, failure of the system 
due to better attack capabilities, this might be impossible in principle. In theory, 
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legal options available are to treat it as a matter of joint liability for a “security 
service”, hardware or software liability only. 
At this point, we step back a bit from a purely formal legal analysis, and ask 
how the TC industry itself perceives the issue, what their conceptual 
understanding is. In order to assess the viability of a large scale project to 
examine the liability hypothesis, a small-scale set of semi-structured interviews 
was conducted – the sample contained Hewlett Packard research staff members 
and Computer Science academic staff at the University of Bristol. The interviews 
uncovered a number of interesting issues, but also led to the conclusion that the 
issue was going to be more complex to research than was originally expected. 
“It’s common understanding” that it is more likely to be a software problem 
rather than hardware says Plaquin at HP Labs, although he does not provide 
much justification for this position, clearly basing his argument on his own 
experience. It is a truism that software is never ‘bug free’, and therefore it is 
expected that it may not always work exactly as intended. Prof. Smart notes that 
it is possible to use processes that can make the software as bug-free as possible 
but that is mainly used in safety critical systems, as it is extremely costly. 
Prof. Smart went on to say that: 
“… if you are … producing hardware you are prepared to tolerate 
errors … one, you can detect errors quickly, two, if there are errors 
you just replace the component. The problem with software is that 
actually detecting errors is much harder, it’s deployed and then in the 
field you have to re-change the software without actually having the 
physical mechanism go back to the manufacturers … there has to be 
some sort of remote update facility, so it’s actually much harder … the 
hardware is actually a relatively easy thing to get right…”. 
It seems therefore that imposing liability on hardware manufacturers might 
be a more realistic solution, as hardware industries are in better place to deal 
with failures. Dr. Page, on the other hand, suggested that the joint liability 
question was difficult to answer, noting that actually proving whether it was a 
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software or hardware problem which caused the failure of a trusted system 
would be very difficult: 
“… it’s difficult to actually replicate these things, so proving that they 
even happened in the first place is slightly contentious.” 
Adding to that, he views the issue in some respects as a matter of trade-off 
between reliability and performance suggesting that  
“… the best thing to say … about the reliability of software is … it’s not 
a solved problem, but the reason you’ve got unreliable software, at 
least partly, is because people have … made a trade-off between 
reliability and performance, or reliability and other things … if you are 
willing to pay the price for reliability you can get a lot more reliable 
systems that you’ve got now.” 
Yet, Pearson at HP Labs sees things as perhaps more complex than that.  
“Because of the way the whole mechanism works … there are multiple 
parties involved. … you’ve got, for example, the specification itself 
which is produced by the TCG and describes … what you have to do to 
produce a trusted platform … it’s possible someone might discover 
there was a problem with that, but I doubt it … then if someone 
actually makes a trusted platform they need to produce a design and 
someone else needs to certify that the design is conformant with the 
specification. There are different bodies performing different roles, 
and then … there are the people that actually produce the different 
components that go into the platform and they’ll actually certify what 
the values of the hash functions and the metrics are going to be … then 
there’s going to be the components that actually do the checks, the 
agents that do the checks in the system, and then there’s the software 
that has to reside on a person’s platform that’s checking that it’s 
engaged with the protocols and actually getting the information and 
doing the analysis on that and deciding, is it going to recommend to go 
ahead or not to go ahead. So there’s all sorts of people who are 
involved, it’s not just the manufacturers of the platform, the people 
who make the chips, … there are probably 10 different groups 
involved in putting things together, some of whom are certifying that 
things conform to a design and things like that…” 
In essence, it appears that she is saying that it may never be clear enough 
which party involved in the provision of a TC based system will be liable in case 
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of failure. Interesting though the answer by Pearson, alerts us to the fact that the 
TCG as a group is performing a different function from its constituent parts. The 
TCG, as an entity, merely certifies the type of system their members are actually 
developing and building. This brings in a potential new dimension: If the system 
fails, in any of the three ways described above, is there in addition to the 
contractual relation with the software vendor also a (quasi-contractual) relation 
with the TCG as certifying body? We will return to this issue below.  
Another issue raised was the issue of shifting liability. In case of failure of TC 
technology, will the vendor companies take responsibility, or will they blame 
users, either individuals or enterprises, for the failure? As regards this concern 
Plaquin at HP Labs answered by saying that at the end of the day it is human 
nature to shift liability, but not the role of the technology. The technology can help 
to establish relevant evidence, independently from the parties. Here, our 
discussion about “chain of custody” from the previous chapter comes back into 
play. To ensure that the evidence isn’t tampered with, the TC system needs to be 
able to reason about its own status, and prove that it was not interfered with. For 
the civil liability issue, this feature becomes obviously relevant to identify where, 
if anywhere, a Type 1 malfunction happened. When the same question was put to 
Prof. Smart, he responded by suggesting that the liability in circumstances where 
there is a failure in TC systems, should, in the enterprise arena at least, be covered 
by contract terms with the liability clearly on the manufacturer i.e. the 
corporation or person selling the kit, and not to the customer who simply buys 
the technology. “A lack of software liability is effectively a vast government 
subsidy of the computer industry. It allows them to produce more products 
faster, with less concern about safety, security, and quality”.66 In our case of TC, 
we argue that the user relies on the TC vendors that the system they are offering 
                                                        





(and the user is buying) is actually operating as it was supposed to. In our opinion 
this leads to the definition of reliance liability that we believe that is the most 
appropriate way to ensure the trust of the users in TC. 
4.2.1.5 Current level of liability exposure for producers, 
in the event of hardware and software failure 
appropriate for TC? 
One of the lessons we learn from even these short interviews, is that the 
industry thinks that any exposure to liability can be managed contractually. 
There might be disagreement where the risk is best located - with the university 
based developers accepting that a shift to consumers may have detrimental effect, 
while the commercial developers are more willing to exclude liability “as long as 
we do everything possible”.  
 The legal contract concerning software which binds the user with the 
software vendor is called End-User Licence Agreement (EULA). This agreement 
contains the terms and conditions that the user must obey, in order to use the 
software legitimately. The agreement may also contain various terms and 
conditions such as to install the software in only one computer, or to use it for 
personal purposes only.  
There are many ways this contract can be presented to the user, in order for 
him to accept and then install and use the software. The EULAs can restrict the 
usage of the software; they may “force” agreement on certain conditions while 
using the system; and lastly they seriously limit the ability of the user to sue the 
vendor for damages or vulnerabilities presented to the software.67 The latter, is 
perhaps the most crucial reason why software developers tend to use EULAs as 
an “insurance” against the users. These kinds of agreements take away the user’s 
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right to customize or even repair their own devices.68 Moreover, the software 
vendors can trust that the software has not been reverse engineered or disabled, 
in any possible way, so that any activities that waive any term or condition 
contained in the EULA are prevented. 
From the manufacturer’s perspective, the disclaimer of liability for software 
faults is probably the most important function contained in an EULA. With the 
user’s agreement, he can no longer sue, or file class-action lawsuits against the 
vendor for faulty products, or for products that do not fulfill the user’s 
requirements. Due to the limited uptake of TC so far, it proved difficult to find 
good examples of TC specific EULAs. But one of the main features of the TCG 
technology, as discussed, is the remote attestation. Principles underlying this 
feature enforce certain aspects of EULAs as it brings third parties into the user - 
computer vendor relation. We note here that EULAs therefore potentially “go 
beyond” the relation between the two contracting parties, and obligate the user 
to a certain behavior towards a party that is not party to the contract.  
As we noted above, it has been suggested in the past that it would be useful 
to apply pressure to software vendors to improve software security and to ensure 
that the software provides the security it should provide, and that in any other 
case, the purchasers should be able to sue the software vendors for any kind of 
harm caused by the use of their products.69 Experts in the fields of IT remain 
divided in two camps on whether software product-liability rules could cause 
more problems rather than they are supposed to solve. Schneier one of the most 
influential IT experts called by the House of Lords Science and Technology 
                                                        
68  Newitz, A. (2005). Dangerous Terms - A User's Guide to EULAs. Electronic Frontier 
Foundation (EFF) - Defending Freedom in the Digital World. from 
http://www.eff.org/wp/eula.php 
69  Chandler, A. J. (2003). Security in Cyberspace: Combatting Distributed Denial of 




Committee to give testimony on the report they issued on "Personal Internet 
Security”, states that “there’s no other industry where shoddy products are sold 
to a public that expects regular problems, and where consumers are the ones who 
have to learn how to fix them”.70 He also thinks that the key to solve this problem 
is by applying software liabilities as computers are the only mass-market 
consumer item in which the vendors are not liable for any faults.71  
Advocates for more burdensome liability rules have made unfavourable 
comparisons to the rules that apply to toasters, automobiles, tablesaws, 
airplanes, and other products.72 In each of these cases, the vendors would be held 
liable if they sell a defective product, and product liability laws compel them to 
issue recalls, or provide warranty repairs or compensation to possibly injured 
buyers or damages caused. 
Expressing a commonly thought question McKenzie asks: “Can you imagine 
a world where the words "software" and "warranty" actually appear on the same 
page?”.73 Rolling on to the next logical question: “What will be the responsibility 
of the software vendors that sell flawed software?”. 
                                                        
70  Schneier, B. (2008). Software makers should take responsibility, The Guardian. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2008/jul/17/internet.security 
71  Schneier, B. (2007). Schneier on Security.  Retrieved from 
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2007/01/information_sec_1.html 
72  For TC comparison with toasters see McKenzie, M. (2009). Software Liability Laws: 
Thinking The Unthinkable.  Retrieved from 
http://www.informationweek.com/news/smb/ebusiness/229206517, automobiles 
see Schneier, B. (2008). Software makers should take responsibility, The Guardian. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2008/jul/17/internet.security, and 
tablesaws see Ganssle, J. (2011). Software liability laws – Part 2.  Retrieved from 
http://www.eetimes.com/electronics-blogs/other/4233623/Software-liability-
laws---Part-2, 




4.2.2 An alternative view: Security as service and the 
relational contract theory. 
Let us recap briefly: In the past, liability regimes for software were far from 
burdensome on software developers and vendors. This has been at least in part 
blamed for the security flaws that they generate.74 Under normal conditions, 
market competition should mitigate this, but even in traditional fields of 
software, monopolies or near monopolies have been the norm rather than the 
exception, on contribution to the high level of software vulnerabilities.75 As we 
argued, TC is premised, to an extent, on the absence of diversity and competition, 
making this an even more pressing issue. At the same time, shifting the burden 
entirely to the industry might not only deter necessary investment in security, it 
can encourage reckless behavior by users. TC is already a potential contributor 
to this “moral hazard”, where people relying on the technology could be induced 
to take excessive risks, as we discussed in chapter 2. Additionally granting users 
with wide ranging legal protection could increase this danger even more.76 
Industry seems willing to treat TC just like any other product, and use EULAs to 
manage their exposure to liability, by regimenting use and hiding the limitations 
of the approach in the small print. This brings us back to the first chapter where 
we discussed the disappointingly limited uptake of TC by consumers. We argued 
there that TC is a compromise between costs and safety - ideally not too costly, 
but as a result not as safe as it could possibly be. From a liability perspective 
                                                        
74  See also Edwards, B., Locasto, M., & Epstein, J. (2014). Panel Summary: The Future of 
Software Regulation. Paper presented at the Proceedings of the 2014 workshop on 
New Security Paradigms Workshop (pp. 117-126),ACM, Kamp, P.-H. (2011). The 
software industry is the problem. Queue, 9(9), pp. 10.  
75  See in particular Kim, B. C., Chen, P. Y., & Mukhopadhyay, T. (2011). The effect of 
liability and patch release on software security: The monopoly case. Production and 
Operations Management, 20(4), pp. 603-617.  
76  August, T., August, R., & Shin, H. (2014). Designing user incentives for cybersecurity. 
Communications of the ACM, 57(11), pp. 43-46.  
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though, this compromise could become an issue in the context of litigation – after 
all, there were foreseeable risks, and known countermeasures, which were 
however not taken due to costs – and all that documented in the technical 
literature. Unsurprisingly, manufacturers will want to emphasize and legitimize 
this in the EULAs, making the buyer a willing accomplice in the corner cutting. At 
the same time, TC adds costs, and the best way to ensure take up is to emphasize 
the security benefits, or at least tacitly rely on the different understanding 
laypersons have of terms such as “trusted” and “secure”. Due to the monopoly 
position of the TCI, a possible option therefore seems to be on balance to increase 
liability (possibly by using “good faith” reading of the EULAs aggressively), while 
allowing some risk management on the side of the TC providers, and if for no 
other reason than to remind users to remain vigilant.  
However, we think that any mere tinkering with software liability rules, or 
EULAs, falls short of what is needed here, for both industry and users. Any such 
attempt would at best address Type 1 failure, failure of the technology to function 
as specified. In the constant arms race between hackers and security solutions, 
Type 2 failures are just as important, and they fall outside even the most 
aggressive use of “good faith” review of liability rules. Here harm is caused by an 
ingenious third party that finds way to circumvent security mechanisms that at 
the time they were developed were state of the art. The fault of the supplier, if 
any, was that it raised unrealistic expectations and caused the buyer to engage in 
risky behavior, preventing out of distrust of users in general that the client used 
other protective measures not TC certified (because in a TC environment, at least 
potentially, some effective but open source and uncertified tools will not work), 
and potentially rather than helping with damage limitation making things worse 
by disabling the affected party from taking remedial steps of their own.  
One part of our solution is relatively simple. “Buying TC” should in law be 
classified as what the consumer will perceive it to be – that is certified security 
service as a package. This sidesteps the debate on whether software is a good, a 
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service or sui generis, and how hybrid hardware/software systems are to be 
considered. It should support “social trust” on the side of the customer, as 
expectations and what is promised match closer, the ability to shift liability is at 
least reduced, and the consumer need not to worry which part of the system 
failed to deliver. To conceptualize TC as a certified security service contract 
however also has another advantage. Service contracts are closer to the 
paradigmatic example of a different way to think about contracts altogether, the 
relational contract theory. While mainly motivated historically by employment 
relations, we can think of “security services” not as a one off service, but a long 
lasting relation. This, we will argue, allows an understanding of the contract 
relation that is much better suited to create “networks of trust”, with a long term 
convergence of interests between the parties, that would match the technology 
based “trust networks” that TC tries to build.  
To understand this argument, we need first to look a bit at one of the 
conceptual shortcomings of classical contract theory for this purpose. In one of 
the most influential papers in legal theory, Wesley Hohfeld’s Fundamental legal 
conceptions as applied in judicial reasoning, the author explicates the meaning of 
core legal concepts such as right, duty and privilege, by constructing an 
interlocking system that maps the relations between the “atoms” so to speak of a 
legal system.77 “Duty” and “Right” are two of these atoms or basic concepts, they 
stand in a relation of judicial correlative to another: that is to say if I have a right 
against you, you have a corresponding or correlative duty towards me. “Duty” and 
“privilege” by contrast are legal opposites: If I have a duty towards you to do X, 
then I don’t have a privilege not to do X.78 Crucially for our purpose, his analysis 
                                                        
77  Hohfeld, W. N. (1917). Fundamental legal conceptions as applied in judicial 
reasoning. Yale Law Journal, pp. 710-770.  
78  ibid. p.719ff. This is one of the most frequently cited papers in legal theory. We will 
only focus on some core ideas, for a fuller academic discussion, the reader is referred 
to the early appraisal here Cook, W. W. (1919). Hohfeld's Contributions to the Science 
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is premised on two assumptions: The first can be called a commitment to bi-polar 
atomism. That is, the legal status of a person, or indeed any complex legal 
problem, can ultimately be broken down in simple relations between two people 
and two people only, each in turn characterized by the basic legal concepts that 
he proposes. For many of his contemporaries (and indeed subsequent critics), 
this seemed problematic. How can we understand “ownership” or right in rem as 
it is traditionally called? If I have an “absolute” right of ownership, say in my 
computer, then this is a right against everybody, not just an individual person. 
For Hohfeld, this is a misconception. Where lawyers often saw a relation that 
involved infinitely many parties, he argued that this can always be reduced in 
principle to a multitude of bi-polar relations between just two people, and 
nothing else but the substance of this relation determines their rights and duties. 
Connected to this view is a “litigation centric” approach to law. In Hohfeld’s view, 
we only understand the meaning of a legal concept when it is litigated in court. 
And in a court room setting, we obviously always have just two parties – plaintiff 
and defendant, fighting it out. So the meaning of “ownership” in my computer is 
not best understood as a complex relation involving everybody, but a relation 
that crystallizes only when you take my computer away, and I sue you in court.  
We can already see here the problem that this conception of law can create 
for TC. In the second chapter, we argued that in modern societies, interpersonal, 
emotive trust between acquaintances had to be replaced by impersonal trust in 
institutions. Weber, so we argued, had given the law an important role in creating 
                                                        
of Law. Ibid., pp. 721-738. and to the more recent comprehensive study here Halpin, 
A. (2007). Rights, Duties, Liabilities, and Hohfeld. Legal Theory, 13(01), pp. 23-39.  
Hohfeld’s analysis has recently received renewed interest in the context of law and 
computers, especially automated legal reasoning and agent technology. Its simplicity 
lends itself to automated, computational characterisations. See e.g. Krogh, C., & 
Herrestad, H. (1999). Hohfeld in cyberspace and other applications of normative 




this trust. I can trust you to fulfill your obligation, because you are under a legal 
obligation to do so. But for Weber, this was arguably not meant simply as 
“compliance by threats”. In his conception of the modern economy, I can trust 
you, and to a degree expose myself to risks, because I know the law, and you know 
the law, and I know that you know the law – a situation which is known under the 
technical term of “common knowledge” in game theory and the theory of 
distributed computer agents.79 In such a situation, my thoughts are not primarily 
that something will go wrong, but that I will be protected. Rather, it is an 
assumption that everything will be as promised, for we all agree that following 
the law is the right thing to do, and only if there should be a problem, 
exceptionally, there is redress. This leads to a concept of more substantive trust, 
as opposed to a society where we think when engaging with others: I do not really 
trust you, you probably will default, but the law will save me. It is however that 
latter attitude that the litigation centric view of law promotes, and which finds its 
expression in reality in the abusive or unfair use of general terms and EULA’s 
discussed above. Their content becomes intelligible if we assume that the issuer 
thinks from the beginning the worst of his customers, and from the outset 
pursues a defensive strategy. 
Just as problematic as the litigation centric view is the emphasis of bi-polar 
relations only. In Hohfeld’s analysis, the law is only concerned with a situation 
where things went wrong, and you have an issue with your TC provider. Nobody 
else is involved. But as we discussed in our analysis of what TC is trying to 
achieve, this breaks up the very essence of a TC mediated relation. I trust the TC 
provider to verify the trustworthiness of everybody that I encounter, and in 
return trust my TC provider enough to provide them with enough information 
about me so that they in turn can assure third parties of my trustworthiness. The 
                                                        
79  See e.g. Halpern, J. Y., & Moses, Y. (1990). Knowledge and common knowledge in a 
distributed environment. Journal of the ACM (JACM), 37(3), pp. 549-587.  
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result is an intricate network where everybody is related to everybody else – and 
where, as Guadamuz noted, power laws and network effects can be efficient. By 
breaking up this network analytically, and disassemble it into bi-polar relations 
between just two parties, the law fails to map the reality of what it tries to 
regulate. 
Building on Hohfeld’s work which was a general characterization of all of the 
law, formalist theories of contract characterize the contract relation in particular 
as an atomistic, bi-polar relation that is not receptive to third party interests or 
wider societal concerns at all. The most influential, and most concise, account for 
formalist contract doctrine can be found in Ernest Weinrib’s “The Idea of Private 
law”.80 Contract law in this view can be fully understood as a bipolar relation 
whose content is entirely dependent on the parties’ stated intention at contract 
formation, and whose sole aim is to ensure “corrective justice”, that is if one 
party’s rights are interfered with, it is entitled to have the balance restored. Wider 
social or political concerns are irrelevant for this view – this is what Weinrib calls 
“the autonomy of private law”, and as a formalist theory, issues such as unequal 
access to information or unequal bargaining power of the parties are also of no 
concern.81 Here we face the problem of trust creation through law even closer at 
home – contracts, the main mode of regulating the relation between TC provider 
and customer, are particularly prone to an interpretation that focuses on the 
“magic moment in time” when offer and acceptance are matched, and is 
irresponsive to any third party interests – the concept of privity of contract that 
we alluded to before. This again breaks up the trust network that TC tries to build 
                                                        
80  Weinrib, E. J. (1995). The idea of private law. Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge, Mass. : 
Harvard University Press. For a critical discussion see e.g. Marshall, J. (2009). On the 
Idea of Understanding Weinrib: Weinrib and Keating on Bipolarity, Duty, and the 
Nature of Negligence. S. Cal. Interdisc. LJ, 19, pp. 385.  
81  So in particular in Weinrib, E. J. (1993). Jurisprudence of Legal Formalism, The. Harv. 
JL & Pub. Pol'y, 16, pp. 583.  
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into small bipolar atoms, and is thus incapable of matching the reality that TC 
creates.  
While formalism in the Weinribian tradition is a highly influential way to 
think about contracts, some of the similarly influential competitors are even 
worse. Economic analysis of contract law in particular shares with the above 
theories its atomism – contracts remain essentially an issue between two parties 
only – but limits the relevant interests to “rational maximization of economic 
interests”.82 One way in which this conception of contract law is expressed in 
practice is the attitude to “efficient breach” of a contract relation: According to 
this theory, if I find myself in a contractual relation, but my economic interests 
would be better served by defaulting and accepting “some” penalty, then the 
rational thing is to walk away from my promise. Contract law, in this view, should 
permit this if the damages in turn are market optimal. In a typical example, if I 
promise to sell my car to you for £300, and I get immediately afterwards an offer 
for £3000, then a rational contract law should allow me to walk away from the 
contract with you, provided I give you your money back plus an adequate 
remuneration for the additional expenses you incurred while waiting in vain for 
your car to be delivered (say £20 for taxi costs, and £5 to make up for inflation 
which means cars are now more expensive). This leaves me better of, and you not 
worse of, in financial terms, as if we had never met.83 We can immediately see 
why this is not an ideal foundation for a contract in security services. Imagine you 
hire a security service in the offline world: you have to trust them with access to 
                                                        
82  For a comprehensive discussion see Goldberg, V. P. (1976). Toward an expanded 
economic theory of contract. Journal of Economic Issues, pp. 45-61. For a balanced but 
friendly appraisal, see Posner, E. A. (2003). Economic analysis of contract law after 
three decades: Success or failure? Yale Law Journal, pp. 829-880.  
83  See for a full discussion Craswell, R. (1987). Contract remedies, renegotiation, and 
the theory of efficient breach. S. Cal. L. Rev., 61, pp. 629. For a rational calculation of 
damages under these conditions see Birmingham, R. L. (1969). Breach of contract, 
damage measures, and economic efficiency. Rutgers L. Rev., 24, pp. 273.  
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your house, they will know where your valuable property is, where your 
protection is the weakest, and if they offer personal protection as well, where 
your children go to school. This requires considerable trust. A contract that 
essentially says that as soon as a local criminal offers more for the service, they 
can terminate the contracts on return of last month’ wages seems incapable of 
creating this type of trust. In the real world, some or all of the trust will have to 
come from something else instead – and we discussed some of the mechanisms 
in the second chapter: public law regulation of the security industry, or self-
regulation of the industry, with a code of practice and an institutionalized 
complaints procedure e.g.. But as we discussed there, this type of framework does 
not exists (yet) for online security: the bouncer who keeps suspicious people out 
of the nightclub is much more heavily regulated than the “firewall bouncer” that 
keeps suspicious packets out of your computer.  
As we discussed above, this is not just a theoretical problem. The way in 
which the industry uses EULAs, and the way in which in our interview “insiders” 
conceptualized the role of contract law, fits this “calculating” approach to use 
contract terms strategically: The customer buys a good in a one off transaction 
(buying say a computer that says “TC in it”) and this marks effectively both the 
beginning and the end of the relation, which is not deeper than say buying a 
toaster. The problem with modern contract theory as a creator of trust has 
however been recognized as a more general problem of modern economies, and 
is sometimes discussed under the concept of “calculativeness of trust” in societies 
governed by classical contract law. It finds a clear expression in this summary by 
Diego Gambetta. 
“There is a degree of convergence in the definition of trust which can 
be summarized as follows: trust is a particular level of the subjective 
probability with which an agent assesses that another agent or group 
of agents will perform a particular action [....] When we say we trust 
someone or that someone is trustworthy, we implicitly mean that the 
probability that he will perform an action that is beneficial or at least 
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not detrimental to us is high enough for us to consider engaging in 
some form of cooperation with him”.84 
We can immediately see the close similarity to the “inductive” concept of 
techno-trust discussed in chapter 2 that underpins TC: trust is an extrapolation 
from past behavior about the probability of future positive behavior. Economic 
theory of contract law recognized that problem, it tried to develop more 
sophisticated models of rationality to minimize its predicted impact. Machiavelli 
may have advised the Prince that he could and indeed should breach contracts 
with impunity, just as classical economic theory of contract law predicts. More 
recent and more sophisticated approaches to economic contract theory such as 
transaction cost economics advises us that “investment in trust” can pay off in the 
long term, and that therefore the wise Prince will give more credible 
commitments.85 However, while there are therefore variations of economic 
theory of contract available that offer a “fix” to the most obvious trust-destroying 
aspects of economic contract theory, there are strong doubts that “calculative 
trust” is ultimately a possibility. 
Writing with general support for an economic analysis of law and from the 
perspective of an economist, Oliver Williamson concludes in an article that had 
substantial impact on the debate on the relation between contracts, economic 
analysis and trust, that: 
“If functional separability does not imply attitudinal separability, then 
piecemeal calculativeness can easily be dysfunctional. The risk is that 
pushing metering at the margin every where to the limit will have 
spillover effects from easy-to-meter onto hard-to-meter activities. If 
cooperative attitudes are impaired, then transactions that can be 
metered only with difficulty, but for which consummate cooperation 
is important, will be discharged in a more perfunctory manner. The 
                                                        
84  Gambetta, D. (2000). Can we trust trust. Trust: Making and breaking cooperative 
relations, 2000, pp. 213-237. at IX. 
85  Machiavelli, N. (1952). The prince (L. Ricci, Trans.). New York: New York American 
Library.(Original work published 1513), pp. 92-93. 
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neglect of such interaction effects is encouraged by piecemeal 
calculativeness, which is to say by an insensitivity to atmosphere.”86 
In our analysis above, we identified all the elements for the TC setting that 
trigger the problems Williamson describes: TC, or computer security in general, 
does indeed require “consummate cooperation” – technological fixes alone can 
lead to moral hazards, only if consumer and TC provider cooperate will true 
benefits be realized. TC can be metered only with difficulty – that was expressed 
by our interviewees when they pointed out the difficulties of modeling and 
predicting flaws and the potential for malfunctioning in a hostile environment in 
advance. This makes it difficult to “meter” what either party needs to do, resulting 
in a “grab for control” by the economically stronger party – the use of Terms and 
Conditions and EULAs to shift risk to the consumer and prescribe in detail what 
they must not do or risk voiding the contract. This converges with other studies 
that have shown the tension between security provisions and an economic 
understanding of contractual relations.87  
Williamson reaches a skeptical conclusion: 
“Trust, I submit, should be concentrated on those personal relations 
in which it really matters, which will be facilitated by the use of 
"political, social, and economic institutions" to govern calculative 
relations. If calculativeness is inimical to personal trust, in that a deep 
and abiding trust relation cannot be created in the face of 
calculativeness, and if pre-existing personal trust is devalued by 
calculativeness, then the question is how to segregate and preserve 
relations of personal trust”.88 
                                                        
86  Williamson, O. E. (1993). Calculativeness, trust, and economic organization. Journal 
of Law and Economics, pp. 453-486. at 480; for a critical discussion see Craswell, R. 
(1993). On the Uses of" Trust": Comment on Williamson," Calculativeness, Trust, and 
Economic Organization". Journal of Law and Economics, pp. 487-500.  
87  See e.g. Langheinrich, M. (2003). When trust does not compute-the role of trust in 
ubiquitous computing. Paper presented at the Workshop on Privacy at UBICOMP (pp. 
1-8), 
88  Willamson op cit p. 483 
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If we followed this conclusion, we should abandon the talk about trust in TC 
altogether, and also abandon the idea that the contractual relation between TC 
provider and customer can sustain the necessary trust between the parties. But 
as we saw, all the alternatives – personal trust, kinship loyalty or institutional 
trust are also not available to us in a global, disembodied medium like the 
Internet. This could explain the low uptake of TC: customer and TC provider need 
a substantial degree of trust to be willing to accept the risks that come for both, 
with that relationship, it requires a degree of cooperation, yet not only is there 
little social capital to sustain that trust, the chosen method of interaction, contract 
law, is based on calculativeness and thus destroying rather than fostering trust. 
We will argue however that this needs not be the end of the story. Ultimately, 
Williamson, and with him the many economic, political science and contract law 
theorists that shared his concern, are still within the conceptual framework of the 
classical, formalist notion of law and legal relation as a one of, bipolar relation 
that we described above in description of Hohfeld and Weinrib. While modern 
society relies essentially on contracts and contracting (again as per Weber), they 
need to be understood differently to fulfill this task. This was particularly obvious 
on long term economic relations such as employment law, where the idea of a 
“one off” meeting of the minds is the least plausible model, and parties tie 
themselves to each other for a long and unpredictable future.89 This gave rise to 
a very different understanding of contracts, the “relational theory of contracts”, 
developed in particular by Ian Roderick Macneil and Stewart Macaulay.90 
                                                        
89 Seminal: Macneil, I. R. (1977). Contracts: adjustment of long-term economic relations 
under classical, neoclassical, and relational contract law. Nw. UL Rev., 72, pp. 854.  
90  See for an exposition of the theory in full e.g. Macaulay, S. (1985). Empirical View of 
Contract, An. Wis. L. Rev., pp. 465. , Macneil, I. R. Ibid.Relational contract: What we do 
and do not know. pp. 483. ; See also Gudel, P. J. (1998). Relational Contract Theory 
and the Concept of Exchange [comments] (pp. 763). 
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This understanding of contract law also leads away from the “litigation 
focused” understanding of law that we encountered above in our discussion of 
Hohfeld, to a view of regulation through contract that is less adversarial and more 
geared towards “community creation”.91 In essence, he argues that contracts are 
never just discrete commodity exchanges, but are situated in complex webs of 
exchange relations.92 This is in marked contrast to both Weinribian legal 
formalism and economic analysis of the law, which both ignore in varying degree 
contextual matters surrounding the contract and concentrate only on the 
expressed terms together with a strictly limited and a priori known range of 
implied terms. They fleetingly connect “total strangers brought together by 
chance rather than any common social structure”.93 Or, as we put it above, parties 
in discrete exchanges are atomised individuals. For this to work, they “would 
have to be completely sure of never again seeing or having anything else to do 
with the other”.94 They are also transient, as a necessary condition of their 
discreetness: “everything must happen quickly lest the parties should develop 
some kind of a relation impacting on the transaction so as to deprive it of 
discreteness”.95 
The paradigmatic exchange for them is the contract of sale of a perishable 
good, such as shopping in a supermarket. By contrast, Macneil takes employment 
contracts as paradigmatic and argues that all contract relations are on a spectrum 
from the highly relational contract to those that look "as if they are discrete", and 
                                                        
91 Skeptical on this diminishing role of litigation to explicate legal concepts is Komesar, 
N. K. (1985). Lawyering versus Continuing Relations in the Administrative Setting. 
Wis. L. Rev., pp. 751. , which nonetheless gives a good disucssion of the meaning of 
this shift in focus.  
92  MacNeil, I., & Campbell, I. D. (2001). The relational theory of contract : selected works 
of Ian MacNeil. London: Sweet & Maxwell. pp. 365–386 at p. 379 
93  MacNeil, (1978) p. 856 
94  ibid p. 856 
95  ibid p. 856  
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transactionalised relations such as one-off commodity purchase. On closer 
inspection though, all relations are connected with and situated within a social 
context. The only successful relations are those that are harmonized with this 
context and do not interrupt them. This by Macneil can be achieved through a 
number of "norms in a positivist sense”. Amongst these, he lists:96  
1. role integrity;  
2. reciprocity (or 'mutuality');  
3. implementation of planning;  
4. effectuation of consent;  
5. flexibility;  
6. contractual solidarity;  
7. the 'linking norms' such as restitution, reliance and expectation interests;  
8. the power norms that create and restraint power;  
9. propriety of means;  
10. harmonisation with the social matrix.  
By "norms in a positivist sense", what he means is that these are the 
conditions that we see observed when humans interact successfully through 
contracts, as opposed to the predictions that the “homo economicus”, the rational 
self-maximiser, of positive economics predicts them to be. So even when we just 
buy a computer, the social context is important. At first, this looks like a simple 
one – off transaction that does not affect the two parties beyond handing over 
goods for money. But once we look closer and keep an eye on the context, a much 
more complex system emerges. McNeil in his examples mentions e.g. brand 
loyalty that this sale can generate well beyond the individual transaction.97 We 
                                                        
96 Macneil, I. R. (2000). Contracting worlds and essential contract theory. Social & Legal 
Studies, 9(3), pp. 431-438.  p. 432 
97  Macneil, I. R. (1973). Many Futures of Contracts, The. S. Cal. L. Rev., 47, pp. 691-816. 
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can add in the modern IT driven economy many more. The customer data that 
now allows the seller to improve services or advertising – her data will reside 
forever in some form in the data sets of the vendor, and thus you could poetically 
say, a small part of her will influence the strategy of the vendor’s business for a 
long time. Then there is the issue of “commensurability”. The choice of software 
system will make this computer compatible with some, and less compatible with 
other computers – the core of a network of users who find it easier to exchange 
files amongst themselves. Indeed, they may soon find that they need voluntary 
Internet discussion boards where owners of this system exchange tips, help and 
advice. Furthermore, there can be contractual software updates or service 
contracts involved.  
So even in situations that look like simple one-off commodity transactions, 
in reality lasting networks are created and facilitated. This works best, so Macneil, 
as a contingent, empirical matter if the above norms are observed in addition to 
what contract law demands as a minimum. Interesting here, and used as an 
example, is mutuality. In the Weinribian concept of contract, I want a computer, 
and the seller wants my money. I grudgingly give him the money (I would rather 
keep it and the computer, and where the law allows, will do so), and he grudgingly 
gives me the computer (he would rather keep it and the money and where the 
law allows, will do so). This “thin” notion of reciprocity and balance is contrasted 
by Macneil’s concept of mutuality. Now, I not only want the computer, I also want 
the company to have the money and make wise use of it – as this enables better 
after-care, or better products in the future which strengthen the brand and thus 
the peer reputation I get from my purchase. The seller in turn wants me to have 
the computer and be happy with it – the compatibility issue can then entice my 
friends to also buy that model, or prepares me for buying updates, upgrades or 
                                                        
norms in marketing: A critical review of Macneil’s contribution. Marketing theory, 
4(3), pp. 239-263.  
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follow up models. If in that scenario, power is too unequally distributed, these 
network benefits will not incur, and hence the power norms need to be carefully 
balanced – taken up the recurrent theme of this thesis that great power demands 
great responsibility. As TC contracts inherently and with necessity contain strong 
power norms (since the technology alone will prevent the user from many 
activities) they need to be balanced and adjusted in the contract, not made worse 
by aggressive use of EULAs.  
 This, again, is not an appeal at the better self of the parties. Rather, the 
extent, to which a particular exchange relation is in accordance with the norms 
will influence the success of the relation for both sides, resulting in greater 
longevity (where desired) and the ability for both parties to gain the full range of 
benefits that the exchange can potentially offer. We therefore submit that the 
contractual relation that regulates the sale of TC products should be particularly 
attuned to these norms, since longevity is intended (the process of remote 
attestation and assurance extend beyond the sale of the TC verified equipment), 
the power differentials are particularly strong, and the aim for both sides, a more 
secure Internet, can only be realised if networks of trust are build. Contract law 
in this view almost becomes a form of sociology, a way to understand the complex 
networks, alliances and interdependencies that make up society, rather than 
(merely) regulating and by doing so even disrupting, the way classical contract 
theory does.98  
In a recent study, Chen Wei Zhu has shown convincingly how relational 
contract theory is particularly suited for software licensing contracts, both on 
historical grounds as the form of contract most closely relate to the original 
                                                        
98  On this understanding of relational contract theory as sociology see Macneil, I. R. 
(1987). Relational Contract Theory as Sociology: A Reply to Professors Lindenberg 
and de Vos. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE)/Zeitschrift für 
die gesamte Staatswissenschaft(2), pp. 272-290.  
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hacker spirit, but also in modern settings.99 While his focus is on open source 
licensing, many of his insights can also be transferred to some types of 
proprietary software. Software, especially software like the one used in TC that 
enables computers to communicate safely, is in his words best understood as 
“relation-ware”.100 This is particularly the case if, as in the open source 
community that he focuses on, developers and users are ultimately the same and 
everybody contributes in the long term. This is less obvious in proprietary 
software, but for security software like TC, the success of the system as we saw in 
the second chapter is also based on continued learning – the users, so we 
discussed, had to give up some information about themselves and their past to 
allow the system to predict their future trustworthiness. In this way, there is a 
continued bi-lateral exchange, a contribution by both parties beyond the moment 
of sale. 
In an even more radical study, Bankowski and Schafer further pushed this 
idea by analyzing relational contracts as constitutive for international legal order 
– which is for obvious reasons of particular relevance for an analysis of Internet 
law and governance.101 They take their inspiration from ‘The Player of Games’ by 
the Scottish novelist Ian M. Banks. In it, the Culture, a profoundly peaceful and 
libertarian human/machine symbiotic society takes on the cruel and aggressive 
Empire of Azad. Azad is unique in its election procedure for its government and 
administration. It is centred on a game, also called Azad. Whoever wins this highly 
complex game becomes Emperor. The final takes place between the Culture 
representative and the Emperor. Both recreate on the board pictures of their 
                                                        
99  Zhu, C. W. (2013). ‘Copyleft’ Reconsidered Why Software Licensing Jurisprudence 
Needs Insights from Relational Contract Theory. Social & Legal Studies, 22(3), pp. 
289-308.  
100  Zhu op.cit at p. 305 
101  Schäfer, B., & Bankowski, Z. (2000). Mistaken identities: The integrative force of 
private law. The Harmonisation of European Private Law, pp. 21-47.  
218 
 
respective societies. The Empire creates a “centralised hierarchical power 
structure in which influence is restricted to an economically privileged class 
retaining its influence through a judicious use of oppression and skilled 
manipulation of the society’s information system. In short, it is all about 
dominance”.102 
The player of the Culture on the other hand, constructs: 
“a grid of forces and relationships, without any obvious hierarchy or 
entrenched leadership, and initially quite profoundly peaceful”.  
The difference in attitude permeates the whole game.  
Bankowski and Schafer suggest that one way to understand this novel as two 
different ways “to see” present society. The first they equate with “public law 
thinking”. Focused on an Austinian notion of the absolute sovereign, it looks for 
“well defined power structure” and “centralised hierarchies”. The use of force to 
guarantee adherence to this one set of rules. There are no networks, just a strict 
line of command. This comes in contrast with the view of a (relational) contract 
lawyer, the player for the Culture, who sees a “grid of forces and relationships 
without entrenched leadership”. They argue that while classical contract law is 
insufficient to explain the formation of societies, a relational understanding of 
contract leads to an understanding of society that is both contractual and 
network centric – thus a legal arrangement that now really matches Guadamuz’ 
characterization of the Internet as complex dynamic system.  
To recap: The relation between TC provider and customer is shaped by 
contract. Part of the function of this contract, so we argued, is to create trust in a 
liberal society where people do not have prior social or familial bounds. We 
argued that classical contract law is however unable to fulfill this function. It is 
based on distrust, and thus disrupts rather than enhances the network of techno 
trust that TC tries to build. EULAs are seen as epitomizing this approach to legal 
                                                        
102  Chapter 1 pg.48 Banks, I. M. (1988). The Player of Games. pp. 1-320.  
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formation of relations, by further entrenching power differentials and enhancing 
the disempowerment of the user that is already inherent in TC (the user as 
problem, who needs to be prevented from interfering with what is good of his 
security) through further legal disempowerment – shifting liability away from the 
vendor and in addition imposing even more restrictions on the buyer what they 
can do without losing; what little protection remains. The inability to create the 
necessary trust, by violating the 10 principles, is ultimately harmful for all 
concerned. This is evidenced by the relative lack of success of TC and the minimal 
uptake – it requires more trust than the system can generate. By contrast, if we 
analyze the contractual relation through the lenses of relational contract theory, 
we see the potential of a TC contract to be the core for an emerging complex and 
sustainable network of the type it needs to create to guarantee Internet security. 
But is this just a different way to look at the same legal reality, a purely 
philosophical speculation which furthermore looks suspiciously idealistic, or do 
real legal consequences follow from it? This is an issue we will discuss in the next 
section.  
4.2.3 Third party liability – no contractual relations – the 
reliance liability case 
Above, we encountered 10 norms that Macneil identified as necessary so that 
contract relations can maximize the mutual interest of all parties, and create 
sustainable networks. From this it is a small step to argue that the degree to which 
actual doctrinal law “fits” these norms determines the usefulness of legal 
concepts methods and interventions in exchange relations. But can we make the 
transition from legal theory to legal practice, apart maybe from admonishing TC 
providers not to leverage their bargaining position too much in drafting liability 
exclusion clauses, or courts to use good faith aggressively in striking out such 
clauses? Is it a purely theoretical or jurisprudential issue, or one that can guide 
us in designing alternative legal rules? It has indeed been argued that legal 
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formalism, on closer inspection, is compatible with relational contract theory,103 
and that for this or similar reasons, changes to contract law doctrine are not 
necessary.104 On the opposite end of the spectrum, it has been argued that a 
relational contract law is impossible in principle.105 We will not engage with this 
discussion, which admittedly was for the author as a computer scientist… difficult 
to follow. Instead, we will demonstrate and argue for two specific and related 
proposals of how we should doctrinally understand TC that does take some 
inspiration from Macneil. We will focus for this on conditions 7 and 8 from the 
above list, (7) the 'linking norms' such as restitution, reliance and expectation 
interests; (8) the power norms that create and restraint power.  
We mentioned the importance of power several times, and it was a recurrent 
theme in this thesis. To ensure internet safety, we permit a monopoly being 
formed in whose hand considerable power is concentrated. To a degree, they will 
determine who can communicate with whom. This, almost inevitably, can bring 
third parties into the equation. We mentioned this briefly above as our “scenario 
3” of things that can go wrong. Malfunctioning TC can harm me, the owner, if my 
computer communicates with an untrustworthy source. Here a contractual nexus 
exists between me and the TC provider who caused the harm. But what if my TC 
system “overlooks” that my computer was compromised, signals this to the 
machine of a third party who, relying on this information, communicates with me 
and as a result also acquires a virus? OR what happens if my computer mistakenly 
does not recognize the remote attestation of the other computer’s safety, block it 
                                                        
103  See in particular Scott, R. E. (1999). Case for Formalism in Relational Contract, The. 
Nw. UL Rev., 94, pp. 847.  
104  So Austen-Baker, R. A Relational Law of Contract?”,(2004). Journal of Contract Law, 
20, pp. 125.  
105  So Eisenberg, M. A. (1999). Why there is no law of relational contracts. Nw. UL Rev., 
94, pp. 805. For a response see Macaulay, S. (2003). The real and the paper deal: 
empirical pictures of relationships, complexity and the urge for transparent simple 
rules. The Modern Law Review, 66(1), pp. 44-79.  
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as a result and a loss for the owner of that computer ensues? Here, the party that 
suffered the harm is not in a contractual relation with my TC provider, nor with 
me. As we will discuss, I may be liable in the first scenario, a third party infected 
with my virus, in tort for the harm - not something the present legal system 
normally imposes on me, but a possibility. Alternatively, we could argue that the 
third party reasonably relied on the signals it received from my TC provider, who 
therefore should shoulder the loss.  
Here relational contract theory comes to its strength, by recognizing the 
extra-legal, social norms that regulate this type of expectation. Through condition 
7, it links the contractual issue to other legal concepts, including as we learned 
“linking norms” to reliance. Reliance or third party liability is indeed the legal 
doctrine that can extend the reach of a contract beyond the parties, and thus 
enable us to move beyond the bipolar, atomistic relation. Here a rough outline of 
the basic idea: I, when contracting with my TC provider, am not just an isolated, 
self- interest maximising actor of neo-liberal economics. I’m a social being with 
pre-existing networks and connections, and I care for others, at least those within 
my network. My TC provider’s role is to guarantee safety not just by checking if 
those who contact me can be trusted, but he also vouches for me. In such a 
situation, what I will need, to trust my TC provider, is not just that he covers 
through damages harm that happens to me. I also want him to cover harm that 
his actions cause my friends, or everyone who relied on him mistakenly certifying 
my trustworthiness, even if they don’t have a contract with him. On the other 
hand, if I trust someone else’s TC provider, I want ideally to know that if things 
go wrong, not just the owner of the computer that I contacted is obligated to 
compensate or help me – as he may lack the resources of the former and the 
knowledge for the latter. What I would like to know is that if something goes 
wrong because I relied on someone else’ TC attestation, is that in case of a 




The legal concept that encapsulates this type of liability outside the 
contractual nexus is known variously as “quasi-contractual”, “third party” or 
reliance liability. We will use this latter term, as it encapsulates what our issue is 
about: compensation for the damage of third parties who trusted mistakenly my 
TC provider’s attestation.  
To do this, we will first discuss the above scenario in a bit more detail, and 
also discuss briefly possible alternatives. We will then split up the problem into 
two configurations which reflect the TC process. In the TC set-up, we can 
distinguish two different forms of “signaling”. When I buy a TC computer, its 
components are certified as we discussed as TC by the TCG as a legal entity, who 
is responsible for developing appropriate standards and tests. So the first type of 
reliance is on this TCI “seal of approval”. Secondly, when actually working, my 
computer self-certifies its correct working, which is then, as we discussed, 
remotely attested by my specific TC provider (who will be a member in some 
form or other of the Trusted Computing Group). Here too, the third party will rely 
on this attestation. For the first scenario, there is a relatively straightforward 
analogy that can be made: The TCG acts like a Trust Mark certifier. We will use 
the discussion on the legal liability of Trust Marks to argue that a) a case has 
successfully been made already to impose reliance liability on them and b) that 
TC is an even clearer candidate for reliance, so that a fortiori this argument can 
be expanded to TC. For the second scenario, our argument is more complicated 
and will look initially more as if the discussion went on a strange tangent.  
To argue that my TC provider should be liable under reliance liability for 
third parties that trusted its remote attestation of my computer, we will compare 
remote attestation with “writing a reference letter” and “certifying as an expert 
the airworthiness of an aircraft”. We will argue that the way TC works combines 
aspects of both types of social activity. This will then allow us to argue that since 
some legal systems successfully use reliance liability in these cases to protect 
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third parties who hired on the basis of a flawed reference, or who boarded an 
airplane on the basis of a flawed certification, so should TC. 
To recap briefly the type of setting that concerns us here: My computer was 
compromised and now can infect other computers that communicate with it. Due 
to a failure in my TC system, this is not spotted, my computer remains “trusted” 
and mistakenly signals its “clean bill of health” to the world. Other computers get 
infected as a result and taken over for a denial of service attack. Who, if anybody, 
is liable for the harm to those computers who trusted me? 
From a legal perspective, one possibility would be to impose on me liability 
for the harm that ensues. If I leave my computer vulnerable and insufficiently 
protected, and it is later used in a crime, I too have to accept some of the blame 
and the liability, just as people might find themselves liable when they leave a gun 
in easy reach of children who then injure someone with it.106 Our computers are 
dangerous for others, if we do not look after them properly, we should bear some 
responsibility even if a nefarious third party, a criminal, intervenes in the causal 
chain and exploits our negligence by harming others. However, for practical, 
conceptual and procedural reasons, this is not really an option. Ordinary users 
lack the know how to properly protect their computers – this we discussed in the 
beginning of the chapter. It would also expose them to potentially massive losses 
which can’t be quantified in advance. If I disable my firewall (because I ignorantly 
thought that it slowed down my video clips streaming) and my computer 
becomes compromised as a result, it could then be used on a Denial Of Service 
attack against the Bank of Scotland. The damage to which I contributed could 
reach the billions. If I’m held liable for this, then computer use would become 
impossible for ordinary citizens.  
                                                        
106  For a discussion of the idea and a comparative analysis of some jurisdictions that 
impose liability, see McClurg, A. J. (2000). Armed and Dangerous: Tort Liability for 
the Negligent Storage of Firearms. CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW, 32, pp. 1189-1246.   
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The affected user whose computer is zombified (taken over by an 
attacker)107 will regularly lack the relevant intent, and also lacks the means to 
avoid such an attack. As the House of Lords notices, protecting yourself against 
the latest threats requires skills simply not available to many.108 Also, each 
individual computer taken in isolation will have played only a marginal role in 
the attack, making it difficult to prove causality, and he also won’t have the 
financial means to compensate for a large scale attack. As we discussed, TC is 
based on a recognition that the user is the weakest chain in the security link. The 
TC philosophy therefore takes the responsibility away from him entirely and 
passes it on to the software and hardware producers. However, in this new 
reality, not buying the product stops being an option, if not for legal, then for 
practical reasons: unless seen as trustworthy by other machines, the computer 
will not any longer be able to communicate with them, or communicate fully. It is 
at this point possible to return to the “virus” analogy from Chapter 2. TC is similar 
to a mandatory vaccination program, where “herd immunity” is achieved at the 
expense of individual choice. Many jurisdictions have rules that permit exactly 
this type of tradeoff in situations of great societal risk,109 and it is not by 
coincidence that the UK, groups large scale DoS attacks together with the danger 
of a pandemic, as a tier one security risk.110  
                                                        
107  on the term “zombie” and its role in DOS attacks, see Elliott, J. (2000). Distributed 
denial of service attacks and the zombie ant effect. IT professional(2), pp. 55-57.  
108  House of Lords Publications. (2007). Personal Internet Security. (HL Paper 165–I). 
London: The Stationery Office Limited Retrieved from 
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legacy of Jacobson v Massachusetts. Am J Public Health, 95 (4), pp. 571-576.  
110  Cm7953. (2010). A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security 




4.2.4 Reliance liability  
If holding the owner of an infected computer liable is not an option, and while 
if TC was established as a solution to the security problem, another option 
presents itself. As stated in the previous point, there is a contractual relationship 
between TC providers and the client (the user) which becomes relevant when the 
client relies on the TC certificate. However, can we also impose a tortuous 
relationship between TC vendor and a third party relying on the TC certificate? 
In this case the third party could seek redress directly from the TC provider who 
issued the certificate to the client. If liability is expressed purely in monetary 
terms, this too may be a problem. Even though the TC provider is in a better 
position to insure himself, the risk would be open ended. This could deter 
investment in security. But the TC provider also has access to considerable 
computing expertise. What we suggest therefore is an obligation to make this 
expertise available to third parties who suffered a harm as a result of relying on 
an inappropriately issued attestation. This, again taking up the ideas of relational 
contract theory, would also match our extra-legal sense of responsibility. If I give 
a neighbor advice, based on my advanced computer knowledge, then I would not 
necessarily feel responsible for every economic harm that he incurs when acting 
on my advice, but I would feel the need to inform him as soon as I realize that I 
made a mistake, and to do my best to use my skills to mitigate the problem.  
This type of delictual “reliance liability” has for instance been discussed in 
the context of engineers certifying an aircraft as airworthy, employers writing 
overly generous references for an employee who subsequently gains a position 
for which he is ill qualified,111 or even publishers for publishing bee-keeping 
                                                        
ocuments/digitalasset/dg_191639.pdf?CID=PDF&PLA=furl&CRE=nationalsecuritys
trategy. 
111  Allen, T. (1995). Liability for References: The House of Lords and Spring v Guardian 
Assurance. The Modern Law Review, 58(4), pp. 553-560. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-
2230.1995.tb02031.x, Honsell, H. (1999). Die Haftung für Gutachten und Auskunft 
226 
 
manuals that contained erroneous information.112 What all these cases have in 
common is that one party has superior knowledge and expertise, is seen as a 
trustworthy source of information by the wider community (and builds its 
business on this reputation) and relying on them for advice is therefore a rational 
decision to make. This bears clear similarities to both TC settings that we 
discussed. The TCG, as a consortium of the major soft- and hardware developers, 
has unique expertise on security issues, and also an insider view on computer 
vulnerabilities – after all, it is more often than not, their own software that is 
vulnerable, and knowledge about the defects is hidden by them behind trade 
secrets and copyright law.113 Indeed, the frequent refusal by companies to share 
security information and information of vulnerabilities could itself be 
constructed as a liability trigger, were if not for the fact that it remains unclear 
and disputed if openness or secrecy is the better policy to ensure security.114 
4.2.5 Relying on the TCG 
In this first scenario, we will analyse reliance liability with regards to the TCG 
as a group that certifies certain products as TC compliant. We do this by building 
an analogy to the better known and established Digital Trust Marks (TMs).  
As more and more of our activities are carried out online, it has become 
increasingly clear over the past decades that the Internet, which was never 
intended for this type and scale of commercial activity, is vulnerable to attacks 
                                                        
unter besonderer Berücksichtigung von Drittinteressen Festschrift für Dieter Medicus 
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112  Lane Jr, D. M. (1988). Publisher Liability for Material That Invites Reliance. Tex. L. 
Rev., 66, pp. 1155-1629.  
113  For a discussion of this problem see Swire, P. P. (2001). What should be hidden and 
open in computer security: lessons from deception, the art of war, law, and economic 
theory. arXiv preprint cs/0109089, pp. 1-54.   
114  see e.g. Nowey, T., & Federrath, H. (2007). Collection of Quantitative Data on Security 
Incidents. Paper presented at the Availability, Reliability and Security, 2007. ARES 
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and criminal activities. Given the widespread acceptance of the 
commercialization of the Internet, e-commerce has experienced astonishing 
growth since its development in the 1990’s. Security and privacy – amongst other 
issues – seem to be at the top of consumer’s concerns while conducting online 
transactions.115 As recent statistics show, e-consumers do not feel secure at all in 
the online environment and this has an impact on their willingness to provide 
personal or payment details over the Internet.116 
Not long time ago, powerful organized crime gangs target as victims 
uninformed and unprepared consumers and exploit weaknesses in their 
computer systems. Attempts to deal with the growing number of reported 
cybercrime incidents include legislation, user training, public awareness, and 
other technical security measures.117 The UK government recognizes the 
detrimental impact that a cyber attack can have on the economy and the social 
well being of the country and the effect of how nations deal with internet freedom 
and security.118  
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 To reap the benefits of the ICT revolution, users must be able to trust their 
system. When asked to pay for goods bought online, to make a bank transfer from 
an online account, or to apply for a passport at a government run website, it is 
essential that the user can trust the communication to be secure, and that the 
party he is communicating to, is the party it claims it is. These are issues that go 
well beyond the remit of TC, whose sole function is protection against viruses or 
Trojans. It does not protect people from handing their bank details to 
“businesses” that have impressive websites and little else, using the stolen data 
for ID theft or online fraud. This type of “computer enabled crime” is for most 
people a greater concern than the fear that their own machine is hacked (the TC 
focus), discouraging potentially the economically beneficial uptake of e-services. 
In an effort to attract and maintain consumers, e-businesses seek ways to 
enhance consumers’ trust to the Internet and to e-commerce as such, to allow this 
“new way of transferring ownership or right to use good or services through a 
computer mediated network”119 to flourish and economy to raise. 
4.3 TMs - Promoting the feeling of security and trust 
Trustmarks (TMs) have been developed in the late 1990s as an attempt to 
develop and gain consumer trust through web signals and thus answer this 
problem.120 The Trustmark Organisations (TMOs) which are also defined as 
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Trusted Third Parties (TTPs), are independent parties that provide TMs to online 
merchants (e-merchants), as a way to label that a product, process or service - 
that the e-merchant offers - conforms to specific quality characteristics 
concerning legitimacy, security of transactions, privacy and integrity.  
TMs are said to promote the feeling of security and trust to e-consumers121 
thus influencing them to engage in e-commerce122 so when the e-merchant 
displays the TM on its website, the e-consumers will minimize their questioning 
of the integrity of that e-merchant in relation to security, privacy and business 
practice. In economic terms, this equates to a reduction in transaction costs.123 
This is mostly because e-consumers rely on the reputation of TMOs124 and on the 
perception that “a third party gives a written assurance that a product, process, 
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or service conforms to specific characteristics”.125 This is considered a form of 
guarantee,126 though we have to be careful that it is the right type of guarantee. 
Warranties for instance, even though they too are guarantees and should perform 
a similar function, are often not increasing trust – probably because they remind 
the customer too much of all the things that can go wrong.127 This matches to a 
degree our argument above about the “litigation centeredness” of classical 
contract law: if contracts are perceived as long lists of things that will go wrong, 
as EULAs frequently do, they are not trust enhancing. If they are read as a manual 
for a fruitful cooperation, they might. The procedure of giving a TM to an e-
merchant goes like this: the e-merchant cooperates with the TMOs and asks for a 
TM, which he gains when he submits a satisfactory self-assessment report 
referring to the business’s security, privacy and practices.128 However, it is 
significant to note that a large gap is identified between the online consumers’ 
actual needs for assurance and the assurance that seals are supposed to offer.129  
                                                        
125  Rae, A., Robert, P., & Hausen, H.-L. (1994). Software Evaluation for Certification. New 
York, NY: McGraw-Hill, Inc. . 
126  Dean, D. H., & Biswas, A. (2001). Third-Party Organization Endorsement of Products: 
An Advertising Cue Affecting Consumer Prepurchase Evaluation of Goods and 
Services. Journal of Advertising, 30(4), pp. 41-57. , Pacini, C., & Sinason, D. (1999). 
Auditor Liability for Electronic Commerce Transaction Assurance: The CPA/CA 
Webtrust. American Business Law Journal, 36(3), pp. 479.  
127  So e.g. Boulding, W., & Kirmani, A. (1993). A consumer-side experimental 
examination of signaling theory: do consumers perceive warranties as signals of 
quality? Journal of Consumer Research, pp. 111-123.  
128  Endeshaw, A. (2001). The Legal Significance of Trustmarks. Information & 
Communications Technology Law, 10(2), pp. 203-230. doi: 
10.1080/13600830120074690 
129  Hu, X. R., Wu, G. H., Wu, Y. H., & Zhang, H. (2010). The effects of Web assurance seals 
on consumers' initial trust in an online vendor: A functional perspective. DECISION 
SUPPORT SYSTEMS, 48(2), pp. 407-418. , Odom, M. D., Kumar, A., & Saunders, L. 
(2002). Web Assurance Seals: How and Why They Influence Consumers' Decisions. 
Journal of Information Systems, 16(2), pp. 231-250.  
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4.4 The analogy between TMs and TC 
While the legal system struggles to keep up with technology developments 
and their enforcement and prosecution, the regulation through technology took 
increasingly center stage.130 Rather than prosecuting crime, the focus shifted on 
communicating architectures that make it impossible to commit crimes in the 
first place. One such architecture is the Trusted Computing (TC), Trustmarks are 
another. But while TC is like all law compliance by design “strongly paternalistic” 
in the sense that it prevents the user from doing certain things harmful to him, 
TM is closer to what Turilli Mateo and Luciano Floridi described as “pro-ethical 
design”: it provides assured information only, but leaves the ultimate decision to 
the user. 131 To use a maybe slightly frivolous analogy: as a parent, you use TC 
with your infants, TM with your teenagers, whose autonomy and potential to 
reasonableness you have to respect despite all evidence to the contrary.  
“TMs are seen as information on somebody or something to be relied upon 
by others”.132 In fact, the e-consumer is “nudged” from the mark (TM) on the e-
merchant’s website to trust that e-merchant and engage in business with him. In 
the case that the collaboration between the e-merchant and the TMOs breaks 
down however, ends or was never properly enforced, the TM system has been 
proved to be potentially weak: cases have been reported that e.g. e-consumers’ 
                                                        
130  Lessig, L. (1996). The Zones of Cyberspace. Stanford Law Review, 48(5), pp. 1403-
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131  For the distinctin between pro-ethical design and paternalistic design see Turilli, M., 
& Floridi, L. (2009). The ethics of information transparency. Ethics and Information 
Technology, 11(2), pp. 105-112.  
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personal identifying data were kept, shared or sold by e-merchants without the 
data subject’s consent and without the TMO’s knowing.133  
In these cases the TMO issued the TM to such e-merchants - who kept the TM 
on their website at the time the malpractice occurred and remained there after 
the violation was discovered134 – causing damages135 to e-consumers.136 Thus, it 
is obvious that the reliance to the trust provided by TMs is potentially 
treacherous and TMOs services can be unreliable and generally lacking in 
accountability.137 
In our present study, we aim to provide a comparison between TMOs, and TC 
in order for both technologies to profit from each other. We argue that both fulfil 
analogous roles, (see Figure 5) in the sense that TC can provide information 
(assurances) that a platform is to be trusted, so that a third-party (i.e. another 
user’s machine) can rely upon and proceed with successful communication and 
exchange of information. The user of the platform communicates with a verifier 
who wants to assure that the user uses the platform containing the specified TPM. 
                                                        
133  Froomkin, A. M. (2000). The Death of Privacy? Stanford Law Review, 52(5), pp. 1461-
1543. , Kornblum, J. (1998). FTC, GeoCities Settle on Privacy, CNET News.com. 
Retrieved from http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1005-200-332199.html, McCarthy, J. 
(1999). TRUSTe Decides Its Own Fate Today, Slashdot. Retrieved from 
http://slashdot.org/yro/99/11/05/1021214.shtml 
134  McCarthy, J. (1999). TRUSTe Decides Its Own Fate Today, Slashdot. Retrieved from 
http://slashdot.org/yro/99/11/05/1021214.shtml 
135  Damages include violation of e-consumer’s privacy and data protection right to pure 
economic loss. 
136  Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 
1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data 
and on the free movement of such data (1995). 
137  Balboni, P. (2008b). Trustmarks: Third-party liability of trustmark organisations in 
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In the same way TMs are seen as information that somebody or someone can rely 







Figure 5: Analogy between TMOs (left) and TC (right) 
As we saw, the whole TC procedure is automated using one out of the four 
main features of TC technology, the remote attestation. This aims to allow 
“unauthorized” changes to software to be detected. It remotely traces any 
changes made to any application and allows a third party to decide whether the 
platform is considered trustworthy.138 This feature helps to prevent the sending 
of data to or from a compromised or untrustworthy computer and certifies that 
no unauthorised program installs, updates or modifications are made in the 
hardware or software on the user’s machine. Moreover, “this allows an entity to 
authenticate the software configuration of a platform that is not under its 
control”.139 Here we can see one main difference between TC and TM: If TC is 
functioning correctly, it is nearly impossible to fool the trusted third party that 
attests the correct working of a platform. This security comes at a “cost”: the 
                                                        
138  Reid, J., Gonzalez Nieto, J., Dawson, E., Okamoto, E. (2003). Privacy and Trusted 
Computing. Paper presented at the Proceedings of the 14th International Workshop 
on Database and Expert Systems Applications (DEXA’03) (2003), Washington (pp. 
383-388),IEEE. 











assurance provider has real time access to the computer whose safe functioning 
it attests, raising concerns about privacy in particular.  
We can see more clearly the differences if we compare this approach with 
SysTrust, a TM approach initiated by the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA) and the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants 
(CICA). SysTrust, is a service which aims to independently assure business and 
customers that an organisation’s systems are reliable.140 SysTrust procedures, in 
conformity with attestation standards of the AICPA, determine the effectiveness 
of controls that make a system operate reliably. Reliability is determined through 
four criteria: security (from physical or electronic unauthorized access), 
availability (operational readiness and access as agreed), integrity (the system 
should be complete, accurate, prompt, and authorized in processing of 
information) and confidentiality in terms of information that are kept.141  
It has been argued however by critics that such TM systems are more 
marketing based than quality based, which leads to questions on the credibility 
of the TM system in the long run.142 The TM provider has no incentives to probe 
too deeply the credentials of the company it certifies – who might desert him for 
a less stringent TM provider. Nor will it be always feasible to check the submitted 
data for its correctness – as seen above, the type of features that TM attests are 
much less demanding, but also more woolly and imprecise than the very formal 
properties assured and certified by TC. Therefore, the danger of opportunistic 
                                                        
140  American Institute of Certified Public Accountants Inc., & Canadian Institute of 
Chartered Accountants. (2006). Trust Services Principles, Criteria and Illustrations 
for Security, Availability, Processing Integrity, Confidentiality, and Privacy (Including 
WebTrust® and SysTrust®) Trust Services Principles, Criteria, and Illustrations (pp. 
155). 
141  Endeshaw, A. (2001). The Legal Significance of Trustmarks. Information & 
Communications Technology Law, 10(2), pp. 203-230. doi: 
10.1080/13600830120074690 
142  Riegelsberger, J., & Sasse, M. A. (2000). Trust me, I’m a .com. The Problem of 
Reassuring Shoppers in Electronic Retail Environments. Intermedia, 28(4).  
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behaviour by e-traders, along with unregulated market forces, are forcing TMOs 
to a more untrustworthy practice that needs to be altered.143 
4.5 Legal environments for digital trust 
In analogy to the case scenarios for TC that we introduced above, we can now 
ask:  
1. what e-consumers can do in order to recover the damage from their 
reliance on the TM and  
2. the fundamental liability question is whether the TMOs are to be held 
liable to e-consumers, for their damages. 
The legal relationship between the two parties (i.e. the TMOs and the e-
merchants) of the TM procedure is contractual; however, an implied tortious 
relationship between the TMOs and e-consumers can be argued as the e-
consumers relied on the certificates that the TMO’s issued (see Figure 5). This 
quasi-contractual relationship cannot at least be excluded a priori. 
Even though TM is a more mature and tested approach than TC, the issue of 
liability of TMOs hasn’t been given much attention from courts or governments, 
but unlike with TC, where this thesis tries to start a discussion, there is at least 
beginning of an academic debate on that issue.  
As stated earlier, in cases where the e-consumer suffers damages due to his 
reliance on the TM that has been issued on the e-merchant’s website, the 
consumer could sue the e-merchant for breach of contract or in tort for wilful act 
or breach of their duty of care (negligence liability). However, the easiness with 
which anyone can set up a commercial website selling products or services 
                                                        
143  Balboni, P. (2008b). Trustmarks: Third-party liability of trustmark organisations in 
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through the Internet,144 decreases the chance for an e-consumer to seek 
vindication against negligent or malicious e-merchants. Therefore, it is easier for 
the e-consumer to locate and sue the TMO for the provision of inaccurate 
information (TMs) on the e-merchants website and also request for 
compensation. There are TMs that use a redress mechanism that “may also have 
character as a third-party guarantee, where the consumer may seek redress”.145 
The redress is not necessarily monetary, but it provides at least access to 
mediation and with that room for a highly flexible system of assigning duties to 
the TMO that issues an unmerited certificate. We agree moreover with Balboni 
that the TMO third-party legal liability systems are inadequate when we compare 
them with Certification Service providers (CSPs) (i.e. auditors/ accountants and 
surveyors) which are considered TMO’s equivalents, in terms of liability rules.146 
Article 6 of the EU’s Electronic Signatures Directive147 describes third-party 
liability of CSPs and in England this is incorporated into the Electronic Signatures 
Directive in Section 4.148 The issue of TMOs third-party liability has been at least 
                                                        
144  For an analysis on the barriers for spotting an e-merchant who has set up a 
commercial website see ibid.. p.28 
145  Trzaskowski, J. (2010). Chapter 3 Legislation and requirements concerning 
Trustmarks. In E. C. C. Denmark (Series Ed.) E-Commerce Trustmarks in Europe   
Retrieved from http://dokumenter.forbrug.dk/forbrugereuropa/e-commerce-
trustmarks-in-europe/helepubl.htm  
146  Balboni, P. (2008b). Trustmarks: Third-party liability of trustmark organisations in 
Europe. Retrieved from 
http://dbiref.uvt.nl/iPort?request=full_record&db=wo&language=eng&query=doc_
id=3240350   
147  Balboni, P. (2004). Liability of Certification Service Providers Towards Relying 
Parties and the Need for a Clear System to Enhance the Level of Trust in Electronic 
Communication. Information & Communications Technology Law, 13(3), pp. 211-242. 
doi: 10.1080/1360083042000219074, Directive 1999/93/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 1999 on a Community framework for 
electronic signatures, 43 C.F.R. (2000). 
148  The Electronic Signatures Regulations 2002 (2002). 
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discussed by Balboni149 and others150 who have analysed liability more closely 
and made proposal for a model of adequate TMO liability.151 Their outcomes are 
described in the following section. 
While there is no case law and almost no literature on the liability of TMOs 
that offers direct protection against damages caused by reliance on 
information,152 as pointed out by Balboni there is a strong case to be made for 
TMOs third-party liability legal issue towards e-consumers.153 As he shows, if we 
analyse this problem from a first principle basis, then the general principles of 
civil liability, tort and contract law alone should be sufficient to make a case for 
reliance liability for TMO – at least in the absence of explicit “do not trust this TM” 
notices.  
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The issue that arises now is that TMOs usually tend to include specific 
clauses154 on their contracts in order to limit or exclude in some cases, the liability 
towards e-merchants and e-consumers. And this is where we see a paradox: 
“TMOs are seen as professionals who provide information on their clients, or 
their clients’ practice, to be relied upon by third parties”155 and therefore enhance 
e-consumer’s trust. It is then highly unlikely that an e-consumer will trust e-
merchant’s security, privacy and business practices if the TMO - that certifies the 
aforementioned - refuses (through those disclaimers) any kind of liability in 
relation to the certificates.  
E-consumers will have to invoke either the general principles of tort and 
contract law or on statutory provisions and case law that may be applied in 
analogy to TMOs. Based on an extensive analysis done by Balboni on US and 
European legal systems concerning third-party liability, most commonly e-
consumers will have to provide evidence  
 for the damages they incurred,  
 against the decision of the TMO to issue the TM (i.e. prove that the TMO 
owes a duty of care towards the consumer and that the TMO acted in a 
way that breached the duty of care) and  
 for the causal link between the TMO’s professional fault and the plaintiff’s 
occurred damage.  
                                                        
154  Clauses limiting or excluding the liability of TMOs to e-consumers can be found on 
the TMO’s website. For a selection of the most commonly used clauses that TMOs are 
using to limit their liability see Ibid. p.153 
155  Balboni, P. (2008a). Model for an adequate liability system for Trustmark 
Organisations. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF LIABILITY AND SCIENTIFIC ENQUIRY, 
1(1/2), pp. 151-163.  
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For the last point, it is a prerequisite to prove both ‘foreseeability’156 and 
‘proximity’157. However in the absence of specific provisions, third-party TMO 
liability will be based on policy arguments.158 It worth to be noted that under the 
2005 Directive on Unfair Commercial Practices,159 TMs can be considered as 
unfair commercial practice if they are not provisional on setting higher standards 
of consumer protection compared to the protection offered by legislation. In fact, 
it will be a requirement to consider advertising and using a TM with equal levels 
of consumer protection and legislative requirements, as unfair commercial 
practice, under national or community law.160 In particular Annex I of the 
Directive comprises a list of commercial practices which are considered unfair.  
From this we can conclude that a good case can be made for a degree of 
reliance liability of TM providers under the general principles of tort law. TC 
providers as we saw are in a better position to assure the integrity of their 
products than TM providers, they are less likely to be impacted by imprudent 
consumer choices (as TC is fully automatic) and the direct damage is more 
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Negligence Law. Columbia Law Review, 61(8), pp. 1401-1424.   
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foreseeable: opening the computer for an attack. This means the absence of the 
policy objections could be used, as per Balboni’s analysis, to deny reliance liability 
even though general tort principles allow it. TC in this sense is closer still to 
Certification Service Providers, even if it lacks at present their tight regulatory 
framework. For them, Certification Service Providers (CSPs) (surveyors, 
accountants, auditors and crucially in an online context, e-signature verifiers) 
reliance liability is often explicitly regulated by statute. As Balboni pointed out in 
his research on the liability issue, by applying the set of rules set by Article 6 of 
the Electronic Signatures Directive, which map out fault-based third party 
liability for CSPs, and postulate CSP’s liability towards third-parties who suffer 
from damages as a result of their reasonable reliance on CSP certificates.161 In the 
same way, TMOs can be held liable to e-consumers who reasonably rely on the 
TM and then suffer loss from such reliance, for the information included in the 
TM at the time of issue, even though the TMO has not provided evidence of 
negligence.  
Our literature survey suggests that while computer scientists seem primarily 
concerned with the technical feasibility of implementing TC, legal academics have 
tended to concentrate on content control and privacy issues.162 Neither group 
                                                        
161  Directive 1999/93/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 
1999 on a Community framework for electronic signatures, 43 C.F.R. (2000), The 
Electronic Signatures Regulations 2002 (2002). 
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appears to be overly concerned with an analysis of the implications of the 
imposition of legal liability for failure within such a system, or potential 
responsibility for wider social and legal concerns to which they may give rise. If 
greater legal responsibility is placed upon hardware/software providers, this 
may have a significant impact upon the speed and scope of system roll-out, and 
may leave the system vulnerable to threats from market pressures.  
A model of adequate third-party liability for TMOs is elaborated based on the 
principles of CSPs liability developing the concept of ‘adequacy’.163 Through this 
concept, liability rules need to protect the e-consumer’s expectations when 
trusting the TMOs, while at the same time, the difficulties that TMOs face because 
of their operation online can be considered.164 This is the type of “contextual” 
analysis that follows the spirit of relational contract theory: do not focus on the 
                                                        
to Copyright? In F. Grosheide & J. J. Brinkhof (Eds.), Intellectual Property 2004: Articles 
on Crossing Borders between traditional and actual (Molengrafica Series) (pp. 405-
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magic moment where a customer enters a contract with a TM certified merchant, 
consider the entire transactional environment, and what signals were send by the 
parties. Such a liability system should also improve TMOs practice quality level 
in order to give TMs the ability to extend their potentials and benefits in social, 
economic and political levels.165 Balboni evokes the ethical theory of Warranted 
Trust to protect both TMOs and e-consumers and develops the context in which 
their trust relationship is constructed,166 an approach equivalent to the relational 
contract theory described above, but with less direct connection to doctrinal legal 
issues.  
Similarly, we argue that based on the TMOs third-party liability, the TC 
reliance liability should be structured as statutory regulations that can be 
potentially applicable by analogy. The same concept of ‘adequacy’ which is 
defined by relating the trust relationship between TMOs and e-consumers should 
be applied in the trust relationship between TC and TC consumers. 
Indeed, in many ways TC is the more obvious target of the reliance liability 
that Balboni discusses, than TM. The TC philosophy takes the responsibility away 
from the user entirely and passes it on to the software and hardware producers. 
Imagine if the user wants to verify that a legitimate TMO is behind that TM. The 
user then clicks on a TM, and for his surprise is transferred to a spoofed website, 
and he realizes that the TMO is not the one that claimed to be. An automated 
system, just like a TC, ought to be able to prevent this from happening, and 
damages for the user to incur. Where in the non-automatic TMO environment, it 
is ultimately a decision by the customer whether to trust a TM, or to engage with 
a site without one, in TC that choice will be more and more limited by design. 
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With that, legal issues of intervening causality that could be seen as an obstacle 
to reliance liability are removed.  
4.6 Wrap-up 
TMOs, unlike TC, rely ultimately on human judgment, and unless backed up 
by a strong regulatory regime could lead to a perception where TMOs are 
untrustworthy, in contrast with their initial aim, and non accountable. At the 
moment, Europe, as well as US, are arguably inefficient in specific statutory 
provisions and case law on TMO third-party liability which makes things harder 
– if not impossible – for e-consumers to enforce TMO third-party liability in cases 
they suffer damages from their reasonable reliance on TMs. Therefore, the TM 
system will be questioned and e-consumer’s trust will be lost once more. 
More generally, due to the unreliability of some TMOs practices, all players 
could ultimately be damaged: the reputation of the TM program damaged by a 
run to the bottom, e-merchants will run the risk of housing an untrustworthy TM 
which other e-merchants used and violated, and e-consumer’s trust in e-
commerce will decrease. Consequently, e-business and e-economies will be hurt 
and governments which remain reluctant to regulate in this matter will allow 
untrustworthy TMOs spreading out. 
In fact, the absence of specific rules on TMO liability creates a legal 
‘immunity’ for TMOs, which is unacceptable. As Balboni proposed,167 floodgates 
arguments which are widely used to limit third-party parties that can rely on the 
TM, should be taken into consideration. As a solution, he proposed that TMOs 
could reasonably limit their liability as it happens, following the example of the 
CSP’s liability provision set in Article 6 of the Electronic signatures directive168 
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and European governments should sooner or later act on this issue before it is 
too late. 
4.7 Regulating reliance 
The previous section made the case for reliance liability for the TCG when it 
acts in a function similar to a Certification Authority and certifies individual TC 
products “in abstracto”. This, we argued, is similar to a TMO or a Certifying 
Service Provider Authority: They all base their certification on a methodological 
self-assessment of the certified party which submits evidence in form of data, 
protocols, accounts of internal procedures, or in the case of a TC program, 
specifications. These are then more (CSP) or less (TMO) rigorously tested for 
their truthfulness. TC, as our interviews show, can test to a rather great extend, 
though not completely, what exactly every proposed component or product 
submitted for certification is doing.  
We now turn to the second setting, the application of TC in specific 
interactions. In this scenario, my computer calculates its own trustworthiness, 
has it remotely attested by the TC provider, and communicates this to a third 
party. What is the status of this communication, and if it is misleading, is there an 
avenue for recourse to the TC attestator? 
Our argument will use an analogy to similar certification in offline settings 
which have been around for a long time in both cases – some jurisdictions do 
impose reliance liability. 
We will examine two different concrete cases starting with an employers’ 
reference letter writing. When an employee seeks a new job, prospective 
employers are asking for reference letters retained by previous employers in 
order to evaluate employees’ job performance, productivity, adaptability, 
reliability, efficiency and character to make a job assignment decision. Pre- 
employment screening of the applicant is the most important aim of a reference 
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letter which helps prospective employers169 avoid hiring staff which are 
unsuitable, especially in high-risk situations, like school teachers, truck, bus or 
train drivers, pilots and others. Some of these will work in environments that 
impose specific legal duties for background checks of their employees.170 A high 
profile case in point is that of Ariel Castro a former school bus driver for 22 years, 
who was sentenced to life plus 1000 years of imprisonment “after pleading guilty 
to 937 charges including aggravated murder, kidnapping, rape and assault that 
allowed him to avoid the death penalty”.171 During his employment as a school 
bus driver, he had been divorced by his wife while he was accused of attacking 
her and violently abusing his wife and their children. Work colleagues in a 
previous job had reported hating working with him, as he was not treating school 
children well, which was documented in support of the school’s decision to fire 
him after a sequence of incidents with school students. Nonetheless, this history 
had been omitted in the reference letter to the next employer – possibly hoping 
that the problem, and an unfair dismissal charge, might go away.172 
 In the case were a job reference given is not accurate either in full or partially 
(selectively omitting crucial information for the employee),173 problems may 
arise when the prospective employer, reasonably relying on the job reference 
given by a previous employer hires the employee, which at the end is proved to 
be unsuitable of the job and results in a foreseeable personal injury, tragic social 
                                                        
169  Gatewood, R., & Hubert, F. (1998). Human resource selection. Fort Worth, Tex.: 
Dryden Press. 
170  See e.g. Connerley, M. L., Arvey, R. D., & Bernardy, C. J. (2001). Criminal background 
checks for prospective and current employees: Current practices among municipal 
agencies. Public Personnel Management, 30(2), pp. 173-183.  
171  News, B. (2013). Profile: Cleveland abductor Ariel Castro, BBC News. Retrieved from 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-22444882 
172  Sperber, A. J. (1997-1998). When Nondisclosure Becomes Misrepresentation: 
Shaping Employer Liability for Incomplete Job References. University of San Francisco 
Law Review, 32(405), pp. 28.  
173  ibid. p.407 
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losses as well as hamper the employer’s business reputation. Injuries can occur, 
either within the business environment, or by an employee outside of the 
environment of the business during working hours or not.  
Should an employer be held liable, for the negligent misrepresentation of the 
employee’s qualifications or for inadequately supplying information for him to 
subsequent employers? In fact should liability be imposed on the referring 
employer for recommending an employee that was proved to be unsuitable for 
the job by selectively omitting important information?  
Different problems are arising in this case if courts do impose liability for 
selective omissions – in this case referring employers in their effort to guard 
themselves against negligent misrepresentation liability can possibly disclose all 
the employee’s negative qualities, which in turn can cause privacy concerns. 
Should e.g. an employer mention in a reference that the candidate had an affair 
with a co-workers wife, badly affecting work morale?174 On the other end, former 
employers could possibly minimise the amount of information given for an 
employee down to the strictly essential, thus significantly reducing the value of a 
job reference letter. Or even worse they can refuse a reference letter to a former 
employee and disseminate information about their employees following a “no 
comment” policy, to avoid defamation liability175 or negligent misrepresentation 
                                                        
174  ibid. p..408 
175  The thread for defamation liability can deter a former employer from giving a 
reference letter, including either totally true or totally false references. Statistics over 
a pilot study prove this fear for legal repercussions by employers, although they 
admit the need for reference letters when they are recruiting themselves Adler, R. S., 
& Peirce, E. R. (1996). Encouraging Employers to Abandon Their No Comment 
Policies Regarding Job References: A Reform Proposal [article] (pp. 1381), 
Harshman, E., & Chachere, D. (2000). Employee References: Between the Legal Devil 
and the Ethical Deep Blue Sea. Journal of Business Ethics, 23(1), pp. 29-39. doi: 
10.1023/a:1006218926970. Still, an employer’s refusal for a reference letter can be 
conceived as defamation Skopic, K. E. (1986-1987). Potential Employer Liability for 
Employee References. University of Richmond Law Review, 21, pp. 28. 
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liability affecting both the quality and quantity of information given to a 
prospective employer.176 “No comment” policies have been excessively extended 
through years, and are definitely not working in favour either of the prospective 
employer nor the candidate employee leading to detrimental effects also being 
socially undesirable177 plus exposes others to harm that could have been 
avoided.178 There have been various proposals on how employers can deal with 
these issues and avoid these significant legal issues,179 which outweigh the 
benefits of providing a reference, as well as to encourage employers to provide 
reference letters,180 restoring the social balance.181 Ethics and social 
responsibility have also been discussed.182 
In the light of these issues, there has been discussion on reforming 
defamation law or compel disclosure obligations on employers183 which are not 
                                                        
176  Sperber, A. J. (1997-1998). When Nondisclosure Becomes Misrepresentation: 
Shaping Employer Liability for Incomplete Job References. University of San Francisco 
Law Review, 32(405), pp. 28.  
177  Saxton, B. (1995). Flaws in the Laws Governing Employment References: Problems 
of Overdeterrence and Proposal for Reform. Yale L. & Pol'y Rev., 13. 
178  Randi v. Muroc Joint Unified School Dist. 1066, 1929 P.1062d 1582, 1060 Cal. Rptr. 
1062d 1263 (14 Cal. 4th 1997). 
179  Saltzman, A. (1997). Suppose they sue? U.S. News & World Report, 123(11), pp. 68. , 
Swerdlow, J. (1990-1991). Negligent Referral: A Potential Theory for Employer 
Liability. Southern California Law Review, 64, pp. 30.  
180  Saxton, B. (1995). Flaws in the Laws Governing Employment References: Problems 
of Overdeterrence and Proposal for Reform. Yale L. & Pol'y Rev., 13. 
181  Adler, R. S., & Peirce, E. R. (1996). Encouraging Employers to Abandon Their No 
Comment Policies Regarding Job References: A Reform Proposal [article] (pp. 1381). 
182  Harshman, E., & Chachere, D. (2000). Employee References: Between the Legal Devil 
and the Ethical Deep Blue Sea. Journal of Business Ethics, 23(1), pp. 29-39. doi: 
10.1023/a:1006218926970 
183  In the start of the previous century Missouri state first Wages, Hours and Dismissal 
Rights § 290.140, 3020 Stat. (1909). and a number of other states later on IND. CODE 
ANN., Information Maintained by the Office of Code Revision Indiana Legislative 
Services Agency  § 22-6-3-1 (1994)., enacted a legislation that for every employee of 
any corporation that is fired or voluntarily quits a service, the former employer’s 
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as effective as expected.184 However many cases185 suggest that former 
employers should be held liable for negligent or fraudulent referral towards third 
parties that suffer substantial risk of physical harm, for selective omissions186 in 
the recommendation letter provided. Sections 311187 and 323188 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Agency which are extensively applied to the 
employment reference situation, clearly state the subject of reliance liability:  
§ 311 
(1) One who negligently gives false information to another is subject 
to liability for physical harm caused by action taken by the other in 
reasonable reliance upon such information, where such harm results 
a) to the other, or 
b) to such third persons as the actor should expect to be put in peril 
by the action taken. 
(2) Such negligence may consist of failure to exercise reasonable care 
a) in ascertaining the accuracy of the information, or 
b) in the manner in which it is communicated. 
 
§ 323 
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render 
services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the 
                                                        
manager is responsible to issue a reference letter known as “service-letter” stating 
between other information the true reason for the employees discharge or cause for 
the employee to quit such service. 
184  Verkerke, J. H. (1998). Legal Regulation of Employment Reference Practices. The 
University of Chicago Law Review, 65(1). 
185  Such as Akins v. Estes, 888 35 (S.W.2d 1994), Gutzan v. Altair Airlines, Inc., 766 F.2d 
135 (United States Court of Appeals 1985), Randi v. Muroc Joint Unified School Dist. 
1066, 1929 P.1062d 1582, 1060 Cal. Rptr. 1062d 1263 (14 Cal. 4th 1997). 
186  Either because the former employee fails to provide or affirmatively misrepresents 
information about a former employee 
187  Restatement (Second) of Agency, §311, NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION 
INVOLVING RISK OF PHYSICAL HARM  (1977a). 
188  Restatement (Second) of Agency, §323, NEGLIGENT PERFORMANCE OF 
UNDERTAKING TO RENDER SERVICES  (1977b). 
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protection of the other's person or things, is subject to liability to the 
other for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise 
reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if 
a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm, or 
b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon the 
undertaking. 
Although there have been debates whether and how to regulate employment 
reference letters, in such cases the court suggested that every former employer 
should give a complete recommendation letter without omitting facts or negative 
information for the prospective employee, thus leading to a deceptively 
incomplete recommendation. These courts thus recognise the tort of negligent 
misrepresentation of information regarding job reference letters.189 Here we can 
identify a special relationship between the former employer and the potential 
employer as they depend upon one another. The latter relies and depends on the 
first, that the reference letter he acquires about a candidate will be accurate, 
truth, honest and comprehensive in all aspects concerning the employee’s 
suitability for the job and will not omit any negative elements or be overly 
generous. The reliance lies to the fact that only the former employer of the 
candidate is in the best position to know the truth about the candidate’s 
suitability for the job and it is reasonable to believe that a prospective employer 
will rely on any information acquired in order to take the hiring decision. Former 
employers would be logical to expect suits over faulty references or 
misrepresentation by third parties when a misleading reference that they have 
given, leads to a negligent hiring. 
On the other hand this can create fear to any prospective employer under the 
light of negligent hiring, and furthermore create a situation where the 
                                                        
189  Sperber, A. J. (1997-1998). When Nondisclosure Becomes Misrepresentation: 
Shaping Employer Liability for Incomplete Job References. University of San Francisco 
Law Review, 32(405), pp. 28.  
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prospective employer could claim190 and would need to explore whether the 
former employer had a duty to warn that the candidate could foreseeably pose 
danger to the prospective employer’s business, or to the general public.191 Under 
this theory the defamation fear seems to emerge, as a fired candidate can sue the 
former employer in case that the reason for the loss of a job opportunity 
amounted to defamation.192  
Courts have also recognised the tort of negligent hiring of an employee 
obliging every prospective employer to reasonably investigate a candidate’s 
background before employment and make sure that he will not pose any threat 
of injury for any member of the public.193 This may be interpreted as “a social 
mandate that employers must exercise reasonable care to hire workers who will 
work safely with co-workers and members of the public”.194 Under this tort 
“employers may be liable to employees or members of the public who are injured 
by an employee whom the employer hired without a reasonable investigation”.195 
The issue still remaining, is how to judge whether the prospective employer’s 
investigation on a candidate’s background has been sufficient.196 In case that a 
personal injury occurs, the plaintiff can sue the current employer and that would 
solve the problem as liability is posed by this theory. It is important to note that 
plaintiff successes in case of lawsuits outweigh defences in negligent hiring 
actions. 
                                                        
190  Cohen v. Wales, 133 A.D.2d 94, 518 N.Y.S.512d 633 (Supreme Court of the State of 
New York 1987). 
191  Swerdlow, J. (1990-1991). Negligent Referral: A Potential Theory for Employer 
Liability. Southern California Law Review, 64, pp. 30.  
192  ibid. p.1645 
193  Restatement (Second) of Agency, § 213(b) (1958). 
194  Saxton, B. (1995). Flaws in the Laws Governing Employment References: Problems 
of Overdeterrence and Proposal for Reform. Yale L. & Pol'y Rev., 13. 
195  ibid. p.76 
196  Swerdlow, J. (1990-1991). Negligent Referral: A Potential Theory for Employer 
Liability. Southern California Law Review, 64, pp. 30.  
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How can we relate this back to TC? In our discussion in Chapter 2, we 
encountered several ways in which “trust” can be build. One way we encountered 
was “inductive, experience based trust”: if you observe over an extended period 
of time that someone behaved trustworthy, you conclude that he is going to be 
trustworthy in the future until proven otherwise. This is not a perfect proof, but 
the best evidence that will often be available. TC incorporates this idea directly – 
the TC components monitor the behaviour of “their” computer, and if there is no 
evidence for tampering in the past, signal that it is trustworthy. Sitting on the 
certified customer’s computer they are in an ideal position to monitor the 
behaviour. In both the employment situation and the TC situation, I have to accept 
that my activities are monitored to some degree. Moreover, in the employment 
situation, I want and need my employer to write a reference for me, and thus have 
to enable this by sharing information with him, and allowing him in turn to share 
it with third parties. This corresponds to the necessary disclosure of private 
information that comes with TC that we discussed in the second chapter, and may 
also shed a new perspective on the more widely discussed issue of privacy and 
TC. If my employer blocks me from finding a new job by giving untrue information 
about me, I can have in some cases a defamation remedy. We are not going as far 
as suggesting that a mistakenly refused trustworthiness attestation is actionable 
under defamation law (as interesting as this proposition sounds). We treat it 
more in the spirit of relational contract theory again – I have a protected 
expectation that what my computer tells about me is correct, which forms part of 
the secondary network of obligations that comes with every transaction. The 
hiring employer in turn has an actionable interest in the correctness of the 
reference, and we have seen how difficult it can be to balance candour, privacy 
defamation and information content in references.  
TC faces a similar issue: how much information do I need to disclose about 
myself to prove trustworthiness on the one hand, how much can I blindly trust 
the reference on the other. As we saw, courts are willing (in some jurisdictions) 
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to make this trust actionable, and we suggest that analogous reasoning applies to 
TC. This leaves still much room to form policy based arguments on just how 
negligent the mistake must have been to trigger liability, for us the important part 
is to establish the principle. Just as in the reference cases, the legal network is 
now extended from employer-employee to the hiring parties, or anyone reading 
the reference, so would an application to TC extend the trust network beyond 
vendor and customer to the reliant party.  
 Trust, based on the observation of past performance was, as we saw in 
Chapter 2, one way to form rational trust. A very different approach is to predict 
trustworthiness on the basis of general principles or expertise. I can trust a bridge 
for instance even if I never saw it being used, if I can use general laws of physics 
to calculate what weight it should be able to bear. I don’t need to know much 
about this specific bridge, but a lot about bridges, or physics, in general. I need 
with other words, abstract expert knowledge. 
This is the second type of scenario where the issue of reliance liability can 
arise: trusting an expert because of his abstract knowledge, not (just) observation 
of the past of a specific object. In the offline world, this type of expertise can be 
found in many professions, accountants, engineers and medical experts being the 
most obvious.  
A case in point is here Candler v Crane, Christmas & Co197 where the plaintiff 
who wanted to invest into a specific company asked the company’s accountants 
to verify the reliability and viability of the company and therefore make sure his 
investment would be a good deal. With the guidance of the accounts presented to 
him, he decided to move forward with his expenditure as all looked perfectly fine. 
The company collapsed and he sued the people on whose expertise he had relied 
– the company’s accountants and auditors. In the courts, the judge found that the 
accounts have been indeed “defective and deficient” and that the accountants 
                                                        
197  Candler v. Crane Christmas & Co., 1 164 (K.B.2 1951). 2 KB 164 
253 
 
were negligent when preparing the accounts that led to the plaintiff’s damage. In 
court the defendants stated that based on the contractual relation of their clients 
to the company, they only owed duty to them and nobody else. While the court of 
first instance and the court of appeal accepted this reasoning, it gave rise to an 
important and eventually successful dissent by Lord Denning.  
Denning L.J, in the court appeal argued in his speech that there were two 
errors that affected the verdict; “The first error was (. . .) that no one who is not a 
party to a contract can sue on it or on anything arising out of it” and the second 
one “that no action ever lies for a negligent statement even though it is intended 
to be acted on by the plaintiff and is, in fact, acted on by him to his loss”.198 This 
led to the conclusion that a third person injured by the negligence of one of the 
two involved parties in the contract, could not sue for damages. 
Contradicting the court’s decision, Denning L.J. stated that persons whose 
professional knowledge and skills are to review books, accounts etc. and generate 
reports on which third parties can rely upon to make their business decisions, are 
having a duty of care towards those parties. Their duty is actually twofold: to 
carefully create their reports, and also to use care in their work resulting in these 
reports,199 as they are possibly influencing third parties into investing into the 
business. Although his opinion has been rejected by the court of appeal, it has 
been adopted and relied upon by the House of Lords.200 
In analogy with TC, we argue that the same rationale of Denning L.J.’s 
reasoning can be applied and therefore extend the duty of care of TC vendors not 
only to their clients, but also to any third party relying to the certification issued 
by them – as certification will be given only to those pc’s who are following the 
standard that their professional knowledge and skills will depict. The main 
                                                        
198  ibid. 2 KB 164 
199  ibid. 2 KB 164 
200  Caparo Industries Plc v. Dickman, A.C.2 605 (House of Lords 1990), Hedley Byrne & 
Co Ltd v. Heller & Partners Ltd, A.C. 465 (House of Lords 1964). 
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questions discussed in Candler v. Crane Christmas & Co court appeal by Denning 
L.J. were basically the following: 
1. “What persons are under such duty?” 
2. “To whom do these professional people owe this duty?” 
3. “To what transactions does the duty of care extend?” 
Considering each one of the questions and discussion followed, we will try to 
show how it applies in the TC reliance liability case. 
4.7.1 “What persons are under such duty?” 
We argue that TC attestator should be considered as the equivalent to 
professionals that should owe a duty of care to any third party relying on the 
certification issued, that suffers harm. That process is done automatically and 
remotely and does raise the issue of liability for autonomous systems in 
distributed networks.201 Given the deterministic nature of the attestation, which 
avoids the common objection against holding the owners of an autonomous 
system liable for mistakes by its agent, this should not be an obstacle. The TC 
attestator computes according to predefined rules (which in turn are certified by 
the TCG – the first setting above), it uses therefore knowledge and skills typical 
for a human expert. Indeed accountancy is one field where computer systems do 
                                                        
201  see e.g. Karnow, C. E. (1996). Liability for distributed artificial intelligences. Berkely 
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replace increasingly the human operator, bringing this example even closer to the 
facts of Chandler v Crane.202 
4.7.2 “To whom do these professional people owe this 
duty?” 
In his reasoning Denning L.J. discussed the extent to which the duty can be 
applied and stated that it should be limited to the extent to which it is reasonable 
for a third party to rely on the information provided by the professionals. If the 
relying party had information at its disposal that casts doubt on the judgment of 
the professionals, or could easily get hold of this information, the rational reliance 
would disappear and the tort claim would be extinguished. In the case of TC, this 
restriction might be moot. Decisions to communicate between computer systems 
have to be made instantaneously, one reason to automatize them, so we could 
never expect from the reliant party to carry out further investigations, or to use 
other information in their decision. Their computer recognizes the TC 
certification, and therefore trust the other computer, in all cases. Even more 
problematic is the indeterminate number of potentially relying parties. Denning 
in Chandler v Crane tried to develop a proximity test to prevent the problematic 
floodgate liability.203 In Chandler, the accountants communicated with one 
specific party, they knew who that party was and why it needed the information. 
That created a degree of proximity that went beyond e.g. writing a generally 
accessible article about their company, or putting their name on a glossy 
brochure. In the TC case, potentially the whole world can access the information, 
                                                        
202  see in particular Sutton, S. G., Young, R., & McKenzie, P. (1995). An analysis of 
potential legal liability incurred through audit expert systems. Intelligent Systems in 
Accounting, Finance and Management, 4(3), pp. 191-204.  
203  discussed by Cardozo C.J. in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E., 255 N.Y. 170, 255 
N.Y.S. 170 441 (NEW YORK 1931). who denied a liability that could expose the 
defendants and could not determinate in quantity, time and class.  
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making the TC attestation more similar to a “communication to the general 
public” that would be too ill defined to trigger reliance liability.  
However three arguments can be used to counter this objection against 
extending Chandler to TC attestation. The first is that unlike the TMO discussed 
above, TC certification still is given on an “interaction by interaction” basis. So 
while TM’s might qualify as “general communication to the public”, TCs at least 
technically, are better understood as many 1:1 verifications between a requester 
of information and the certifier, bringing it closer to the facts of Chandler. Second, 
as the above cited case of the bookkeeper’s manual shows, courts have on 
occasions extended reliance liability also to publications to the general public, 
provided there was “rational” reliance due to the eminence of the source and the 
special role the publisher took on (there: on behalf of the bookkeepers 
association). This too applies in TC: the certificate is issued “on behalf of” the TCI 
group, which has taken on voluntarily the special role to ensure greater security. 
Finally, as we argued above, there is an argument that reliance liability can be 
extended even to TMs, and for them, the indeterminate number of people 
potentially relying on it, is a much more obvious problem.  
4.7.3 “To what transactions does the duty of care extend?” 
At this point we need to show to which transactions the duty of care of a TC 
attestator should extend. In our view this refers to the scope of use of the 
certificates and where these will be needed. In a nutshell, the duty of care should 
reach only the points which the certificate will reach. Of course, this can lead to 
an indeterminate liability as well, because the certification will be used for most 
– if not for all – of the transactions between a TC computer and any third party. It 
does not however lead to transitive liability. If A relies on my computer’s 
certificate, this certificate was unwarranted, and his computer is infected, and in 
turn infects C’s computer, then there should be no liability of my attestator to C – 
if on policy grounds only, to prevent everybody becoming responsible for 
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everything. This, admittedly, makes it more difficult to have the legal network of 
liability match the trust network which is strictly transitive. Here, however, a 
compromise between the logic of the computer and the logic of the law seems 
necessary.  
Let us recap again: Trust is not only build on observation of past behavior, it 
can also be build on prediction of future behavior based on general laws known 
to experts. TC also has aspects of this type of expertise: it is build on formal 
modeling of possible future risks and threats, and incorporates knowledge about 
computer vulnerabilities in general. For this type of statements too, courts have 
been willing to impose liability. We discussed in some detail Chandler and the 
knowledge of accountants, and cited cases from aviation security and scientific 
publishing. Again the similarities to the TC attestation process seem strong 
enough to permit a direct analogous application, even though the “expert” in this 
case seems to be a computer program.  
4.8 From examples to doctrine: Contractual liability on 
reliance 
Having discussed specific examples, we now bring the discussion back to the 
general theory of reliance liability. According to Smith “reliance theories regard 
contractual obligations as being imposed by the law in order to ensure that those 
whom we induce to rely upon us are not made worse off as a consequence”.204 
Although courts have been sometimes seeking for special relationship between 
parties or “relationship equivalent to contract”,205 there have been cases were 
this relationship equivalent was not so meaningful to be identified. Yet, the 
existence of a relationship, contributes to establish proximity. This fits well to our 
general framework of relational contract theory, that is sensitive to the 
particularities of the social interaction that surround and exchange. 
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A discussion on the degree of knowledge on the defendant’s side has been 
raised by the House of Lords in cases of third-party liability.206 This analysis 
further strengthens our claim on the duty of care for the TC certification to third 
parties, to the TC provider. As we argued, the information and power imbalance 
between TC and customers is particularly high, and the autonomy of the customer 
severely curtailed. The knowledge that the TC certificate – issued by the TC 
attestator when an upcoming connection to a third-party will rise – and the 
reliance that will follow it by any third-party, should also be taken into serious 
consideration by courts similar to the Harris and Another v Wyre  Forest  District 
 Council and Another and Smith v. Eric S Bush cases.207 It is therefore not necessary 
for the third party to prove that his reliance and decision to undertake the TC 
vendor’s professional activity was already known/ expected by them. We argue 
that it is fair, just and reasonable to place on the TC vendors some tortious duty 
of care towards any third-party, and also the duty of care should arise even in the 
absence of direct relations/affairs between the parties. Ultimately, this is in the 
benefit of all concerned: I as TC customer can trust TC not only that they will see 
me right, but also everybody in my network that relied on them. Third parties can 
act on a TC certificate, resulting in greater uptake and use of the technology. 
Extending liability regimes beyond the contractual parties creates thus network 
effects – the very reason why TC might be an answer to the thorny issue of 
Internet security. 
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CHAPTER 5 :  
CONCLUSIONS 
5.1 Conclusions  
Throughout this thesis we have explored different issues enacting from the 
adverse of the Internet, the need for technological systems to ensure security for 
the user, and the implications that these technologies bring with them. As a case 
study/ example of regulation through code we have used the technology of 
Trusted Computing mainly because it is a paradigmatic solution and a highly 
plausible answer to various threats like cybercrime. Although this was one of its 
initial aims, we have explained why it failed to achieve the crucial economy of 
scale and the network effect that would indeed have made this technology a 
radical game changer.1 The TC as a technological advancement would have meant 
a significant change in the way users relate to their machines, and amongst them 
in the digital era we live in.  
However, TC has been treated as a mere technical fix, the wider societal 
implications of TC were ignored, and as a result the social and socio-legal 
environment were inappropriately prepared for such an approach. We have then 
explored the different roles that law can play under the circumstances. TC 
providers could be exposed with new and difficult to quantify litigation risks, thus 
hindering the development of TC, or it could fail to protect the reasonable 
expectation of TC consumers to have remedies in case TC causes them harm. On 
the other hand, it could promote TC by matching the technological concept of 
trust (“techno-trust”) with the legal or socio-legal concept of trust. Then it would 
be easier for the user that “trusts” a computer system and the legal system 
                                                        
1 Chapter 1, Section 1.1 
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rewards this trust by protecting the reliance on this system through appropriate 
remedies, to accept the shortcomings associated with TC. 
As we have showed in this thesis, this “matching” or “isomorphism” between 
technical and legal understandings of trust was never really developed or made 
fully explicit and this lead to the limited success of TC. The thesis focused 
primarily on the conceptual clarification of the differences in the way in which 
computer scientists, psychologists and sociologists understand the term “trust”. 
We then argued that systemic features of the TC philosophy did not help to diffuse 
public trust in their product, as it inevitably creates legal issues, since beneath the 
technical aspects we identify fundamental legal and jurisprudential issues, for 
which the current legal system seems ill prepared. TC is based on the “scale free” 
trust and self-organizing trust networks and these issues that emerge, deter the 
“scale free law” of succeeding and leave the law on the back burner. 
Further we have identified the related legal issues that are likely to emerge 
with the new applications of TC i.e. cloud computing, virtualizations and the 
Internet of Things and the demands that autonomous, flexible and decomposable 
systems bring along.2 But as law is left behind, so is one of the major instruments 
for governments to instill social acceptance and public trust in institutions, as 
opposed to personal trust between individuals. TC could be based on individual 
trust relations merely because it is a computing network, however the core 
                                                        
2  See e.g. Gessner, D., Olivereau, A., Segura, A. S., & Serbanati, A. (2012, 25-27 June 
2012). Trustworthy Infrastructure Services for a Secure and Privacy-Respecting 
Internet of Things. Paper presented at the Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing 
and Communications (TrustCom), 2012 IEEE 11th International Conference on (pp. 
998-1003), IEEE, Ukil, A., Sen, J., & Koilakonda, S. (2011, 4-5 March 2011). Embedded 
security for Internet of Things. Paper presented at the Emerging Trends and 
Applications in Computer Science (NCETACS), 2011 2nd National Conference on (pp. 
1-6), IEEE. Skeptical on the usefulness of TC for the IoT is Hoepman, J.-H. (2012). In 
Things We Trust? Towards Trustability in the Internet of Things. In R. Wichert, K. Van 
Laerhoven & J. Gelissen (Eds.), Constructing Ambient Intelligence (Vol. 277, pp. 287-
295): Springer Berlin Heidelberg. 
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implementation of it, is crucially dependent on public trust in the TCG as an 
institution. This nexus between public and personal trust generates most of the 
arising most pressing conceptual issues. 
5.1.1 TCG as an Internet Security provider 
 This thesis uses TCG as an ideal type of institution that is obliged to 
provide Internet security, and as such we contrast it to approaches that try to 
ensure Internet security through the state - as a core provision of the state 
towards citizens. Similarly, we treat TC as the security paradigm promoted as an 
entire suite of programming and development approaches to Internet security, 
and as such it has to reach the equilibrium in conflicting demands, including 
privacy, costs, security, user autonomy and transparency. For the purposes of this 
thesis TC is used as an example also because it proposes a very specific mix of 
these characteristics with different degree of emphasis in each one of them. As 
we have argued, although Trusted computing tries to make the Internet more 
secure, it is not what is technically known as “secure computing” where a machine 
will never do anything else but what is expected of it.3 On the contrary, TC is based 
on inductive inferences where if a machine seems to perform as intended, and 
had the same constant behavior is trusted. Trustworthy is a judgment that can be 
extrapolated from the past and present observed behaviors to the future.4 We 
noted that “trusted” in the computer sense only partially matches the concept of 
“trustworthiness” as understood in social life: “trusted” is what the technology 
gives us, “trustworthy” is what we want. 
Here we researched the new dilemma that occurs – the one that every 
technological solution to computer vulnerabilities faces: secure computing is 
                                                        
3  Proudler, G., Chen, Liqun, Dalton, Chris. (2014). Trusted Computing Platforms: TPM2.0 
in Context (1 ed.): Springer International Publishing. p. 9ff. 




significantly costly and therefore cannot be afforded by simple public users. As a 
countersolution, trusted computing is cost-neutral and if benefited from the 
economies of scale, it could eventually deliver higher degree of protection at 
viable costs.5 But this dilemma introduces to two main questions for this thesis 
to explore: The legal one of liability and the techno-legal one of “risk 
compensation”. The first emerges because TC is a less-than-perfect solution to 
the security challenge, it is nonetheless increasing the costs of computing, and 
therefore consumers will only buy TC protected computers if they think that their 
investment will be a winning one by receiving increased security.6 Then the 
advertising group will extol the virtues of TC emphasizing the offered protection, 
and the legal department will add as many liability exclusion clauses into the 
contract with the customer as possible to protect their own company.7 But in this 
scenario consumers are left in ambiguity since they believe they invest in actual 
security systems, and not just a “trusted” system. We have argued that TC brings 
a significant shift of power away from the customers to the industry. The problem 
                                                        
5  Ibid. p.9 
6  On the problem of cost benefit analysis in Internet security , see Anderson, R. (2001). 
Why information security is hard - an economic perspective. Paper presented at the 
Computer Security Applications Conference, 2001. ACSAC 2001. Proceedings 17th 
Annual (pp. 358-365),IEEE. Particularly relevant for the point here his attempt to 
include psychological analysis of consumer behaviour in Anderson, R., & Moore, T. 
(2009). Information security: where computer science, economics and psychology meet 
(Vol. 367). On the empirical basis for making rational decisions on security 
investment see also Gordon, L., & Loeb, M. (2006). Economic aspects of information 
security: An emerging field of research. Information Systems Frontiers, 8(5), pp. 335-
337. doi: 10.1007/s10796-006-9010-7; This issue affects not only consumers, but 
also companies and public sector entities, see e.g. Tanaka, H., Matsuura, K., & Sudoh, 
O. (2005). Vulnerability and information security investment: An empirical analysis 
of e-local government in Japan. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 24(1), pp. 37-
59. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2004.12.003. 
7  On this problem see the hart-hitting presentation by Virvilis, N. (2015). Advanced 
Persistent Threats: The Empire Strikes Back! , pp. 16-19.   
263 
 
becomes even worse if we consider the different understandings that consumers 
have for the everyday notion of “trusted” and the notion of “trustworthiness”.  
The second emerges since the customer wrongly estimates that he is safe, as 
he paid for a secure system, he may engage in a more risky behavior and this is 
the so called “risk compensation problem”. This also poses a potential issue for 
legal regulation and an issue that this thesis tried to explore. In particular, we 
tried to walk around the issue that lies in the interface of law and technology 
which arises from the need for cybersecurity solutions based on certified 
trustworthiness. Cybersecurity technology solutions, have been in the center of 
attention in an effort to apply regulation through code, thus making it impossible 
to commit crime in the first place.8 TC which is used as an example throughout 
this thesis, is a security solution which has evolved from the need to address 
issues like data exposure on systems, system compromise as part of software 
attack and prevention of identity theft to mitigate the risks and dangers; and help 
to increase data management and identity security. 
5.1.2 TC and regulation 
Furthermore, in Chapter 4, we saw the fundamental issue lying underneath 
the contract law, which is if any classical, liberal contract law can provide the type 
of relation that is needed for TC to create the networks of security and trust that 
they intent. As it is well known, contracts cannot be dynamic, or complex because 
they are lacking transitivity.  
                                                        
8  See also Lessig, L. (1996). The Zones of Cyberspace. Stanford Law Review, 48(5), pp. 
1403-1411. , Pagallo, U. (2015). Good onlife governance: On law, spontaneous orders, 
and design The Onlife Manifesto (pp. 161-177): Springer, Yeung, K. (2008). Towards 
an Understanding of Regulation by Design. In K. Yeung (Ed.), Regulating technologies: 
Legal futures, regulatory frames and technological fixes (pp. 79-108). Oxford: Hart, 
Yeung, K., & Dixon-Woods, M. (2010). Design-based regulation and patient safety: a 
regulatory studies perspective. Social Science & Medicine, 71(3), pp. 502-509.   
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Next, the thesis expanded on how TC tries to build complex dynamic trust 
networks “bottom up”, without central, let alone state, oversight or control. 
Through our analysis we also encounter the specific reasons that make TC as 
promoted by the TCG insufficient, in the absence of positively enabling legislative 
interference. Proudler et al’s analysis is used in particular to collate why TC has 
been rejected by the audience, which in our view perceived this technology as a 
power grab under the pretense of enhanced security.9 
Guadamuz indicates that complex and dynamic security networks that can 
self-organise are essential for efficient Internet regulation,10 and we believe that 
this can only be achieved if we have a mix of at least a certain degree of social 
trust along with techno-trust. We then explained that TC delivers only techno-
trust that falls short of what is needed, and creates two separate but causally 
connected issues for law and regulation. First, it causes potentially legal problems 
for users and wider society, problems that the law may need to rectify. Second, to 
achieve its aims it needs a more sympathetic regulatory framework that gives 
consumers better reasons to invest in TC. The two issues are connected: As long 
as potential users feel that TC exposes them to technical risks without legal 
redress, or legal risks without giving them the control to mitigate these risks, they 
will refrain from investing into the TCI model. 
This thesis has also visited other issues that may occur from TC and its 
feature to approve with which technologies it accepts to communicate. This in 
our view is a monopoly position to force products and solutions on unwilling 
users, and competitors’ open source products are excluded from this synergy. 
It has also been proved that social capital is lacking to marshal social trust, 
and TCG buyers reject the business proposition. According to Max Weber, people 
                                                        
9  Proudler, G., Chen, L., & Dalton, C. (2014). Futures for Trusted Computing Trusted 
Computing Platforms (pp. 21-36): Springer International Publishing. p.2. 
10  Guadamuz, A. (2011). Networks, Complexity and Internet Regulation: Scale-free Law: 
Edward Elgar Pub. 
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should learn to trust in laws, and the bureaucracies that enforce them, rather than 
trusting the individual. This in turn requires trust in systems of law and 
administration, rather than people (or companies). We argue that TCG relied 
exclusively on market and network driven solutions insufficiently and the 
institutional-legal framework along with the pre-existing social trust rejected the 
model. “Metagovernance” for networks and markets has also been explored as a 
solution to the problem arising, and we identify two of the points that such a 
solution will need to address. 
We even argue that it’s not just the trust relation towards a particular 
institution (i.e. TCI) that is the issue, rather, holistic trust in the form of a network 
where everybody is connected with and trusting in, everybody else is at stake. In 
our opinion “trust in institutions” is insufficient, and it also needs a high injection 
of pre-existing trust. We therefore argue that we need the right type of law, which 
“follows” and “enhances” transitive and dynamic network foundations. 
Reliance liability is the exact type of private law we need to transform 
intransitive contract relations to transitive, and network-supporting ones. 
Relation contract theory is used to allow us to redraw the image of contract 
binary, static and atomistic relations.11 
To achieve higher levels of security, control is taken away from users and is 
remotely managed by trusted third parties. In Chapter 2, we have identified some 
of the legal problems this may cause, the regulatory alternatives that 
                                                        
11  For an introduction to relational contract theory, see Gudel, P. J. (1998). Relational 
Contract Theory and the Concept of Exchange [comments] (pp. 763). For a 
comprehensive discussion that focuses on the economic exchange relation and its 
role in sociology discussed here see in particular Macneil, I. R. (1987). Relational 
Contract Theory as Sociology: A Reply to Professors Lindenberg and de Vos. Journal 
of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE)/Zeitschrift für die gesamte 
Staatswissenschaft(2), pp. 272-290.  An important critical voice to which we will have 
to return is Fox Jr, J. W. (2003). RELATIONAL CONTRACT THEORY AND 
DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP. Case Western Reserve Law Review, 54(1), pp. 1-67.  
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governments are facing, and their respective inadequacies. Mainly we have 
explored the radical legal issues of who should be appointed to minimize the 
harm, together with the rights and authority that comes with such a role, and if 
he should be held legally liable if harm occurs. The answers then lead to a larger 
issue, the one of reliance liability, which is a relation outside the contractual 
nexus. We believe that TC vendors should be held liable when a third party 
relying on the trusted certification they have issued, suffer losses. To make our 
point clearer, we used the regulation of electronic signatures under the Electronic 
Signatures Directive.12 Most importantly, we stress the point that even in the 
absence of TC, governments in their efforts to improve the security of the Internet 
should use regulatory options for a possibility to impose delictual liability on 
software developers for security risks in their products (even outside the 
contractual nexus with their customers). 
We explored and criticized the different regulatory strategies identified by 
the House of Lords’ report,13 one of them is holding the private sector and the 
software industry responsible for the security of the Internet backed by legal 
sanctions. As this option has the major drawback - that it can scare software 
vendors and the private sector and deter them from creating secure systems and 
then face legal liability - efforts to reduce crime through architecture have risen.14 
                                                        
12  Balboni, P. (2004). Liability of Certification Service Providers Towards Relying 
Parties and the Need for a Clear System to Enhance the Level of Trust in Electronic 
Communication. Information & Communications Technology Law, 13(3), pp. 211-242. 
doi: 10.1080/1360083042000219074 
13  House of Lords Publications. (2007). Personal Internet Security. (HL Paper 165–I). 
London: The Stationery Office Limited Retrieved from 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200607/ldselect/ldsctech/165/165
02.htm. 
14  For a recent analysis of the state of the art in offline crime reduction through design, 
see Crowe, T. D. (2000). Crime prevention through environmental design : applications 
of architectural design and space management concepts (Second edition.. ed.). Boston, 
Mass.: Boston, Mass. : Butterworth-Heinemann.; For a cyberspace specific analysis 
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While technology has in recent years pushed crime prevention into the forefront 
of public debate, it is important to remember that first, these methods long 
predate modern ICT,15 and second post-crime analysis and investigation remains 
as important as ever. 
TC is an architecture-based proactive crime control and through our 
research we show that while technology has been an enabling factor for greater 
involvement of the private sector in policing functions, reactive cybercrime 
investigations should also use private sector participants.16 We argue that TC’s 
move in the field of crime investigation and computer forensics is inevitable, and 
TC as a technology is a perfect fit to assign state roles to the private sector 
guaranteeing or certifying Internet safety both for pre-crime protection and 
prevention, and post-crime investigation. In our view, by extending the demands 
that were strictly related to the police force, to TC providers, TC providers will be 
considered as a de-facto police force. This, we contest, wakes potentially more 
rights, but also more duties which promote social trust.  
Due to TC’s origins in DRM and its support by major IP rightholders, this 
thesis revealed the important problem that TC faces, where according to Shearing 
and Stenning on the privatization of policing “private police” and “property 
owner” become one and the same person, at least for some crimes and delicts.17 
We note that while increased use of criminal law to act against copyright 
                                                        
see Katyal, N. K. (2003). Digital Architecture as Crime Control. The Yale Law Journal, 
112(8), pp. 2261-2289. doi: 10.2307/3657476. 
15  For an overview of early architecture-driven crime control offline, see Jeffery, C. R. 
(1977). Crime prevention through environmental design: Sage Publications Beverly 
Hills. 
16   See e.g. Phillips, A., & Nance, K. L. (2010). Computer Forensics Investigators or Private 
Investigators: Who Is Investigating the Drive? Paper presented at the Systematic 
Approaches to Digital Forensic Engineering (SADFE), 2010 Fifth IEEE International 
Workshop on (pp. 150-157),IEEE.  
17  Shearing, C. D., & Stenning, P. C. (1981). Modern Private Security: Its Growth and 
Implications. Crime and Justice, 3, pp. 193-245.  
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violations is a general trend, it includes outsourcing of preventative and 
investigative policing to private sector actors, which in the case of TCI are also 
major IP right holders that used in the past technologies that were suggested for 
general online security. 
5.1.3 TC and digital forensics 
This thesis discussed that while TC providers will inevitably be involved in 
post-crime investigations, the same measures that protect a computer from 
criminals can be also used to protect them against legitimate police investigation 
methods, like remote forensic analysis. This shows the necessity to think of an 
appropriate legal environment that can address the concerns regarding rule of 
law, justice and individual liberty; and on the other hand reveals the paradox of 
whether it is desirable for the TC to provide the purported level of security from 
attacks. Using examples and analogies that added significant value to our 
research argument structure, we tried to answer critical questions regarding the 
issues that TC will probably face if seen as a privatized police function. Issues like 
circumvention of legal rules aimed for protecting citizens from the state, and the 
level of responsibilities that we impose on TC in exchange with the great powers 
it wields were in depth investigated. With such great powers, great responsibility 
should come, with a role for the law to address the arising ethical concerns and 
rebalance the interplay of power and responsibility. In short, governments (and 
citizens) should accept this power shift and its consequences only if a 
corresponding increase of responsibility occurs in the side of the TC provider. 
Through our literature review, we have showed that unsophisticated users 
are the weakest link in the effort of making the Internet more secure against 
cyber attacks. An obvious solution to the problems arising from their inability 
which may also affect third-parties through botnets and DoS attacks, is to remove 
the responsibility of maintaining the security for the user’s own computer from 
him, and assign it to a third party. Interesting legal issues then emerge for the 
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employees of these third parties, one of them being what his responsibility is, if 
incriminating material is located on a user’s pc. The contractual relation between 
the user and the third party company should be one relying on trust, and for 
anyone to access the user’s pc, the explicit consent of him should be granted.  
DRM as heritage of TC is also discussed, in terms of the power given to TC 
providers and the knowledge on the content of the user’s computer, since it 
seems that the information obtained from the user’s computer is not gathered 
only to prevent unauthorized programs from running, but also for removing 
programs remotely. This, as we have depicted, raises – amongst others – legal, 
privacy and forensics investigations concerns. For us, this is one more argument 
why it might be desirable to create a sui generis framework for TC providers that 
recognizes that monitoring, analyzing and to a degree retaining data about 
suspicious activities is their very reason for existence. 
To create further responsibility for TC developers, they could potentially be 
obliged to compromise their own product under certain circumstances. However, 
decisions would have to be taken on the degree of judicial oversight and warrant 
requirements towards TC providers. We note that balancing the legal obligations, 
privileges, immunities and burdens in an equitable way for both consumers and 
software vendors, requires much more complex legal responses from those 
envisaged by the House of Lords.18 Further, the type of knowledge required by 
various criminal offences and the amount of actual knowledge TC providers could 
or should have about the content of their customers’ hard drive, are discussed as 
arguments. In our analysis we noted that special privileges may have to be 
created by law - possibly similar to the ones of ISSPs or even new tailor made 
exemptions - to exempt TC providers from an overly onerous reporting 
                                                        
18 House of Lords Publications. (2007). Personal Internet Security. (HL Paper 165–I). 





requirement, which may designate them as a surveillance authority on behalf of 
the state, potentially creating a dispute with their customers. We also explored a 
new perspective and parallelized TC with other professions that provide security 
functions and how law is dealing with them.  
Although TCI can be seen a police force, as we have showed in Chapter 3, in 
the eyes of the law, it still remains under the private law sector, and the direct 
relation with its customers is mediated through contract law. Importantly 
enough, we explored why traditional contract law alone is insufficient to mediate 
TC, since we showed in detail that the very nature of contract poses a 
fundamental issue. Since TC relies on networks, which inherently requires 
transitive relations where everybody is connected to everybody, and everybody 
is affected by everybody, traditional contract law and the atomistic binary 
relation that is carries, is inadequate. We propose that “relational contract 
theory” is much more appropriate to regulate contracts in TC and we suggest 
using the concept of “reliance liability” as a cornerstone of TC regulation through 
private law as it introduces third parties into the emerging trust network. 
5.2 Research significance 
The research significance of this thesis arises from our attempt to “parallel 
read” the technical aspects of TC and the sociological reflection on the interaction 
between trust and law. We gave an in depth analysis of trust’s significance in 
sociology and how it relates to technology and the law feeding the discussion with 
important contributions from existing theories. Network complexity is an 
obstacle for Internet regulation, and through this thesis we state that if social 
trust relations in complex modern societies are self-organizing in dynamic 
complex networks, and if security “travels along” the trust nodes of this network, 
then the result will be an environment with ubiquitous security – the ultimate 
goal of TCI. According to our analysis this can raise several sociological problems 
and we researched each one of them. In particular, the first question is if social 
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trust networks are self-organizing, complex dynamic systems and if “security” in 
these systems follows trust. The relation between the two concepts of trust then 
comes into play and we tried to answer the question if the network effects that 
TC aimed to create, despite the different perceptions of trust, are isomorphic to 
the trust networks which exist in society. However, since the answer is not 
affirmative, we explained in detail the reasons we have to doubt all three 
premises, at least to a degree. 
Law is the only mode of regulation that can play a crucial role in settling the 
issues that occur. According to Lessig and the four modes of the square of 
regulation, described in Chapter 2, we elucidated that TC follows just two of those 
modes. Using ideas from Max Weber and his analysis of the role of formal law in 
modern, market driven societies, we attempted to show that the TC network will 
only work when security and techno-trust are packed along with legally enabled 
social trust that follows the connected nodes of the network creating an emergent 
“web of trust”.19 Only then we will be able to achieve dynamic complex networks 
that are isomorphic to the communication network of the Internet, however we 
argue that this is a difficult proposition to achieve and list the systematic 
problems that arise with the very concept of law.  
But even when we try to classify Trusted computing as a commercial product 
to identify the legal system that we should follow, the distinction is not clear – is 
it a service, hardware or software? TC tries to offer security, which is obviously 
the union of these three. Concerning law however, each of these categories is 
treated differently, and therefore is not suitable to handle this type of 
interdependent entity as we argue. 
In Chapter 3, we argued that TC is best understood as privatization of 
centralized government functions, not a decentralized, emergent network 
governed by free contractual association only. Next, we contented that making 
                                                        
19 Lessig, L. (1999). Code and other laws of cyberspace: Basic books. esp. p.83ff  
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the TCI act as police, prosecution and jury all in one, creates a significant 
imbalance in procedural law and evidence, which can be resolved with regulation 
through law between customers and the TC provider. 
Trusted computing is used throughout this thesis to discuss the type of 
response to cyber crime and this is the main interest of this manuscript. Our 
discussions stress the point that while TC offers “pre-crime” features, it is also 
relevant for post-crime and crime investigation purposes. More significantly we 
argue that if the trustworthiness of the Internet can be increased through 
technological rather than legal solutions, taking TC as such a solution, then the 
provider of such security will inevitably need access to the user’s hard drives and 
will be able to alter and reconfigure software on the machine. In a forensic 
context, TC features can give the computer evidence a much higher evidential 
value, since these deter the owner or any malicious third party from altering 
certain configurations. At the same time, a backdoor is left open, for alterations 
done by the TC provider who is certified as a trusted third party. Returning back 
to our initial argument, we believe that this requires significant amount of trust 
in the sociological sense and which we argue that TCI is unlikely to enact.  
In our view, it is necessary to create a legal duty on TC providers to ensure 
that data integrity cannot be tampered by any employee for evidential purposes. 
Further, TC providers could be required to develop protocols with the explicit 
requirement of legal admissibility highlighting the privacy issues that TC raises. 
Thus, we approached the legal environment around TC from a public (criminal 
law) perspective and we answered critical questions like what the state or society 
can legitimately demand from TC providers, what rights can they be given, what 
obligations should they be under. 
Importantly enough, we have identified that TC has not been given much 
attention from courts or governments, and this thesis along with the journal 
articles the author has published on the same area, aim to give at least a beginning 
of an academic debate on that issue. Computer scientists seem primarily 
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concerned with the technical feasibility of implementing TC, legal academics have 
concentrated on content control and privacy issues,20 thus leaving the analysis of 
the implications of the imposition of legal liability in case of failure within a TC 
system, or potential responsibility for wider social and legal concerns, 
unexplored. 
5.3 Future research 
Due to the low uptake of TC, as acknowledged by the TCG themselves, it was 
difficult to test some of the conceptual claims of this thesis through empirical 
                                                        
20  Anderson, R. (2003a). Trusted Computing Frequently Asked Questions / TCG / 
LaGrande / NGSCB / Longhorn / Palladium / TCPA – Version 1.1. (2003). 
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/tcpa-faq.html, Anderson, R. (2004). Cryptography 
and Competition Policy - Issues with ‘Trusted Computing’ Economics of Information 
Security (Vol. 12, pp. 35-52): Springer US, Bradgate, R. (1999). Beyond the 
Millennium - The Legal Issues: Sale of Goods Issues and the Millennium Bug. The 
Journal of Information, Law and Technology (JILT), 2, 
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/jilt/1999_1992/bradgate/. , 
Chandler, A. J. (2003). Security in Cyberspace: Combatting Distributed Denial of 
Service Attacks. University of Ottawa Law and Technology Journal, 1(1-2), pp. 231-
261. , Charlesworth, A. (2005). DRM: the Straw to Break of Procrustean Approaches 
to Copyright? In F. Grosheide & J. J. Brinkhof (Eds.), Intellectual Property 2004: Articles 
on Crossing Borders between traditional and actual (Molengrafica Series) (pp. 405-
422): Intersentia, Erickson, J. S. (2003). Fair use, DRM, and Trusted Computing. 
Communications of the ACM, 46(4), pp. 34-39. , Hilley, S. (2004). Trusted computing - 
path to security or road to servitude? Network Security, 2004(8), pp. 12-15. , Pearson, 
S. (2005, 23-26 May 2006). Trusted Computing: Strengths, Weaknesses and Further 
Opportunities for Enhancing Privacy. Paper presented at the Proceedings of the Trust 
Management: Third International Conference, iTrust 2005, Paris, France (pp. 305-
320),Springer-Verlag GmbH, Reid, J., Gonzalez Nieto, J., Dawson, E., Okamoto, E. 
(2003). Privacy and Trusted Computing. Paper presented at the Proceedings of the 
14th International Workshop on Database and Expert Systems Applications 
(DEXA’03) (2003), Washington (pp. 383-388),IEEE, Samuelson, P. (2003). DRM {and, 
or vs.} the Law. Communications of the ACM, 46(4), pp. 41-45. , Turner, M., Budgen, D., 
Brereton, P. (2003). Turning software into a service. Computer -- IEEE Computer 
Society, 36(10), pp. 38- 44. , Woodford, C. (2004). Trusted Computing or Big Brother? 
Putting the Rights back to Digital Rights Management. U. Colo. L. Rev., 75, pp. 253-300.  
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research. In particular, there isn’t yet a clear, discernible trend on how EULAs in 
this area will finally look like, and just how burdensome on the buyer they will 
be. Monitoring this situation, and incorporating a more substantive corpus 
analysis of contract terms and EULAs would be a logical next step to test 
empirically some of the theories put forward in this thesis.  
The empirical study tried to establish in particular how computer scientists 
“make sense” of the law, how they match what they know intimately, and what 
they are doing, to how they understand the law operates. It was not possible to 
carry out a corresponding study on how practicing lawyers conceptualize TC - a 
study of the thinking of in-house law departments in large TC companies would 
be needed for that, which raises obvious methodological problems of access and 
confidentiality, but also “trustworthiness” of the answers, that would be given 
with possible future litigation in mind. 
A second major development that took place during the work on this thesis 
was the emergence of the Internet of Things. This in many ways magnifies some 
of the issues discussed in this thesis. The human loses even more control 
(depersonization)21, is even more taken out of the equation, and the power shift 
to the software developers becomes even more complete. Networks that combine 
in addition to hundreds of millions of connections between desktops or similar 
devices will become networks of hundreds of billions of entities, increasing 
exponentially in complexity. Security becomes as a result also an even more 
interdependent network of strong and weak links - an attack on a badly protected 
thermostat could follow down communication lines to entirely different 
computer systems. At the same time, vulnerabilities become even more 
threatening - hacking into my computer to steal credit card details or spam 
people in my address book is one thing, hacking into my car while I’m driving and 
disabling the brake system is a very different threat scenario. Leaving it to human 
                                                        
21   Schneier, B. Security in 2020. CryptoGram, Jan. 2011. 
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consumers to ensure the security of these new networks seems even less a 
proposition than it was on the Internet. Customers who forget to update their 
anti-virus system, despite frequent pop ups, are not likely to ensure that the 
connection between their freezer and their house thermostat are secure - or 
indeed would know how to do this. They have to trust even more their systems. 
As a consequence, trusted computing as a security paradigm could get a new lease 
of life, or as an industry insider said, we need “trusted computing of acid”.22 If our 
conceptual approach is valid, this increasing dependency, coupled with a loss of 
power, and the way in which IoT applications are going to be embedded in our 
daily lives as long-lasting commitments, should further push courts and 
legislators to use both public law regulation and civil liability rules as tools to 
protect customers of TC and address the necessarily widening power imbalance. 
Another significant technology for the Internet is Blockchain which is a 
reliable strong cryptographic technology underlying bitcoins23 - a new open and 
decentralized system resembling the bottom up network formation that TC tries 
to accomplish creating a chain of assurances about data. Blockchain does not 
reside on a single server, but like TC it is found on a distributed network of 
computers. The similarity of Blockchain with TC can be identified on the network 
formation by TC pc’s when each TC pc certifies that another pc can be trusted and 
connected. In the same way a distributed authentication exists where each valid 
transaction in Blockchain is timestamped and then is added into a block which is 
then linked to the other blocks created thus forming a trusted chain.  TC as we 
have argued in Chapter 2, was seen as a possible solution to the problem of trust 
                                                        
22   so an industry speaker at a Dagstuhl seminar on security in the IoT, under Chatham 
house rules 
23   See The Economist. (2015). Blockchains: The great chain of being sure about things. 
The trust machine. The concept was invented in 2008 as the basis for renegade online 
currency, bitcoin. In this context, the blockchain is a digital ledger that records every 
bitcoin transaction that has ever occurred. See Nakamoto, S. (2008). Bitcoin: A peer-
to-peer electronic cash system. 
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between machines and users, and Blockchain is another way in which strangers 
who have never met or trust each other can create networks of trust24. Along with 
the original idea of using Blockchain systems and zero knowledge proofs to 
cryptographically argue on the properties of encrypted data without decrypting 
the data, ensuring the privacy of the transaction data is another goal to be 
achieved.25 The similarities between Blockchains and TC technology should be 
further explored and we believe that eventually each technology will be able to 
benefit from the other. 
 
                                                        
24 Based on the decentralised nature of blockchains and the limited possibility of 
malicious infections, they have been described as “trustless” because the need for 
trust between participants is no longer required  
25 Allison, I. (2016). Blockchains, banks and zero-knowledge proofs, International 
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